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   ABSTRACT 
The thesis develops and seeks to validate a conceptual model for the evaluation of the 
transnational effectiveness of terms regulating documentary credits. The standpoint of 
that evaluation is the commonly accepted median compromise of the contested needs of 
the parties who typically transact documentary credits. The model is formulated and 
validated by both a doctrinal study of the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary 
Credits (UCP) 600, and its previous iterations, and a functional comparative doctrinal study 
between English and Jordanian laws supplemented by an empirical study of Jordanian 
commercial practices. 
It is postulated that the functional elements of the substance of documentary credits are 
the embedded usages of irrevocability, conformity and autonomy, and that it is only by 
the optimal application of these usages that the sociological value of documentary credits 
can be achieved and the objective median compromise of the contested needs of the 
transacting parties arrived at are rationally deducted. It is contended, by adapting social 
systems theory, that what is termed in this thesis as embedded trade usages of 
transnational commercial transactions constitute socially diffuse law having a normative 
force to the extent of displacing even some categories of mandatory law arising under 
autopoietic Municipal legal orders. The socio-legal nature of the embedded usages of both 
conformity and autonomy is critically analysed in the conceptual model in order to evaluate 
the legal positions, and the legal communication, of UCP 600 terms under the English and 
Jordanian legal orders and Jordanian commercial practices.    
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THE AIM AND OBJECTIVES 
 
1.1.1 The aim of this thesis is to develop a conceptual model for the evaluation of the 
transnational ‘effectiveness’ of terms regulating documentary letters of credit. As it 
would be wholly impractical to address transnational effectiveness by applying the 
conceptual model to all legal orders, two particular legal orders have been chosen 
(for reasons subsequently explained): namely, that of the English legal order and 
that of the Jordanian legal order as supplemented by Jordanian commercial practice.  
 
1.1.2 The task is not, therefore, to discern whether the terms regulating documentary 
credits are right or wrong, but it is rather to discern whether such terms are, and 
can be, commonly applied with some means of functional coherence amongst the 
relevant actors. The transaction of documentary credits is an assurance of payment 
by the issuing bank to a particular beneficiary on the condition of presenting 
documents that appear to conform to the terms of the credit. It is one of the most 
common methods of payment in international supply contracts,1 and it is inherently 
transnational since it facilitates a payment between sellers and buyers who are 
domiciled in different jurisdictions through banks which are also based in different 
countries. Any purportedly effective terms regulating documentary credits must, 
therefore, take effect transnationally, and as such their functional coherence 
inevitably involves the capability of them being both applied by the transactional 
actors across national borders and generating similar legal positions in the 
communication processes of all the various legal systems involved in the relevant 
transaction.  
 
                                                          
1 Documentary credits were described as the “life blood of commerce” per Donaldson LJ in Intraco Ltd v Notis 
Shipping Corp of Liberia (The Bhoja Trader) [1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 256; [1981] Com. Loyd’s Rep 184.  
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1.1.3 The function of efficacy is the most essential element in the purpose of “Uniform 
Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP)”: the latest revision is UCP 
600, promulgated by the International Chamber of Commerce “ICC” in Paris 
governing most documentary credit transactions. 2 This function was expressed by 
Wilbert Ward, the original instigator of the UCP, in the introduction of the original 
UCP in 1922 that the adoption of uniform regulation on documentary credits by the 
ICC will “obtain international uniformity ... and eliminate many difficulties between 
bankers and business men”. 3 The UCP were first introduced in parallel with the 
establishment of the ICC in the spirit of uniformity: the main aim of the ICC being 
to alleviate the confusion caused by national laws on commercial transactions across 
borders. To achieve such an aim apropos documentary credit transactions, the ICC 
promulgated a set of regulations (UCP) on documentary credits to establish 
uniformity in practice, “so that practitioners would not have to cope with a plethora 
of often conflicting national regulations”.4 Being transnationally effective is, thus, the 
key for successful terms regulating documentary credits.  
 
1.1.4 The development of the proposed conceptual model aspires to give effect to various 
research objectives, namely those of: 
 
1- Enhancing the understanding of the functional nature of documentary credits and 
the role of trade usages in transnational commercial law; 
2- Facilitating how legal orders and quasi-legal orders can regulate documentary credits 
in an effective way; 
3- Assessing the efficacy of UCP 600 within the functional comparative study between 
the English legal order and the Jordanian legal order and Jordanian commercial 
practices, and in doing so providing:  
                                                          
2 ICC, Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits “UCP 600”, (ICC No. 600, 2007).  
3 Taylor, The Complete UCP, (1ST edn, ICC 2008), 27. 
4 UCP 600, Foreword.   
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a) Doctrinal analyses as to the current and potential legal positions in relation to 
documentary credits under, respectively, the English legal order and the 
Jordanian legal order; 
b) A hybrid of doctrinal and empirical analyses in order to ascertain the above 
referred to position of the Jordanian legal order; 
c) A functional comparative evaluation of the similarities and differences between 
the above legal orders and the application of UCP 600 rules within these legal 
orders particularly in the light of the textual changes from the predecessor 
provisions of UCP 500; 
d) An evaluation of the contested needs of the parties to documentary credit 
transactions, namely the applicants, the beneficiaries and the bankers.  
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CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
 
1.2.1 A norm might be defined as an observed action or declared belief that is informally 
understood and socially expected by most members of a community. A norm might 
also denote a normative proposition having a normative force that is recognised 
either formally by the state (e.g. a law prohibiting money laundering) or informally 
by the members of the community (e.g. expelling the deviant member from the 
community).5 Laws have impacts on norms, and norms have impacts on laws. Both 
are manifested through communications. Social norms are either accepted or 
rejected by the legal order with which the social norms communicate. Once accepted 
the social norm interacts with the internal legal doctrines of the communicated legal 
order, and such interaction generates a new legal doctrine under the respective legal 
order.6 Over time the interplay between law and norms is dynamic and can be 
unstable.  
 
1.2.2 In transnational law one cannot assume the community governed by a norm or a 
law is the same (some may be governed by the law, some by the norm and some 
by both). To some extent the legal and normative orders that govern transnational 
transactions are voluntary. This is for three reasons. Firstly, the parties are not 
necessarily subject to the same legal order when it comes to issues of both 
substantive law and enforcement of any legal decision upon their person or assets. 
Secondly, the dominant free market ideology of trade (a naturally market based 
activity)7 has allowed choice of contractual terms and governing law to be made by 
parties – freedom of contract makes the laws submitted to (substantive and 
procedural) matters of voluntary agreement. Thirdly, trading relations are partially 
voluntary (freedom of contract in the sense of freedom to contract with whom one 
                                                          
5 Lapinski and Rimal, An explication of social norms. [2005] Communication Theory, 15(2), 127–147. 
6 Luhmann, Law as a Social System, (1st edn, OUP 2004), translated by Klaus Ziegert. 
7 Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order (University of Chicago Press, 1948) vii, 271, [1]. 
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wishes to contract with): obviously the possible counterparties are limited, but they 
are likely to be numerous.  
 
1.2.3 In a situation where force may or may not be effective (when legal enforcement of 
decisions may or may not be effective) the reputation of both parties and legal orders 
becomes important. The reputation of the party is about behaving in accordance with 
the norms of the group;8 the reputation of the legal order is for fair and predictable 
rulings. In transnational law the reputation of legal systems is important in a way it 
is not in law within a single jurisdiction (for obvious reasons – there is no place for 
choice of law in a single jurisdiction). Law needs to be chosen, and the law that will 
be chosen is the law that enables the parties to realise their ends (it meets their 
needs). So here alignment with the norms of the parties is a powerful force because 
it will guide the choices of the parties. The other factor likely to guide that choice is 
how well the law performs (it is clear, predictable, perceived as fair, impartial 
between nationals and foreigners and effective remedially). Therefore, evaluation 
should make effectiveness central because the perceived effectiveness of the law will 
determine its reputation which will determine its use. 
  
1.2.4 In addressing the contested needs of the parties to documentary credits, it must be 
borne in mind that the perspective of one of the parties in documentary credits (i.e. 
the buyer as an applicant to the credit, the seller as a beneficiary in the credit and 
the bank as a facilitator of payment) as to the effectiveness of terms regulating 
documentary credits would tend to favour its own interests and to treat its own 
interests as the predominant ones. To balance the contested interests of the parties 
on the basis of a philosophical value that has not been broadly tested, would run the 
risk of being actually rejected by the parties. The produced communications (i.e. 
ideas generated from the interaction of ideas) that are commonly applied by the 
                                                          
8 In psychology an individual who keeps disobeying group norms runs the risk of being institutionally deviant: 
Hackman, Group influences on individuals in organizations, in Dunnette and Hough (Eds.), Handbook of industrial 
and organizational psychology (1992 Vol. 3) Palo Alto: Consulting Psychologists Press, 234-245.  
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parties in the process of the competition of parties’ interests in the free market,9 can 
be regarded as the compromise of what had in reality already been determined by 
the parties as their own interest.  
 
1.2.5 Social communications are not supported by a decisive mechanism (e.g. decisions 
provided by courts or arbitrators) which might determine them as normative 
expectations.10 It is only the communications that are manifested by actions and 
commonly applied by actors that might have normative force.11 Accordingly it is the 
usually accepted compromise that must be regarded as having normative force. It is 
on the basis of that compromise that the perspective of the efficacy of transnational 
terms regulating documentary credits is based, since it is the tested perspective as 
it is commonly accepted. Such a perspective is, thus close to the reality12 of the 
transaction. It is the standpoint of the bargaining role of the transaction of 
documentary credits. Thus according to John Commons13 a simple bargaining unit 
such as a sale of commodity, according to many economic theorists, consists of four 
competing parties as follows:  
 
“B  $100  B1  $ 90 
S $110  S1 $120 
 
The competing buyers offer to pay $100 and $90; the competing sellers offer to 
accept $110 and $120.  The final price will lie between $100 and $110”.14 
 
                                                          
9 Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order (1948) vii, 271, [1] University of Chicago Press.  
10 Teubner, Law As An Autopoietic System, (1edn 1993, Blackwell Publishers) chas 2 & 3.   
11 Jacobson, Mortensen and Cialdini, Bodies obliged and unbound: differentiated response tendencies for 
injunctive and descriptive social norms, [2011] Journal of personality and social psychology, 100(3) 433-48.     
12 Rosenberg, ‘Scientific Values and the Values of Science’ in Carrier, Howard, Kourany (eds) The Challenge of 
the Social and the Pressure of Practice: Science and Values Revisited, (2008) University of Pittsburgh: he argues 
that truth is the goal of science and realism (sociological term) as the appropriate attitude towards successful 
scientific theories.  
13 Commons, The Problems of Correlating Law, Economics and Ethics [1932] 8 Wisconsin Law Review 3. 
14 Commons, The Problems of Correlating Law, Economics and Ethics [1932] 8 Wisconsin Law Review 3, 5. 
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1.2.6 So the prevailing price is the median compromise between the parties. Commons 
suggested that the bargaining transaction is the “behaviourist negotiations of 
persuasion or coercion between persons deemed to be free and equal”15 which 
terminates a transfer of a constructive control of commodity and money. The transfer 
is not actual (or physical transfer) but the expectation that future physical transfer 
will be protected changing the position of the parties, and such a normative 
expectation is based on the usages of traders which reflect traders usual intention. 
Commons argued that Municipal laws are in alignment to the custom of merchants 
in order to reflect the intention of traders, and thus presumptions such as a trader 
takes goods in exchange of responsibility to pay are made and enforced by the state; 
hence usages become a law enforced by the state. Here there are two relevant issues 
for the conceptual model in this thesis. Firstly, the bargaining role of the transaction 
is the standpoint of the effectiveness of terms governing documentary credits. This 
leads to the result that the underlying sociological value and the collective function 
of documentary credits is the median compromise between the parties who typically 
transact documentary credits. Secondly, transnational terms and Municipal legal 
orders must be responsive to documentary credit usages in regulating documentary 
credits in order to reflect the intention of parties. The latter forms part of the means 
of responsiveness in the conceptual model as elucidated below.      
 
1.2.7 The inquiry is to determine, or to have access to, how the median compromise of 
the contested interests of parties to documentary credit transactions would be 
accepted by the parties and other actors as that median compromise. The empirical 
approach would be to analyse the parties’ practices in documentary credits, as 
practices manifest a selection of communications that are acted on and are 
effectively validated by their tangible application by the parties. Such an empirical 
approach is rendered impractical as the scope of the application of documentary 
                                                          
15 Commons, The Problems of Correlating Law, Economics and Ethics [1932] 8 Wisconsin Law Review 3, 6. 
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credit practices varies from practices that have been applied just between the 
contracting parties, to those that are commonly applied between all traders at a local 
level and eventually to those that are commonly applied between all traders at an 
international level in the context of a wide range of underlying transactions. The 
range of practices and trades is so diverse as to make the selection of representative 
data subjects an inevitably subjective exercise on the part of the researcher.  
 
1.2.8 For that reason, the median compromise has been primarily established by the 
exercise of deductive reasoning16 from the contention in chapter 2 that there are 
usages embedded to a particular transaction. So in addition that such practices are 
well-observable and perceived by traders in the relevant context as being binding 
and thus usages, they are embedded in terms that the absence of which threatens 
the existence of the transaction. The embedded usages of “irrevocability”, 
“autonomy” and “conformity” constitute the compromise of parties’ contested 
interests in documentary credits. As the transaction of documentary credits is 
transnational, its embedded usages ought to be transnational and their existence 
should not be subject to a local context. The capability of the documentary credit 
instrument to reconcile the differences in the needs of international traders has led 
to its successful evolution as being the life blood of transnational commerce.17 It is 
by the “collective function” of embedded trade usages of documentary credits that 
the accepted compromise is identified and by the functions of each embedded usage 
the communicative interests of the parties are determined, as evidenced primarily 
by the literature review and secondarily by the empirical findings from elite 
interviews. 
 
 
                                                          
16 Fisher, Critical Thinking, (2011) Cambridge University Press. 
17 RD Harbottle (Mercantile) Ltd v National Westminster Bank Ltd [1978] Q.B. 146, 155 per Kerr LJ.  
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Substance Of Documentary Credits 
 
1.2.9 The first and most essential step that a regulator of documentary credits (e.g. UCP 
community) must undertake is to understand the functional nature of documentary 
credits, and that is the compromise as to the contested needs of the parties which 
is made concrete by the embedded trade usages and their functions.  
 
1.2.10 Where buyers and sellers enter into an international supply contract, sellers will often 
require a guarantee of payment prior to the shipment of the goods to avoid exclusive 
reliance on the financial covenant of the other contracting party. It is, however, for 
the security of buyers to hold payment until they receive the required goods or unless 
they are confident that the required goods are dispatched in a way that the seller’s 
right in the goods are effectively transferred to the buyer. In addition, buyers in 
general wish to postpone their duty of making a payment in order to boost their 
liquidity. Sellers, however, wish to obtain payment immediately or at least to be 
assured that they are guaranteed to be paid in a determinable time prior to 
dispatching the goods. All the participating bankers responded to the question 
regarding the reasons that draw traders to deal with documentary credits by stating 
that the lack of trust between exporters and importers leads traders to use 
documentary credits as a method that provides security for both exporters and 
importers. Muhammad Burjaq stated that “documentary credits are meant to 
minimise the risk of both the seller’s evasion from delivery and the buyer’s evasion 
from payment”18 and Nart Lambaz emphasised that “first time sellers prefer to use 
documentary credits. Big companies prefer documentary credits with traders in 
developing countries. A documentary credit can also be a financial tool”.19 
Accordingly, the instrument of a documentary credit was created by the practice of 
                                                          
18 Annex I, para 6. 
19 Annex I, para 6.  
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bankers and traders across borders as a response to the lack of trust between 
exporters and importers.  
 
1.2.11 Pursuant to the embedded usage of irrevocability, a documentary credit provides the 
seller (beneficiary of the credit) with a guarantee of payment by a trusted third party, 
which is usually a bank, prior to the shipment of the goods. 20 The seller is assured 
that once the bank issues a documentary credit in his favour the bank is not entitled 
to revoke the duty to pay the credit, 21 and as such once the credit is issued the seller 
will be confident to start the process of manufacturing the goods, or buying the goods 
from the ultimate supplier, in order to export them to the buyer. The participating 
traders stated in the empirical study that a documentary credit is a kind of a 
guarantee for their rights. Jamal Abushamat summarised this view, stating “as 
sellers we will be assured that the payment will be made before the arrival of the 
goods”.22 The irrevocability usage, thus, serves the accepted need of assurance of 
payment prior to the shipment of goods.   
 
1.2.12 According to the embedded usage of conformity sellers are not entitled to receive 
payment unless and until they present the documents that are required by the credit. 
Since buyers in the modern age of export and import do not own or control ships it 
is essential for them to receive documents evidencing the delivery requirements in 
the credit prior to the payment.23 Buyers are entitled to receive documents that are 
in compliance with the required terms of the credit. Traditionally buyers use 
                                                          
20 United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada[1983] 1 AC 168, 183 per Lord Diplock where 
his Lordship clearly stated that documentary credits are methods of payment that are based on the assurance 
of the payment to the seller.  
21 “Regulations Affecting Export Commercial Credits”, New York Bankers Commercial Credit Conference  (1920); 
Article 6 UCP 500; Articles 2, 7, 8 UCP 600; English law: Hamzeh Malas Sons v British Imex Industries Ltd [1958] 
2 Q.B. 127, 127 per Jenkins LJ; USA: Foglino & Co v Webster, 216 N.Y.S. 225 (1926); West Virginia Housing 
Dev Fund v Sorka 415 F Sunn1107 (1976); cf; Sarna, Letters of Credit The Law and Current Practice, (3ed, 
Carswell 1992) para 1.8.1; UCC, S. 2 (325) (3); s. 5 (106) (a) of the revised UCC now states that “a letter of 
credit is revocable only if provides so”; Germany: An Oelofse, The Law of Documentary Letters of Credit in 
Comparative Perspective, (1st edn, Interlegal 1997), 30; Jordan: Court of Distinction (Civil) 152/1975 Adalah 
Programme.  
22 Annex I, para 7.  
23 Chapter 2, para 2.2.20  
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documentary credits for C.I.F contracts and therefore, in most cases, they require 
documentary proof of the following: (i) verification of the purchased goods; (ii) the 
shipment of the goods; and (iii) the insurance of the goods.24  
 
1.2.13 Although the function of the usage of conformity is to serve the accepted need of 
buyers for assurance of shipment as to the required goods, there are three accepted 
parties’ needs that influence the connotation of conformity. The first is speed, as 
buyers require receipt of that documentary proof within a period of reasonable 
promptness after the bank’s determination of conformity.25 Also sellers want to be 
paid as soon as they present the required conforming documents.26 The second 
emanates from the sellers’ need of assurance of payment and that is the need of 
sellers for a manageable presentation of documents, so the presentation must be 
manageable by a reasonable seller and responsible actors issuing documents in 
connection with international supply contracts.27 The third emanates from the need 
of banks for assurance of payment and that necessitates banks being able to 
undertake a manageable examination of documents, so banks will be protected from 
either a claim by the buyer or the seller.28 These three needs make conformity an 
elastic concept having various meanings, some of which are close to the need of 
buyers for documentary assurance, whereas others travel from this need in order to 
fulfil the needs of manageable presentation and examination. The elastic concept of 
conformity is fully analysed and evaluated in chapters 3 and 4.  
                                                          
24 UCP 1974, Introduction; it is clearly noted from all the UCP revisions since 1933 that the documents that have 
commonly been required by buyers are invoices, transport documents and insurance documents. For the UCP 
revisions: Taylor, The Complete UCP, (1st edn, ICC 2008), 27. 
25 Buyers in international trade under English law are entitled to reject the goods if they are not shipped at the 
stipulated time: Bowes v Shand (1877) 2 App.Cas.455, cf,  
Bowes v Chalyer (1923) 32 C.L.R. 159; Bridge and others (eds), Benjamin’s Sale of Goods (8th edn, Thompson 
2010), para 18.310.  
26 Under English law, for instance, terms relating to time in international trade are regarded as conditions to the 
effect that the breach of them gives rise to a repudiatory breach: Bunge Corporation v Tradax Esport SA [1980] 
1 Lloyd’s Rep 1 HL. 
27 The introduction of ISBP and many changes in UCP 600 are meant to serve the need of sellers for manageable 
presentation and to standardise the decisions of banks as to the conformity of documents: UCP 600, Foreword. 
28 Standardisation the banking decisions as to the conformity of documents would eliminate difficulties between 
banks and traders: chapter 2, para 2.3.1.  
40 
 
 
1.2.14 The autonomy usage protects the need of sellers for assurance of payment by 
asserting that the bank’s duty to make payment should not be subject to any 
disputes arising between the seller and the buyer, so the only condition that might 
restrain the payment is the default of sellers in the presentation of documents as 
required in the credit.29 This in turn assures banks that the instrument of a 
documentary credit is secure and easy to facilitate,30 because banks are only 
concerned to examine whether the appearance of the presented documents fulfils 
what is required by the credit. Accordingly, the autonomy usage makes the accepted 
need of sellers and banks for assurance of payment more realisable.  
 
1.2.15 The fact that the embedded usages of irrevocability, conformity and autonomy have 
been commonly applied with some means of functional coherence by  parties to  
documentary credits across international borders and by actors such as legal orders 
(e.g. English and Jordanian laws) and quasi-legal orders (e.g. UCP) has made them 
usages that have generated normative expectations of binding repetition. These 
usages, in turn, make concrete the median compromise of the parties’ contested 
needs, and the rejection of one of the pillars of that median compromise would 
threaten the existence of any alternative compromise of those contested needs. 
 
1.2.16 Accordingly, the sociological value underlying documentary credits is the critical 
balancing of the distinct archetypal security needs of each of the four groups of 
contracting parties who typically transact documentary credits (i.e. issuing bank, 
confirming bank applicants and beneficiaries). It is a teleological value as it is the 
cause and the function of the documentary credits’ pillars (i.e. irrevocability, 
                                                          
29 United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada[1983] 1 AC 168, 183 per Lord Diplock where 
his Lordship clearly stated that documentary credits are methods of payment that are based on the assurance 
of the payment to the seller.  
30 Hassan, Lai and Yu, Market Disciple of Canadian Banks’ Letters of Credit Activities: An Empirical Examination, 
[2002] The Service Industries Journal, (22) Oct 187-208. 
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conformity and autonomy).31 Yet, the value underlying documentary credits, the 
pillars of documentary credits serving such value and the accepted needs of the 
parties underlying the pillars in addition to the functions of the pillars constitute the 
substance of documentary credits. The diagram below illustrates the substance of 
documentary credits.  
 
Diagram 1: Substance of Documentary Credits  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
31 For teleology: Kant, Critique of Judgement, translated by Nicolas Walker 1956 (OUP 2007).     
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Means: Responsiveness, Certainty, Flexibility, Communication And 
Clarity 
 
1.2.17 For effective terms governing documentary credits the UCP community must 
appreciate and reflect the substance of documentary credits, to the extent that the 
embedded trade usages must prevail over other practices or norms in documentary 
credits. Otherwise parties, and even actors such as Municipal legal orders, of 
documentary credits would reject rules that do not reflect their compromised 
interests. But how can the UCP, or any terms intended to regulate documentary 
credits, convey the substance of documentary credits in an effective way? To be 
functionally determinable, the substance must be formed through means or tools 
reflecting the functions of the substance. It is proposed that responsiveness, 
certainty, flexibility, communication and clarity are the tools or means that are 
capable of reflecting the functions of the embedded trade usages and thus the 
compromised needs of the parties.  
 
1.2.18 The UCP community must firstly utilise the tool of responsiveness as to documentary 
credit practices and the common fundamental doctrines of Municipal legal orders, in 
order to determine the subsequent suitable tools. In most cases certainty is the 
suitable means that addresses the needs of the parties. But given both the 
complexity of the broadness of various distinctive matrices of facts and that the UCP 
operate within different Municipal  legal orders - so their application depends not 
only on the acceptance by parties but also by legal orders - it is impossible to achieve 
certainty for all situations. So if there are common prevailing mandatory doctrines 
under legal orders confining the scope of a common practice in documentary credits, 
then flexibility is the suitable means allowing the intended rule to be adapted rather 
than being rejected by legal orders. However, certainty and flexibility might be 
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combined in one rule, so each operates within its limits. The fourth tool is 
communication which can be utilised where there is a need to rectify mal practices 
or misunderstanding as to the sociological value of documentary credits and the 
accepted needs of the parties. The fifth, and most important, is the tool of clarity 
which must be utilised with all other tools. Each tool is explained below and the 
interaction between the tools is illustrated in diagram 2.  
 
1.2.19 Responsiveness. The UCP 600 and ICC interpretative aids must be responsive to 
both the practices of documentary credit transactions and common fundamental 
doctrines of Municipal legal orders. In respect of responsiveness to common practices 
the UCP terms must reflect existing documentary credit trade usage that is 
categorised in this research as embedded usage (i.e. irrevocability, autonomy and 
conformity) because it is a socially diffuse law that has a transnational normative 
force amongst documentary credit parties, actors and legal orders.32 Thus a UCP 
term that is repugnant to such usage would not be effective. Still, the UCP need to 
reflect the practices of documentary credit parties, since the accepted common 
practices are evidence of the constructive intention of the parties. According to 
Commons conformity of law, whether autopoietic Municipal legal orders or 
transnational self-regulatory rules, to mercantile usages is part of the bargaining 
transaction of the unity of activity (i.e. documentary credit) that is subject to 
disputes before courts or boards.33   
 
1.2.20 It follows a UCP term envisaging a new practice must be revised if it is not accepted 
and adopted by parties. In the context of conformity, the UCP need to reflect the 
common practices adopted by the usual actors, not merely the parties, including the 
performance of transactions underpinning documentary credits, such as carriers and 
insurers, in order to facilitate a manageable presentation for sellers. In respect of 
                                                          
32 Chapter 2, par 2.2.23. 
33 Commons, The Problems of Correlating Law, Economics and Ethics [1932] 8 Wisconsin Law Review 3; above 
1.2.6. 
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responsiveness to legal orders, since a UCP revision is a body of self-regulatory rules 
operating across and within different legal orders, the effectiveness of UCP terms is 
contingent on a successful responsiveness to the mandatory rules and fundamental 
doctrines of Municipal legal orders (e.g. freedom to contract, pucta sant servanda, 
ex turpi causa, public policy and public morality). Unless the UCP are sufficiently 
responsive, a UCP term might be “coded as illegal” (i.e. these Luhmann terms are 
not necessarily related to criminal law, they merely mean that a social norm or 
concept is rejected when the binary code of legal/illegal of the system of law codes 
the norm as illegal so it is rejected from being part of the legal order)34 and thus be 
unenforceable under the communications of particular Municipal legal orders.  
 
1.2.21 Certainty. This means connotes the knowledge of the parties in advance as to the 
regulatory position (UCP 600 and the ICC interpretative aids) of documentary credits 
issues,35 and the knowledge as to either the acceptance or the rejection of such a 
position by the applicable Municipal legal order. Therefore terms governing 
documentary credits must be coherent in achieving uniformity in interpretations. In 
order to assure sellers and banks as to the enforcement of their right to payment 
and reimbursement respectively there must be guidance providing rules as to the 
determination of the status of conformity, as it is an elastic concept, for common 
presentations, so that sellers and banks know in advance their position. The 
effectiveness of the means of certainty depends on the utilisation of the means of 
responsiveness and clarity.    
 
1.2.22 There are other non-textual means – which this research will not deal with – that 
might lead to diverse inconsistent interpretations. One factor is that meaning may 
be lost in translation. Another factor is the epistemological position of bankers (i.e. 
the perspective of a banker as to the interpretation of issues is dependent on how 
                                                          
34 Luhmann, Law as a Social System, (1st edn, OUP 2004), translated by Klaus Ziegert, 17-21. 
35 Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, [1976] 89 Harvard Law Review 1685, 1687. 
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that banker views the world and individual bankers might adopt commercial 
approaches, literal rigid approaches or legal protective approaches). For instance, 
the major concern for Arab-Bank is the compliance with Jordanian law and for that 
reason, unlike any other bank in Jordan, it determines the conformity of a presented 
bill of exchange according to the Jordanian Commercial Code.36 A further factor is 
the lack of appropriate training.37 Experts who run training sessions may have 
different interpretations, and this gives rise to the demand for experts who are 
admitted by the ICC in order to foster unified interpretations.  
 
1.2.23 Flexibility. No law, self-regulatory rules or standard terms are able to expressly 
capture all potential situations that might be generated in the context of 
documentary credits. Indeed any transnational norm or trade usage is not absolute 
as it is subject to mandatory rules of Municipal legal orders, and thus it is not wise 
to envision transnational rules as being absolute. For instance, the effectiveness of 
the embedded usage of autonomy is subject to exceptions that vary across legal 
orders.38 Here an attempt by the UCP to shield the autonomy principle from legal 
orders’ exceptions would be futile and might, in a worst case scenario, lead to a 
complete rejection of the application of the UCP. Given the fact that each legal order 
has its own interconnected doctrines it is not generally the task of the UCP to fashion 
or even to categorise legal concepts. For instance, it is notable that the UCP do not 
seek to categorise the documentary credit relationship between the beneficiary and 
the bank. Any attempt to introduce such categorisation must be based on the policy 
of the adaptability of the UCP terms into various legal orders. Furthermore, flexibility 
is an essential tool to reflect the need of banks for manageable examination to the 
effect that banks must be permitted to exercise a marginal discretion in the 
determination of conformity as elucidated in chapter three.39   
                                                          
36 Annex I, par 31.  
37 Annex I, par 26.  
38 Chapter 5 for fraud and illegality exceptions.  
39 Chapter 3, para 3.2.4. 
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1.2.24 Communication. Given the soft power of acclamation (i.e. acceptance, adoption 
and encouragement of adoption) by social actors, the UCP can influence parties and 
actors to documentary credits, and free actors such as legal orders, towards uniform 
outcomes or effects that are consistent with the sociological value of documentary 
credits. This is particularly the case where the lack of common understandings in 
relation to a documentary credit issue is affecting the certainty of the accepted needs 
of the parties. Therefore, it is sometimes necessary for the UCP community to 
formulate terms that are designed to rectify current misunderstandings, or some 
particular practices, that are considered by the UCP community to be contrary to the 
intended sociological value of documentary credits. This is not to challenge any rule 
of conduct (i.e. a rule that is commonly accepted by citizens),40 as the UCP and their 
interpretative aids must be responsive to common practices. It is only where the 
practices are not common that they need to be challenged and shaped by the UCP 
and its interpretative aids. Similarly the UCP and their interpretative aids should not 
challenge perceived overriding mandatory law under Municipal legal orders,41 
otherwise the UCP and their interpretative aids will open themselves up to rejection 
by legal orders (i.e. if they attempt to override fundamental concepts considered to 
create overriding mandatory norms such as respect for party autonomy over the 
agreement they make).42 To functionalise the tool of communication in a 
determinative way the tools of responsiveness and clarity must be fully utilised in 
the first place by means of effective guidance over the use of the transnational norms 
that the UCP are seeking to create.    
 
                                                          
40 Hartian concept that there is a primary rule of conduct so rules are accepted by citizens: Hart, The Concept 
of Law, (1ST edn, OUP 1972) in his Postscript.  
41 Carter, The Role of Public Policy in English Private International Law, [1993] ICLQ, 42, 1 Jan 1-10; Kuwait 
Airways Corp v Iraqi Airways Co (No.6) [2002] 2 A.C. 883.  
42 For example: sub-article 14 (h) UCP 600 directing banks to ignore a non-documentary term would not be 
enforceable under English and Jordanian laws; below chapter 4, para 4.3.14.  
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1.2.25 Clarity. The language of UCP 600 and ICC interpretive aids must be imbued with 
autonomous self-contained meaning and be precise, so that both the semantic 
expression and the ordinary, or the technical, meaning of the words of a UCP 600 
term should convey an obvious exclusive interpretation when they are read together 
with the guidance of ISBP and ICC Opinions or Papers. Such clarity demands 
comprehensibility, in that UCP 600 terms need to be understandable to the audience 
(i.e. reasonable bankers and traders). This might be achieved by the use of ordinary 
words, the implementation of a logical structure and the avoidance of undue 
verbosity.43 Clarity affects all other tools and ultimately the commonality of applying 
the intended meanings of the UCP.    
 
Diagram 2: Means  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
43 Holland and Web, Learning Legal Rules, (6th edn, OUP 2006), 205-209.   
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PRINCIPLES AND RULES 
 
1.2.26 It is necessary to look at how regulatory rules, UCP 600, form the concepts of 
irrevocability, conformity and autonomy (i.e. jurisprudential rules) in order to assess 
to what extent UCP 600 terms reflect the substance of documentary credits. Also 
there is, or must be, a relationship between the types of form and the means (e.g. 
standards or principles serve the means of flexibility where particular rules are more 
expedient for the means of certainty). Understanding different types of form enables 
us to evaluate how the intended outcomes of the concepts of irrevocability, 
conformity and autonomy need to be expressed. Moreover, such an understanding 
assists the research to determine the scope of conformity under the UCP and the 
English and the Jordanian legal orders. The understanding of the nature and 
categories of form is based on the work of Duncan Kennedy.44  
 
1.2.27 Principles refer to the direct substantive objectives of a legal order, such as freedom 
to contract.45 Rules convey the functional implementation of the objectives that 
requires an official to respond to a factual situation by intervening in a determinable 
way. Such an intervention manifests the merit of “formal realisability” (i.e. the 
quality of ruleness in terms of the capability to direct an official to respond to each 
of easily distinguishable lists of facts in certain situations by intervening in a 
determinative way)46 which is, unlike principles, highly resonant in rules. Principles 
are in most cases general where rules are usually divided into general and particular 
rules. The attribute of generality in the case of rules “kills many birds with one 
stone”.47 This, however, bears a high risk where there is an imprecision in the general 
                                                          
44 Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, [1976] 89 Harvard Law Review 1685.  
45 Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, [1976] 89 Harvard Law Review 1685, 1688. 
46 Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, [1976] 89 Harvard Law Review 1685, 1690.  
47 Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, [1976] 89 Harvard Law Review 1685, 1688. 
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form of rule as there would be in reflecting the value of documentary credits. Rules 
usually emerge from principles and particular rules might emerge from general rules. 
 
Summary Of The Conceptual Model 
 
1.2.28 The conceptual model that is proposed in this study is based on the perspective of 
the sociological value of documentary credits: the critical balancing of the distinct 
archetypal security needs of each of the four groups of contracting parties who 
typically transact documentary credits (i.e. issuing banks, confirming banks, 
applicants and beneficiaries). Such value is made realisable and concrete by the 
documentary credits’ embedded usages (pillars) of irrevocability, conformity and 
autonomy. The interactive communications between such usages and the fact that 
they are commonly applied as transnational norms evidence the accepted 
compromised needs of the parties that have triggered the embedded usages in the 
first place, and the functions of such usages protect the compromised needs. The 
sociological value, the pillars and their functions and the compromised needs as 
evidenced by the pillars constitute the substance of documentary credits. The UCP 
community must reflect the substance of documentary credits. The means to convey 
the substance are responsiveness, certainty, flexibility, communication and clarity. 
To determine the scope of the forms that intend to regulate documentary credits, 
the Kennedyian categories of jurisprudential rules of principles, general rules and 
particular rules are adopted.  
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THE DESIGN AND METHODS OF THE RESEARCH 
 
1.3.1 The conceptual model in this research is applied to UCP 600 terms in the context of 
the English legal order and Jordanian legal order and Jordanian commercial practices. 
The methodology in the application of the conceptual model of this research is 
primarily doctrinal study (i.e. a study of legal norms from their legal sources, codes, 
cases, texts, commentary etc),48 although such doctrinal study will - as regards 
certain aspects of particular research questions - be supplemented by an empirical 
study (i.e. involving elite interviewing of ministers, judges, bankers and traders in 
Jordan as to the use of documentary credits in Jordan, since as the key decision 
makers they are the relevant “elite”).49  
 
1.3.2 The selected case for study. The Jordanian Civil Code is based on Sharia law50 
and some elements of French Civil law that are consistent with Sharia principles.51 
The Jordanian Sharia law has influenced many Arabic countries such as the United 
Arab Emirates, Sudan and Kuwait. Jordan is the researcher’s home jurisdiction where 
he practices law and has contacts. The Jordanian jurisdiction system is a hybrid 
system of Civil law and Common law. Thus, it is based on formal codes and 
precedents of the highest court (i.e. Court of Distinction).52 Only the decisions of the 
Court of Distinction, (which is known in France and Egypt as the Court of Cassation 
but is referred to in this research as the Court of Distinction, since it is the correct 
translation from Arabic), are binding on all courts. The Court of Distinction is not an 
appeal court for factual disputes, but rather it is an appeal court for disputes in 
                                                          
48 James, Holland and Webb, Learning Legal Rules, (7th edn, OUP 2010).  
49 Richards, Elite Interviewing: Approaches and Pitfalls, [1996] Politics, (March) 199-204.  
50 Article 1 Civil Code (1976).  
51 Jordan Laws and Rules, Memorandum of Clarification of Civil Code, (1977).  
52 Zoaby, Legal Culture: The Law in our Life: Comprehensive Study of Jordanian Law in Light of The Updated 
Legislations and the New Practices (1st edn, Wael 2008).  
51 
 
respect of the position at law.53 However, as a matter of documentary credit’s law, 
Jordanian law has few detailed and precise rules dealing with documentary credits, 
and it is – as are other Arabic laws - currently heavily reliant on a single out of date 
commentary text.54 In the context of documentary credits, English common law is a 
hegemonic legal order that influences many legal orders including Jordanian law55 
and the UCP itself.56 The fact that Jordanian law is a hybrid legal order enhances its 
ability for the adaptation of hegemonic foreign functional doctrines.57 In the context 
of evaluating the effectiveness of UCP 600 - and analysing the pillars of documentary 
credits - under the Jordanian legal order it is necessary therefore to also conduct 
such a task under English common law. Hence, the selected legal orders (i.e. English 
and Jordanian laws) are compatible for this research.  
 
1.3.3 The need for empirical study and formal realisability. Jordanian law lacks rules 
having the character of “formal realisability” (i.e. the quality of ruleness in terms of 
the capability to direct an official to respond to each of easily distinguishable lists of 
facts in certain situations by intervening in a determinative way)58 regulating 
documentary credits subject, or not, to the UCP. Accordingly this research requires 
empirical study with judges, bankers, traders and ministers to inform the doctrinal 
study of how Jordanian law deals, and ought to deal, with documentary credits 
subject to UCP 600. The empirical analyses provide insight as to the objective needs 
and interests of documentary credit parties in Jordan. This of course sets the platform 
of how Jordanian doctrines interact with such objective needs and interests in 
responding to documentary credit issues. The benefit is to postulate functional 
                                                          
53 Article 191 Jordanian Civil Procedures Rules (1988). 
54 The work of Professor Awad: Awad, Documentary Credits, (1st edn, Dar Elnahda 1985).  
55 The Court of Distinction in Alrasheed Bank v Publisher of the House of International Books 1733/2011 Adalah 
Programme has referred to the work of Prof Awad, Documentary Credits, (1st edn, Dar Elnahda 1985) as a source 
and this work is influenced by English common law in many aspects.    
56 For instance: one of the key changes in UCP 600 was the promulgation of article 7 (c) which addresses the 
issues created by the English Court decision in Banco Santander SA v Bayfern Ltd [2000] 1 All E.R; Hwaidi, The 
implications of Banco Santander SA v Bayfern Ltd on deferred payment under documentary credits in UCP 600, 
[2011] I.B.L.J (May) 569-576.   
57 Plessis, Comparative Law and the Study of Mixed Legal Systems, in Reimann and Zimmermann (eds), The 
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, (1ST edn, OUP 2006), 489. 
58 Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, [1976] 89 Harvard Law Review 1685, 1686-1690. 
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doctrines as to the legal positions under Jordanian law. Also the empirical analyses 
inform the conceptual model particularly in respect of the various objective needs of 
documentary credit parties with emphasis on the Jordanian banking community since 
bankers are the key players in documentary credits.  
 
1.3.4 This is in contrast with English common law, which has both detailed and 
authoritative precedents regulating documentary credits subject to the UCP and offer 
relative certainty as to how the UCP are perceived and interpreted in the context of 
English commercial practices: the perception of British banks having been presented 
thoroughly to the ICC in the context of most iterations of the UCP59 and the ICC 
Drafting Group being headed by a British banker.60 Given the extensive geographical 
reach of English common law in the context of documentary credit trade practices, 
an empirical study of the documentary credit trade practices in the context of English 
law would have to be a long term project stretching over many states. It is 
appropriate for the empirical study to be confined to Jordan, but the approach 
adopted in this research of combining doctrinal legal and empirical study of 
documentary credit transactions could form a conceptual template for future 
empirical study of documentary credits, or indeed other trade practices, in 
connection with English law.   
 
1.3.5 Methodological steps of the research. There are seven steps to the research 
methodology leading to the evaluation of the effectiveness of UCP 600 as illustrated 
in diagram 3. The first four steps were conducted by doctrinal study. The fifth step 
was conducted empirically. The six and seventh steps comprised the analyses of the 
empirical data in light of the doctrinal study followed by the evaluation. The 
methodological bases of those steps are explained below.  
                                                          
59 Ellinger, The Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP): their development and the current 
revisions, [2007] L.M.C.L.Q. 2 (May), 152-180.  
60 UCP 600, Introduction; Gary Collyer is a worldwide documentary credit banking expert who also presents the 
British banks issues. 
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Diagram 3: Methodological Steps of the Research 
  
 
Doctrinal Study 
1.3.6 General overview. Doctrinal or black letter law is traditionally based on positivism61 
(i.e. law is an independent body of systematic rules that is studied separately from 
morals or other social factors) or interpetivisim62 (i.e. law is based on normative 
social premises so law and morals cannot be divided). The doctrinal study of this 
research is a hybrid one, in that whilst in most cases positivism applies, in the some 
cases interpretivisim applies. This is explained below.     
 
1.3.7 Hart and Luhmann. The research pursues by the doctrinal study Hart’s descriptive 
jurisprudence, being a pragmatic conceptual analysis that is not premised upon any 
inference from legality to legitimacy.63 However, such an approach is also normative 
                                                          
61 Lead by Herbert Hart: Hart, The Model of Rules, Positivism and The Separation of Law and Morals, [1958] 
Harvard Law Review, 4; Hart, The Concept of Law, (1st edn, OUP 1972). 
62 Lead by Ronal Dworkin: Dworkin, The Model of Rules, [1967] The University of Chicago Law Review, 35,14;  
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (1977); Dworkin, Law’s Empire, (1st edn, Universal Publications 1986).  
63 Hart, The Concept of Law, (1ST edn, OUP 1972) in his Postscript. 
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in the sense that it answers to norms of constructive theory and aims to discipline 
the use and structure of concepts. As it is a conceptual analysis of law, it rationalises 
the concept of law through the articulation of criteria as to its use.64 The research 
endeavours to identify the legal positions - by conceptual analysis – that English and 
Jordanian courts will adopt to the use of UCP in documentary credits. The research 
is therefore seeking the general, not absolute, shared criteria for the application of 
legal concepts. In particular, the nature of legal orders in this research is seen 
through the lens of Luhmann’s theory of law as a social system.65 Pursuant to such 
a theory, law is a self-produced social system which has – as with other social 
systems – evolved as an autopoietic  construct from being directly related to its 
environment so as to have its own internal limited range of responses and an internal 
basis for the selection of a particular response to external stimuli. The range of 
responses is the operation of legal norms that have been developed internally: they 
are the internal communications (i.e. interconnected legal doctrines or norms) of the 
system of law. Law responds to its environment through an internal selection of the 
interaction of its internal communications. Both elements constitute the operative 
closure of law or legal order to the effect of achieving the autonomy and the 
boundaries of a system of law. This is illustrated below in Diagram 4.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
64 Coleman and Shapiro (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence & Philosophy of Law (1st edn, OUP 2002), 
ch 8 by Coleman.   
65 Luhmann, Law as a Social System, (1st edn, OUP 2004) translated by Klaus Ziegert.  
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Diagram 4: Elements of a System of Law 
 
 
1.3.8 There are two indispensable mechanics of operative closure as illustrated in diagram 
5 below. 66 The first indispensable mechanic is its function of achieving certainty of 
outcome as the ability of a legal order to make a final determinative decision is 
essential for the maintenance of the normative function of law. Therefore the internal 
communications of a legal order must be collectively stabilised, by operative closure, 
at the moment when the legal system communicates with its external environment 
(i.e. the disputants) in response to an external stimulus (i.e. the dispute that has 
been referred to it).  The second mechanic is the binary code of the system that 
ensures that the system of law responds internally to the external stimuli by 
operating its binary code to code those stimuli as either as legal or illegal (i.e. as 
postulated by Luhmann as terms merely referring to the acceptance or rejection by 
the legal system of issues brought before it by the disputants and not as meaning 
legality and illegality under public law) and then communicating with its external 
environment on the basis of that coding.  
                                                          
66 Luhmann, Law as a Social System, (1st edn, OUP 2004) translated by Klaus Ziegert, cha 2.  
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1.3.9 If the communicated fact is coded illegal it means that it is rejected by the legal 
system in the sense that it will not become part of the legal system at the time of 
the communication (there being a temporal aspect to legal norms in that any decision 
made by a legal order is effective only at that time and may differ from prior and 
subsequent decisions). If the fact is coded legal it will become part of the internally 
communicated doctrines, and that represents the cognitive face of law at a given 
point of time. Thus the operations of law distinguish fact from legal norm and it is 
that distinction that is central to the normative programming of law through which 
legal systems are able to achieve normative operative closure at any single point of 
time. 67 Such a structure ensures that all operations and norms of a legal order are 
considered to be internal to the legal order itself, unlike Hart’s rules of recognition 
that are sometimes presumed derived from outside law.68 Understanding law 
through Lumann’s theory makes obvious that a term of the UCP needs to be 
successfully communicated to all the various legal orders that are, effectively, being 
requested by the UCP community to take cognisance of and give effect to the UCP 
and its interpretative aids. Such effect can only be achieved by operation of law’s 
binary code in the sense of the norms of the UCP being coded as being legal (i.e. 
accepted) by those legal orders notwithstanding any contrary interconnected 
doctrines of a divergent legal order. Therefore the tool of responsiveness is an 
essential to communicate with legal orders.  
                                                          
67 Luhmann, Law as a Social System, (1st edn, OUP 2004) translated by Klaus Ziegert, cha 3.  
68 Luhmann, Law as a Social System, (1st edn, OUP 2004) translated by Klaus Ziegert, introduction.  
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Diagram 5: Indispensable Mechanics of Operative Closure  
 
 
 
1.3.10 Dworkin. As explained above, according to Luhmann’s theory law responds to an 
external stimulus through the internal selection of law’s interconnected internal 
communications. It is however submitted that there can be latent values that might 
also play a role – along with the legal communications - in triggering the binary code 
of the acceptance or the rejection of an outside norm (i.e. Luhmann does not deny 
the unapparent influence of social norms as they are part of ongoing complex causal 
relationships between the systems in society). This is particularly the case where 
there is a severe conflict as to the shared criteria for the application of concepts. In 
such a situation the research seeks to apply Dworkin’s normative interpretative 
jurisprudence (i.e. angling the analysis to normative premises so as to defend the 
legal concepts and interpret them in a way so as to be consistent with societal 
morality) in some of the legal analyses particularly that relate to proposing 
transnational guidance.69 Such normative jurisprudence functions through 
constructive interpretation, which proceeds by imposing the ‘best’ light of meaning 
                                                          
69 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, (1st edn, Universal Publications 1986). 
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on the legal practice of law from the perspective of the internal participants of law, 
such as judges, and then restructuring such contested law according to that 
meaning.70  
 
1.3.11 Communication and evaluation. In conclusion, a successful responsiveness by 
the UCP to the internal communications within legal orders constitutes part of the 
conceptual model as to the efficacy of UCP 600, because such a successful 
communicative responsiveness is an objective necessary to the means of certainty, 
flexibility and communication which in turn is essential to achieve the needs of the 
documentary credit parties underpinning the security of documentary credits. This 
approach being essentially Hartianian, but also Dworkinian in so far that the 
successful responsiveness with legal orders is not a mere objective necessity but 
also a doctrinal value.    
 
CRITICAL ANALYSIS AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
1.3.12 The research conducts doctrinal critical analysis of documentary credit transactions, 
as set out in Diagram 3, under (a) UCP 600, (b) UCP 600 in the English legal order 
and (c) UCP 600 in the Jordanian legal order. It also conducts functional comparison 
between English common law and Jordanian law.  
 
1.3.13 UCP and doctrinal analysis. A UCP revision is regarded as a like-legal order having 
systematic rules, interpretive standards71 and normative function.72 Such a claim is 
based on the theory of the privatisation of law-making as a new paradigm in law 
making in transnational commercial law.73 Many international private organisations 
                                                          
70 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, (1st edn, Universal Publications 1986).   
71 Chapter 2, para 2.3.1.  
72 By virtue of international trade usage as to the ubiquity of the UCP: Hwaidi and Ferris, The Existence of 
International Unchangeable and Changeable Trade Usage, submitted paper to the SLS on Sep 2013 
<http://www.conference.legalscholars.ac.uk/edinburgh/paper.cfm?id=107>. 
73 For the theory of privatised law-making: Berger, The Creeping Codification of the New Lex Mercatoria, (2edn, 
Kluwer Law International 2010), 38-51. 
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function as formulating agencies by publishing “self-regulatory rules”74 in order to 
regulate a particular field in international trade. Prominent among these rules is the 
UCP. The ICC publishes valuable interpretive aids to foster an international 
interpretation of the terms of the UCP. The doctrinal critical analysis begins with UCP 
600 in its transnational context in order to provide the doctrinal positions of 
documentary credits subject to UCP 600, which are in turn set to be tested under 
the English and Jordanian legal orders.  
 
1.3.14 English critical analysis. Secondly, the doctrinal critical analysis is applied to 
English common law to analyse the effects of the UCP 600 doctrinal positions under 
English law. English common law is based on judicial precedents; it has, as does any 
legal order, its own doctrinal system that must be followed in making and 
interpreting law.75 English common law is a coherent hegemonic law in the context 
of documentary credit transactions and provides detailed and certain functional legal 
positions on many issues regarding documentary credits both when subject to the 
UCP or when not so subject. It is a necessary step to evaluate the effects of UCP 600 
in terms of whether the generated positions under English common law are as 
intended by the UCP 600 Drafting Group and to evaluate such effects against the 
yardstick of security. Such analyses ease the process of the critical analysis under 
Jordanian law.  
 
1.3.15 Jordanian critical analysis. Thirdly, after the provision of the doctrinal positions 
under UCP 600 and English common law, the doctrinal critical analysis is undertaken 
under Jordanian law which is based on formal Codes and judicial precedents of the 
highest court. The Jordanian doctrinal positions are partly influenced by the analysis 
of the doctrinal positions that offer model functional solutions under English common 
                                                          
74 The UCP are identified as being “self-regulatory rules” in Ly, International Business Law and Lex Mercatoria, 
(1st edn, North Holland 1992), 164. The UCP are perceived as a self-contained code under English law: Fortis 
Bank S.A./N.V, Stemcor UK Limited v Indian Overseas Bank [2011] EWCA (Civ) 58, [29]. The UCP are described 
as “code like” by Berger, The Creeping Codification of the New Lex Mercatoria, (2edn, Kluwer Law International 
2010), 38-51.  
75 James, Holland and Webb, Learning Legal Rules, (7th edn, OUP 2010). 
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law, where the underlying policies and principles of English law in the investigated 
matters are also evident in the principles of Jordanian law. However, a socio legal 
study by empirical work was also conducted to further inform and validate the 
Jordanian functional doctrinal positions.  
 
1.3.16 Functional comparison. Fourthly, a doctrinal functional comparison between 
English common law and Jordanian law is undertaken to compare both the 
interconnected abstract doctrines and the judicial decisions as responses to real life 
situations.76 Such a method aims to reveal the functional equivalence and dissonance 
of English and Jordanian laws particularly in their reception, interpretation and 
application of UCP 600. This identifies the functions which are transferred into 
objective needs and interests informing the conceptual model and being tested by 
the model.77  
 
Empirical Design 
 
1.3.17 General overview. The fifth step is the empirical study which is designed as an 
inductive qualitative research for it aims to acquire insight into the commercial and 
legal practices.78 The main objectives of the empirical study are as follows: 
 
1- Informing the Jordanian critical doctrinal analysis as required in the doctrines of trade 
usage and the criteria for experts in the Jordanian Civil Procedures for expert 
evidence. Thus the empirical study intends to represent the banking practices on 
documentary credits in Jordan. This informs the doctrinal comparative study.  
                                                          
76 Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative Law, in Reimann and Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Comparative Law, (1st edn, OUP 2006) ch 10; Zweigert and Ko ̈tz, Introduction to comparative law 
(3rd edn, Clarendon Press 1998).  
77 Zweigert and Puttfarken, Critical Evaluation in Comparative Law [1973-76] 5 Adelaide Law Review 343.  
78 6 and Bellamy, Principles of Methodology, (1st edn, Sage 2012).  
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2- Informing directly the application of the conceptual model on UCP 600 by gaining 
insight as to the approaches of bankers in understanding and interpreting both the 
pillars of documentary credits and the UCP 600.  
3- Informing Jordanian critical analysis and the functional comparison by revealing the 
approaches of judges and bankers in understanding and interpreting both the pillars 
of documentary credit and UCP 600. 
4- Informing directly the conceptual model by revealing the reaction of the Jordanian 
government as to the introduction of UCP 600.  
5- Informing the critical doctrinal analysis as to the significant issues that affect 
Jordanian traders in the use of documentary credits subject to UCP 600.   
 
The selection of cases (i.e. subjects of investigation in the empirical study) is firstly 
addressed, and then followed by the method of the empirical study (i.e. elite 
interviews).   
 
SELECTED CASES 
 
1.3.18 Banks. To address the first three objectives outlined above banks were selected as 
the cases for investigation. There are fifteen Jordanian banks in Jordan and a further 
nine foreign branches of banks in Jordan.79 Six banks were selected in the study 
including:  
 
 “Central Bank”, which is the Jordanian governmental bank. 
 Three Jordanian banks that are regarded as the main players in the Jordanian 
economy, namely: Arab-Bank, which is one of the leading banks in the Middle East;80 
Bank A (identity is concealed) which is considered to be the most effective domestic 
                                                          
79 http://www.cbj.govjo/pages.php?menu_id=34.  
80 http://www.gfmag.com/archives/175-may-2013/12485-worlds-best-banks-2013-middle-
east.html#axzz2bNfmUOz0.  
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bank in providing credits; and Bank B (i.e. identity is concealed) which is regarded 
as having the most advanced technological banking services in Jordan.81 
 “Alitihad Bank”, which is the Jordanian bank that represented Jordan and the Middle 
East in the revision of UCP 600 in the ICC. 
  “BLOM Bank, which is a Lebanese bank that is a leading foreign bank in Jordan.  
 
1.3.19 The selected representatives of each bank were respectively the heads of the 
documentary credit department in their bank, as they are the experts and the 
decision makers on documentary credit transactions of their banks. Given the fact 
that the selected cases of Jordanian banks constitute around 30% of Jordanian banks 
(i.e. the relevant “population”), it is plausible to claim that the selected cases are 
representative of the Jordanian banking sector transacting documentary credits in 
Jordan and the foreign branch bank BLOM is a typical case for foreign banks in Jordan 
having similar conditions to the other foreign banks.82 There is, however, no need to 
select additional representatives to the head of a documentary credit department in 
the banks, as he or she is the one who gets involved in every disputable documentary 
credit matter in the bank. He or she, except in the Arab- Bank, determines and 
implements the interpretation of UCP 600 in the bank.83  
 
1.3.20 Judges. The cases for the above third objective, in addition to bankers, were the 
High Court Judges who are well renowned for their experience in dealing with 
documentary credit cases. There are few Jordanian judges with this experience, so 
the selection of three judges is sufficient to grasp a general understanding of the 
actual approaches of Jordanian judges to the pillars of documentary credits.  
 
                                                          
81 http://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/41409.wss.  
82 http://www.cbj.govjo.  
83 For case selection: Henn, Weinstein and Foard, a Critical Introduction to Social Research, (2 edn, Sage 2009), 
70-73.   
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1.3.21 Ministers. The present and a previous Minister of Industry and Trade were the 
selected cases to address the above fourth objective. The present Minister was 
selected as he is able to represent the views of the Jordanian government regarding 
UCP 600. The previous Minister was also selected as he currently holds the position 
of the head of ICC in Jordan. Thus he is able to reveal the relationship between UCP 
600 and the Jordanian government.  
 
1.3.22 Traders. The selected cases for the last objective were three traders. Unlike the 
banking sector, the trading sector is a huge one both numerically and in its diversity. 
Any trader who is involved in export and import is expected to use documentary 
credits. There are many variables such as business size of traders and foreign 
branches. The documentary credit transaction is very complex in nature and this is 
one of its disadvantages. Given the fact that most of traders who are involved in 
export and import in Jordan are small enterprises,84 it would not have been 
appropriate to assume any technical expertise on the part of traders as to the 
operation of UCP 600. This indicates that selecting more traders - even if it is based 
on different variables - would not substantively provide more insight, given the fact 
that the aim of qualitative study is to build a depth of understanding rather than 
claiming generalisability.85 Thus three traders were selected as being typical for 
Jordanian traders using documentary credits. One is a trader who is involved in 
import transactions. The other is a trader who has a foreign branch in the import 
country. The last one is involved in import and export and is a well-known trader as 
he is the head of the Industry Chamber in Jordan.  
 
1.3.23 Justification for not interviewing other actors. Although practices of insurers 
and carriers in the insurance and shipping industries affect the documentary 
conformity in documentary credits, these actors are not the main players in 
                                                          
84 http://www.ammanchamber.org.jo. /node/studies.aspx. 
85 For illustration of the selection of typical cases: Henn, Weinstein and Foard, a Critical Introduction to Social 
Research, (2 edn, Sage 2009).   
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documentary credits as they are not the parties who enter into the autonomous 
documentary credit arrangements. Thus the practices of such actors in relation to 
documentary credits can be seen as being irrelevant for the interpretation of 
documentary credit arrangements except to the extent that they might comprise 
part of the factual matrix that judges need to take into account in deciding cases 
(the English case of Homburg Houtimport BV v Agorsin Private Ltd (The Starsin)86 is 
a nice example of that tangential effect in another contractual context since in that 
case Lord Hoffman took account of banking practice87 in deciding who was the 
contractual carrier under a bill of lading for the purposes of the English legal orders 
adjudication of a claim under the carriage contract).    
 
THE METHOD OF EMPIRICAL STUDY 
 
1.3.24 The most plausible method to address the objectives in the context of the selected 
cases was considered to be qualitative in depth, face–to-face and one-to-one 
interviews, because the inquiry was exploratory in nature aiming to investigate an 
uncharted environment. Indeed such interviews enabled the researcher to enter into 
dialogue with the interviewees to explore issues in detail through the use of, as put 
by Henn and others, “probes, prompts and flexible questioning styles”.88 The semi-
structured open ended interviews maximised the researcher’s understanding of the 
commercial and legal viewpoints of the interviewees as to both the pillars of 
documentary credits and the operation of UCP 600 and ensured the researcher to 
convey the complex doctrinal concepts to the interviewees and to check both his 
understanding and that of interviewees.  
 
1.3.25 Elite interviews. Thus interviews were conducted with bankers, judges, ministers, 
and traders. Such interviews are known as elite interviews which can loosely be 
                                                          
86 [2004] 1 AC 715. 
87 [2004] 1 AC 715, [74]-[78]. 
88 Henn, Weinstein and Foard, a Critical Introduction to Social Research, (2 edn, Sage 2009), 187. 
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defined as interviewing individuals with particular expertise.89 Exception must be 
made to the traders as they should not be regarded as experts in documentary 
credits, but they are experts in export and import transactions. Given the fact that 
bankers had the most expertise amongst the other interviewees in documentary 
credits, most bankers were passionate – but some of them were anxious - to convey 
their many various ideas in respect of documentary credits and other related 
transactions making it difficult to keep the dialogue with most bankers within the 
themes of the interviews. This was mainly tackled by giving the interviewed bankers 
the opportunity to speak without any interruption for the first five to ten minutes 
and then reconfirming and emphasising the subjects that the researcher needed to 
discuss.      
 
1.3.26 Ethics. All the interviews were conducted according to Nottingham Trent University 
Research Ethics policy.90 Each interview was preceded by a participants’ information 
sheet, a brief explanation of the ethical issues, and a consent form. Since the subject 
is in relation to the doctrines of law and to the banking practices the ministers and 
traders agreed to disclose their identity. However only two out of the six interviewed 
bankers and all the interviewed judges required the researcher to conceal their 
identity. The necessary steps to secure anonymity of those who selected the option 
to conceal the identity was undertaken, including that the recordings and transcripts 
of interviews were only handled by the principal investigator.  
 
1.3.27 Risks in warranting results. The main risks in the method of interviews primarily 
related to bankers. There was a risk that the interviewee banker might either be 
affected by the opinion of the researcher or else convey an opinion instead of a fact. 
This was tackled by designing suitable questions focussed on the particular practices 
                                                          
89 Morris, The Truth About Interviewing Elites, [2009] Politics 29 (3), 209; Burnham and others, Research 
Methods in Politics, (1st edn, Palgrave 2004).  
90 http://www.ntu.ac.uk/research/document_uploads/81937.pdf.  
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of themselves and their banks. In addition to the subjectivity risk, some bankers, in 
the event of the interview, were wary about their answers as they did not want to 
appear as non-experts. The researcher tackled this issue by emphasising that there 
was an option for the concealment of identity in the consent form.  The researcher 
used the Jordanian Arabic accent rather than Classic Arabic as it sounded friendlier 
with bankers, ministers and traders, but Classic Arabic was used with judges as it is 
perceived by them as the appropriate mode of communication to discuss legal issues. 
The researcher praised the experts and assured them that no personally negative 
observation would be noted. A further risk was that some of the interviewees did not 
perceive the interview as having a high value, as the researcher lacks power relative 
to elites.91 Accordingly, the researcher represented himself in a professional way, 
emphasising the importance of the results and used technical terms to demonstrate 
his knowledge.92 The researcher represented himself both as a researcher and a 
lawyer in such a way that he might be perceived as being both an insider (e.g. in 
terms of banking) and an outsider (e.g. in terms of being not a rival).93  
 
ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS AND COMPARATIVE STUDY 
1.3.28 Bankers. As to the sixth methodological step of the research as set out in Diagram 
3, that part of the empirical data generated by interviewing bankers which related 
to the establishment of banking practices was read from the realist social science 
approach as such data is evidence of external events.94 For instance, whilst five of 
the bankers confirmed that the period of the examination of documents in 
documentary credits is two banking days that data was not treated as being 
represented of the perspective of bankers, but as being declarative of the actual 
                                                          
91 Bygnes, Interviewing People-Oriented Elites, [2008], Eurosphere Online Working Paper Series, Bergen: 
University of Bergen. 
92 Herod, Reflections on Interviewing Foreign Elites: Praxis, Positionality, Validity, and the Cult of the Insider, 
[1999] Geoforum 30(4), 321. 
93 For insider or outsider status of the researcher in elite interviews: Herod, Reﬂections on Interviewing Foreign 
Elites; cf; Praxis, Positionality, Validity, and the Cult of the Insider, [1999] Geoforum 30(4), 315.   
94 Silverman, Doing Qualitative Research: A Practical Handbook, (2nd edn, Sage 2005), 154, cf: Henn, Weinstein 
and Foard, a Critical Introduction to Social Research, (2 edn, Sage 2009), 186.   
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banking practice. The realist approach was essential to integrate the data into the 
doctrinal analysis of Jordanian law and ultimately for the functional comparative 
study, in order to reveal the effects of the Jordanian legal doctrines. The remaining 
empirical data from bankers was read by a narrative approach,95 as it represented 
the bankers’ own interpretations in relation to UCP 600. Nevertheless, such 
interpretations were accepted as being representative of those of the bank in which 
the expert banker worked, since he implements his own interpretations of UCP 600 
in the practices of that bank. There was no risk of subjectivity, because the 
interpretation of UCP 600 is always applied in a particular transactional context. Such 
analysis directly informed the conceptual model as to whether the intended meaning 
of UCP 600 terms are uniformly apparent to the bankers and in respect of the 
objective needs and interests of bankers in Jordan.   
 
1.3.29 Judges. The data regarding the approach of Jordanian judges as to the documentary 
credits were read in the narrative approach to inform both the Jordanian doctrinal 
analysis and the functional comparative study.  
 
1.3.30 Ministers. The collected data from the ministers were analysed by both the realist 
approach where the minister described a social event such as that there is ongoing 
discussion to amend the law. Other collected data from the ministers were analysed 
by the narrative approach where the minister provided his view regarding the social 
events.  
 
1.3.31 Traders. Finally, the data from traders were read in the narrative way to inform the 
commercial perspectives of the traders regarding some of the significant articles in 
                                                          
95 Silverman, Doing Qualitative Research: A Practical Handbook, (2nd edn, Sage 2005), 154, cf: Henn, Weinstein 
and Foard, a Critical Introduction to Social Research, (2 edn, Sage 2009), 186.  
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UCP 600. Such analysed collected data informed the evaluative standpoint as to the 
objective needs of traders. 
 
 
Contribution 
 
1.4.1 The developed conceptual model in this thesis is novel not only because of its main 
functions (i.e. enhancing the understanding as to the functional nature of 
documentary credits; providing a framework to the documentary credits community 
on how to design effective terms governing documentary credits; and assessing the 
efficacy of UCP 600 within the context of the English legal order and Jordanian legal 
order and Jordanian commercial practices) and the fact that there is currently no 
other conceptual model in the literature review facilitating how documentary credits 
can be regulated effectively, but also because it is close to the sociological reality of 
documentary credits, since its perspective is based on the sociological value of 
documentary credits that is rationally deducted from the functions of the embedded 
usages of documentary credits.  
 
1.4.2 The research also provides an original doctrinal contribution to the analysis of UCP 
600 and English common law positions on documentary credits. It provides doctrinal 
and empirical analysis aiming to establish the functional positions of Jordanian law 
on documentary credits. This research has the capacity to strongly influence both 
Jordanian courts and Jordanian bankers in their application of UCP 600 in the context 
of Sharia law and Civil law system in the Middle East. The research will assist different 
legal orders in the interpretation of the UCP. Furthermore, the investigation as to the 
nature of the embedded usages, pillars, of documentary credits will assist the 
international discourse as to the nature of transnational commercial law. It is 
intended that the design, by combining traditional legal doctrinal study with empirical 
study, will make a genuine contribution to the method of doctrinal legal study for 
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issues of transnational commercial law. The articles published in the leading 
international law journal in banking law96 and the presented papers at academic 
conferences 97 as part of the research indicate the originality of the research.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
96 Hwaidi and Harris: The Mechanics of Refusal in Documentary Letter of Credits: An Analysis of the Procedures 
Introduced in Article 16 UCP 600, [2013] J.I.B.L.R 28(4), 146-155; Hwaidi, The Story of The English Strict 
Compliance Principle in Letters of Credit and its Consistency with the UCP,  [2014] J.I.B.L.R 28 (2), 71-81.  
97 Hwaidi and Ferris, “The promise and problems for elite interviews in legal and commercial practices in the 
context of documentary credits, presented paper at the Annual conference of Socio Legal Study Association 
(SLSA) at University of York (26-28/03/2013): 
<http://www.conference.legalscholars.ac.uk/edinburgh/paper.cfm?id=107>. 
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GENERAL VIEW 
 
2.1.1 The substance of a documentary credit transaction is based on, what would in 
sociological discourse be referred to as its “value”,98 the critical balancing of the 
distinct archetypal security needs of each of the four groups of contracting parties 
who typically transact documentary credits (i.e. issuing banks, confirming banks, 
applicants and beneficiaries). It is the fact that maintenance of this critical balance 
is essential to the value of the transaction that triggers the embedded trade usages 
(referred to in chapter 1),99 since those embedded trade usages collectively operate 
to functionally maintain that balancing of the contested needs of the transacting 
parties and constitute the main part of the developed conceptual model. It is because 
these embedded trade usages are essential to the value of the transaction that it is 
proposed in this thesis that English and Jordanian laws, and those of other Municipal 
legal orders, ought to explicitly recognise embedded trade usages as a category of 
customary law that operates at a higher normative level than that of other trade 
usages. The second, and main, part of this chapter addresses the above questions. 
The third part deals with the nature of the UCP and the perspectives of the English 
and Jordanian legal orders as to the reception and interpretation of the UCP. It is 
essential, however, to give account to the broad context of documentary credits 
before dealing with the above issues. The first part addresses therefore the process 
of documentary credits and their historical development.  
 
 
The Process Of A Documentary Credit 
 
 
2.1.2 Essential steps in a documentary credit. Under a documentary credit transaction 
a buyer (i.e. the applicant) approaches a bank (i.e. the issuing bank which is usually 
                                                          
98 Alder, The Value Concept in Sociology, [1956] American Journal of Sociology, 27:272-279. 
99 Para 1.2.10-14.  
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domiciled in the buyer’s country) to open a documentary credit for the seller (i.e. 
the beneficiary). By such an instrument the issuing bank undertakes an obligation to 
make a payment to the beneficiary (i.e. the principle of irrevocability) on the bank’s 
receipt of certain documents stipulated by the documentary credit (e.g. a bill of 
lading evidencing the shipment, and affording constructive possession of the goods, 
to the applicant). The issuing bank needs to certify that the presented documents 
are in conformity with the terms and conditions of the documentary credit, otherwise 
the bank is not entitled to reimbursement by the applicant (i.e. the principle of 
conformity).100 In checking the conformity of the presented documents, the issuing 
bank shall not inquire into the actual facts that are presented by the documents (i.e. 
the presumption of appearance). Furthermore, the issuing bank’s payment obligation 
is not contingent on any disputes arising between the seller and buyer in the 
underlying trading relationships (i.e. the principle of autonomy).101  
 
2.1.3 Banking roles. In most cases issuing banks use the service of another bank (i.e. a 
correspondent bank), most frequently in the beneficiary’s country, to advise the 
beneficiary as to the opening of the documentary credit. The correspondent bank in 
this role is known as the “advising bank”. If the correspondent bank, which will 
frequently be the advising bank, is required by the terms of the documentary credit 
to confirm the documentary credit and that bank agrees to confirm it, such a 
correspondent bank will become a “confirming bank” which endures the same 
liabilities and undertakes the same obligations as the issuing bank.102 Documentary 
credits can also be made available to be paid or negotiated by a correspondent bank 
other than the confirming bank. Such a bank has the option to pay or negotiate the 
credit. It is known in this role as the “paying bank”, or “negotiating bank” as the 
case may be but UCP 600 adopts the term “nominated bank” to refer to the paying 
                                                          
100 Chapter 3.  
101 Chapter 5. 
102 The obligations of the confirming bank towards the beneficiary are the same as those of the issuing bank; 
however the latter is obliged to reimburse a confirming bank that pays the beneficiary against the presentation 
of conforming documents: articles 7 and 8 UCP 600.    
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bank, negotiating bank, the bank which accepts the bill of exchange annexed to 
documents, and sometimes the confirming bank. Thus a correspondent bank can 
take the role of merely advising, merely confirming, advising and confirming, merely 
paying or negotiating, accepting the documents, or advising and paying or 
negotiating the credit.  
 
2.1.4 Reimbursement. Upon making payment against presented documents that are in 
conformity with the credit, the paying bank will be entitled to reimbursement by 
either the confirming bank or the issuing bank. The confirming bank will be 
reimbursed by the issuing bank and the latter will be reimbursed by the applicant. 
This process is illustrated in diagram 6 below.  
Diagram 6 
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History Of Documentary Credits  
 
2.1.5 Traveller letters of credit. It is generally believed that documentary credits were 
evolved from traveller letters of credit which were also known as open, clear or 
uncovered letters of credit.103 The purpose of traveller letters of credit is substantially 
different from the aim of documentary credits. Traveller letters of credit intended to 
raise funds for a travelling merchant in a foreign country in which the merchant 
sought to buy goods. Under such an instrument, a merchant (i.e. the applicant), who 
intended to travel to a foreign country without carrying cash with them, requested 
from a merchant-banker in his own country a letter of credit whereby the merchant-
banker (i.e. the issuer) promised the foreign addressees of the letter of credit (i.e. 
the beneficiaries) to fully repay to them the amount of the bill of exchange if they 
paid or accepted liability to pay the bill to the applicant.104 Thus the promise to pay 
to merchants or bankers who would advance funds to the travelling merchant the 
amount of the credit was unconditional and its purpose was the raising of funds for 
the applicant.  
 
2.1.6 By contrast, the promise of payment in documentary credits is conditional upon the 
presentation of documents conforming to the terms of the credit and has the purpose 
of providing an assurance of payment to the seller prior to the shipment of goods, 
or the performance of services, under a supply contract, rather than merely raising 
funds for the applicant. However, both instruments share the function of being an 
assurance of payment. Given technological and transactional advancements in inter-
bank payment mechanisms, traveller letters of credit fell out of use in the twentieth 
century in international trade. 
 
                                                          
103 McCurdy, Commercial Letters of Credit, [1922] Harvard Law Review Association 539.  
104 Story, Commentaries on the Law of Bills of Exchange, Foreign and Inland as Administered in England and 
America, (2nd edn, Little and Brown 1860) ch XIII par 459.   
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2.1.7 Brief history.105 Many traveller letters of credit were used in conjunction with bills 
of exchange to the effect that the issuing of the traveller letter of credit was to 
guarantee an anticipatory acceptance of a bill of exchange.106 It seems that the idea 
of undertaking to accept bills of exchange was the trigger for the development of the 
documentary letters of credit instrument, by which a banker or a well-respected 
merchant issues a letter to a seller promising to accept the bill of exchange if the 
seller presents the required documents that fulfil the terms of the letter.107 Thus the 
new form of letters of credit became known as documentary credits, in that the 
“honour”108 of the credit was conditional upon conforming documents being 
presented by the beneficiary.  
 
2.1.8 Documentary credits were developed in the nineteenth century in connection with 
Anglo-American trades.109 They became well established and viable in international 
trade after the end of the First World War.110 The post-war instability of the 
international trade market caused new and experimental markets to evolve. Thus 
the use of documentary credits became necessary as a secure means of payment for 
both sellers and buyers. Sellers in hegemonic countries such as the USA started to 
export to new and strange buyers in evolving markets and developing countries. 
These sellers found it convenient for their security to demand either cash with order 
or confirmed documentary credits, as they would be assured of payment by a bank 
in their country prior to the shipment of the goods.111 The empirical findings for the 
present research confirm that sellers dealing with buyers in developing countries 
such as Jordan continue to demand confirmed documentary credits.112 Nart Lambaz 
                                                          
105 For a thorough history of documentary credits: Elinger, Documentary Letters of Credit: A Comparative Study, 
(1st edn, Singapore Press 1970) ch II. 
106 Maitland v The Chartered Mercantile Bank of India, London and China (1865) 2 H. & M. 440. 
107 There are fair amount of reported American cases in the very early of the nineteenth century in the USA 
involving documentary credits that were issued by banks as an assurance of payment of the bill of exchange 
against documents: McCurdy, Commercial Letters of Credit, [1922] Harvard Law Review Association 539. 
108 This concept is used in UCP 600 and is defined as pay, negotiate or accept to pay the credit.  
109 Hershey, Letters of Credit, [1918] Harvard Law Review Association, 1 (Nov).  
110 Elinger, Documentary Letters of Credit: A Comparative Study, (1st edn, Singapore Press 1970), 29.  
111 Hershey, Letters of Credit, [1918] Harvard Law Review Association, 1 (Nov). 
112 Annex I, para 6.  
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stated: 
 
“First time sellers prefer to use documentary credits. Big companies prefer 
documentary credits with traders in developing countries. A documentary credit can 
also be a financial tool”.   
 
2.1.9 Most importers in that new international market did not own or control ships. It was 
therefore essential for their security to receive documentary evidence of the 
shipment of the goods prior to the payment.113 Documentary credits were clearly 
recognised by English courts in 1854.114 The first attempt in Jordan to shape the 
transaction of documentary credits in an authoritative legal form by courts was in 
1975.115  
 
Regulating Documentary Credits And The Source Of Their Law 
 
2.1.10 Traveller letters of credit, which were a facility for raising funds in a foreign country, 
did not contravene with the fundamental doctrines of contract law under common 
law. The promise of the merchant-banker to reimburse, and to pay the extra fee, 
the addressee is an offer of a unilateral contract that is only binding on the promisor 
once the addressee acts on the promise,116 and accordingly consideration moves 
from the addressee to the promisor (i.e. the promisor becomes bound to reimburse 
only when the promissee accepts to undertake payment). Once the addressee 
accepts the bill of exchange annexed to the traveller letter of credit, the offer cannot 
be withdrawn as the addressee unequivocally begins the performance of the act (i.e. 
the undertaking to pay the beneficiary).117  
                                                          
113 Hershey, Letters of Credit, [1918] Harvard Law Review Association, 1 (Nov). 
114 Gurney v Behrend (1854) 3 E1. & B1. 622; Maitland v The Chartered Mercantile Bank of India, London and 
China (1865) 2 H. & M. 440.  
115 Court of Distinction (Civil), 152/1975, Adalah Programme.  
116 Rogers v Snow (1573) Dalison 94; Great Northern Ry v Witham (1873) Law Report 9 C.P. 16, 19.  
117 For unilateral offer: Beale and others (eds), Chitty on Contracts (31st edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2010) para 
2.083. 
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2.1.11 English law. By contrast, the undertaking to make a payment under documentary 
credits is addressed to the seller of goods, who is usually domiciled in a foreign 
country, and it is a binding undertaking upon the issuing bank once it is issued 
(embedded trade usage of irrevocability), regardless of the fact that it violates the 
common law requirement that consideration be reciprocal. The source of the law of 
the issuing and confirming bank’s undertaking in documentary credits is the practice 
of bankers and traders rather than contract law. Jenkins LJ stated the position in 
Hamzeh Malas Sons v British Imex Industries Ltd:118 
 
“An elaborate commercial system has been built up on the footing that bankers' 
confirmed credits are … [binding] … and, in my judgment, it would be wrong for this 
court in the present case to interfere with that established practice”.  
 
2.1.12 Jordanian law. Consideration is not a requirement for the formation or 
enforceability of contracts under Jordanian law. The Court of Distinction did not, 
therefore, elucidate the source of the issuing and confirming banks’ duty to honour 
documentary credits, when the Court recognised the irrevocable obligation of the 
issuing bank to honour the issued credit.119 The Court of Distinction did not however 
require an expert evidence to prove the usage of irrevocability, so the inference 
should be that the embedded usage of irrevocability is well known law.  
 
2.1.13 Contract law. As a matter of genesis, documentary credits have been evolved by 
mercantile usage120 to provide sellers, buyers and banks with a secure facility of 
payment as a response to the lack of trust between parties in international trade.121 
                                                          
118 [1958] 2 Q.B. 127, 129. 
119 Court of Distinction (Civil), 152/1975, Adalah Programme. 
120 Hamzeh Malas Sons v British Imex Industries Ltd [1958] 2 Q.B. 127, 127 per Jenkins LJ where a documentary 
credit was described as a commercial system.   
121 United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada[1983] 1 AC 168, 183 per Lord Diplock where 
his Lordship clearly stated that documentary credits are methods of payment that are based on the assurance 
of the payment to the seller; McCurdy, Commercial Letters of Credit, [1922] Harvard Law Review Association 
539, 543; Malek and Quest, Jack: Documentary Credits, (4th edn, Tottel 2009) paras 1.2 and 1.3; Elinger and 
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The beneficiary, seller, under the credit is entitled to enforce the performance of the 
credit on the basis of mercantile usage. It is suggested by Professor Goode that such 
a distinctive feature of documentary credits does not make it inappropriate to treat 
them as contractual in nature, since parties proceed on the basis of the protection 
of the expectation of the beneficiary as to its entitlement to the performance of 
documentary credits and hence contractual remedies are applicable.122 Under 
Jordanian law, the fact that custom is a source of law does not bar its consequences 
to be treated according to the conventional contract law rules, to the extent that the 
rules of contract law are consistent with custom.123 Moreover, the relationships 
between documentary credit parties, except the binding undertaking by the bank to 
the beneficiary under common law, are contractual in nature under both English and 
Jordanian laws.  
 
2.1.14 Need for uniformity. The relationship between the distinct documentary credit and 
supply transactions and between the parties to those transactions generates many 
legal complexities as does the engagement of the different jurisdictions and laws 
applicable to the enforcement of the various contracts and relationships constituting 
those transactions. It was in consequence of that complexity that the UCP were 
introduced in 1922 by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in Paris.124 The 
UCP were first introduced in parallel with the establishment of the ICC in the spirit 
of uniformity: the main aim of the ICC being to alleviate the confusion caused by 
national laws on commercial transactions across borders. To achieve such an aim on 
the transaction of documentary credits, the ICC promulgated a set of regulations on 
documentary credits to establish uniformity in practice.125  
                                                          
Neo, The Law and Practice of Documentary Credit, (1st edn, Hart 2010), 1; for banking security and risk 
assessment: Hassan, Lai and Yu, Market Disciple of Canadian Banks’ Letters of Credit Activities: An Empirical 
Examination, [2002 ] The Service Industries Journal, (22) Oct 187-208. 
122 Goode, Abstract Payment Undertakings And the Rules of The International Chamber of Commerce, [1995] 39 
Saint Louise University Journal, 725, 732.  
123 Article 2 Civil Code (1976); article 3 Commercial Code (1966).  
124 Taylor, The Complete UCP, (1st edn, ICC 2008), 27. 
125 UCP 600, Foreword.  
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2.1.15 UCP. The first formal version of the UCP was promulgated in 1933 by the 7th 
Congress of the ICC in Paris. It was adopted by banks in a number of European 
countries and by some banks in the United States.126 In 1951 the 13th Congress of 
the ICC promulgated a revision of the UCP which was adopted by banks in Asia, 
Africa, Europe and the American continent including the United States.127 The 1951 
code, however, was rejected by banks in the United Kingdom and most banks in the 
Commonwealth of Nations which resulted in a division between the British and the 
UCP practice on documentary credits.  
 
2.1.16 Nevertheless, British banks were represented in the ICC’s Committee in the process 
of revising the 1951 UCP version. This resulted in the promulgation of the 1963 
version of the UCP which was adopted by the British Banks and the entire 
Commonwealth of Nations.128 This version was later revised by the ICC resulting in 
the promulgation of another revision of the UCP in 1974. The code was revised again 
by the ICC in 1983 resulting in the promulgation of UCP 400. The other revision of 
the UCP was in 1993 and known as UCP 500. The latest revision of the UCP is known 
as UCP 600 which was promulgated by the ICC in Paris and became effective in July 
2007.129 The vast majority of documentary credits are subject to the UCP.130 The 
empirical findings of the present research confirm that it is standard for banks in 
Jordan to issue documentary credits that are subject to the UCP.131 The UCP aim to 
achieve a certain legal environment in a changing world and therefore they are 
regularly revised to adopt the ongoing changing practices and indeed to envisage 
new practices in order to solve common problems.132 
                                                          
126 ICC Brochure 82. 
127 Ellinger, The Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP): their development and the current 
revisions, [2007] L.M.C.L.Q. 2 (May), 152- 180, 153, ftn 10.  
128 ICC Brochure 222.  
129 ICC, Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits “UCP 600”, (2007).  
130 UCP 1962, Introduction.  
131 Annex I, para 12. 
132 Below para 2.3.1.  
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EMBEDDED TRADE USAGE OF THE PILLARS OF 
DOCUMENTARY CREDITS  
2.2.1 The existence of international trade usage or custom in the handling documentary 
credits is a matter of importance for international trade, and a matter of great 
interest for our understanding of the nature of law. Such trade usage or custom has 
been identified as the classic example of the new lex mercatoria of our globalised 
age.133 It may feature in Municipal laws, arbitrations, national litigation, or the non-
contentious understanding of parties to international contracts.  
 
2.2.2 A first and unavoidable problem in any attempt in investigating the dynamic nature 
of international trade usage is that domestic laws interpret trade usage discretely 
from one another.134 Transnational law holds an ever-present potential for 
fragmentation into national or regional self-contained autopoietic  systems of law. 
Even if a trade usage were universally recognised this risk of fragmentation through 
the internal communications of legal doctrine within each such legal system would 
continue to exist. Thus the rules of transnational law are perceived by Municipal legal 
systems as external stimuli to be communicated with the internal communications 
of each legal system and as such the stimulus might either be accepted or rejected 
by the internal communications of each system.135 
 
2.2.3 A second problem is that of linked meanings: thus, trade usage de facto is a matter 
of sociological fact; trade usage de juris is a matter of legal doctrine (i.e. it is received 
within the English and Jordanian legal orders as a matter of fact that in order to be 
effective it must fulfil the criteria that are laid down by a certain legal doctrine under 
                                                          
133 Goode, Rule, Practice, and pragmatism in transnational commercial law [2005] International & Comparative 
Law Quarterly 539, 547. The discoverers of the new lex mercatoria are Clive Schmittoff and Berthold Goldman:  
Schmitthoff, The sources of the law of international trade: with special reference to East-West trade, (1st edn, 
Stevenson and Sons 1964); Goldman, La Compagnie de Suez, societee’ internationale’, [1956] Le Monde, 4 
October, 3.   
134 Ly, International Business Law and Lex Mercatoria, (1st edn, North Holland 1992). 
135 Annex I, para 7: Luhmann, Law as a Social System, (1st edn, OUP 2004) translated by Klaus Ziegert.  
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English or Jordanian laws). The two may or may not coincide in any particular 
instance. However, the embedded aspects of trade usage as de facto and de juris 
will always be connected in any rational legal system, and are very likely to have a 
dynamic and reflective relationship.  
 
2.2.4 A third and crucial problem is the failure to distinguish between what it is termed 
below “embedded” and “peripheral” trade usage. Although it is generally unwise and 
confusing to coin terms, other potential synonyms are already loaded with 
unwelcome and confusing semantic baggage. Some distinction is needed, as a failure 
to make the conceptual distinction generates confusion in the role of international 
trade usage across borders and the application of self-regulatory rules claiming to 
reflect usage and practice. The distinction the research is trying to establish is one 
of function rather than merely one of genesis – embedded trade usage is essential 
to the particular function embodied by a particular category of transaction, whilst 
peripheral trade usage is relative to factors other than transactional function such as 
time and place. Thus, embedded usage may be codified, or not, and any codification 
may be by international governmental or non-governmental organisations or 
national legislature. The issue is not one of power or sovereignty. There is no 
argument that the current structures of Municipal legal orders could not change an 
“embedded” aspect of trade usage as a matter of national law. However, the 
consequence of such a change would be that the very nature of the underlying 
transaction as seen by that legal order would be altered. The idea is that the 
embedded aspects are constitutive of the commercial institution in point. The pillars 
of documentary credits offer a major account of embedded trade usage.   
 
Usage, practice and usage as lex mercatoria   
2.2.5 Usage and practice. Trade usage de facto might be defined as: a common 
observance of a regular practice or set of practices that is or are well known and 
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adopted amongst traders in a particular trade, and which generates a sense of 
commercial order in the context of particular trades. Thus, it is how things are done 
and variation from the practice is viewed by members of the community of practice 
as discreditable. Trade practice de facto share the same definition in that the 
common observance of a regular practice which generates expectations of repetition 
and reciprocation that have some normative force but not a sense of being binding 
in the relevant particular trade.  
 
2.2.6 Empirical findings. The empirical findings of this research confirm the existence of 
such a distinction between usage and practice. Thus, Qhaleb Joudeh stated that the 
UCP is not considered as law in the sense of de jure, but as a matter of fact it is law 
for banks as the bank which deals with documentary credits not subject to the UCP 
might suffer negative consequences the harshest of which is the exclusion from the 
documentary credit business community. In this respect he said “we exclude some 
of the UCP terms but we cannot actually dare to exclude its essence or spirit”. Four 
other bankers stated that their “banks are obliged” to apply the UCP and that the 
banks cannot entirely exclude the application of the UCP, but they can merely 
exclude and change some of the UCP terms. 136 So there is a common sense that the 
application of the UCP is binding upon banks, namely it is a trade usage and not a 
mere trade practice. There is also market practice (e.g. the period of examining 
documents in documentary credits is three banking days by the vast majority of 
banks)137 that is commonly and regularly adopted by the majority of banks without 
the sense of being binding, although such practice might create an expectation of 
repetition. Qhaleb Joudeh stated that as a matter of good practice the bank needs 
to examine the documents in a maximum of three banking days, even though it has 
a five banking days period for examination pursuant to UCP 600.138 
                                                          
136 Annex I, para 12.  
137 Annex I, para 33.  
138 Annex I, para 33.  
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2.2.7 Acclamation. The normativity force of practice and usage is generated by 
acclamation, namely, spontaneous regular adoption with observance of acceptance. 
Practice and usage are, therefore, the spontaneous creation of actors in a particular 
trade and therefore they are particular in the sense of being associated to a particular 
trade139 or locality. Generally speaking the more particular the usage the more 
certain it is.  
 
2.2.8 Lex mercatoria. Under systems theory, Teubner proposes that one can speak of 
law when (1) conflicts are defined by an institutionalised conflict resolution as a 
divergence of expectation, and (2) conflicts are resolved by the use of the code 
legal/illegal (acceptance/rejection).140 According to Teubner, lex mercatoria can be 
a socially diffuse law or even a partially autonomous legal system. By lex mercatoria, 
Teubner must mean trading rules that have an institutionalised process of conflict 
resolution (e.g. disputes are invariably referred to the same arbitral body) testing 
the disputed state of affairs against the common practice and usage of traders and 
using the code legal/illegal (acceptance/rejection) accordingly. This type of 
institutionalised lex mercatoria (of which there are many examples viz. the trading 
rules of the Grain and Free Trade Association and the International Cotton 
Association to name but two), is a socially diffuse law as it is still produced by 
reference to external factors (i.e. practice and usage) as trading expectations are 
based on them. This lex mercatoria recognises its own components: process 
(conflict), element (action), structure (social norm) and identity (world-view).141 
Such lex mercatoria might develop into a partially autonomous system once it 
elevates itself to the level of being self-referential in the determination of its 
decisions, particularly by developing its own internal structure for the development 
                                                          
139 Goode, Rule, Practice, and pragmatism in transnational commercial law [2005] International & Comparative 
Law Quarterly 539, 547-548. 
140 Teubner, Law As An Autopoietic System, (1993, The European University Institute) p.38.  
141 Teubner, Law As An Autopoietic System, (1993, The European University Institute).  
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of legal norms (i.e. similar to the Hartian rule of recognition concept). The issue here 
is that the conceptual models of Luhmann and Teubner in systems theory would 
perceive practice and usage as being non-binding social norms that are distinct from 
the normatively binding concepts of such institutionalised lex mercatoria. It is the 
latter (rather than practice or usage per se) that can constitute a socially diffuse law 
and eventually develop into a partially autonomous legal system within the 
conceptual models of Luhmann and Teubner.  
 
2.2.9 Usages as lex mercatoria. It is however argued in this thesis that to consider 
usage as law (i.e. lex or socially diffuse law) it is neither necessary to have an 
adjudicating body to determine disputes nor an institutionalised resolution process. 
Instead it is contended that, free actors (such as traders, bankers or insurers)142 who 
resolve controversial behaviours by firstly testing them against their own usages and 
secondly, by their actions, classifying them as being acceptable or unacceptable 
(through the use of the code acceptance/rejection) are essentially creating socially 
diffuse law. The element of the ‘sense of being binding’ in usages is essential for the 
operation of the code acceptance/rejection. Without such an element, a state of 
affairs might be generally accepted although it contravenes the expectation of 
repetition. A mere practice, therefore, must become usage in order to elevate to the 
level of law. A classic example of usage as being a socially diffuse law (lex 
mercatoria) is the acceptance or rejection of a state of affairs in a particular port by 
carriers, consignors and consignees according to the usages of that port. The 
observable application and normative force of such usage is apparent to those 
operating at that port and particular to the location of that port and will have the 
sense of being binding thereby creating behavioural expectations  amongst traders 
in that locality.  
  
                                                          
142 On the basis of exchange on intangibles in social groups under a system of exchange in the free market: 
Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory, (1st edn Harvard University Press 1990) ch 2.    
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2.2.10 The effect of the normative force of usages (generated by acclamation and 
adherence) in a particular context (i.e. either a particular locality for lex mercatoria 
or a particular transnational transaction for international lex mercatoria as explained 
below) is not only that usages become social norms constituting normative 
propositions (in the sense of being binding), but such normativity also generates 
further structural components. These further structural components are that of: (1) 
a process where controversial behaviours are tested as a divergence of expectation 
against the norms; (2) a decision whereby the actors by their actions in either 
rejecting or accepting a state of affairs develop new practices; and (3) an identity 
whereby the particular social group operating those practices become distinct. This 
lex mercatoria operates when usages are associated to a particular transaction or 
locality, because such usages are generally certain (i.e. some means of functional 
coherence at a particular time and having the above components)143 due to the fact 
that outsiders have alternative localities and this alleviates constant challenges to 
such usages. The inquiry is therefore whether usages can operate as lex mercatoria 
on an international or delocalised level. Given various autopoietic legal systems and 
the variability of economic and political factors worldwide, the question is whether 
usages can ever be commonly applied with some means of functional coherence 
(having the above social components at a particular time) by both free actors (e.g. 
traders) across the borders and adjudicating bodies (e.g. courts) of various Municipal 
legal orders?  
 
2.2.11 The conventional view is that usages only become internationally de juris when they 
are recognised, explicitly (i.e. by declaring the usage as law) or implicitly (i.e. by the 
fact that the usage fulfils the external criteria to become binding under the relevant 
legal order) under many different legal orders each of which operates as a distinct 
autopoietic system. According to this view, trade usage de juris varies across legal 
                                                          
143 Goode, Usage and its reception in transnational commercial law [1997] International & Comparative Law 
Quarterly 1, 14. 
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orders and its recognition depends on the reception of trade usage de facto by the 
relevant legal order. 144 It is submitted in this thesis that international usages only 
exist, as de facto and de juris, if they are embedded in a particular transaction which 
is inherently transnational, and that the rejection by a Municipal legal order to 
recognise an embedded usage of a particular transaction would functionally lead to 
a rejection of the whole transaction. This is because in relation to a particular 
transaction the normative propositions developed by usages, referred to in the 
previous paragraph, generate the above structural components (i.e. process, 
decision and identity) in addition to the component of embedded usages or overriding 
norms of the transaction (as the particular context must be a transaction vis–a-vis 
a place). For a particular transnational transaction, the process is that controversial 
behaviours are tested as a divergence of expectation against the embedded usages. 
Also, the normativity force of international embedded trade usages has the potential 
of being part of the structure (i.e. having the highest order in the doctrines or 
components of an autopoietic legal order)145 of many Municipal legal orders world-
wide. Therefore, as illustrated below in the embedded usage of irrevocability under 
English law, international embedded usages have the normativity force to even 
override mandatory law under autopoietic Municipal legal orders, but their normative 
force is subject to the overriding mandatory law (i.e. a prohibition by a national 
parliament of certain activities: the norm of the parliamentary sovereignty has a very 
high hierarchical status in the structure of many Municipal legal order) that is 
perceived by the state or the legal order as fundamental to the structure of the legal 
order. 146 Also the normative force of international embedded usages is subject to 
the freedom to contract which is a transnational overriding mandatory law as it is 
driven from the ideology of free market.    
                                                          
144 Goode, Rule, Practice, and pragmatism in transnational commercial law [2005] International & Comparative 
Law Quarterly 539. 
145 The component of structure in legal orders has the highest hierarchal level: Teubner, Law As An Autopoietic 
System, (1edn 1993, Blackwell Publishers) ch 2 & 3.  
146 Carter, The Role of Public Policy in English Private International Law, [1993] ICLQ, 42, 1 Jan 1-10; Kuwait 
Airways Corp v Iraqi Airways Co (No.6) [2002] 2 A.C. 883. 
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Embedded And Peripheral Trade Usage147 
 
2.2.12 When a particular transaction, institution or instrument – which is usually problem 
orientated - becomes so well known, whether locally, regionally or internationally, 
by virtue of trade usage it conveys with it, as submitted, “embedded” and 
“peripheral” aspects of trade usage.  
 
2.2.13 Embedded usages. Embedded trade usages are those constitutive or fundamental 
principles148 that are necessary to give sense to the commercial transaction, 
institution or instrument, so that the non-recognition of any of these principles 
threatens the viability of the commercial transaction, institution or instrument. Such 
trade usages are characterised in this research as embedded because they are 
associated with the existence of the underlying commercial transaction, institution 
or instrument. Embedded trade usages are implicitly recognised as law – in relation 
to commonly accepted particular commercial transactions - by both merchants and 
courts and they can be international lex mercatoria. Once a particular commercial 
transaction (e.g. bills of exchange or documentary credits) is recognised by a legal 
order, embedded trade usages of such a transaction are, and must be, recognised 
by that legal order as a matter of rational deduction to the effect that the 
communicated embedded trade usage de facto generates an internal communication 
within the legal order to give de jure effect to that trade usage within the autonomous 
constraints of that legal order.  
 
                                                          
147 They are called “unchangeable” and “changeable” in a previous paper presented at the annual conference of 
the Society of Legal Scholars: Hwaidi and Ferris ‘The Existence of International Unchangeable and Changeable 
Trade Usage’ (SLS Conference, Edinburgh, September 2013) 
<http://archive.legalscholars.ac.uk/edinburgh/restricted/paper.cfm?id=107>. 
148 Principles are distinct from rules in terms that the former represent the underlying purposes and policy of law, 
whereas the latter are more specific and technical that enjoy far more formal realisability: Kennedy, Form and 
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, [1976] 89 Harvard Law Review 1685. 
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2.2.14 Peripheral usages. By contrast, peripheral trade usages are that usage the absence 
of which does not threaten the existence of the underlying commercial transaction, 
institution or instrument, they are the usages that do not reflect the concrete nature 
of the underlying transaction and they rather reflect the interests of internal actors 
which are changeable from place to place and, time to time. Peripheral usage is a 
distinctive creature of a particular locality or community. Peripheral usage therefore 
cannot be internationally certain as it reflects the interests of the actors in a locality 
or a particular community which differ from the interests of actors in other localities 
or communities. Peripheral usage might therefore be rejected or dramatically 
changed by other communities and legal systems since it is not fundamental to the 
underlying transnational transaction. Peripheral usages are lex mercatoria in their 
locality (e.g. Jordanian banking community) but are not international lex mercatoria. 
 
2.2.15 Illustrations. The usage of applying the UCP to documentary credits in Jordan, as 
clarified by the empirical findings,149 is an example of peripheral usage. Thus in 
countries such as the UK, documentary credits prior to 1963 used to be issued 
without being subject to the UCP and that did not threaten the existence of 
documentary credits. Similarly, if we suppose that the period of three banking days 
in examining documents in documentary credits was usage, and not a mere market 
practice,150 in Jordan, here such usage would clearly be peripheral because it would 
solely be the creation of the Jordanian banking community and it might thus 
substantially differ in other countries without affecting the viability of documentary 
credits. By contrast, the norms of irrevocability, autonomy and conformity are 
embedded usages in documentary credit as elucidated below.  
 
 
 
                                                          
149 Annex I, para 12.  
150 Annex I, para 23. 
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IRREVOCABILITY 
 
2.2.16 One of the embedded trade usages of documentary credits is that the bank which 
issues the credit is under an obligation from the moment of issuing the credit, or the 
moment that the beneficiary has received the advice of issuing the credit, to make 
payment to the beneficiary who presents the required documents, and such an 
obligation of payment cannot be revoked without the acceptance of the 
beneficiary.151 If the bank were not obliged to make payment then sellers would not 
accept the documentary credit as a form of payment, simply because it would not 
be a secure method of payment and therefore it would be useless.152  
 
2.2.17 Unsurprisingly, the irrevocable obligation to make payment in documentary credits 
was implicit in the first attempt to promulgate banking “regulation” for uniform 
practices in documentary credits: “Regulations Affecting Export Commercial 
Credits”.153 Documentary credits are presumed irrevocable under common law154 and 
Jordanian law155 unless otherwise expressed.156 Surprisingly, the first version of the 
UCP attempted to relieve the banks from the obligations of irrevocability, by 
providing that a documentary credit was assumed revocable (i.e. the issuing bank 
has the right to cancel or amend the revocable credit at any time and without prior 
notice to the beneficiary)157 unless the credit was made expressly irrevocable.158 This 
                                                          
151 “Regulations Affecting Export Commercial Credits”, New York Bankers Commercial Credit Conference  (1920); 
Article 6 UCP 500; Articles 2, 7, 8 UCP 600; English law: Hamzeh Malas Sons v British Imex Industries Ltd [1958] 
2 Q.B. 127, 127 per Jenkins LJ; USA: Foglino & Co v Webster, 216 N.Y.S. 225 (1926); West Virginia Housing 
Dev Fund v Sorka 415 F Sunn1107 (1976); cf; Sarna, Letters of Credit The Law and Current Practice, (3rd edn, 
Carswell 1992) para 1.8.1; UCC, S. 2 (325) (3); s. 5 (106) (a) of the revised UCC now states that “a letter of 
credit is revocable only if provides so”; McCurdy, Commercial Letters of Credit, [1922] Harvard Law Review 
Association 539, 556; Germany: Oelofse, The Law of Documentary Letters of Credit in Comparative Perspective, 
(1st edn, Interlegal 1997) 30; Jordan: Court of Distinction (Civil) 152/1975 Adalah Programme.  
152 Cape Asbestos Co Ltd v Lloyds Bank Ltd [1921] WN 274, obiter, per Mr. Justice Bailhache: the judge used the 
term “unconfirmed” as a synonym for revocable.  
153 Adopted by the New York Bankers Commercial Credit Conference of 1920.  
154 Giddens v Anglo-African Produce Company Ltd (1923) 14 Lloyd’s L. Rep 230; in USA: UCC s. 2-325 (3).  
155 Court of Distinction (Civil), 152/1975, Adalah Programme. 
156 This is also the position in Germany: Oelofse, The Law of Documentary Letters of Credit in Comparative 
Perspective, (1st edn, Interlegal 1997) 30.  
157 For the meaning of revocable documentary credits: article 8 UCP 1974; Cape Asbestos Co Ltd v Lloyds Bank 
Ltd [1921] WN 274; Panoutsos v Raymond Hadley Corporation of New York [1917] 2 K.B. 473. 
158 Article 3 of UCP 1933, Brochure 82, ICC. 
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remained the UCP position until 1993 when UCP 500 was promulgated.159 Despite 
the widespread adoption of the earlier versions of the UCP by bankers and traders 
the revocable credit was never widely used. 
 
2.2.18 In practice, almost all banks and traders expressly contracted for irrevocable 
documentary credits between 1933 and 1993.160 This fact is evidence of the 
existence for de facto embedded trade usage of irrevocability. The UCP preference 
for revocability was impotent against the normative force of the embedded aspect of 
usage. Even where parties chose to incorporate the heterodoxical UCP into their 
contract they amended it in this respect. The UCP presumption of revocability was 
replaced by a presumption of irrevocability by UCP 500;161 and finally in 2007 UCP 
600 declared that documentary credits can only be irrevocable.162 The ICC thus spent 
over half a century in a futile attempt to shift trade usage or custom on the nature 
of the payment obligation in documentary credits. The victory of embedded trade 
usage and the underlying understanding, expectations, and norms, is now complete, 
and documentary credits are irrevocable under UCP 600. Indeed being responsive to 
the norms materialising the underlying policy of documentary credits is essential not 
only for the commonality of any rule but also for its survival. 
 
2.2.19 The irrevocability principle is enforceable under English law even though it violates 
the Common law requirement that consideration be reciprocal. Jenkins LJ stated the 
position in Hamzeh Malas Sons v British Imex Industries Ltd:163 
 
                                                          
159 Taylor, The Complete UCP, (1st edn, ICC 2008).  
160 Goode, Usage and its reception in transnational commercial law [1997] International & Comparative Law 
Quarterly 1, 14.  
161 Article 6 UCP 500.  
162 Articles 2, 7, 8 UCP 600.  
163[1958] 2 Q.B. 127, 129. 
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“An elaborate commercial system has been built up on the footing that bankers' 
confirmed credits are … [binding] … and, in my judgment, it would be wrong for this 
court in the present case to interfere with that established practice”.  
 
Here the “commercial system” is recognised as being capable of infringing the 
doctrines of Common law by way of being treated as an exception and the source of 
undertakings. The result must be correct, but the explanations of the result are 
inadequate whilst there is a lack of a clear recognition of embedded trade usages.   
 
 
CONFORMITY 
 
2.2.20 The second embedded trade usage in documentary credits is the principle of 
conformity. Indeed documentary credits were evolved from letters of credit on the 
basis that the payment in the credit is conditional upon presenting documents that 
are in compliance with the terms of the credit.164 The principle of conformity or 
compliance of documents is described as regular order by international banking 
community,165 strict compliance under Common law166 and absolute compliance 
under Jordanian law.167 The law was stated by Viscount Summer in Equitable Trust 
Co of New York v Dawson Partners Ltd:168 
 
“It is both common ground and common sense that in such a transaction the 
accepting bank can only claim indemnity if the conditions on which it is authorized 
to accept are in the matter of the accompanying documents strictly observed”. 
                                                          
164 Above: para 2.1.9. 
165 Draft Uniform Regulations on Export Commercial Credits (1927) presented to ICC’s fourth Conference: Taylor, 
The Complete UCP, (1st edn, ICC 2008), 30. See also: article 10 UCP (1933) No. 82 and article 9 UCP (1951) 
No.151.  
166 Equitable Trust Co of New York v Dawson Partners Ltd (1926) 27 Lloyd’s Rep 49, 52.  
167 Court of Distinction (Civil), 316/1988, Alkustas programme.  
168 (1926) 27 Lloyd’s Rep 49, 52; Gian Singh & Co Ltd v Banque de l’Indonchine [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1234, 1240: 
“This oft-cited passage has never been questioned or improved upon” per Lord Diplock; English, Scottish and 
Australian Bank Ltd v Bank of South Africa (1922) 13 Lloyd’s Rep 21, 24.  
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2.2.21 Accordingly, it was not only that this embedded trade usage fulfilled the common 
requirements for trade usage, there was a “common sense” that the documentary 
credit could not be workable if this embedded trade usage did not exist. The buyer 
would be entirely vulnerable if the principle of conformity did not apply because the 
sole means available to the buyer for self-protection, the requirement of documents 
evidencing due shipment would be useless in the absence of the principle.169 
 
AUTONOMY170 
 
2.2.22 The third embedded trade usage in documentary credits is the norm of autonomy in 
documentary credits: the requirement that the documentary credit contract is 
independent from any underlying sale contract and from the actual facts.171 It was 
described by Lord Diplock in United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank 
of Canada172 as a “trite law” that this principle applies, he further elucidated:  
 
“The whole commercial purpose for which the system of confirmed irrevocable 
documentary credits has been developed in international trade is to give to the seller 
an assured right to be paid before he parts with control of the goods that does not 
permit of any dispute with the buyer as to the performance of the contract of sale 
being used as a ground for non-payment or reduction or deferment of payment.” 173 
 
                                                          
169 This is the dichotomy between traveller letters of credit and the modern documentary letters of credit: Elinger, 
Documentary Letters of Credit: A Comparative Study, (1st edn, Singapore Press 1970), 24-38.     
170 Chapter 5. 
171 Jordanian law: Court of Distinction (Civil), 1050/2006, Adalah Programme; UCP: articles 4, 5 UCP 600; articles 
3, 4 UCP 500; article 1”Regulations Affecting Export Commercial Credits”, New York Bankers Commercial Credit 
Conference (1920). 
172 [1983] 1 AC 168, 182.  
173 United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1983] 1 AC 168, 183.  
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The House of Lords in this case relied on both logic and trade usage to recognise that 
the trade usage is so fundamental that it constitutes the “whole commercial purpose” 
of the transaction. Thus it is embedded usage to the transaction.  
 
HIERARCHY AND CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
 
2.2.23 The above three examples of principles derived from trade usage should be regarded 
as embedded within the nature of documentary credit transactions. They can be 
recognised as capable of having the effects of law (i.e. international lex mercatoria), 
by for instance being judicially noticed without the need of proof by expert 
evidence,174  whenever a legal system recognises the use of documentary credits. 
Embedded trade usages need to be demarcated from peripheral trade usage and 
accorded a higher status in the hierarchy of legal norms than mere peripheral trade 
usage in order that the integrity of the transaction they support is maintained both 
across legal orders and over time.   
 
2.2.24 Due to the freedom of contract that is caused by the ideology of a free market, it is 
essential for legal orders to be reliable in their delivery of conceptually useful tools 
and outcomes to facilitate the realisation of the parties’ objectively intended bargain 
lest parties chose other legal systems to give effect to their transnational 
transactions. Therefore, it is important for a Municipal legal order to accept 
embedded usages of transnational transactions and not to reject or dramatically 
change an embedded usage in a transnational transaction, otherwise the legal order 
would be perceived as rejecting the whole transaction and that would affect its 
reputation as a useful legal order. Given the force of globalisation the embedded 
usages of transnational transactions are becoming part of the social component of 
“structure” in Municipal legal orders and such a component has the highest order 
                                                          
174 Hamzeh Malas Sons v British Imex Industries Ltd [1958] 2 Q.B. 127; United City Merchants (Investments) 
Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1983] 1 AC 168.  
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amongst the other social components (i.e. process, element and identity) that 
enables a legal order to successfully operate as a fully functioning social system.175 
As illustrated above the embedded usage of irrevocability in documentary credits 
was accepted under Common law regardless of the fact that it contravened its 
mandatory legal doctrine that consideration be reciprocal.176 Accordingly, it can be 
contended that there is already an implicit recognition that internationally embedded 
usages (international lex mercatoria) is becoming part of what is regarded under 
systems theory the structural component (similar to constitutional law) of the 
Common law social system. Therefore such an international lex mercatoria binds 
even mandatory law under autopoietic Municipal legal orders, but it is subject to 
overriding mandatory law (i.e. a prohibition by a national parliament of certain 
activities: the norm of the parliamentary sovereignty has a very high hierarchical 
status in the structure of many Municipal legal order)177 and freedom to contract.    
 
2.2.25 A regulator of documentary credits must therefore give effect to the embedded 
usages of irrevocability, autonomy and conformity. The underlying need and the 
function of the principle of irrevocability is the security of payment to sellers as 
logically deducted in Cape Asbestos Co Ltd v Lloyds Bank Ltd178 where Justice 
Bailhache stated that without the irrevocability principle documentary credits would 
be useless. The underlying need of assurance of payment for sellers and banks is 
made concrete by the function of the autonomy principle whereby the bank is not 
entitled to examine any of the underlying transactions. The principle of conformity 
functions as a documentary proof of the shipment of the required goods in order to 
fulfil the need of buyers for an assurance of delivery against payment.179 
                                                          
175 In contrast Teubner argued that international trade usages as part of globalisation break the frames of the 
boundaries of autopoietic Municipal legal systems:  Teubner, Breaking Frames: The Global Interplay of Legal 
and Social Systems, [1997] The American Journal of Comparative Law (45) 149. 
176 United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1983] AC 168, 182 per Lord Diplock 
177 Carter, The Role of Public Policy in English Private International Law, [1993] ICLQ, 42, 1 Jan 1-10; Kuwait 
Airways Corp v Iraqi Airways Co (No.6) [2002] 2 A.C. 883. 
178 [1921] WN 274.  
179 As this is the dichotomy between traveller letters of credit and the modern documentary letters of credit: 
Elinger, Documentary Letters of Credit: A Comparative Study, (1st edn, Singapore Press 1970), 24-38.     
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English Law 
 
2.2.26 Three categories of practice. English law distinguishes between three categories 
of trade practice, namely: (1) trade usage which is a synonym for trade custom180 
embracing both embedded and peripheral trade custom; (2) the market practices of 
traders in the context of the recognition of their settled and established trading 
practices; and (3) the established course of dealing of particular traders in the 
context of their particular trades.  
 
2.2.27 Trade usage. The term trade usage is a synonym for “trade custom” but the latter 
is usually used in relation to a particular place (e.g. custom of a port).181 For the 
practice to amount to a recognised usage by English law, it must be182 (i) certain, in 
the sense that the practice is uniform and clearly established;183 (ii) notorious, in the 
sense that the practice is so well known in the market in which it is alleged to exist, 
so everybody in the particular trade enters into a contract with that usage as being 
an implied term that does not need to be expressed;184 (iii) binding, in so far as 
being perceived as having binding effects upon any person involving in the particular 
trade in which the practice operates;185 (v) reasonable,186 although if a party knows 
of the unreasonable practice and agrees to it then, though unreasonable, he is bound 
by it unless the practice contravenes mandatory law or public policy.187  
 
                                                          
180 Strathlorne Steamship Co Ltd v Hugh Baird & Sons Ltd 1916 S.C. (H.L.) 134, 136 per Lord Chancellor; 
Exxonmobil Sales and Supply Group v Texaco [2003] EWHC 1964 Com 24.   
181 Smith & Service v Rosario Nitrate Company, Limited [1894] 1 Q.B. 174.  
182 Nelson v Dahl (1879) 12 Ch. D. 568, 575 per Sir George Jessel; Cunliffe-Owen v Teather [1967] 1 W.L.R. 
1421, 1437 per Ungoed-Thomas J; Rutherford v Seymour Pierce Ltd [2010] EWHC 375 (Q.B.), [19]. 
183 Cunliffe-Owen v Teather [1967] 1 W.L.R. 1421, 1437 per Ungoed-Thomas J; Nelson v Dahl (1879) 12 Ch. D. 
568, 575 per Sir George Jessel who stated: “certain as the written contract itself”. 
184 In Re Goetz, Jonas & Co [1898] 1 Q.B. 787; Moult v Halliday [1898] 1 Q.B. 125. 
185 Strathlorne Steamship Co Ltd v Hugh Baird & Sons Ltd 1916 S.C. (H.L.) 134, 141 per Lord Shaw. 
186 Joseph Tucker v Joseph Linger (1883) 8 App. Cas. 508; reasonableness is assumed where the practice is 
accepted practice and well known: Strathlorne Steamship Co Ltd v Hugh Baird & Sons Ltd 1916 S.C. (H.L.) 134, 
136 per Lord Chancellor.    
187 Perry v Barnett (1885) 15 Q.B.D. 388, 397 per Bowen LJ. 
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2.2.28 Generally speaking trade usage is effective through contract under English law.188 
Thus trade usage has the effects of being an implied term to contracts in a particular 
trade189 or an interpretive aid to contractual terms (i.e. usage might change the 
ordinary meaning of a contractual term if it is so notorious).190 Trade usage cannot 
be annexed to a contract where it causes insensibility or inconsistency to the terms 
of the contract.191 To be effective trade usage must not be in defiance to mandatory 
law to usage that has been judicially noticed and has become part of Common law.192 
Usage is treated as a matter of fact until eventually, after generally being proved so 
often in courts, it becomes so well understood that the courts take judicial notice of 
it.193 The existence of embedded trade usage is the focus of this thesis as it is the 
main element in the conceptual model, and therefore English cases as to the role of 
peripheral usage in the interpretation of contractual terms are not analysed.   
 
2.2.29 Implicit recognition of embedded usage. However, where usage is so notorious, by 
being as submitted embedded, and not peripheral,194 to the particular notorious 
commercial institution then usage can be a source of law creating rights and duties 
on parties who are privy to a contract and thus such usage is effective even if it 
contravenes mandatory law, except public policy and public morality, and it would 
be regarded as an exception - and not a replacement – to that mandatory law.195 As 
explained above the embedded usage of irrevocability provides a stark example for 
the recognition of embedded usage as a source of undertakings rather than contract 
                                                          
188 McKendrick (ed), Goode on Commercial Law, (4th ed, LexisNexis 2009), 14. 
189 Nelson v Dahl (1879) 12 Ch. D. 568, 575 per Sir George Jessel; Cunliffe-Owen v Teather [1967] 1 W.L.R. 
1421, 1437; Rutherford v Seymour Pierce Ltd [2010] EWHC 375 (Q.B.), [19].  
190 Nielsen & Co. v Wait, James & Co (1885) 16 Q.B.D. 67; Andressen v Shields & Brown (1897) 5 S.L.T. 52; 
Jacobsen, Sons & Co. v Underwood & Son (Limited) (1893) 1 S.L.T. 422; different witness opinions will not be 
taken into account if they were in conflict: Birrell and Others v Dryer and Others (1884) 9 App. Cas. 345.  
191 Joseph Tucker v Joseph Linger (1883) 8 App. Cas. 508; Palgrave Brown & Son, Ltd. v Owners of S.S. Turid 
[1922] 1 AC 397; Aktieselkab Helios v Ekman & Co [1897] 2 Q.B. 83. 
192 Goodwin v Robarts (1875) LR 10 Exch 337 at 357, Ex Ch, per Cockburn CJ; Brandao v Barnett and Others 
(1846) 3 Common Bench Reports 519, 136 E.R. 207, [530] per Lord Campbel; Halsbury's Laws of England, 
(2012) volume 32.2. para 61. 
193 Universo Insurance Company of Milan v Merchants Marine Insurance Company, Limited [1897] 2 Q.B. 93, 96 
per Lord Esher; Moult v Halliday [1898] 1 Q.B. 125; Brandao v Barnett and Others (1846) 3 Common Bench 
Reports 519, 136 E.R. 207, [530] per Lord Campbel: “when a general usage has been judicially ascertained and 
established, it becomes part of the law-merchant”. 
194 Below para 2.2.5. 
195 Goodwin v Robarts L. R. 10 Ex. 337; Rumball v Metropolitan Bank  2 Q. B. D. 194; Bechaunaland Exploration 
Company v London Trading Bank, Limited [1898] 2 Q.B. 65. 
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law regardless of the fact that it contravened with the Common law doctrine that 
consideration be reciprocal.196  
 
2.2.30 A second example of embedded trade usage under English law is the negotiability of 
bills of exchange being an exception to mandatory law that a party to a contract is 
not permitted to transfer his right under the contract to another person.197 Thus the 
embedded trade usage of negotiability faced rejections by the legal communications 
of Common law and pleaders in the seventeenth century used to plead the 
negotiability of bills of exchange on immemorial local custom.198 Bowen LJ in Picker 
v The London and County Banking Company, Limited199 used the phrase “well known 
to law merchants” to signify the effect of the trade usage of the negotiability of bills 
of exchange as an  exception to mandatory Common law. Such a phrase was later 
interpreted by Kennedy J in Bechaunaland Exploration Company v London Trading 
Bank, Limited200 as denoting the modern law merchant or trade usage and not merely 
the ancient law merchant.201 The usage of negotiability has become part of the 
structure (in addition to the embedded usage that bills of exchange are orders of 
payment) of the commercial viability of bills of exchange and it is therefore lex 
mercatoria (i.e. being used as a reference to the code of legal/illegal by actors in 
testing a controversial behaviour in connection to bills of exchange).      
 
2.2.31 A third example emanates from the transaction of bills of lading.202 A bill of lading 
functions as evidence to the delivery and shipment of goods. This embedded usage 
is part of the structure of bills of lading and its non-recognition under a legal order 
                                                          
196 Para 2.2.19.  
197 Picker v The London and County Banking Company, Limited (1887) 18 Q.B.D. 515, 520 per Bowen LJ; Lord 
Irvine, The Law: An Engine for Trade, [2001] Modern Law Review, May 64 (3) 333, 339; cited; Three Rivers v 
Bank of England [1996] QB 92.   
198 Pleaders in the seventeenth century used to plead the negotiability of bills of exchange on immemorial local 
custom: Halsbury Laws of England, (5th edn, 2012), 32 para 62.  
199 (1887) 18 Q.B.D. 515, 520.  
200 [1898] 2 Q.B. 658, 668, 674.    
201 The concept of ancient law merchants denotes the usage from immemorial time or the usage that was 
recognised by the courts of merchants.  
202 Harris, Ridley’s Law of the Carriage of Goods by Land Sea and Air, (8th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2010) para 
3.2.3.  
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would lead to the collapse of the transaction of bills of lading under that legal order.  
The other usage is the treatment of a bill of lading as a document of title. Such usage 
started to develop around the eighteenth century and has become embedded in the 
modern trade. The evolutionary process of bills of lading was elucidated in the 
Rafeala by Lord Steyn:  
 
“One must start with the function of the bill of lading in international trade. Through 
the centuries that role has changed. What started as a bailment receipt of goods 
developed into a receipt containing the contract of carriage, and in the course of time 
acquired a third characteristic, that of a negotiable document of title. In modern 
commercial usage the bill of lading is one of the pillars of international trade, 
providing the credit necessary for the financing of mercantile trade.”203 
 
2.2.32 By the embedded usage of documentary title a bill of lading is symbolic of the right 
of the possession of goods and it can be freely transferred to third parties. The carrier 
is obliged to deliver the goods, and thus the possession of the goods,204 only to the 
person who presents the bill of lading. Such trade usage was elegantly described by 
Bowen LJ in Sanders Bros v Maclean & Co:205 
 
“A cargo at sea while in the hands of the carrier is necessarily incapable of physical 
delivery. During this period of transit and voyage, the bill of lading by the law 
merchant is universally recognised as its symbol, and the indorsement and delivery 
of the bill of lading operates as a symbolic delivery of the cargo”.  
 
                                                          
203 J I Macwilliam Co Inc v Mediterranean Shipping Co SA (“the Rafaela”) [2005] 2 A.C. 423, 453 -454.  
204 Harris, Ridley’s Law of the Carriage of Goods by Land Sea and Air, (8th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2010) para 
3.2.3.4.3: “the real significance of the bill of lading lies in the right which it embodies to possession of the 
goods from the carrier”.  
205 (1883) 11 QBD 327.  
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As the trade usage of documentary title has become part of the structure of bills of 
lading, it was recognised under Common law regardless that it had contravened with 
the traditional Common law doctrine that contractual rights cannot be 
transferable.206 Accordingly, a bill of lading was founded on the embedded usage 
that it is a receipt of goods, so the absence of such usage leads to the collapse of 
the transaction of bills of lading. But such a structure was developed by the 
spontaneous practices of traders, so the new usage of document of title became part 
of the structure when it had been accepted and applied by most traders and legal 
orders across borders. Therefore, a non-recognition of the embedded usage of 
document of title by a legal order would threaten the viability of bills of lading under 
that legal order.  
 
2.2.33 Market practice. The second category is market practice which is distinguished 
from trade usage, by the words of Lord Shaw: 
 
“The distinction should be made plain between a settled and established practice in 
the general sense of the mere occurrence of instances (many of which may have 
sprung from express contract), and a settled and established practice which amounts 
to the acceptance of a binding obligation of a custom apart from particular 
bargain”.207  
 
The role of market practice became important after the new approach of the test of 
a reasonable reader against the matrix of fact,208 and where there is more than one 
possible construction the court takes the one that is consistent with business 
common sense, in the interpretation of contracts under English law.209 Thus market 
                                                          
206 Lickbarrow v Mason (1794) 5 T.R. 683. 
207 Strathlorne Steamship Co Ltd v Hugh Baird & Sons Ltd 1916 S.C. (H.L.) 134, 141.  
208 Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank [2011] 1 W.L.R. 2900. 
209 Prenn v Simmonds [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1381, 1383 per Lord Wilberforce; Reardon Smith Line Ltd. v Yngvar 
Hansen-Tangen [1976] 1 W.L.R. 989 per Lord Wilberforce; American Airlines Inc v Hope [1974] 2 Lloyd's Rep 
301, 305 per Lord Diplock; Reasonable reader: Attorney General of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd [2009] 1 W.L.R. 
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practice is part of the matrix of fact of a contract where the parties are internal actors 
of the relevant market, and as such market practice has usually the same effects of 
trade usage.210 The difference is that there is no requirement for the validity of the 
practice to be perceived as being binding and rather it is sufficient that the practice 
is regular in the sense of generating an expectation of repetition. Still for market 
practice to be considered part of the matrix of fact the practice must be proved and 
that the parties must take notice of it in the particular bargain, and that would be 
presumed where the parties are internal actors. But, unlike practice, trade usage 
applies whether or not the parties are internal actors in the relevant market since 
usage is perceived as both being binding on its relevant institution, marketplace or 
locality. Of course, market practice cannot contravene mandatory law unless – 
subject to the rules of public policy and public morality - it is clearly proved that the 
contractual parties intend to adopt the practice instead of the default rule of law.   
 
2.2.34 Previous course of dealing. The third category is course of dealing which is what 
is adopted consistently on similar occasions between the same parties. Contractual 
terms are incorporated on the basis of the previous course of dealing between the 
parties.211 An applied mode of dealing of a particular firm in a particular trade cannot 
be imposed on another party unless it is proved that it has actually taken notice of 
it.212  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1988 per Lord Hoffman; Investors Compensation Scheme LTD v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 W.L.R. 
896, 912 per Lord Hoffman; Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank  [2011] 1 W.L.R. 2900.  
210 Lloyds TSB Bank Plc v Clarke (Liquidator of Socimer International Bank Ltd) [2002] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 992 ; 
Crema v Cenkos Securities Plc [2011] 1 W.L.R. 2066.  
211 Henry Kendall & Sons v William Lillico & Sons Ltd [1969] 2 AC 31.   
212 Beale and others (eds), Chitty on Contracts (31st edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2010) para 13.022.  
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JORDANIAN LAW 
 
2.2.35 Two categories of practice. Jordanian law explicitly distinguishes between two 
categories of practice being trade usage or custom, and practice or occurrence of 
instances.  
 
2.2.36 Trade usage. Custom or usage must be notorious, longstanding, certain, consistent 
and should not contravene mandatory law213 or public policy or public morality.214 
There is no authority in Jordan suggesting that the meaning of longstanding refers 
to time immemorial, as under English law in respect of custom in land law, but such 
a term denotes that usage must be well established for many years in the sense of 
it being well known. Unlike English law, for a practice to amount to trade usage it 
does not need the requirement of being perceived as having binding effects.215 Also 
usage is regarded as a source of law under Jordanian law where there is lacunae in 
Jordanian codes.216 It is submitted, however, that usage has the effect of law as long 
as it is the prevailed concurrent usage.217  
 
2.2.37 Practice including course of dealing. The second category is what is known as 
practice or occurrence of instances which is given effects ancillary to contracts, by 
being interpretative aids or incorporated terms to contracts. Practice, whether it is 
general or particular,218 needs to be a consistent occurrence of instances or be 
notorious and common in order to have effect.219 Practice is not recognised if it 
contravenes written law.220 Particular practice does include a particular course of 
                                                          
213 Article 4 Commercial Code (1966); custom in civil and not commercial matters should not contravene written 
law: article 2 (1) Civil Code (1976).  
214 Article 2 (3) Civil Code (1976).  
215 Article 2 (3) Civil Code (1976).  
216 Article 2 Civil Code (1976); article 3 Commercial Code (1966).   
217 Article 4 of Commercial Code (1966) employs the word “saad” which denotes notorious, concurrent and 
prevailing usage.  
218 Article 220 (1) Civil Code (1976). 
219 Article 220 (2) Civil Code (1976). 
220 Article 2 Civil Code (1976).  
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dealing between the same parties. As practice is not law, it cannot be regarded as a 
source of law and must thus be proved before courts in each case.  
 
2.2.38 Implicit recognition of embedded usage. The Court of Distinction recognised the 
transaction of documentary credits as an irrevocable binding promise that is 
independent from underlying transactions. Although there was no explicit reference 
to trade usage, it can be clearly inferred that the recognition of the autonomy 
principle was based on international lex mercatoria as the Court did not take into 
account the fundamental doctrine in contract law that a binding promise must have 
a legal cause.221 The negotiability character of bills of exchange is recognised as an 
essential part of bills of exchange under Jordanian law.222 
 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
2.2.39 The distinction by English law between trade usage and market practice is not a 
fiction, since such segmentation is also reflected de facto by Jordanian bankers in 
that trade usage generates the sense of being legally binding where practice 
generates a mere expectation of repetition.223 It follows that the lack of imposing the 
sense of being binding for the recognition of usage under Jordanian law does not 
reflect the sociological facts.224 Thus such an element is decisive to distinguish usage 
from practice in terms that it might be the justification of treating usage as having a 
higher hieratical level than market practice primarily under Jordanian law as usage 
is regarded as law, unlike practice, and operates independently from contract. As 
explained above, for practice to become lex mercatoria it must evolve to usage by 
having the element of the sense of being binding. When one speaks of international 
                                                          
221 Court of Distinction (Civil), 152/1975, Adalah Programme. 
222 Article 141 Jordanian Commercial Code (1966).  
223 Above para 2.2.6; Annex I, 12.  
224 As the empirical findings are based on a qualitative study conducted on small pattern of selected cases, in the 
context of trade usage, a claim for generalizability or even external validity cannot be warranted for the findings.  
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lex mercatoria the practice should not only be usage but also embedded to the 
transaction by being part of the structure, so it can resist a dramatic change under 
a particular legal order. Hence, a state of affair is tested (by the use of code 
acceptance/rejection) by actors (traders and legal orders) against the structure of 
the transaction across borders.   
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THE NATURE OF THE UCP 
 
2.3.1 Self-regulatory rules. The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC),225 being a 
formulating agency of rules, is one of the most powerful international private 
organisations in facilitating the transaction of businesses in international commerce. 
The ICC publishes “self-regulatory rules”226 endeavouring to create certain legal 
environment in a particular transactional field of international trade. Prominent 
among these rules is the UCP which purport to be declarative of pre-existing and 
current practice relative to documentary credits. The Drafting Group of the UCP also 
tries to envisage future evolution of documentary credit practices.227 Given the ICC 
Opinions and other interpretative aids aiming to provide coherence in interpreting 
the UCP by using the code legal/illegal it is appropriate to perceive the UCP as a 
partially-autopoietic system. What differentiates the UCP from international and 
Municipal legal orders is that they are more exposed to external communication as 
the “formal realisability” of the UCP is contingent upon both the legal order that it 
operates within and the trading communications for which it operates. To maintain 
the soft-power of the UCP the internal communication of the UCP (i.e. the terms of 
the UCP and their interpretations as perceived by the ICC or the Banking community) 
must accept external facts (e.g. legal doctrine in a Municipal law or trading needs) 
that are commonly shared amongst legal orders or with trading communities.   
 
2.3.2 Acclamation. The new paradigm in law-making known as privatisation in law-
making228  generates a shift in the creation of many modern international trade 
usages. International trade usage is no longer solely a spontaneous-creation. The 
self-regulatory rules published by private organisations envisage expected future 
                                                          
225 http://www.iccwbo.org. 
226 Such rules are called as “self-regulatory rules” by: Ly, International Business Law and Lex Mercatoria, (1st 
edn, North Holland 1992) 164; they are also called as “code like” by: Berger, The Creeping Codification of the 
New Lex Mercatoria, (2edn, Kluwer Law International 2010) 38-51.  
227 UCP 600, Introduction. 
228 Berger, The Creeping Codification of the New Lex Mercatoria, (2edn, Kluwer Law International 2010) 38-51.  
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trade usage.229 So, the evolution of many modern trade usages begins with an 
express promulgation which acts as an embryonic stage. The second stage is 
acclamation through acceptance and adoption of the proclaimed usage by traders 
and other market participants which is an essential step for the envisaged trade 
usage to qualify as trade usage de facto. Thus the scheme of envisaged trade usage 
needs to be internationally followed by the practice of traders, bankers and the 
involved parties in order to become international trade usage. To become truly 
international usage needs to be embedded to the transaction in order to resist a 
dramatic change under a particular legal order. Accordingly, many modern 
international trade practices are still treated as organic – not legislated – and whilst 
the embryonic stage of such organic practice is not spontaneous the birth of 
international trade usage still requires “spontaneous” behaviours which are in turn 
the proof as to whether a self-regulatory rule is effective. We must beware of claims 
to promulgate international banking practice as a trade usage, even if the attempt 
is temporised by a humility that aspires merely to “reflection”,230 since the validity 
of trade usage must be a matter of acclamation rather than promulgation. In that 
context the nature of the UCP involves the communication of the UCP terms within 
the doctrines of legal orders (i.e. English and Jordanian laws in this research) as to 
both the legal status of the UCP and the interpretation of the UCP terms.    
 
Legal Status Of The UCP 
 
2.3.3 Public and private law. From the perspective of international public law it is clear 
that the UCP are neither regarded as a treaty ratified by authorities representing 
states, nor as customary international law in the sense of being binding custom 
                                                          
229 For example: see the introduced formalities in article 16 UCP 600 as discussed in Hwaidi and Harris, The 
Mechanics of Refusal in Documentary Letter of Credits:An Analysis of the Procedures Introduced in Article 16 
UCP 600, [2013] Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation, 28(4), 146-155. 
230 Such a humility we should recall that was shown by Coke CJKB who asserted the judicial power in the service 
of declaration of the common-law in the seventeenth century.  
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between states. It is also clear from the perspective of private law that in most 
countries the UCP are not legislated as law,231 but it is not clear whether the UCP 
have the force of law through the communication of trade custom or usage under 
legal orders.  
 
2.3.4 Application and terms of the UCP. A dichotomy must be drawn between the 
status of the applicability of the UCP and the status of the UCP terms. The application 
of a UCP term might not be regarded as trade usage but the content of a UCP term 
might be a reflection of existing law or current usage as in the case of UCP 600 
articles declaring the embedded trade usages of autonomy,232 irrevocability233 and 
conformity.234 Or it might be that the application of the UCP is trade usage but the 
terms of the UCP contradict existing law or usages, as did the proposition of 
revocability under UCP 400 explained above.235 Indeed some terms of the UCP 
endeavour to envisage new practices.236 Therefore the UCP terms cannot be taken 
as decisive evidence of current practices but they might be regarded as initial 
evidence that would give way to contrary expert evidence. It is the general view 
under English law that the UCP do not have the force of law,237 in the sense they do 
not operate independently from documentary credit contracts.  
 
2.3.5 Incorporation. It is suggested by many scholars that the UCP are treated as 
standard contractual terms where they are incorporated expressly or implicitly (e.g. 
                                                          
231 The UAE is an exception: UAE Commercial Transaction Law (1993).  
232 Articles 4 and 5 UCP 600. 
233 Articles 1, 7 and 8 UCP 600. 
234 Article 14 UCP 600.  
235 Para 2.2.16.  
236 UCP 600, Introduction.  
237 M. Golodetz & Co. Inc. v Czarnikow-Rionda Co. Inc [1980] 1 W.L.R. 495, dicta, per Donaldson J that the UCP 
“have no force of law”. 
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by a previous course of dealing,238 or tacit understanding so that the failure of making 
a reference to the UCP was a technical error)239 in a documentary credit contract.240  
 
2.3.6 Absence of incorporation. The question is what is the status of the application of 
the UCP when they are not incorporated into a documentary credit contract? The 
answer is quite certain under Jordanian law as the empirical findings of this research 
clarify that it is trade usage in Jordan to apply the UCP to documentary credits.241 
Given the fact that trade usage has the force of law in Jordan the application of the 
UCP, and thus the terms of the UCP, has the force of law subject to the mandatory 
law and, as submitted, embedded trade usage. 
 
2.3.7 The position in the UK is less certain as there is no current legal or empirical evidence 
regarding the practice of the application of the UCP in the UK. However, there is 
strong indication that the practice of applying the UCP by British banks is very 
common,242 so it can be said that it is the market practice in the UK to apply the UCP 
and such a practice might have become usage if it would be proved before courts 
that the application of the UCP is perceived as being binding. It is submitted, 
therefore, that in the absence of a documentary credit contract incorporates the UCP 
by express words or through course of dealing, the UCP would nevertheless be 
applied. Either because their application might be considered peripheral trade usage, 
or because their application might be considered as having been impliedly agreed in 
the light of the modern approach of interpreting contracts by reference to the 
appropriate matrix of facts.243 Except of course where the factual matrix evidences 
                                                          
238 Malek and Quest, Jack: Documentary Credits, (4th edn, Tottel 2009) para 1.28. 
239 Bridge and others (eds) Benjamin’s Sale of Goods (8th edn, Thompson 2010), para 23.08.  
240 Elinger and Neo, The Law and Practice of Documentary Credit, (1st edn, Hart 2010) 43-46; Bridge and others 
(eds), Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, (8th edn, Thompson 2010) para 23.8; Malek and Quest, Jack: Documentary 
Credits, (4th edn, Tottel 2009) para 1.23. 
241 Annex I, para 12. 
242 ICC Brochure 222.  
243 Matrix of facts: Prenn v Simmonds [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1381, 1383 per Lord Wilberforce; Reardon Smith Line 
Ltd. v Yngvar Hansen-Tangen [1976] 1 W.L.R. 989 per Lord Wilberforce; American Airlines Inc v Hope [1974] 2 
Lloyd's Rep 301, 305 per Lord Diplock; Reasonable reader: Attorney General of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd 
[2009] 1 W.L.R. 1988 per Lord Hoffman; Investors Compensation Scheme LTD v West Bromwich Building Society 
[1998] 1 W.L.R. 896, 912 per Lord Hoffman. 
108 
 
a common intention to contract of a documentary credit outside the UCP. 
Accordingly, the application of the UCP would be ancillary to a documentary credit 
contract, and not themselves be a source of law, under English law to the effect that, 
unlike Jordanian law, the UCP are unable to create rights or duties on parties privy 
to the documentary credit contract. However, it is submitted that the conveyed 
content of an article of the applied UCP through the usage or market practice, in the 
absence of their express incorporation in the documentary credit contract, cannot 
prevail over concurrent peripheral usage.   
 
2.3.8 UCP 600. Article 1 states that UCP 600 applies “when the text of the credit expressly 
indicates that it is subject to these rules”. The equivalent provision in the predecessor 
revision provided that UCP 500 applies “where they are incorporated in the text of 
the credit”.244  It is submitted that the addition of the word “expressly” neither 
denounces  the application of the UCP as trade custom or usage, nor does it convey 
that it is the practice to  apply the UCP only where the credit expressly so stipulates. 
Of course it is the aim of the UCP to be internationally customarily applied since the 
objective of the UCP is to achieve uniformity in documentary credit practices and 
regulations.245 The word “expressly” was added to emphasise the fact that the ICC 
is a non-governmental organisation that is unable to enact Municipal laws, and thus 
the UCP may not have the force of law under legal orders as states are sovereigns 
and some of them may enact laws regulating documentary credits in lieu of the 
UCP.246 For example, due to the fact that Tunisia and Kuwait ratified the treaty of 
UNCITRAL on Independent Guarantees and Stand-by Letters of Credit,247 the UCP 
are not automatically applied to stand-by letters of credit in these countries even if 
the UCP might previously have been customarily applied. Accordingly, it is necessary 
for the commonality of the UCP to encourage banks around the world to expressly 
                                                          
244 Article 1 UCP 500.  
245 UCP 600, Foreword.  
246 Drafting Group, Commentary on UCP 600: Article by Article Analysis, (ICC No. 680, 2009), 11. 
247 United Nations Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-by Letters of Credit (New York, 1995).  
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incorporate the UCP in documentary credit contracts in order to contract out of the 
application of law or rules other than the UCP, given the fact that freedom to contract 
is a common paradigm of legal orders in the twenty first century.248 Given the fact 
that the embedded trade usages of documentary credits represent the fundamental 
purposes of entering into documentary credit contracts, a mere expression of the 
incorporation of the UCP as a whole might not give effect to a UCP term that 
contravenes an embedded trade usage of documentary credits, it would be presumed 
that it is the intention of the parties to apply such embedded concepts to the 
documentary credit institution unless it is clearly expressed to contract out of them.    
 
Interpretation Of The UCP 
 
2.3.9 Interpretative aids. The ICC publishes interpretative aids to the terms of the UCP 
demonstrating how the UCP terms should be applied. These aids are the: 
International Standard Banking Practice for Examination of Documents under 
Documentary Credits (ISBP),249 Opinions of the Banking Commission250 and Rules 
for Documentary Credit Dispute Resolution Expertise (DOCDEX).251   
 
ISBP 
 
2.3.10 The ISBP is promulgated by the ICC Banking Commission in their endeavour to 
reflect the international standard banking practices on how document checkers 
                                                          
248 Article 1 (1) UNIDROIT Principles (2010).  
249 For UCP 500: ICC, International Standard Banking Practice for the Examination of Documents under 
Documentary Credits (ISBP), (ICC Publication No. 645, 2002); for UCP 600: ICC, International Standard Banking 
Practice for the Examination of Documents under Documentary Credits (ISBP), (ICC Publication No. 681, 2008); 
ICC, International Standard Banking Practice for the Examination of Documents under Documentary Credits 
(ISBP), (ICC Publication No. 745, 2013).  
250 Opinions in relation to UCP 500 & 400: ICC Banking Commission, Collyer and Katz (eds), Collected Opinions 
1995-2001 (ICC Publication No. 632, 2002); ICC Banking Commission, Collyer and Katz (eds), Unpublished 
Opinions 1995-2004 (ICC Publication No. 660, 2005); Opinions in relation to UCP 600 & 500: ICC Banking 
Commission, Collyer and Katz (eds), Opinions 2005-2008 (2009, ICC Publication No. 697); ICC Banking 
Commission, Collyer and Katz (eds), Opinions 2009-2011 (ICC Publication No. 699, 2012). 
251 Collyer and Katz (eds), Collected DOCDEX Decision 1997-2003 (ICC Publication No. 665, 2004); Collyer and 
Katz (eds), Collected DOCDEX Decision 2004-2008 (ICC Publication No. 696, 2008).  
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examine documents for conformity.252 It was originally created to reduce the large 
percentage of refused documents on first presentation.253 The ISBP was first 
approved by ICC in 2002 and the preparatory work of that version included reviewing 
the checklists of some 39 ICC national committees on how documents were 
examined. The task did not report on the practices of banks in individual countries 
that differed from each other, rather the task aimed to reflect the practices that were 
commonly adopted by banks.254 The ISBP was linguistically updated in 2007 to match 
the language of UCP 600 by making technical adjustments in capitalisation, 
substituting article references for those of UCP 500 and incorporating changes in 
ISBP paragraphs necessary to bring the wording in line with wording in UCP 600.255 
The ISBP 2002 was revised for the first time in 2013.256 The new revision of ISBP 
covers practices identified by ICC Opinions after the promulgation of UCP 600.  
 
2.3.11 Binding interpretative aid by incorporation and practice. In relation to the 
status of ISBP, the introduction of UCP 600 specifically refers to the application of 
the ISBP as a binding interpretative aid to the UCP where it states: 
 
“During the revision process, notice was taken of the considerable work that had 
been completed in creating the International Standard Banking Practice for the 
Examination of Documents under Documentary Credits (ISBP), ICC Publication No. 
645. This publication has evolved into a necessary companion to the UCP for 
determining compliance of documents with the terms of letters of credit. It is the 
expectation of the Drafting Group and the Banking Commission that the application 
of the principles contained in ISBP, including subsequent revisions thereof, will 
continue during the time UCP 600 is in force”. 
                                                          
252 ISBP 2002, Foreword.  
253 ISBP 2007, Foreword. 
254 ISBP 2002, Foreword. 
255 ISBP 2007, Foreword.  
256 ICC, International Standard Banking Practice for the Examination of Documents under Documentary Credits 
(ISBP), (ICC Publication No. 745, 2013). 
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2.3.12 In this respect ISBP 2013 states that “this publication is to be read in conjunction 
with UCP 600 and not in isolation”.257 Also a reference to the ISBP was made in article 
1 and sub-article 14 (d) of UCP 600 but without capital letters as UCP 600 eradicates 
the use of capital letters. However, it is suggested by Elinger and Neo that a non-
capitalisation of the term “international standard banking practice” reflects that there 
can be an international practice in a particular region other than the ISBP.258 It is 
submitted that, under English and Jordanian laws, an incorporation of UCP 600 into 
a documentary credit contract entails the incorporation of the ISBP as the latter is 
clearly referred to in UCP 600. Here the incorporated UCP terms are regarded as 
standard contractual terms and the ISBP as a binding interpretative aid to the UCP, 
so the ISBP should not contradict the UCP terms. In the case of an absence as to the 
reference of the application of the UCP in a documentary credit, the empirical findings 
clarify that it is market practice, if not trade usage, in Jordan to apply the ISBP in 
checking the conformity of documents.259 Muhammad Burjaq said:  
 
“The bank is not obliged to apply ISBP as the deletion of the capital letters in UCP 
600 in the reference to ISBP signifies this position. But the bank is obliged to apply 
ICC Opinions as they reflect the international banking practices. The bank must apply 
ISBP where there is no guidance in the ICC Opinions”.  
 
2.3.13 Such a practice and view was not shared by any other bankers regarding the ISBP, 
as all other bankers stated that their banks apply the ISBP to the examination of the 
documents along with UCP 600 and they are obliged to do so. The reason behind the 
obligation to apply the ISBP was explained by Qhaleb Joudeh and Koloud Alkalaldeh 
in terms that the ISBP is part of UCP 600 and moreover, Mr A and B praised the ISBP 
                                                          
257 ISBP 2013, Preliminary Considerations.   
258 Elinger and Neo, The Law and Practice of Documentary Credit, (1st edn, Hart 2010), 32. 
259 Annex I, para 14.  
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for simplifying issues and easing the task for the determination of the status of 
conformity.  
 
2.3.14 As the subject of the empirical study of this research is Jordan the research is unable 
to point to the current practice in the UK. Of course the matter as to whether or not 
it is usage or practice to apply the ISBP, in the case of non-incorporation, will be 
determined by expert evidence before courts under the English and Jordanian legal 
orders.260    
 
OPINIONS 
 
2.3.15 ICC Opinions represent the view of the ICC Commission on Banking Technique and 
Practice regarding queries, each based on a given set of facts with no supporting 
documentation, that are related to the terms of the UCP. Such Opinions reflect how 
banks would interpret the given set of facts in practice. They serve as guideposts to 
courts in interpreting ICC rules261 as they fill “in the details that the UCP, being more 
general in nature, cannot always provide”.262 The ICC Opinions are a binding 
interpretive aid as envisaged by the ICC in respect to the UCP in the case of 
ambiguity.263 Nevertheless, there is no reference in UCP 600 or the predecessor 
revision as to the application of ICC Opinions, and as such the incorporation of the 
UCP does not entail an incorporation of ICC Opinions. Thus the effectiveness of the 
application of Opinions as interpretative aids to the UCP is contingent on whether or 
not it is practice to apply them under legal orders.  
 
                                                          
260 Jordanian law: Article 2 Jordanian Evidence Code (1952); English law: in Fortis Bank S.A./N.V, Stemcor UK 
Limited v Indian Overseas Bank states [2011] 1 C.L.C. 276, 288-289 the Court of Appeal called the expert 
evidence to validate the position of international practice. 
261 Collected Opinions 1995-2001 (ICC No. 632, 2002), Foreword.  
262 Collyer and Katz, ICC Opinions 2009-2011, (2012) preface, ICC No 732.    
263 Collected Opinions 1995-2001 (ICC No. 632, 2002), Foreword.  
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2.3.16 Empirical findings. The empirical findings indicate that there is no usage but 
market practice in Jordan to apply ICC Opinions, and that the reasons and situations 
triggering the application of the Opinions substantially differ between banks and are 
not as envisaged by the ICC (i.e. the Opinions apply in the case of the ambiguity of 
a UCP term where the ISBP are silent as to that ambiguity). Thus there is a Jordanian 
bank that prioritises the application of ICC Opinions over the ISBP to the effect that 
such bank only applies the latter where there is no guidance in ICC Opinions, because 
the perception is that the Opinions reflect the international standard banking 
practice.264 By contrast, some banks never apply ICC Opinions as to conformity,265 
whilst other banks only apply ICC Opinions where there is a conflict with other banks 
regarding conformity.266 Still, some banks only apply ICC Opinions where there is a 
disagreement regarding conformity between the employees of the same bank.267 
Finally, some banks apply ICC Opinions where there is a lacuna in UCP 600 or 
ISBP.268 We might draw an inference that such empirical findings apply to other 
Arabic countries and might even apply worldwide. Such differences in the application 
of ICC Opinions might be caused by a lack of clarity in that there is no reference to 
the ICC Opinions either in the text of or in the introduction to UCP 600 as such. 
Moreover, there is a problem as to the extent to which ICC Opinions that were issued 
in relation to predecessor revisions would apply to UCP 600, and a dilemma as to 
which Opinion would apply in the case of conflict between the Opinions themselves. 
Problems, or uncertainties, of application give rise to the possibility of inconsistency 
as to the interpretation of the UCP.    
 
 
 
 
                                                          
264 As in Bank Alitihad: Annex I para 14. 
265 As in Central Bank and BLOM Bank: Annex I para 14. 
266 As in Arabic Bank: Annex I, para 14. 
267 As in Bank A: Annex I, para 14. 
268 As in Bank B: Annex I, para 14. 
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DOCDEX 
 
2.3.17 The rules of DOCDEX were first approved by the ICC in October 1997 as a response 
to demands for a rapid and cost effective means of dispute resolution. The disputes 
in relation to the terms of the UCP are presented, with all the supporting 
documentation, to a panel of three experts who are appointed by the ICC 
International Centre for Expertise. The experts are anonymous and their decision is 
not binding on parties. The ICC has the right to publish the decisions without 
disclosing the identities of the parties. Unlike ICC Opinions the DOCDEX are not 
approved by the full ICC Banking Commission. This weakens the claim for “external 
validity”269 that DOCDEX decisions reflect international practice. The other difference 
is that under DOCDEX decisions all the supporting documentations in question are 
presented. By contrast, a Banking Commission Opinion is a snapshot of a given set 
of facts and it is not based on documentary evidence presented by the disputed 
parties. It thus represents a less than complete consideration of the circumstances 
of a case. This in turn affects the validity of considering a Banking Commission 
Opinion as evidence before courts even in resolving a dispute between the same 
parties who made a request to the ICC.270 As with ICC Opinions there is no reference 
as to the application of DOCDEX in UCP 600. The empirical findings clarify that it is 
not market practice in Jordan to check DOCDEX in interpreting the UCP.271   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
269 This term is adopted from the field of social research which means, in the context of this study, that the 
collected data represent many different cases and can generalise beyond the immediate subjects and 
circumstances, namely, the experts views represent the international practice: Hen, Weinstein and Foard, A 
Critical Introduction to Social Research, (2nd edn, Sage 2009), 70; 6 and Bellamy, Principles of Methodology, (1st 
edn, Sage 2012), 21-24. In this context, a claim for external validity can be more effective where the views are 
presented by the full ICC Banking Commission experts if each of whom represents the business and the banking 
community from the different worldwide regions. 
270 Collected DOCDEX Decision 2004-2008 (No. 696, 2008) Foreword.  
271 Annex I, para 14. 
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COMMENTARY 
 
2.3.18 The Drafting Group of UCP 600 have issued the Commentary on UCP 600 to reflect 
their view, not necessarily of those of the ICC Banking Commission, of the process 
of promulgating UCP 600 and the reasons underlying the new changes in UCP 600 
in order to assist meaningful interpretation.272 Unlike the ISBP and Opinions, the 
Commentary is not authorised or published by the Banking Commission.273 Again, 
there is no reference to the Commentary in the UCP and the empirical findings 
indicate that banks in Jordan do not apply them.274  
 
ENGLISH LAW 
 
2.3.19 Modern approach and Fortis. Contractual terms are construed under English law 
by looking at the common intention of the parties275 in an objective way which is – 
under the modern approach - in commercial contracts a reasonable reader test276 
against the matrix of facts277 (i.e. all the backgrounds of the contract including 
market practice).278 As set by Lord Reid “the more unreasonable the result the more 
unlikely it is that the parties can have intended it”.279 For commercial contracts 
reasonableness of the conveyed meaning is based on “commercial business 
commonsense” as elucidated by Lord Diplock:280 
 
                                                          
272 Drafting Group, Commentary on UCP 600: Article by Article Analysis, (ICC No. 680, 2009).  
273 Drafting Group, Commentary on UCP 600: Article by Article Analysis, (ICC No. 680, 2009), Foreword.  
274 The interviewees did not mention that their banks apply the Commentary as an interpretative aid regarding 
UCP terms dealing with conformity of documents: Annex I, para 24.   
275 Marquis of Cholmondeley v Clinton (1820) 2 Jac. & W.I. 91. 
276 Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank [2011] 1 W.L.R. 2900; Attorney General of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd [2009] 
1 W.L.R. 1988 per Lord Hoffman; Investors Compensation Scheme LTD v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 
1 W.L.R. 896, 912 per Lord Hoffman. 
277 Prenn v Simmonds [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1381, 1383 per Lord Wilberforce; American Airlines Inc v Hope [1974] 2 
Lloyd's Rep 301, 305 per Lord Diplock; Reardon Smith Line Ltd. v Yngvar Hansen-Tangen [1976] 1 W.L.R. 989 
per Lord Wilberforce.  
278 Lloyds TSB Bank Plc v Clarke (Liquidator of Socimer International Bank Ltd) [2002] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 992 ; 
Crema v Cenkos Securities Plc [2011] 1 W.L.R. 2066.  
279 Wickman Machine Tool Sales Ltd v Schuler A.G. [1974] AC 235, 251. 
280 Antaios Compania Naviera S.A. v Salen Rederierna A.B  [1985] AC 191, 201. 
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“If detailed semantic and syntactical analysis of words in a commercial contract is 
going to lead to a conclusion that flouts business commonsense, it must be made to 
yield to business commonsense”.281 
 
Based on the reasonable reader test, standard commercial contracts are construed 
in a uniform sense and not fundamentally differently in each individual contract.282 
The commercial commonsense in the interpretation of the UCP was clarified in Fortis 
Bank S.A./N.V., Stemcor UK Limited v Indian Overseas Bank283 where Thomas LJ 
stated:  
 
“In my view, a court must recognise the international nature of the UCP and approach 
its construction in that spirit. It was drafted in English in a manner that it could easily 
be translated into about 20 different languages and applied by bankers and traders 
throughout the world. It is intended to be a self-contained code for those areas of 
practice which it covers and to reflect good practice and achieve consistency across 
the world. Courts must therefore interpret it in accordance with its underlying aims 
and purposes reflecting international practice and the expectations of international 
bankers and international traders so that it underpins the operation of letters of 
credit in international trade. A literalistic and national approach must be avoided”.284 
 
2.3.20 Uniformity, interpretative aids and international practice. The underlying aim 
of the UCP is to achieve uniformity in practices and terms regulating documentary 
credits throughout the world. The commercial commonsense of reflecting 
international practices and expectations as expressed above by Thomas LJ in Fortis 
                                                          
281 Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank [2011] 1 W.L.R. 2900.  
282 Global Coal Ltd v London Commodity Brokers Ltd [2010] EWHC 1347 (Ch); Atlas Navios-Navegacao Lda v 
Navigators Insurance Co Ltd [2012] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 629, [23]: Beal and others (eds), Chitty on Contracts, (31edn, 
Sweet and Maxwell 2012) para 12.57. 
283 [2011] EWCA (Civ) 58, [29]; confirmed; Alternative Power Solution Ltd v Central Electricity Board and another 
[2015] 1 W.L.R. 697.    
284 Fortis Bank S.A./N.V, Stemcor UK Limited v Indian Overseas Bank [2011] EWCA (Civ) 58, [29].  
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Bank SA/NV v Indian Overseas Bank,285 regarding the issue of refusal of documents, 
was established by reference to international practice declared by both expert 
evidence and DOCDEX.286 Indeed, there is a tendency in English courts to give effects 
to the ICC interpretive aids relative to the UCP in construing the UCP to the effect 
that such aids (i.e. ICC Opinions, DOCDEX and ICC Positions Papers) are regarded 
as persuasive sources – but the ISBP are a binding interpretative aid where the UCP 
are expressly incorporated into a credit contract or through course of dealing – for 
the interpretation of the UCP.287 Thus in respect of the status of the ICC position 
paper for originality288 David Steel J stated in Credit Industriel et Commercial v China 
Merchants Bank:289 
 
“a) UCP is a code produced and published by the ICC. 
(b) It is entirely legitimate for the ICC to seek to resolve any ambiguities in, or 
difficulties of interpretation of, the code.(c) The decision in 1999 involved discussion 
with local banking commissions throughout the world (to which all banks, including 
CIC and CMB were able to contribute)”. 
 
2.3.21 Expressed and incorporated terms. Expressed contractual terms exclude or 
modify incorporated terms290 and in case of irreconcilable conflict between a UCP 
term (where it is incorporated or applied by virtue of trade usage or market practice, 
and an expressed term in the credit contract) the general English law principle gives 
effect to the express term as being the most likely manifestation of the intention of 
the parties.291 However, it is submitted, where an expressed term contravenes a UCP 
                                                          
285 [2011] 1 C.L.C. 276, [40]. 
286 ICC DOCDEX Rules. Decision 242.  
287 Bulgrains & Co Ltd v Shinhan Bank [2013] EWHC 2498 (Q.B.), [42]. 
288 ICC Banking Policy Statement, The Determination of an “Original” Document in the Context of UCP 500, 
(1999) July 470/871, it will be referred later in the research as “ICC Banking Commission Decision”.  
289 [2002] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 427; [2002] C.L.C. 1263, [61-64].  
290 Homburg Houtimport BV v Agorsin Private Ltd (The Starsin) [2004] 1 AC 715, [11].  
291 Homburg Houtimport BV v Agorsin Private Ltd (The Starsin) [2004] 1 AC 715, [11]. An express term of a 
non-documentary condition prevails a UCP term that provides to disregard a non- documentary condition: 
Kumagai-Zenecon Construction Ltd (in Liq) v Arab Bank plc [1997] 3 SLR 770; Korea Exchange Bank v Standard 
Chartered Bank [2006] 1 S.L.R. 565, 577.     
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term that reflects an embedded trade usage courts would not give effect to the 
expressed term, unless it is very clearly stipulated in a way that is strongly indicated 
to be intended to be effective in the holistic context of the credit contract. In respect 
of implying terms, courts cannot imply terms into a contract to make the express 
terms reasonable.292 Courts can thus only imply a term, as a matter of inference 
from the contractual terms themselves - where it is necessary293 to give meaning to 
what would the contractual terms convey to a reasonable person that is consistent 
with business sense.294 
 
JORDANIAN LAW 
 
2.3.22 Sanctity of plain terms and ordinary meaning. The principles for the 
interpretation of contractual terms in the Civil Code295 apply to commercial contracts. 
As under Common law, the interpretation of contractual terms under Sharia law is 
based on the common intention of the parties and on what the parties have agreed 
as their obligations in the contract.296 The common intention of the parties is 
objectively established by the ordinary meaning297 of the apparent clear and plain 
terms of the contract.298 Technically, Jordanian law provides rules in respect of the 
objective test to establish the apparent intention of parties,299 which are: (i) “the 
original position is that words convey the true meaning, so it is not permitted to 
convey a metaphor unless it is impossible to convey the true meaning”300 and (ii) 
“effects must not be given to an indication [incorporation] where there is an 
                                                          
292 Attorney General of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd [2009] UKPC 10, [27], per Lord Hoffmann.  
293 Liverpool City Council v Irwin [1977] AC 239, 254; Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd [1986] 
AC 80, 104-105. 
294 Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank [2011] 1 W.L.R. 2900; Attorney General of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd [2009] 
UKPC 10, [27], per Lord Hoffmann; Transfield Shipping Inc v Mercator Shipping Inc (The Achilleas) [2009] 1 AC 
61, [12]. 
295 Articles 213-240 Civil Code (1976).  
296 Article 213 Civil Code (1976).  
297 Article 214 Civil Code (1976): “consideration must be given for the intentions [or content] and meanings and 
not for the form of words”; translated by the researcher.  The translation is a subjective one that is based on the 
linguistic legal understanding of the translator.    
298 Article 239 Civil Code (1976); Jordan Laws and Rules, Memorandum of Clarification of Civil Code, (1977), 
240.  
299 Jordan Laws and Rules, Memorandum of Clarification of Civil Code, (1977), 245. 
300 Article 214 (2) Civil Code (1976); article 12 Mecelle (1877). 
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expression”.301 Accordingly, clear and plain contractual terms have superseding 
normative force and their ordinary meaning should not be deviated from by courts 
even for the aim of establishing the real intention of the parties, since article 239 of 
the Civil Code provides: 
 
“1 - If the phrase of the contract is clear, it is not permissible to deviate from it by 
way of an interpretation to get to know the intention of the contracting parties. 
2 - If there was a place for the interpretation of the contract, the common intention 
of the contracting parties must be sought without a mere adherence of the literal 
meaning of the words but the judge must look at the nature of the deal and what 
should be conveyed from the trust and the security between the contracting parties 
according to the current custom in transactions”.  
 
2.3.23 Thus, unlike the modern English approach of interpreting commercial contracts, 
Jordanian law’s approach is traditional in the sense that the sanctity as to the 
ordinary meaning of expressed terms is still applicable to commercial contractual 
terms, so a conveyed ordinary meaning of a UCP term may not be changeable to 
yield to business commonsense as perceived by international practice. Even where 
there was ICC Position Paper or Opinion to the effect that there should be a deviation 
from the ordinary meaning of the words the conveyed ordinary meaning of a UCP 
term might not be displaced under Jordanian law.     
 
2.3.24 Ambiguity and lacunae. Conversely, where there is an ambiguity (i.e. many valid 
interpretations of the same contractual term) or lacunae (i.e. the state of affairs is 
not regulated by the expressed or incorporated terms) in the contractual terms 
                                                          
301 Article 15 Civil Code (1976); article 13 Mecelle (1877).  
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courts then should not merely rely on a literal interpretation.302 Rather, a purposive 
interpretation should be applied.303  
 
2.3.25 Ambiguity. The aim of the purposive interpretation in the case of ambiguity is to 
clarify the common intention of the parties.304 The rule of such a purposive 
interpretation is that courts must look at the nature of the contract, and the 
trustworthiness that should be available between the parties as informed by custom 
or usage of transactions.305 As it is not trade usage in Jordan - as clarified by the 
empirical findings -306 that banks check ICC interpretative aids, except the ISBP, in 
interpreting the UCP, there is a potential that Jordanian courts would rely on 
Jordanian usage or practice as proved by expert evidence in interpreting the UCP. If 
there is no particular Jordanian usage or practice in interpreting a particular UCP 
term, as in most cases, then it is submitted that (as the international nature of the 
UCP depends on international banking practices as reflected or envisaged in ICC 
interpretative aids) Jordanian courts need to interpret the UCP through the lens of 
ICC interpretative aids. The empirical findings indicate that it is the aspiration of the 
previous Industry and Trade Minister, who is the head of the ICC in Jordan, that 
Jordanian courts would interpret the UCP through an international lens as reflected 
in the ICC interpretative aids, because being part of the international finance 
community is necessary for the expansion of the Jordanian finance sector.307 The 
problem however is that the concept of trustworthiness originates from the context 
of civil contracts, and therefore such a concept should merely be operated in 
commercial transactions to the extent of what is accepted as trustworthiness in the 
relevant trade practice and that might be interpreted by Jordanian courts as being 
resolutely local rather than international.  
                                                          
302 Article 239 (2) Civil Code (1976).  
303 Jordan Laws and Rules, Memorandum of Clarification of Civil Code, (1977), 238 -239.  
304 Article 239 (2) Civil Code (1976).  
305 Article 239 (2) Civil Code (1976). 
306 Annex I, para 14. 
307 Annex I, para 16. 
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2.3.26 Lacunae. The purposive interpretation where there are lacunae aims to determine 
the scope of the contract.308 Article 202 of the Civil Code provides:  
 
“(1) The contract must be performed in good faith.  
 (2)The contract is not confined in obliging the party on what is expressed, the 
contract includes its associated incidents according to law, custom and the nature of 
the transaction”.      
 
The parties are presumed to tacitly agree to the ancillary incidents of the contract as 
recognised by, law, custom and the nature of the transaction.309 Furthermore, the 
parties must perform the contract in good faith,310 in the sense the performance of 
the contract must be executed on the basis of trust and honesty which can be 
determined objectively by reference to the reasonable person test.311 By the same 
tone, the freedom of the use of rights where they are spelled out in law or in a 
contract in an absolute way (e.g. the right to withdraw from the partnership of a 
company at any time)312 is subject to the good faith principle and the principles of 
Sharia law as implemented in the Civil Code. The relevant Sharia principles are that 
the “prevention of detriments prevails over gain of benefits”313 and that “the use of 
rights should not be unlawful”.314 The use of right is considered as unlawful315 where 
there is “an intention of infringement”,316 “the intended benefits are unlawful”,317 or 
“the benefit is not appropriate with the occurred disadvantages on others”.318 These 
doctrines are regarded by the Court of Distinction as principles of justice.319 They are 
                                                          
308 Jordan Laws and Rules, Memorandum of Clarification of Civil Code, (1977), 243-44.  
309 Article 202 (2) Civil Code (1976). 
310 Article 202 (1) Civil Code (1976). 
311 Aljbouri, The Concise In The Explanation Of Jordanian Civil Law, (1st, Wael 2011) 388 
 ,يروبجلايندرلاا يندملا نوناقلا حرش يف زيجولاط( ,1 ,2011.ص )388.  
312 Court of Distinction (Civil) 653/1998, www.lob.govjo. 
313 Article 64 Civil Code (1976).  
314 Article 66 (1) Civil Code (1976).  
315 Article 66 (2) Civil Code (1976); Court of Distinction (Civil) 761/2007, www.lob.govjo. 
316 Article 66 (2) (a) Civil Code (1976). 
317 Article 66 (2) (b) Civil Code (1976). 
318 Article 66 (2) (c) Civil Code (1976). 
319 Court of Distinction (Civil) 653/1998, www.lob.govjo. 
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considered as sources of law.320 However, the principles of Sharia law and justice 
cannot strike down the rights that are spelled out in a contract.321 It is submitted 
that the principle of “prevention of detriments prevails over gain of benefits”322 
should not be strictly adhered in the context of commercial law as taking risk is an 
inherent element in undertaking business transactions. For instance, applicants in 
documentary credits take the risk, or the potential detriment, that banks would not 
investigate the actual status of goods even where there is a suspicion of fraud, 
because speed and cost are paramount practical benefits that prevail over potential 
detriment.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
320 Article 3 Civil Code (1976).  
321 As inferred from articles 164 and 213 Civil Code (1976).   
322 Article 64 Civil Code (1976).  
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CONCLUSION 
2.4.1 The commercial system of documentary credits was mainly generated and fashioned 
by the practices of banks and traders around the world, and therefore it was 
necessary in this chapter to investigate the nature of international trade usages that 
is relative to documentary credits. It was concluded that the pillars of documentary 
credits (i.e. irrevocability, autonomy and conformity norms) are embedded aspects 
of the de facto international trade usage of documentary credits to the effect of being 
lex mercatoria that are received as facts by autonomous legal orders and generate 
internal legal communications in those legal orders to the effect that such embedded 
international trade usages have de jure effect under legal orders that recognise the 
legality of documentary credits. The embedded usages of irrevocability, autonomy 
and conformity constitute the structure of the transaction of documentary credits. 
Such a structure operates as a socially diffuse law and thus lex mercatoria, since 
actors of documentary credits test a state of affairs as a divergence of expectation 
against the structure by using the code legal/illegal (acceptance/rejection).  
 
2.4.2 As a documentary credit transaction is inherently transnational, its embedded usages 
ought to be transnational, and a non-recognition of any of its embedded usages by 
any legal system would threaten the existence or viability of documentary credits 
under that legal system and this would negatively affect the reputation of the legal 
order as being able to facilitate the needs of traders. Based on the dogma freedom 
to contract, traders would not apply a legal order that does not assist them to achieve 
their ends. Therefore, English and Jordanian laws implicitly recognise the notion of 
international embedded usages, as illustrated in bills of exchange, bills of lading and 
documentary credits, and the normativity of international embedded usages is 
becoming part of the “structural” component (having the highest order amongst 
other components) of the English legal order and that ought also to be accepted as 
being the case under the Jordanian legal order. Embedded usages of transnational 
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commercial transactions are therefore international lex mercatoria (being accepted 
and applied as a socially diffuse law by both citizens across borders and Municipal 
legal orders). As a stepping-stone for effective terms governing documentary credits, 
such terms must be based on the embedded usages of irrevocability, autonomy and 
conformity whether or not legal orders explicitly differentiate internationally resonant 
embedded trade usages from other notions of trade custom.             
 
2.4.3 Yet, the peripheral aspects of trade usage, such as the application of the UCP in 
Jordan (i.e. by virtue of trade usage where the credit contract does not expressly 
incorporate the UCP) as indicated by the empirical findings of this research, must 
give way to embedded trade usage. Only if the peripheral usage was to be 
incorporated into the contract in such a way as to indicate that the intention of the 
parties was to contract out of the embedded usage would that not be the case. Article 
2 of UCP 600 reflects the normative force of the principle of irrevocability, being 
embedded trade usage, by both defining documentary credits as being irrevocable 
and by deleting the reference to the revocable type of documentary credits. Such a 
change introduced in UCP 600 was necessary because it is reflective of the 
sociological value of documentary credits (i.e. the critical balancing of the distinct 
archetypal security needs of each of the four groups of contracting parties who 
typically transact documentary credits).  
 
2.4.4 A further change introduced in UCP 600 is the call in article 1 for documentary credit 
parties to “expressly” incorporate the UCP into their documentary credit contracts. 
Such a change is responsive to the principle of freedom to contract that is shared by 
almost every legal order. Given the fact that the application of the UCP does not 
have the force of law under English law and is peripheral trade usage under Jordanian 
law, an expressed incorporation as to the application of the self-regulatory rules of 
the UCP warrants a high level in hierarchy for the effectiveness of the application of 
UCP 600 to the effect that its application will prevail over the application of law or 
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convention (i.e. which is neither mandatory nor is a matter of public policy or public 
morals) in relation to documentary credits. However to prevail over the embedded 
trade usages of documentary credits it must be expressed clearly that the parties 
have agreed to depart from them since such usages represent the fundamental 
purposes of entering into documentary credit contracts.    
 
2.4.5 Finally, UCP 600 as with its previous iterations lacks clarity regarding the status of 
its ICC interpretative aids except for the ISBP. The sole reliance on usage or practice 
in applying the ICC interpretative aids would not achieve uniformity, because the 
application of such aids would substantially differ between banks as clarified in the 
empirical findings. Indeed, inconsistencies in interpreting the UCP lead to 
uncertainties affecting the viability of documentary credits as a means of secure 
payment. Given the fact that some legal orders (e.g. Jordanian law) are still 
traditional in interpreting commercial contracts in terms that they might not interpret 
the UCP through an international lens by considering the ICC aids, it is to be hoped 
that the UCP would make an explicit reference as to both the application of ICC 
interpretative aids and their respective hierarchical status in interpreting the UCP. 
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GENERAL VIEW  
 
 
3.1.1 Letters of credit are recognised as documentary letters of credit, documentary credits 
or covered credits due to the concept of documentary compliance or conformity. 
Pursuant to such a concept, the honour of the credit is conditional upon the 
presentation of documents that correspond to the terms of the credit. Conformity is 
known as compliance in the international banking community in that the presented 
documents must be in regular order.323 Conformity is also known as strict compliance 
under Common law324 and absolute compliance under Jordanian law.325 Conformity 
is one of the main functional elements in the substance of documentary credits as 
proposed in the developed conceptual model in this thesis and the purpose of this 
chapter is to evaluate the effectiveness of the conformity concepts under UCP 600 
by reference to the evaluative model.326 Both the sociological and legal nature of 
conformity is examined in this chapter to determine the scope of conformity in a way 
that accords with the common generalised formulation of legal concepts, namely: 
principles, general rules and particular rules respectively. Whilst this chapter seeks 
to evaluate the principles and general rules for conformity under UCP 600 on the 
basis of the conceptual model which is set out in chapter 1,327 chapter 4 will address 
and evaluate the particular rules for conformity.  
 
3.1.2 Plan of chapter. Prior to the evaluation of the scope of conformity, we need firstly 
to look at the nature of conformity as a concept in society and the difficulties of 
seeking to regulate such a concept in UCP 600. Secondly we need to look at the legal 
                                                          
323 Draft Uniform Regulations on Export Commercial Credits (1927) presented to ICC’s fourth Conference: Taylor, 
The Complete UCP, (1st edn, ICC 2008), 30.  See also, article 10 UCP (No. 82, ICC 1933) and art.9 UCP (No.151, 
ICC 1951).   
324 Equitable Trust Co of New York v Dawson Partners Ltd (1926) 27 Lloyd’s Rep 49, 52.  
325 Court of Distinction 316/1988 (Civil) Alkustas programme.  
326 Chapter 1, para 1.2.11-12.  
327 Chapter 1, para 1.1.32. 
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nature of conformity. Thirdly the principle and general rules determining the meaning 
of conformity in UCP 600 is critically analysed and evaluated.     
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ELASTIC NATURE OF CONFORMITY 
 
3.2.1 It is clear that the beneficiary is not entitled to enforce the bank’s undertaking to 
honour the credit where documents are not presented, or where the presented 
documents are not in conformity. Defining and forming the concept of conformity is 
the cornerstone for effective terms governing the documentary conformity in 
documentary credits. Any regulator of documentary credit transactions needs to use 
that cornerstone to shore up and define the boundaries of the concept of conformity: 
since that concept is fundamental to a coherent understanding as to when 
documentary presentations are acceptable, and when they are not, and to the 
consistent application by bankers, beneficiaries and applicants of that understanding. 
In social science terms, the nature of concepts vary from simple unitary concepts to 
multi-scaled concepts. A simple concept is where a case of study falls under the 
concept if it only meets a single condition, so one condition is essential and sufficient 
to constitute the concept (e.g. if the liquid is H2O then it is water). Accordingly it can 
be said that the concept of conformity is a simple type as it only constitutes one 
condition, namely, that the presented documents must correspond to the terms of 
the credit, and such a condition is essential and sufficient to constitute conformity.328 
For a valid and reliable concept one must ensure that the concept is formed for the 
intended purpose and has the virtues of coherence, consistency, intelligibility and 
measurability.329 Although the extension of the above simple concept of conformity 
(i.e. what it denotes) might refer to a wide range of cases; its intention or sense (i.e. 
what the concept connotes) does not capture the attributes of how conformity is or 
must be applied by bankers and other actors, nor does take into account the 
contested needs of the documentary credit parties (as identified in the developed 
conceptual model in chapter 1).330 Hence, the above simple type of the concept of 
                                                          
328 For formation of concepts: 6 and Bellamy, Principles of Methodologies, (1st edn, Sage 2012), 138 -139; Goertz, 
Social Science Concepts: a user’s guide, (1st edn, PUP 2006). 
329 6 and Bellamy, Principles of Methodologies, (1st edn, Sage 2012), ch 9. 
330 For the boundaries of extension and intension in concepts: Sartori, Concept Misformation in Comparative 
Politics, [1970] American Political Science Review, 64, 4, 1033-53.  
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conformity lacks the virtues of consistency, intelligibility and measurability to serve 
the efficacy of terms regulating documentary credits.  
 
3.2.2 The task is how to form a concept of conformity that can capture the essential 
attributes for the purpose of effective terms regulating documentary credits 
transnationally. It is proposed in the developed conceptual model that the UCP 
community must use the means of responsiveness in forming the concept of 
conformity, and accordingly the formed concept must be based on the embedded 
usage of conformity in the trade. The virtue of such an approach is that by analysing 
the embedded usage of conformity one can rationally deduct the underlying needs 
that are commonly accepted by the parties from the function served by the usage of 
conformity. Once the concept reflects what is commonly observed and understood 
as essential attributes by the parties, it would have some prospect of being 
commonly understood and applied by actors.  
 
3.2.3 Because importers in emerged markets of the last century did not own or control 
ships the embedded usage of conformity was developed to serve the prominent need 
of importers to have a documentary assurance as to the shipment of the required 
goods prior to the payment.331 Therefore, the strong meaning of conformity is that 
documents must be in a mirror image to the terms of the credit in order to warrant 
the security for importers by having documents that appear to be, letter by letter, in 
compliance with the required conditions of the credit. However, since the conformity 
usage is dependent on the positive actions of both sellers (and the carriers, insurers 
and other agents they use) to present documents representing on their face 
compliance with the conditions of the credit and banks to examine the compliance of 
documents, it encounters the contested needs of sellers and banks as to speed, 
manageable presentation and manageable examination of documents.332 Such 
                                                          
331 Hershey, Letters of Credit, [1918] Harvard Law Review Association, 1 (Nov). 
332 Chapter 1, diagram 1. 
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contested needs make conformity an elastic concept, so its meaning (depending on 
the essentiality of each party’s need according to a particular matrix of facts) might 
travel from the above strong meaning or dimension to a weak meaning or dimension. 
In social science terms, such a concept of conformity is regarded as a “wide scale” 
type in that it has a strong and a weak meaning or dimension, and presented 
documents falling anywhere between these dimensions might qualify as 
conforming.333 Given the fact that the bank’s role in determining conformity is 
assumed to be a ministerial role (whereby it looks only at the appearance of the 
documents and not at the actual facts represented by the documents), it is submitted 
(as inferred from the various commercial and legal sources)334 that there are seven 
identifiable dimensions contained within the wide scale concept of conformity. 
 
Dimensions (Meanings) Of Conformity 
 
3.2.4 (1) The most exacting dimension is that the contents of documents must be in a 
mirror image to the terms of the credit, so any difference is not tolerated.335 (2) The 
next dimension is that the contents of the document must be consistent with the 
terms of the credit, with other contents in the same document and with contents of 
other documents: so a difference in meaning is tolerated to the extent it does not 
affect the collective meaning of the documents envisaged by the terms of the 
credit.336 (3) The third dimension is the same as the second except that the 
consistency is only required between the contents of the presented document and 
                                                          
333 6 and Bellamy, Principles of Methodologies, (1st edn, Sage 2012), 139.  
334 Below paras 326-331. 
335 ICC Banking Commission have warned that the mirror image test should not even apply on descriptions of 
goods in the invoice: ISBP 2013, C3; ISBP 2007, para 58; the mirror image test is clearly rejected and does not 
constitute part of article 14 of UCP 600: Drafting Group, Commentary on UCP 600: Article by Article Analysis, 
(No. 680, ICC 2009), 63; the abstract term “exact compliance” was introduced, but might have had a different 
meaning, by Bailhache J in English, Scottish and Australian Bank Ltd v Bank of South Africa(1922) 13 Lloyd’s 
Rep 21, 24.  
336 The general test for conformity under article 13 and 21 of UCP 500 was based on the concept of “inconsistency” 
which was to a certain extent understood by bankers as what is described as dimension two in this research 
because the concept of inconsistency unconsciously triggered the operation of its antonym which is consistency, 
and that lead to the encompassing of simple typing and grammatical errors in the concept of “inconsistency”. It 
is for that reason conformity was in practice elevated from dimension two to one: Drafting Group, Commentary 
on UCP 600: Article by Article Analysis, (No. 680, ICC 2009), 64.   
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the credit.337 (4) The median dimension is that the contents of the document must 
not be in conflict with the terms of the credit, with other contents in the presented 
document and with contents of other documents: so in this dimension any 
substantive difference is tolerated unless it causes a conflict in the credit.338 (5) A 
more purposive dimension is that the contents of the presented document in the 
context of the collective purpose and structure of the document itself, the other 
documents, the terms of the credit and the relative requirements in the applicable 
law must not be in conflict: so a substantive difference is tolerated unless it causes 
a contextual conflict with the credit, the applicable law or the contents of the 
presented documents.339 (6) A looser, but still purposive dimension is that the 
contents of the presented document in the context of the collective purpose and 
structure of the document itself, the other documents and the terms of the credit 
must not be in conflict: so a substantive difference is tolerated unless it causes a 
contextual conflict with the credit or the contents of the presented documents.340 (7) 
A further dimension is that the contents of the presented document in the context of 
the collective purpose and structure of the document itself and the terms of the credit 
must not be in conflict, so a difference is tolerated unless it causes a direct contextual 
conflict with the relevant term of the credit.341  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
337 Linkage in terms that documents must relate and be consistent with one another as suggested by the claimant 
in Banque de l’Indochine et de Suez SA v J.H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd [1983] Q.B. 711, 731 is not required. 
338 That was the apparent general test for conformity under UCP 500 but the term inconsistency was used instead 
of conflict.      
339 This dimension is the same as envisaged by sub-article 14 (d) of UCP 600 except that it has an addition which 
is that the documents must also fulfil the requirements under the applicable local law as in the case for bills of 
exchange as imposed by Opinions 2009-2011, R.730.  
340 This is the dimension that is adopted by sub-article 14 (d) of UCP 600, it must be noticed that this dimension 
under UCP 600 refers to the terms of the credit in a broad terms that include the terms of UCP 600 and ISBP.  
341 The contents of the documents are not required to be tested against the contents of other documents: this  
issue being subjected to a furious debate in the Drafting Group and the ICC national committees in the 
preparation work for UCP 600: Drafting Group, Commentary on UCP 600: Article by Article Analysis, (No. 680, 
ICC 2009), 63.   
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FORMAL REALISABILITY 
 
3.2.5 According to Kennedy “formal realisability” means the quality of ruleness in terms of 
the capability to direct an official to respond to each one of an easily distinguishable 
lists of facts in certain situations by intervening in a determinative way.  The question 
is whether there is a concept of conformity that is capable of consistent application 
across the wide range of very different circumstances arising in international trade: 
so as to engender a conclusive concept of conformity that can easily determine, in a 
decisive way, whether any factual matrix arising in international trade is in 
conformity or not. However, the description of compliance as strict or absolute under 
English and Jordanian laws gives no real insight as to the determination of the 
dimension into which conformity might fall. Now, conformity falling in dimension one 
(i.e. mirror image) has a high degree of formal realisability. However, conformity 
falling in a dimension between two and seven might be inadequate in terms of 
allowing easy determination with a high degree of certainty (i.e. knowledge in 
advance by actors) as to whether particular documents are in conformity or not. 
Conformity falling in dimension one would reject any difference. But there is no 
certain answer for a difference where conformity falls in a dimension between two 
and seven as whether or not this would result in a substantive difference or conflict 
would depend on the underlying factual circumstances. Here a bank would only be 
absolutely certain as to its rights and obligations where a particular rule, applying to 
the specific scenario and being capable of common application, was in existence.  
  
CONTESTED NEEDS 
3.2.6 The origin of the elasticity nature of conformity has its source in the opposing needs 
of the parties. Each party demands a standard for security that might clash with 
other parties’ security demands and thus different means (i.e. certainty, clarity, 
responsiveness, flexibility and communication) are used accordingly. Therefore 
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achieving the right balance of security is the main challenge in the regulation of 
conformity.  
 
3.2.7 Sellers’ security. From the sellers’ perspective, conformity would fall in dimension 
seven or six as identified above.342 This would facilitate a presentation by sellers of 
documents conforming to the terms of the credit, as discrepancies would then be 
disregarded unless they conflicted with the apparent purpose of the relevant terms 
of the credit. It is clarified by the empirical findings in this research that some traders 
face unreasonable difficulties in presenting conforming documents due to the literal 
and strict approach that is adopted by some banks because of bureaucratic 
procedures. Thus His Excellency Muhammad Asfor stated: 
 
“We have, as traders, difficulties such as late shipment and the fact that employees 
in banks are not aware of international practices in many areas in trade and 
transport. The dilemma is that the banks DC forms are extremely difficult to be 
changed due to the fact that the decision can only be made by the head of a 
department”.343 
 
3.2.8 Nevertheless, through the means of certainty sellers are assured that their 
documents will be honoured. As explained above, conformity in the first dimension 
has a high degree of formal realisability which substantially serves the means of 
certainty.344 Of course such a dimension provides the least assurance of payment for 
sellers as it is very difficult in practice to present documents that are letter by letter 
in conformity.345 However, a selection of one of the other dimensions (i.e. dimension 
two to seven) does not have a high degree of formal realisability, in that such a 
selected dimension does not always direct the bank in a decisive way as to whether 
                                                          
342 Para 3.2.4. 
343 Annex I, para 25.  
344 For the means of certainty: chapter 1, para 1.2.20.  
345 UCP 600, Introduction.  
135 
 
any factual matrix arising in international trade is in conformity or not. For such 
dimensions (i.e. two to seven), certainty demands detailed guidance (such as articles 
14 to 34 in UCP 600, ISBP and some ICC Opinions)346 in the form of particular rules 
to determine the status of conformity in specific common situations.  
 
3.2.9 Buyers’ security. However, from the buyers’ perspective, dimension seven would 
expose buyers to the risk of making payment against documents that might not 
reflect complete and perfect performance of the underlying transaction envisaged by 
the credit. Buyers would therefore not be assured that the correct goods have been 
shipped to them as required in the credit. Buyers might prefer the first strongest 
dimension. Jamal Abushamat stated “the documents must be letter by letter in 
conformity”.347 This would not merely provide them with a good assurance that the 
correct goods are shipped, but would also give them the upper hand because sellers 
would find it difficult to procure conforming documents and would be exposed to the 
discretion of buyers as to whether to accept them and to waive discrepancies. Of 
course where the market value of goods had fallen, buyers generally would not be 
content to waive discrepancies even though such discrepancies did not affect the 
contractual rights of buyers. 
 
3.2.10 Indeed, the first dimension is very rigid and extremely difficult to meet in practice, 
particularly given the fact that there are many different actors who issue documents 
such as insurance companies and carriers. Sellers would be wary of dealing with 
documentary credits that required conformity to fall into the first dimension as there 
is no real security of payment for sellers in those circumstances due to the high 
potential for refusal of the presented documents. There is evidence that even the 
second dimension, under the prior iterations of the UCP, is very difficult to meet in 
practice.348 
                                                          
346 Opinions 2009-2011, R.757.  
347 Annex I, para 25.  
348 As it can be inferred from the high number rate of refusals on first time presentation: UCP 600, Introduction.  
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3.2.11 Banks’ assurance of reimbursement. Security is the main concern for banks just 
as for buyers and sellers. It is essential for banks to secure both their rights of 
reimbursement and their reputation as a payment facilitator. But the preference of 
banks as to the dimensions of conformity is very sensitive to the particular 
circumstances of a documentary credit transaction and is largely contingent on both 
their role in the relevant documentary credit and their commercial relationship with 
the applicant as well as the beneficiary as explained below. 
 
3.2.12 Issuing and confirming banks’ security. The empirical findings of the present research 
indicate that an issuing bank which has a good relationship with a customer (i.e. the 
applicant) having a good financial covenant, may generally prefer dimension six and 
would not treat any discrepancy as material unless it affects the collective purpose 
and structure of the credit or the presented documents.349 Nart Lambaz said: 
 
“The discrepancy needs to be a material one that affects the essence of the 
commercial transaction”.  For example, the address is required only in relation to the 
name of the country in UCP 600, we used to apply this rule under UCP 500 because 
we regarded the discrepancy in the details of the address - except as to the name of 
the country - as not being a material one”.350  
 
Koloud Alkalaldeh stated “the material discrepancy is the one that affects the rights 
of the bank”.351 
 
3.2.13 However, where the issuing bank or indeed the confirming bank suspects there is a 
fraud, or there is a genuine dispute between the applicant and the beneficiary 
                                                          
349 Annex I, paras 24-26. 
350 Annex I, para 24. 
351 Annex I, para 24. 
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regarding the goods, it might then prefer to adopt one or other of the first three 
dimensions to allow it to refuse documents. Effectively it is in the issuing bank’s 
interests in such circumstances to have flexibility, in which case the beneficiary would 
not be certain as to the meaning of conformity or the status of its documents. Indeed, 
the empirical findings indicate that some bankers prefer the flexibility in the 
strictness of conformity to enable them to penalise suspected fraudsters.352 Qhaleb 
Joudeh stated that: 
 
“The discrepancy is a discrepancy but the decision for conformity depends on the 
bank and its customer circumstances … there is no bank that deals with conformity 
with utmost good faith because the standard for whether the discrepancy is material 
or not depends on the circumstances.353 
 
3.2.14 Generally speaking, as indicated in the empirical findings, issuing banks, and 
confirming banks in the case of a suspicion of fraud, prefer to have discretion to 
decide whether the discrepancy is a material one or not. Here, for banks a material 
discrepancy is, in reality, any discrepancy deleteriously affecting the rights, liabilities 
and commercial interests of the bank in connection with the documentary credit. But 
as the banks’ role in conformity is supposed to be a ministerial one, banks must rely 
on legitimate matters of form vis-a-vis the presentation of documents to justify their 
decision to regard a discrepancy as material.354  
 
3.2.15 Paying and negotiating banks’ security. However, flexibility by issuing or confirming 
banks has the potential to cause dispute with paying, or negotiating, bank. Certainty 
is essential for these banks as they want to be assured that their decision to accept 
a presentation of conforming documents is certainly correct so as to trigger 
                                                          
352 Annex I, para 26.  
353 Annex I, para 26.  
354 Annex I, para 26.  
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reimbursement by the issuing, or confirming, bank. Furthermore, the first three 
dimensions as to conformity would not be the preference of paying and negotiating 
banks. Since the application of these dimensions would lead in most cases to the 
refusal of a presentation and the efforts that the paying or negotiating banks would 
spend to examine the documents might not be+ rewarded as they would not be able 
to honour the credit and thus make the intended profit. Hence, from their perspective 
the inspection of presented documents must be capable of being carried out quickly 
and easily to reduce the consumption of money and time.355 
 
3.2.16 Flexibility. If dimension five, six or seven was adopted then banks must exercise a 
degree of judgement as to the apparent purpose and structure of the terms of the 
credit. Marginal discretion is necessary to avoid immaterial inconsistencies causing 
unnecessary rejections. Furthermore, banks need to exercise their discretion where 
there is no guidance in UCP 600 or in its interpretative aids as to the status of 
conformity regarding a particular situation. Here, the banker’s decision as to the 
status of conformity should be considered as valid if it has exercised its best 
discretion as a reasonable banker and acted in good faith (i.e. the bank should 
adhere to its ministerial role). Furthermore, banks need flexibility to be able to raise 
issues of concern (as matters for the proper exercise of their marginal discretion) as 
to the determination of documentary conformity in order to safeguard their right of 
reimbursement. 
 
SECURITY AND DIMENSION SIX 
 
3.2.17 The initial question in regulating conformity is what is the acceptable balance of 
security as between competing – and directly opposing – needs for security in 
connection with conformity? As a first step, one of the dimensions of conformity must 
                                                          
355 For instance it is a banking standard in Jordan to examine the documents within two or three banking days 
which is less than the period that is set out in article 14 UCP 600: annex I, para 33.   
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be determined to be a definitive domain for the operation of conformity within the 
context of the UCP.  
 
3.2.18 It is submitted that dimension six would provide a balance of security that would 
satisfy documentary credit parties, as neither party has all the risk. Sellers would be 
assured that there is a good possibility that the documents would be accepted, 
because any difference in the documents would be tolerated unless it would reach 
the level of conflict and the conflict must also reach the level of a contextual conflict 
in terms of being a conflict with the collective purpose and structure of the credit or 
the documents. Unlike dimension five sellers need not check the requirements of the 
applicable Municipal law as they would not be familiar with such a law which is usually 
foreign to them. Sellers would be assured that buyers or the banks cannot refuse 
the documents on the basis that there is an apparent conflict or contradiction in 
ordinary meaning (as under dimensions three and four) since the conflict in 
dimension six must be substantive or material in the sense of being a contextual 
conflict. Indeed, only such a conflict actually affects the purpose of requiring the 
documents as this truly and actually undermines the security for buyers. Dimensions 
two and three contain the requirement of consistency which might lead to the idea 
that general information must be spelled out in all documents and the documents 
must be positively consistent in terms that a mere difference of meaning would not 
be tolerated. Dimension seven disregards a contextual conflict between the 
presented documents, so the buyer’s security is affected as data in a presented 
document which appear to conflict with the purpose and function of another 
presented document would be accepted.  
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3.2.19 It follows that the bank would exercise a level of discretion to determine what is 
material conflict as observed by Parker J, in considering conformity under Common 
law, in Banque de l’Indochine et de Suez SA v JH Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd:356  
 
“I accept … that Lord Sumner's statement cannot be taken as requiring rigid 
meticulous fulfilment of precise wording in all cases. Some margin must and can be 
allowed …”. 
 
Here dimension six, as it is the adopted test for conformity in UCP 600, directs the 
bank to exercise a structured marginal discretion, in that the bank must find out the 
collective purpose and structure of the required document from the appearance of 
the terms of the credit and the document itself in order to determine whether the 
apparent conflict affects the purpose of the credit. So the flexibility for banks is 
structured and not loose. However, dimension six, as in all dimensions except the 
first dimension, does not have a high degree of “formal realisability”. So the main 
concern for banks, particularly paying and negotiating banks, would be certainty in 
order to be assured of their entitlement of reimbursement. Indeed dimension six, 
which should be regarded as a general rule for the test of conformity, needs to be 
supplemented by particular rules. As we will see below, dimension six is adopted by 
sub-article 14 (d) of UCP 600 as being the general test for conformity.357  
 
Meaning Of Conformity Under UCP And ISBP 
3.2.20 The meaning, and the general test, for conformity in UCP 500 and in the predecessor 
revisions has led to interpretations by banks that placed conformity into the 
aforementioned dimension two or one.358 A difference in the documents was not 
tolerated where it affected the alignment of the relationships between documents 
                                                          
356 [1982] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 476, 482.  
357 Para 3.4.28. 
358 Drafting Group, Commentary on UCP 600: Article by Article Analysis, (No. 680, ICC 2009), 64.  
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and the terms of the credit, even if there was no material conflict with the terms of 
the credit. Thus 70% of the presented documents were refused at the first 
presentation during the life of UCP 500.359 This high level of rejection threatened the 
reputation of documentary credits as a means of payment and settlement in 
international trade,360 since sellers would question the security of the payment 
undertaking under documentary credits when there was no assurance of 
enforcement because of the high risk of documentary rejection. Consequently, UCP 
600 was mainly promulgated to address conformity in order to reduce unnecessary 
rejections.361 The new language, particularly in article 14, suggests that conformity 
in UCP 600 falls in dimension six as it will be elucidated later.362  
 
3.2.21 However, the introduction of ISBP in 2002363 had already reduced the rate of 
rejections.364 ISBP was updated, and not revised, in 2007 in order to match the 
language and the new structure of UCP 600.365 ISBP 2002 was revised for the first 
time in 2013.366 The new revision of ISBP covers practices identified by ICC Opinions 
since the promulgation of UCP 600. It also regulates conformity for some documents 
that were not covered in ISBP 2002, such as a packing list, weight list, beneficiary 
certificate and non-negotiable sea waybill.  
 
3.2.22 ISBP contains particular rules that are tailored to specific situations.367 It determines 
how the criteria for conformity that are set out in the UCP operate in standard 
international banking practices. In the same spirit, the ICC Opinions provide 
guidance for the interpretation of UCP 600, as “it fills in the details that the UCP, 
                                                          
359 As indicated by a number of surveys: UCP 600, Introduction.  
360 UCP 600, Introduction.  
361 UCP 600, Introduction.  
362 Para 3.4.28. 
363 ICC, International Standard Banking Practice for the Examination of Documents under Documentary Credits 
(ISBP), (No. 645, ICC 2002). 
364 ISBP 2013, Introduction; ISBP 2007, Introduction. 
365 Chapter 2, para 2.3.10; ICC, International Standard Banking Practice for the Examination of Documents under 
Documentary Credits (ISBP), (No. 681, ICC 2007); UCP 600, Introduction.  
366ICC, International Standard Banking Practice for the Examination of Documents under Documentary Credits 
(ISBP), (No. 745, ICC 2013). 
367 For particular rules: chapter 1, para 1.2.17. 
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being more general in nature, cannot always provide”.368 Similarly, decisions or 
position papers by the ICC – such as ICC Banking Commission Decision “Statements 
Indicating Originality” – regarding conformity might be applicable. Accordingly the 
concept of conformity within UCP 600 must be examined both by reference to those 
rules and their interpretive aids (i.e. ISBP, ICC Opinions and ICC Papers), and 
evaluated in the context of its purpose (i.e. to achieve, or maintain, documentary 
credits as a secure means of payment and settlement in international trade). 
However, the commercial and legal difficulties potentially obstructing that purpose 
must be taken into consideration.     
 
LEGAL DIFFICULTIES 
3.2.23 As analysed in chapter 2, both the UCP’s legal status and interpretation are 
contingent on the interacted doctrines of Municipal legal orders. Accordingly, a first 
difficulty is that legal orders may adopt different approaches for the interpretation of 
the UCP. We are now quite certain that the UCP are interpreted through an 
international lens under English law.369 Thus, ICC Opinions and ICC Position Papers 
are generally regarded as a persuasive source in interpreting the UCP, as they are 
to a certain extent representative of the international banking view of interpreting 
the UCP.370 Indeed, the clear meaning of a UCP term that causes a great 
inconvenience to the international business community might be overridden by an 
interpretation expedient to that community.371 On the other hand, the position is not 
clear under Jordanian law and it is difficult to envisage a situation in which Jordanian 
                                                          
368 Collyer and Katz, ICC Opinions 2009-2011, (No 732, ICC 2012) Preface.    
369 Fortis Bank S.A./N.V, Stemcor UK Limited v Indian Overseas Bank [2011] EWCA (Civ) 58, [29]. 
370 Chapter 2, para 2.3.16.  
371 The Court of Appeal in Kredietbank Antwerp v Midland Bank Plc [1999] Lloyd's Rep. Bank. 219 held that the 
requirement that a document be “marked as original” in sub-article 20 (b) of UCP 500 applied to photocopies of 
computerised documents, but not to word–processed and laser printer documents and that, as submitted, was 
due to the expectation of the international banking community: Hwaidi and Ferris, The Existence of International 
Unchangeable and Changeable Trade Usage, submitted paper to the SLS on Sep 2013 
<http://www.conference.legalscholars.ac.uk/edinburgh/paper.cfm?id=107>. 
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law would be prepared to allow an interpretation that is driven by the international 
business community to override the clear meaning of a UCP term.372 
 
3.2.24 A second difficulty is that a UCP term might be rejected under the communicated 
Municipal legal order or system. It is submitted that freedom to contract is one of 
the most fundamental doctrines under both English373 and Jordanian laws.374 A UCP 
term that attempts to disregard what the parties have expressly agreed in the credit 
might lead not only to the invalidity of such a term, but also to inconsistencies in 
practice and consequent disputes as some banks might seek to rely on such a UCP 
term in determining conformity against traders intent on relying on their own express 
agreements.375    
 
3.2.25 A third difficulty is that extensive terms regulating conformity may heighten 
formalities, and heightened formality might attract the opposing doctrines of good 
faith under Jordanian law,376 business common sense under Common law377 or even 
unconscionability under Common law.378 A refusal notice (i.e. a notice that must be 
served to inform the beneficiary that the documents are rejected for discrepancies) 
is a good example. A requirement by UCP 600379 to express the word “refusal” in a 
notice of refusal might be treated as a mere formality where the notice clearly 
conveys the meaning that the bank refuses the documents. Yet a beneficiary might 
be denied the right to reject the refusal note on the basis of the lack of such 
formality.380 Here the intention of the UCP is to serve certainty by heightening 
                                                          
372 Chapter 2, para 2.3.18. 
373 Suisse Atlantique Société d'Armement Maritime SA v NV Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale  [1967] 1 AC 361, 
399 per Lord Reid.  
374 Article 213 Civil Code (1976). 
375 Chapter 4, para 4.4.2.  
376 A contract must be performed in good faith: article 202 Civil Code (1976).  
377 Antaios Compania Naviera S.A. v Salen Rederierna A.B [1985] AC 191, 201 per Lord Diplock.  
378 Unconscionability or lack of faith is recognised as an exception to the autonomy principle in relation to demand 
bonds in Singapore: Bocotra Construction Pte Ltd v A-G (No2) [1995] 2 SLR 733; GHL Pte Ltd v Unitrack Building 
Construction Pte Ltd and Another [1999] 4SLR 604. In England unconscionability may in very special case be 
regarded as an exception to autonomy principle in demand bonds: TTI Team Telecom International Ltd and 
another v Hutchison 3G UK Ltd [2003] EWHC 762 (TCC).      
379 Sub-article 16 (c) (i) UCP 600.  
380 Chapter 4, para 4.5.4.  
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formality but the result of the interaction with Municipal systems of law is that 
uncertainty is heightened.   
 
COMMONALITY OF UCP 600, ISBP, OPINIONS AND COMMENTORY 
3.2.26 In order to regulate how banks must determine conformity, it is essential for terms 
regulating conformity to be commonly applied by banks in the sense of them 
adopting the same interpretations of, and the same approach to, conformity. As 
elucidated in chapter 2, banks apply UCP 600 and ISBP to conformity as confirmed 
by the empirical findings,381 and this is due to the clarity as to the reference of the 
applicability of ISBP in the text of UCP 600.382 However, due to the lack of clarity in 
the text of UCP 600, there is no commonality in the ways of applying ICC Opinions. 
For the same reason, there is no commonality as to the application of the Drafting 
Group Commentary.383 Problems, or uncertainties, in applying the ICC interpretative 
aids give rise to the possibility of inconsistency as to the determination of conformity 
where there is ambiguity or no guidance in the text of UCP 600 and ISBP. Further 
similar dilemmas can be anticipated when there is a new revision of ISBP that 
endeavours to amend or to replace a conformity rule in UCP 600. As the majority of 
banks in Jordan treat ISBP as part of UCP 600 in relation to conformity, there is a 
possibility that some banks might give effect to a new ISBP over UCP 600. This would 
be inconsistent with the position of both the English and Jordanian legal orders.384  
 
3.2.27 Empirical findings. Indeed, the empirical findings indicate that there is no common 
understanding amongst bankers as to what is meant by material or contextual 
conflict in sub-article 14 (d) of UCP 600.385 Some banks perceive it as the conflict 
that affects the commercial essence of the transaction.386 So they adopt the sixth 
                                                          
381 Annex I, para 14: Jordanian Banks and such findings might extend to Arabic Banks.  
382 Chapter 2, para 2.3.11.  
383 Chapter 2, para 2.3.16. 
384 Chapter 4, para 4.4.7 ; Chapter 2, para 2.3.16 - 22.   
385 Annex I, para 24-26. 
386 As in BLOM Bank: Annex I, para 24.  
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dimension of conformity. Where other banks perceive a material conflict as any 
conflict that affects the rights, liabilities and commercial interests of the bank in 
connection with the documentary credit387 thereby infringing the neutrality of their 
ministerial role and acting in apparent breach of their undertakings under UCP 600. 
Such diverse inconsistent interpretations are caused by a lack of clarity in the text 
of UCP 600. The meaning of material, or contextual, conflict (i.e. conflict with the 
collective purpose and structure of the term of the credit and the documents) is only 
explained by the Drafting Group of UCP 600 in their Commentary on UCP 600.388 
Again, such Commentary creates a dilemma as to its application not only due to the 
absence of any reference in UCP 600 and ISBP as to its application but also because 
it is not promulgated by the Banking Commission of ICC.389 In conclusion, due to the 
lack of clarity bankers might adopt a meaning to the concept of conformity other 
than the intended meaning (i.e. dimension six).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
387 As in Arabic Bank: Annex I, para 24. 
388 Drafting Group, Commentary on UCP 600: Article by Article Analysis, (No. 680, ICC 2009), 64. 
389 Drafting Group, Commentary on UCP 600: Article by Article Analysis, (No. 680, ICC 2009), Introduction.  
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LEGAL NATURE OF CONFORMITY  
3.3.1 The principle of conformity gives rise to uncertainty as to the nature and scope of 
the legal undertakings it creates, which are highlighted below. The terms of the UCP 
must be sufficiently broad – without being loose - to include various legal categories 
under distinctive legal orders (e.g. the use of the term duty instead of contractual 
duty includes the possibility contractual obligations and undertakings based on sole 
act). Also the realisation of the legal nature of conformity clarifies the basis of the 
appropriate standard as to the test of conformity, and whether aspects such as a 
banker’s examination of documents is an obligation or not.    
 
3.3.2 No obligation of examination. There are only two provisions in UCP 600 that 
express the obligations that the issuing bank owes to the applicant. One provision is 
sub-article 4 (b) which can be treated under English and Jordanian laws as creating 
a duty on the part of the bank to advise the applicant to avoid including in the credit 
any reference to the underlying contract and the like.390 Another provision is article 
37 which seeks to exclude the issuing bank from any liability for the mistakes of 
advising banks in advising the credit. However, sub-article 14 (a) of UCP 600 
provides that the bank must examine the documents to determine whether the 
presented documents are in conformity. Such a provision does not postulate that the 
bank owes to the applicant a duty of examination; it rather intends to protect the 
bank as explained below.391 Yet, under English and Jordanian laws the issuing bank 
and the applicant are in a documentary credit relationship which means that the 
issuing bank must adhere to the mandate of the applicant.392 Generally speaking, 
the purport of that mandate, which is usually expressed in the issuing bank’s form 
of contract, provides that the bank is obliged to honour the credit against the 
                                                          
390 Chapter 5, para 5.2.4.  
391 Para 3.3.7. 
392 English law: Commercial Banking Co. of Sydney v Jalsard Pty Ltd (1973) AC 279, 285; Midland Bank v 
Seymour (1955) 2 Lloyd’s Rep 147, 153; Credit Agricole Indosuez v Muslim Commercial Banking Go of Sydney 
Ltd v Jalsard Pty Ltd [2000] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 275, 280; Jordanian law: Court of Distinction (Civil), 152/1975, Adalah 
Programme. 
147 
 
required documents. Thus the presented documents must correspond to what is 
required in the credit. If the credit is honoured against non-conforming documents, 
the bank will be in breach of its mandate. The consequence of such a breach is that 
the issuing bank is not entitled to reimbursement.393 Furthermore, the bank might 
be sued for damages by the applicant where the latter loses the right to reject 
documents in the underlying contract (e.g. in a CIF contract where delivery of 
conforming goods is evidenced by the delivery of conforming documents). These 
consequences may be regulated by the mandate between the issuing bank and the 
applicant. In conclusion, the UCP leave to Municipal law to determine what duties 
are owed in contract and tort by the bank to the applicant. The UCP itself might not 
create a duty to examine the documents but the applicant’s mandate may do so.   
 
3.3.3 Conformity as a condition triggering undertakings. UCP 600 plays a bigger role 
in the undertakings of the issuing bank towards the beneficiary,394 where sub-article 
7 (a) states: 
 
“A. Provided that the stipulated documents are presented to the nominated bank or 
to the issuing bank and that they constitute a complying presentation, the issuing 
bank must honour ... .  
B. An issuing bank is irrevocably bound to honour as of the time it issues the credit”. 
 
In addition, UCP 600 articulates the undertakings owed to the nominated bank (i.e. 
confirming, paying or negotiating banks) by the issuing bank, where sub-article 7 
(c) states:  
 
                                                          
393 Equitable Trust Co of New York v Dawson Partners Ltd (1927) 27 Lloyd’s Rep 49; Midland Bank v Seymour 
(1955) 2 Lloyd’s Rep 147. 
394 Article 7 UCP 600; article 9 (a) UCP 500; the confirming bank bears the same obligations as the issuing bank 
towards the beneficiary: article 8 UCP 600; article 9 (b) UCP 500.   
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“An issuing bank undertakes to reimburse a nominated bank that has honoured or 
negotiated a complying presentation and forwarded the documents to the issuing 
bank. Reimbursement for the amount of a complying presentation under a credit 
available by acceptance or deferred payment is due at maturity, whether or not the 
nominated bank prepaid or purchased before maturity. An issuing bank's undertaking 
to reimburse a nominated bank is independent of the issuing bank’s undertaking to 
the beneficiary”. 
 
Here it is clear that the undertaking on the part of the issuing, or confirming,395 bank 
to honour the credit is conditional upon the presentation of conforming documents. 
This can be seen in the judgement of the Court of Appeal in Glencore International 
AG v Bank of China396 where Bingham Mr stated “the duty of the issuing bank is, and 
is only, to make payment against documents which comply strictly with the terms of 
the credit”. It is also clear that the obligation of the issuing, or confirming, bank to 
reimburse the nominated bank is conditional upon forwarding conforming documents 
to the issuing bank. By analogy, the applicant is obliged to reimburse the issuing 
bank only where the documents are in conformity.  
  
Conformity As A Right And A Condition  
3.3.4 Consequently, the applicant has the right to receive documents that are in 
conformity. Here conformity is a right. For beneficiaries conformity is a condition 
precedent that must be fulfilled as part of the conditional right of payment. Similarly 
conformity is a condition protecting the issuing or confirming bank against the 
nominated bank. This is not just to protect the issuing bank from the possible liability 
to the applicant, but it might be that the issuing bank is a party who has real interests 
                                                          
395 Article 8 UCP 600; article 9 (b) UCP 500.   
396 [1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 135, 155. 
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in the documents (e.g. the issuing bank is the consignee in the bill of lading).397 The 
issuing bank, or nominated bank (i.e. confirming, paying and negotiating bank), 
needs to forward conforming documents to the applicant, or to the instructing bank 
as the case may be, in order to be entitled to reimbursement. Here, conformity is a 
protection for the issuing or nominated bank. The issuing or nominated bank is 
entitled to reimbursement as long as the documents are in conformity (i.e. in the 
case of certainty where the status of conformity is clear), even where the bank has 
not actually examined the documents. Both UCP 600 and its predecessor398 stipulate 
that the bank (i.e. issuing, confirming, paying or negotiating) “must examine a 
presentation” to determine conformity. But as analysed above UCP 600 does not 
create an obligation on the issuing or confirming banks to examine the documents,399 
rather this provision advises the banks to undertake the task of examination since, 
we will see below, a diligent examination protects banks in enforcing their right of 
reimbursement where the status of conformity is uncertain.400  
 
Conformity As An Objective And Subjective Belief 
3.3.5 The question is what does the bank rely on to validate its decision as to the 
conformity, or otherwise, of the presented documents and thus to enforce its right 
to reimbursement?  
 
REASONABLE CARE 
 
3.3.6 In the so called “reasonable care defence” where reasonable care is exercised by the 
bank (i.e. issuing, confirming, paying or negotiating bank) in determining the 
conformity status of the presented documents, the bank is not responsible for any 
                                                          
397 The empirical findings confirm such interests in Jordan: Annex I, para 32. 
398 Sub-article 14 (a) UCP 600; sub-article 13 (a) UCP 500.  
399 The paying or negotiating bank is not even obliged to honour the credit in the first place: article 12 UCP 600; 
article 10 UCP 500. 
400 Para 3.3.7.  
150 
 
want of conformity. Sub-article 13 (a) of UCP 500 contained a reference to 
“reasonable care” by stating: 
 
“Banks must examine all documents stipulated in the Credit with reasonable care, to 
ascertain whether or not they appear, on their face, to be in compliance with the 
terms and conditions of the Credit...” 
 
The reference to “reasonable care” in UCP 500 was a source of confusion as to when 
the bank could rely on reasonable care and what is meant by, or the scope of, 
reasonable care.401 Indeed the bank is obliged to strictly adhere to the instructions 
of the applicant as it was elucidated by Sumner LJ in Equitable Trust Co of New York 
v Dawson Partners Ltd:402  
 
“There is really no question here of waiver or of estoppel or of negligence or of breach 
of a contract of employment. It is both common ground and common sense that in 
such a transaction the accepting bank can only claim indemnity if the conditions on 
which it is authorised to accept are in the matter of the accompanying documents 
strictly observed”.   
 
It is accordingly clear that the nature of the bank’s duty is not a reasonable care in 
providing a service to check the status of conformity. Rather, the bank guarantees 
that it will be cautious in adhering to the terms of the credit in such a way that any 
cautious bank on its position might reach the same conclusion. However, later in 
Gian Singh & Co Ltd v Banque de l’Indochine403 Lord Diplock referred to the term 
“reasonable care” in connection with conformity where he stated:  
 
                                                          
401 Malek and Quest, Jack: Documentary Credits, (4th edn, Tottel 2009) para 8.3.  
402 (1927) 27 Lloyd’s Rep 49, 52.  
403 [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1234, 1238.  
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“The duty of the issuing bank, which it may perform either by itself, or by its agent, 
the notifying bank, is to examine documents with reasonable care to ascertain that 
they appear on their face to be in accordance with the terms and conditions of the 
credit. The express provision to this effect in article 7 of the Uniform Customs and 
Practice [this provision in 1962 revision has not been changed in UCP 400 and 500] 
for Documentary Credits does no more than re-state the duty of the bank at Common 
law”.  
 
It is submitted that the term “reasonable care” under both Common law and UCP 
500 was necessary to protect the bank in the situation where the status of conformity 
was uncertain. In such a situation the bank needed to prove that it had exercised its 
reasonable care in its narrow sense, namely: another cautious bank might, and not 
should, have reached the same conclusion irrespective of the subjective 
circumstances of the bank (e.g. the employees of the bank were on strike). The 
problem is in the language (i.e. reasonable care) that was used to describe the above 
legal position. In conclusion the term “reasonable care” in conformity was not 
intended to correlate to its usual meaning under employment or service contracts in 
which a performing party does not guarantee the result of the performance but 
agreeing to perform its services to a relative standard that is subject to the 
contingent circumstances, but as a description of the scope of a banking ministerial 
discretion.     
 
UCP 600 (NO REASONABLE CARE) 
 
3.3.7 The reference to “reasonable care” is bravely omitted in UCP 600 in which sub-article 
14 (a) states:  
 
“A nominated bank acting on its nomination, a confirming bank, if any, and the 
issuing bank must examine a presentation to determine, on the basis of the 
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documents alone, whether or not the documents appear on their face to constitute 
a complying presentation”. 
 
The Drafting Group were confident to erase the term “reasonable care” as ISBP had 
been promulgated in 2002 prior to the drafting of UCP 600, and ISBP contained 
detailed rules directing a bank as to the status of conformity on many specific factual 
matrices.404 In addition the Drafting Group felt that the guidance for conformity in 
article 2 of UCP 600 was clear and comprehensive.405 Article 2 states:  
“Complying presentation means a presentation that is in accordance with the terms 
and conditions of the credit, the applicable provisions of these rules and international 
standard banking practice”.   
 
So, the Drafting Group felt that there was certainty as to the meaning of conformity 
in many common situations. Accordingly, it is clear now that presented documents 
are, in most cases, either conforming to the terms of the credit or not, and as such 
the bank has no discretion in such cases and no ability to rely on the exercise of 
reasonable care. Here it is irrelevant whether or not the bank has actually examined 
the documents and the bank is supposed to make the correct decision as to the 
status of conformity regardless of its circumstances or its discretion. The omission 
of the term “reasonable care” is also significant where the status of conformity is 
uncertain, as the relevant situation is not determinatively captured by UCP 600 and 
ISBP. It is clear now, the bank cannot rely on the “reasonable care” defence in its 
broad sense (i.e. the bank has exercised what it can to do relative to the 
circumstances in which it finds itself). The bank can only rely on its claim that it has 
come to a decision as to the status of conformity that any cautious bank might make, 
regardless of the particular circumstances of the bank (e.g. the employees of the 
bank were on strike). This can only be proved where the bank has actually examined 
                                                          
404 Drafting Group, Commentary on UCP 600: Article by Article Analysis, (No. 680, ICC 2009), 62.  
405 Drafting Group, Commentary on UCP 600: Article by Article Analysis, (No. 680, ICC 2009), 62.  
153 
 
the documents in compliance with the required standard of a prudent bank (i.e. 
following the rules of UCP 600 and ISBP on the determination of the status of 
presentation).406 That is why the reference that the bank must examine the 
documents under sub-article 14 (a) of UCP 600 is a necessary advice aiming to 
protect the bank’s right to reimbursement in the case where the status of conformity 
as to presented documents is uncertain. 
 
 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND JORDANIAN LAW 
 
3.3.8 The empirical findings indicate that bankers perceive a presentation as being either 
in conformity or non-conformity and assume that any prudent banker would reach 
the same decision as to the conforming status of the presented documents.407 The 
interviewed bankers in Jordan define a prudent banker as any banker who is 
specialised in checking documents in documentary credits, and not an eminent 
expert - such as Muhammad Burjak - who provides training in documentary 
credits.408 As analysed above, the position that the presented documents are either 
in conformity or non-conformity should be confined to situations where there is 
certainty as to the status of conformity (e.g. where the issue is regulated with clarity 
in UCP 600 and ISBP). However, the empirical findings indicate that there is a lack 
of clarity in article 2 of UCP 600.  
 
LEGAL NATURE OF CONFORMITY AND CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
 
3.3.9 The deletion of the reference to “reasonable care” is a welcome step under UCP 600 
in order to avoid the inherited confusions that were caused by the use of such a 
                                                          
406 The omission of reasonable care must be interpreted as seeking a clarification rather than an amendment: 
Malek and Quest, Jack: Documentary Credits, (4th edn, Tottel 2009) para 8.4. 
407 Annex I, para 26. 
408 Annex I, para 26. 
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term. It is, however, unfortunate that UCP 600 did not set up a standard for 
conformity whereas the status of documents is uncertain. It is submitted that the 
standard should be an objective one: any cautious bank might, and not should, reach 
the same conclusion irrespective of the subjective circumstances of the bank. It must 
be appreciated that the examination of documents plays a protective role when the 
status of conformity is uncertain (as designing particular rules addressing all cases 
is an impossible task), so the bank is assured of reimbursement as long as it 
examines the documents according to the aforementioned objective standard. Thus, 
after determining the meaning of conformity (i.e. dimension six), a regulator must 
also determine the banking standard for the determination of documentary 
conformity whereas the status of the conformity of documents is uncertain.  
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SCOPE OF CONFORMITY409 
 
3.4.1 This section evaluates (on the basis of the conceptual model that was set out in 
chapter 1) under UCP 600 and its interpretative aids, how issues of conformity should 
be determined in the light of the English and Jordanian legal orders. Also the 
functional scope of conformity (i.e. the regulated conformity that captures 
documentary credits cases in a determinable way) under UCP 600 and its 
interpretative aids is analysed.   
   
Principle Of Conformity 
 
3.4.2 For conformity to be regarded as principle it must be formed in a way that directly 
reflects that documentary credits constitute an assurance to the buyers of effective 
delivery of the goods by presentation of documents corresponding to the 
requirements of the credit (i.e. as identified in the conceptual model: conformity 
mainly serves the function of documentary assurance as to the delivery of the 
required goods). Conformity is implicitly set out as a principle in the UCP and is 
expressly stipulated as a principle under English and Jordanian laws.   
 
UCP 
 
3.4.3 The concept of compliance or conformity was set out at an early stage by the main 
players of documentary credits in the international banking community in a form that 
the principle of conformity was implicit in the Draft Uniform Regulations on Export 
Commercial Credits (1927), in which it was stated that the presented documents 
                                                          
409 For scope of conformity under English law: Hwaidi, The Story of The English Strict Compliance Principle in 
Letters of Credit and its Consistency with the UCP, [2014] J.I.B. L.R. 28 (2), 71-81. 
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must be in regular order.410 Similarly, under UCP 500, conformity was not spelled 
out as a principle in expressed terms, but it was implicit. Sub-article 13 (a) of UCP 
500 provided that the bank is under a duty to examine the presented documents in 
order to determine whether the documents are in compliance with the terms of the 
credit, and compliance must be determined by international standard banking 
practice as reflected in UCP 500. Also the principle of conformity is implicit in UCP 
600 from both sub-article 14 (a), which is equivalent to sub-article 13 (a) of UCP 
500 apart from the omission of the term “reasonable care”, and article 2. However 
article 2 of UCP 600 presents a significant change as to the principle of conformity, 
or complying presentation as it is called therein, where it states:  
 
“Complying presentation means a presentation that is in accordance with the terms 
and conditions of the credit, the applicable provisions of these rules and international 
standard banking practice”. 
 
3.4.4 Determinable principle. Unlike the predecessor revisions, article 2 of UCP 600 
directs any party determining an issue of conformity in a documentary credit 
transaction to consider that issue against particular contextual sources for criteria 
(i.e. the terms of the credit, the terms of UCP 600 and international standard banking 
practice). Here the benefit of the form of principle as to conformity is not merely that 
it reflects the underlying value of documentary credits (i.e. secure method of 
payment and settlement in international trade) as under the predecessor revisions, 
but it also has the advantages of both having a fair degree of “formal realisability” 
and a high degree of generality. “Formal realisability” in the sense that we know now 
documents must conform to those three sources of criteria. The generality of the 
principle of conformity is very high as it captures all cases in documentary credits. 
                                                          
410 Draft Uniform Regulations on Export Commercial Credits (1927) presented to ICC’s fourth Conference; article 
10 UCP (No. 82, ICC 1933); article 9 UCP (No.151, ICC 1951): Taylor, The Complete UCP, (1st edn, ICC 2008), 
30.   
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However, the lack of clarity as to what international standard banking practice refers 
to may affect commonality, since (as evidenced by the empirical findings)411 a 
minority of banks might prioritise the application of ICC Opinions in over ICC ISBP. 
It is submitted that such a lack of clarity would not affect the position of English and 
Jordanian laws as they would enforce the application of ICC ISBP, given the fact that 
the introduction of UCP 600 expressly applies ICC ISBP to the issue of conformity.   
 
 
ENGLISH AND JORDANIAN LAWS 
 
3.4.5 The concept of conformity is described as a “strict compliance” under English law412 
and as “full conformity” under Jordanian law.413 Both are regarded, as a matter of 
form, as a principle, because they directly reflect the underlying policy of 
documentary credits.414 The principle of strict compliance is encapsulated in the 
judgement of Sumner LJ in Equitable Trust Co of New York v Dawson Partners Ltd:415 
 
“It is both common ground and common sense that in such a transaction the 
accepting bank can only claim indemnity if the conditions on which it is authorised 
to accept are in the matter of the accompanying documents strictly observed”.  
 
The principle of full conformity was stated by the Court of Distinction in case 
316/1988:416 
 
                                                          
411 Annex I, para 24. 
412 Equitable Trust Co of New York v Dawson Partners Ltd (1927) 27 Lloyd’s Rep 49, 52.  
413 Court of Distinction (Civil), 316/1988, Kurtas Programme. 
414 For principles: chapter 1, para 1.2.25.  
415 (1927) 27 Lloyd’s Rep 49, 52.  
416 Court of Distinction (Civil), 316/1988, Kurtas Programme.  
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“The issuing bank does not accept the documents unless they are in full conformity 
with the conditions of the credit, and if there is a difference the bank will refuse the 
documents”.417 
 
Sumner LJ endeavoured to functionalise, or enhance the “formal realsability” of the 
principle of strict compliance by spelling out the consequences of disregarding strict 
compliance. Thus a bank is not entitled to indemnity for a payment against 
documents when a cautious banker would have refused them for non-compliance. 
This may be inferred from the reasoning that: 
 
“There is really no question here of waiver or of estoppel or of negligence or of breach 
of a contract of employment”.418  
 
Similarly the Jordanian Court of Distinction endeavoured to functionalise the principle 
of full conformity by the statement “... and if there is a difference the bank will refuse 
the documents.” 419 Such a statement is however better considered as a general rule, 
which will be examined under the heading of general test for conformity.420  
 
 
FORMAL REALISABILITY  
3.4.6 The principles of “strict compliance”,421 “full conformity”422 and “complying 
presentation: presented documents must be in accordance with three identified 
sources of criteria423 all lack the ability to determine the dimension in which 
conformity falls. The principles of strict compliance and full conformity have a very 
                                                          
417 Translated by the researcher.  
418 Equitable Trust Co of New York v Dawson Partners Ltd (1927) 27 Lloyd’s Rep 49, 52.  
419 Court of Distinction (Civil), 316/1988, Kurtas Programme. 
420 Below para 3.4.21.  
421 Equitable Trust Co of New York v Dawson Partners Ltd (1927) 27 Lloyd’s Rep 49, 52. 
422 Court of Distinction (Civil), 316/1988, Kurtas Programme.  
423 Article 2 UCP 600.  
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low degree of “formal realisability”. However, as above explained, the principle of 
complying presentation has a fair degree of “formal realisability”. Still none of these 
principles are capable of directing a banker in a particular case as to whether a 
presentation of documents in a particular situation is certainly in conformity or not.   
 
3.4.7 Applications. The direct application of such principles by courts might enhance the 
“formal realisability” of these principles. Thus the credit in Equitable Trust424 required 
a presentation of a certificate issued by the Chamber of Commerce of Batavia. Such 
a body did not actually exist. The beneficiary presented a certificate issued by the 
“Handelsvereeniging of Batavia” which was a semi-official body that fulfilled the 
functions normally associated with a chamber of commerce. It was held that such a 
presentation was in compliance with the credit. The application of the principle of 
strict compliance in this case had little precedential value, since no attempt was 
made to set out an abstract point or rule that can be followed in future cases. Also, 
the court might have simply looked at the issue through the general English doctrines 
for the interpretation of contractual terms, so the court imposed a reading that made 
the reference to non-existing body meaningful by identifying who might have been 
intended by the inappropriate reference. It can, nevertheless, be inferred from such 
an application that the principle of strict compliance under Common law does not fall 
in the first dimension for conformity (i.e. mirror image).425 This might appear 
inconsistent to a previous dictum expressed, in 1922, by Bailhache J in English, 
Scottish and Australian Bank Ltd v Bank of South Africa426 in which the principle of 
strict compliance had been referred to as “an exact compliance”. Such an expression 
should not be taken literally. Given the fact that documentary credits came into 
common use in international trade in the UK just after the end of the first world 
war,427 it was necessary to emphasise the establishment of the principle of strict 
                                                          
424 Equitable Trust Co of New York v Dawson Partners Ltd (1927) 27 Lloyd’s Rep 49. 
425 Above para 3.2.2. 
426 (1922) 13 Lloyd’s Rep 21, 24; cited; Malek and Quest, Jack: Documentary Credits, (4th edn, Tottel 2009) para 
8.31. 
427 Hershey, Letters of Credit, [1918] Harvard Law Review Association, (Nov). 
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compliance under Common law, in order to protect the commercial essence of 
documentary credits particularly in the environment where the UCP did not exist. 
This interpretation finds its support in Kredietbank Antwerp v Midland Bank plc428 
where Evans LJ  stated:  
 
“... [T]he requirement of strict compliance is not equivalent to a test of exact literal 
compliance in all circumstances and as regards all documents. To some extent, 
therefore, the banker must exercise his own judgment whether the requirement is 
satisfied by the documents presented to him”. 
  
3.4.8 Need for rules. In order to achieve a high level of formal realisbility we need general 
and particular rules that determine the application of the principle to various 
identifiable matrices of facts. The rules must not only be capable of determining in 
which dimension conformity falls, but also of determining how conformity functions 
when applied to a wide range of circumstances. However, the principle of conformity 
under UCP 600 has the virtue of capturing all documentary credits cases. The 
principles of conformity under English and Jordanian laws also have the virtue of 
generality, but it is a loose generality and as such it has a very broad flexibility that 
might affect its ability to capture the intended cases.  
 
General Rule Of Appearance 
 
3.4.9 The reason that the rule of appearance is set out in this chapter prior to the general 
test for conformity, which is also a general rule, is that the appearance rule has a 
high degree of both generality and “formal realisability” as it captures most cases in 
documentary credits in a determinative way, in the sense it directs a banker to act 
decisively on many factual matrices across the wide range of very different 
                                                          
428 [1999] Lloyd’s Rep 219, 223.  
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circumstances arising in conformity. Most importantly, unlike other rules of 
conformity, the rule of appearance is generated from the principle of appearance 
which functions as a bridge between the conformity norm and autonomy norm in 
documentary credits. The principle of appearance is generally addressed in chapter 
5. The concern in this chapter is regarding the elements of the appearance principle 
that are related to conformity and constitute the rule of appearance. The appearance 
rule means that a document checker should determine the status of conformity 
exclusively on the basis of what appears on the documents and nothing else. 
 
UCP 
 
3.4.10 Articles 5 and 34 of UCP 600 and their equivalent articles 4 and 15 in UCP 500 spell 
out the principle of appearance. Our concern here is on the rule of appearance that 
is related to conformity which is spelled out in sub-article 14 (a) of UCP 600, inter 
alia:  
 
“A nominated bank acting on its nomination, a confirming bank, if any, and the 
issuing bank must examine a presentation to determine, on the basis of the 
documents alone, whether or not the documents appear on their face to constitute 
a complying presentation”. 
Both phrases “on the basis of documents alone” and “on their face” constitute the 
rule of appearance for conformity under UCP 600. The equivalent provision under 
UCP 500 is sub-article 13 (a) which stated: 
 
“Banks must examine all documents stipulated in the Credit with reasonable care, to 
ascertain whether or not they appear, on their face, to be in compliance with the 
terms and conditions of the Credit...”.     
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3.4.11 Changes. UCP 600 presents two changes in respect of the rule of appearance. The 
first is the addition of the phrase “on the basis of the documents alone” in sub-article 
14 (a). This addition is necessary to obliterate any ambiguity as to the appearance 
rule, and as such it is plain that the bank should not be concerned about any matter 
except what appears on the documents. So, it is clear, for instance, if a bill of lading 
indicates that the freight is paid, the bank is under no obligation to check that the 
freight has actually been paid.429 The new phrase is not a repetition of article 5 of 
UCP 600 which provides that the bank deals with documents and not with goods. 
The new phrase directly serves the rule of appearance, whereas article 5 serves the 
principles of appearance and autonomy. The second change is the omission of 
“appear on their face” in the subsequent provisions of sub-article 14 (a). Thus it is 
clear now the article that deals with the general test for conformity (i.e. article 14) 
starts with the general rule of appearance which applies to all documentary credit 
cases. There is no need to repeat “on their face” as that might invite confusion, 
particularly where such a phrase is expressed in some conformity provisions and not 
expressed in other conformity provisions. The phrase “on their face” must not be 
understood as to refer to “front versus the back of a document”,430 but it stands for 
the reviewing of data within a document and thus it emphasises that banks should 
not go beyond what appears in the documents.  
 
ENGLISH AND JORDANIAN LAWS 
 
3.4.12 It is well established under English law that the bank is not entitled to examine the 
underlying facts,431 goods432 or the relevant contracts.433 The appearance rule under 
                                                          
429 Collected Opinions 1995-2001, R.432.  
430 Drafting Group, Commentary on UCP 600: Article by Article Analysis, (No. 680, ICC 2009), 62. 
431 Westpac Banking Corp v South Carolina National Bank [1986] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 311, 315 per Goff L.J.; Forestal 
Mimosa Ltd v Original Credit Ltd [1986] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 329, 334. 
432 Guaranty Trust Co of New York v Van den Berghs Ltd (1925) 22 Lloyd's Rep 446, 454 per Scrutton L.J.; Biddell 
Bros v E Clemens Horst Co [1911] 1 K.B. 934, 958 per Kennedy L.J. 
433 United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1983] 1 AC 168, 183; Credit Industriel et 
Commercial v China Merchants Bank [2002] C.L.C. 1263, [30]. 
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Jordanian law can be inferred from the decision number 1050/2006 of the Court of 
Distinction that the bank should not check or allow any interference of the underlying 
contract or other contracts in the determination of the conformity of the 
documents.434 The appearance rule lacks clarity under the English and Jordanian 
legal orders; particularly as the latter regime does not have an expressed position 
as to the appearance rule in connection with issues of conformity. However, as the 
rule of appearance is clear under UCP 600 it will be enforced under English and 
Jordanian laws to the extent that it is not repugnant to their fundamental legal 
doctrines.435  
 
DISCLAIMER 
 
3.4.13 As a consequence of the principle and rule of appearance, article 34 of UCP 600436 
provides that the bank does not warrant the truth, accuracy or legal effectiveness 
for any state of affairs that does not appear on the face of a document.437 
 
 
PARTICULAR RULES OF APEARANCE OF GENERAL APPLICATION 
 
Banks are not concerned with non-documentary credit trade usage 
 
3.4.14 As an application to the appearance rule a non-documentary credit usage or market 
practice should not intervene in the determination of conformity. For instance, where 
shipment has been effected from two ports, shipping companies would insert the 
date of the shipment in an on board notation only after the entire quantity had been 
loaded at the final port of loading, which means that there is no need to provide two 
                                                          
434 Court of Distinction (Civil), 1050/2006, Adalah Programme.   
435 For documentary fraud and illegality exceptions: chapter 5.  
436 Equivalent to article 15 UCP 500.   
437 Chapter 5, para 5.2.13. 
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on board notations to prove the date of each shipment. Here the bank should not 
rely on such a trade usage, and thus the bank needs to check the date of each 
shipment on the face of the presented documents.438 
 
Authenticity 
 
3.4.15 Both the need for speed in decision making and the fact that banks are not expected 
to be experts in the trade transactions underlying the documentary credits create an 
objective of speed and a factor of ignorance that informs the underlying policy of the 
principle of appearance. Therefore, the rule of appearance in UCP 600 functionalises 
this objective and factor by generating a particular rule regarding authenticity, as 
article 3 provides: 
 
“A requirement for a document to be legalized, visaed, certified or similar will be 
satisfied by any signature, mark, stamp or label on the document which appears to 
satisfy that requirement”.439 
Thus there is a presumption of due execution in the presentation of documents: in 
effect a presumption that the beneficiary is bona fide and presents authentic 
documents. Therefore, there is no requirement for a particular locally utilised method 
of signifying authenticity where the credit requires the documents to be legalised or 
certified. In similar fashion, when it comes to the authentication of documents the 
UCP provides for a wide variety of acceptable means. Article 3 of UCP 600 provides: 
 
“A document may be signed by handwriting, facsimile signature, perforated 
signature, stamp, symbol or any other mechanical or electronic method of 
authentication”.440 
                                                          
438 Opinions 2009-2011, R.723; J H Rayner & Co Ltd v Hambro’s Bank Ltd [1943] KB 37: the argument that the 
statement “coromandel groundnuts” as stated in the credit was the same in the trade usage of groundnuts as 
“machine – shelled groundnuts kernels” which was stated in the bill of lading was rejected by the Court of Appeal.   
439 Equivalent to sub-article 20 (d) UCP 500.  
440 Equivalent to the second sentence of sub-article 20 (b) UCP 500.  
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Thus, any of the listed forms: a signature, a stamp, a label, or a mark intended to 
authenticate a document is accepted under the UCP. Article 3 allows a wide variety 
of permissible forms for authentication of documents.  
 
3.4.16 Furthermore, the characters used are presumed to be appropriate if they are not 
within the common knowledge of the local bank. Where any of the acceptable 
signatory methods is expressed in the local language of its issuance, which is 
different from the language of the credit, it must be accepted without the need to 
prove the translation of the contents.441 Such a position reflects pragmatic needs. 
Thus, it is not expected that a stamp from the Chinese Custom and Revenue would 
be issued in Arabic, even if the language of the credit was in Arabic. Similarly, it is 
not expected from an Arabic bank – where the language of the credit was in Arabic 
– to translate the Chinese stamp for it would take a long time that might exceed the 
permitted period for examination. Nevertheless, if the bank was cognisant of the 
language (e.g. the language of the credit was in English but the language of the 
stamp was in Arabic and the bank was an Arabic bank) of the data in the stamp, 
then the bank would be liable for accepting such a stamp if its data raised a valid 
ground for refusal. Moreover, where the document contains a declaration, in the 
language of the credit, which provides that the documents are issued and signed by 
the stated company in the credit, then the bank is not entitled to translate the foreign 
language of the contents of the stamp (i.e. language different from the credit’s 
language), even where such contents provide the possibility that the documents are 
issued or signed by a company other than that stated Fin the credit.442  
 
3.4.17 Exception to authenticity. However, as an exception to the presumption of 
authenticity drafts, certificates and declarations are not to be treated as authentic, 
                                                          
441 Collected Opinions 1995-2001, R.441.  
442 Opinions 2005-2008, R.668. 
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unless they are signed by some permitted signatory method443 and as such they 
must be signed even if the credit does not require such documents to be signed or 
legalised.444 Indeed such a presumption, which was introduced in the ISBP, is 
responsive to: (i) most legal orders requiring a signature on bills of exchange (ii) the 
commercial sense of requiring certificates and declaration in that it is implicit that 
the parties are seeking authentication to confirm a state of affairs.   
 
Empirical findings 
 
3.4.18 Many banks in Jordan are cautious about the authenticity of documents. They 
demand a handwritten signature for documents in order for them to be treated as 
original, and as such they are willing to exclude the relative articles in UCP 600 that 
provide otherwise. Thus Muhammed Burjaq stated that Alitihad Bank does not 
usually exclude any of UCP 600 terms, but some banks exclude article 17 of UCP 600 
as they require a handwritten signature for documents to be original.445 Nart Lambaz 
said: 
“We impose a condition that the original documents must have a handwritten 
signature. This is to ensure whether or not the documents are original.  Our 
customers do not mind that but we have a lot of complaints from beneficiaries”.  
 
This is the same position as Mr A’s Bank. Arabic Bank has a more relaxed approach, 
Koloud Alkalaldeh stated: “we require that the documents must be signed. It can be 
signed in handwriting or by other means”. Mr B stated: 
 
                                                          
443 For signatory methods: article 3 UCP 600.  
444 ISBP 2013, A3, B8; ISBP 2007, para 37. 
445 Annex I, para 17. 
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“We do not require a handwritten signature on documents in order for them to be 
regarded as original. But we are thinking to implement such a requirement for bills 
of lading”.  
 
Thus, some banks even plan to impose a requirement for a handwritten signature 
on bills of lading.446 For these banks the issue is that they want to be protected 
against fraud. As authenticity is dealt with by many articles in UCP 600 including 
articles 3 and 17, and A35 of ISBP 2013, a requirement for a handwritten signature 
needs to be clearly stipulated. If the bank intends to require a handwritten signature 
for all the required documents, then the bank would need to exclude the articles in 
UCP 600 that relate to signature. Of course this creates complexities and difficulties 
in presenting documents that are in conformity, as many documents are issued not 
by the beneficiary. Indeed, the empirical findings indicate that many complaints have 
already been made by various beneficiaries about the requirement of a handwritten 
signature.447 Given the fact that Jordan is a developing country banks still require a 
traditional method of signature, regardless of the fact that the Evidence Code does 
not limit the signature method to a handwritten signature.448 Thus the dilemma of 
commonality as to the UCP articles regulating methods of signature is caused by 
social factors and not by the text of UCP 600. Such a dilemma might be tackled by 
providing training to banks in Jordan regarding the impact of requiring a handwritten 
signature.      
 
EXCEPTIONS TO APPEARANCE RULE 
 
3.4.19 Fraud. Under English and Jordanian laws, fraud is a well-known exception to the 
principle, and thus the rule, of appearance. It is submitted in chapter 5449 that where 
                                                          
446 Annex I, para 30.  
447 Annex I, para 30.  
448 Article 13 Evidence Code (1952). 
449 Para 5.3.13. 
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there is credible evidence of a material fraud as to the truth of the facts represented  
in the documents, then such documents ought to be proved to be in actual conformity 
with the credit in order to overcome the serious allegation of fraud. Thus the 
underlying facts – and not merely the represented facts appearing in the documents 
- must be in conformity with the credit in order for the payment obligation to be 
enforceable. 
 
3.4.20 Common knowledge. Another exception is not the invention of legal orders but it 
is rather the invention of ICC Opinions. Pursuant to this ICC exception, the bank 
needs to apply common knowledge in checking conformity. Thus, where the credit 
provides that shipment is to be effected from any port in a specified region, then the 
bank has the right to investigate whether the port of loading as stated in the bill of 
lading – even where it is stated in the bill that it is the port in the specified region - 
is an actual port in that region.450 The meaning of common knowledge might be 
loaded with inherent ambiguity, but this might be tackled by a reasonable reader 
test.451 Namely: common knowledge is the knowledge that any reasonable banker 
in documentary credits would have in the relevant circumstances. In litigation, this 
would be proved by expert evidence. The common knowledge exception reflects the 
need for discretion. Here, flexibility is necessary to give the bank the required degree 
of judgement, which is to be exercised pursuant to the criterion of “contextual 
conflict” as it will be discussed in the coming section.     
 
General Test For Conformity (The Material Alignment Test) 
 
3.4.21 We have seen so far two propositions capturing all or most cases in documentary 
credits. The principle of conformity under UCP 600 determines the sources of criteria 
                                                          
450 Collected Opinions 1995-2001, R.261.   
451 A reasonable reader test is a doctrine to interpret contractual terms and notices under common law: Rainy 
Sky SA v Kookmin Bank [2011] 1 W.L.R. 2900; Investors Compensation Scheme LTD v West Bromwich Building 
Society [1998] 1 W.L.R. 896, 912 per Lord Hoffman.  
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against which documents in all documentary credits cases need to be checked.452 
The general rule of appearance under UCP 600 captures most cases of documentary 
credits.453 It has generated a few particular rules and triggered a few exceptions. But 
as the rule of appearance is generated mainly from the principle of appearance and 
not from the elastic concept of conformity, it has a high degree of “formal 
realisability”, even though it does not have many particular rules. In this section we 
will consider the general test for conformity as set out in sub-article 14 (d) of UCP 
600, which is – in effect – a presumption of conformity in the absence of contextual 
conflict. It is called, in this research, the “material alignment test”. It determines in 
which dimension conformity falls. It has generated many particular rules in order to 
enhance its “formal realisability”. It has, however, a low degree of generality (i.e. a 
fair amount of cases are not captured by material alignment) even though it has the 
form of general rule since it has been formulated subject to many exceptions.  
 
GENERAL RULE OF MATERIAL ALIGNMENT 
 
3.4.22 The general test for conformity under UCP 600 is set out in sub-article 14 (d) of UCP 
600. which provides, inter alia: 
“Data in a document, when read in context with the credit, the document itself and 
international standard banking practice, need not be identical to, but must not 
conflict with, data in that document, any other stipulated document or the credit”. 
 
The equivalent of sub-article 14 (d) of UCP 600 is the second sentence of both sub-
article 13 (a) and article 21 of UCP 500. The second sentence of sub-article 13 (a) 
of UCP 500 stated: 
 
                                                          
452 Complying presentation: Article 2 UCP 600. 
453 Sub-article 14 (a) UCP 600.   
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“Compliance of the stipulated documents on their face with the terms and conditions 
of the Credit, shall be determined by international standard banking practice as 
reflected in these Articles. Documents which appear on their face to be inconsistent 
with one another will be considered as not appearing on their face to be in compliance 
with the terms and conditions of the Credit”.  
 
The second sentence of article 21 of UCP 500 stated:  
 
“If the Credit does not so stipulate, banks will accept such documents as presented, 
provided that their data content is not inconsistent with any other stipulated 
document presented”.  
 
CHANGES 
 
3.4.23 There are many important changes in UCP 600 as to the general test for conformity. 
It is irrelevant that the intention under UCP 500 was to give conformity the same 
meaning as would eventually be more adequately expressed in UCP 600. What is 
important is the meaning conveyed by the expressed language of the articles, 
namely: what bankers can be expected to understand by the provisions of the UCP?      
 
3.4.24 Structure. Firstly, the structure is now clear and entails determinative guidance 
under UCP 600, as we know now that there is one key sub-article (i.e. being sub-
article 14 (d)) which determines the general test for conformity. This was not straight 
forward under UCP 500 as the general test for conformity was fragmented and 
needed to be inferred from different parts of various articles (i.e. being inferred from 
the second sentence of both sub-article 13 (a) and article 21).  
 
3.4.25 Need not be identical to. Secondly, the introduction of the phrase “need not be 
identical to” in sub-article 14 (d) of UCP 600 leaves no scope for an argument that 
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conformity might fall in the first dimension (i.e. mirror image). Even though that was 
the intended position under article 13 of UCP 500, the language of sub-article 13 (a) 
of UCP 500 lacked clarity, and as such many banks used to refuse documents on the 
basis of simple typing mistakes and grammatical errors.454 
 
3.4.26 Not conflict with. Thirdly, and most importantly, the introduction of the concept 
that documents “not conflict with” under sub-article 14 (d) of UCP 600 instead of 
“inconsistency” in the equivalent provisions in UCP 500 is significant. On the one 
hand, the concept of “inconsistency” is a loop negative concept that leads to the 
operation of its positive side, or antonym, which is consistency. On the other hand, 
the concept “not conflict with” is a simple negative concept that does not lead to a 
positive element, because it constitutes a single isolated condition.455 So, the 
requirement under sub-article 13 (a) of UCP 500 that “documents which appear on 
their face to be inconsistent with one another will be considered as not appearing on 
their face to be in compliance” would convey an interpretation providing that the 
bank must check whether there is consistency between the data of the same 
document, data in other documents and data in the credit as interpreted by 
international standard banking practice. Here an apparent difference of meaning 
between the documents might be regarded as a lack of consistency, which would 
justify refusal regardless the materiality of the difference. But by reason of the test 
of “not conflict with” under sub-article 14 (d) of UCP 600, if there is an apparent 
difference in the meaning between data of presented document, data in other 
documents, the terms of the credit or the international standard banking practice 
then such a difference is disregarded unless it causes a conflict.  
 
                                                          
454 Drafting Group, Commentary on UCP 600: Article by Article Analysis, (No. 680, ICC 2009), 64.  
455 For forming concepts in social science: 6 and Bellamy, Principles of Methodologies, (1st edn, Sage 2012), 138-
139. 
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3.4.27 When read in context. Fourthly, in order that a conflict to be qualified as a positive 
or material conflict capable of justifying a refusal, the conflict must be contextual. 
The addition of the phrase “when read in context” in sub-article 14 (d) of UCP 600 
means that a conflict should only be regarded as a material when it causes a 
contextual conflict. The Drafting Group in their commentary on UCP 600 explained: 
 
“The requirements of the documentary credit, the structure and purpose of the 
document itself and international banking practice need to be assessed, understood 
and be taken into consideration in determining compliance of a document ... the new 
standard of “not conflict with” relates the data contained in the document to what 
was required by the documentary credit, to what is stated in any other stipulated 
document and to international standard banking practice”.456   
 
The purpose of a document might be stipulated in the document itself, or might be 
inferred from the function of the document where any reasonable banker is expected 
to know such a purpose.457 An example for a contextual conflict is an air way bill 
evidencing that the goods are consigned to the bank, instead of being consigned to 
the applicant as required in the credit. The conflict here is a contextual one as it 
defeats the purpose of enabling the applicant to possess the goods without the 
interference of the bank.458 In conclusion, the general test for conformity is called in 
this research as the “material alignment” test which means: data in the presented 
document in the context of the collective structure and purpose of the document 
itself and the other documents, and in the context of the terms of the credit and 
international standard banking practice must not be in conflict.  
 
 
                                                          
456 Drafting Group, Commentary on UCP 600: Article by Article Analysis, (2009, ICC No. 680), 64. 
457 Collected Opinions 1996-2005, R.322.  
458 Collected Opinions 1996-2005, R.406.  
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MATERIAL ALIGNMENT AND DIMENSION SIX 
 
3.4.28 Conformity in UCP 600 falls in dimension six with an addition that conformity in UCP 
600 is subject to international standard banking practice. Such an addition plays a 
role in enhancing certainty as international standard banking practice – mostly 
represented by ICC’s ISBP – mainly functions to clarify when a difference or conflict 
in documents is to be interpreted as a contextual conflict. As submitted above, 
dimension six would achieve the right balance of security as between the competing 
needs of security. Indeed the general test for conformity under UCP 500 was 
understood by many bankers to fall in dimension two.459 The question is whether the 
general test for conformity under UCP 600 is clear in the sense that it conveys a 
unified interpretation.   
 
 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
3.4.29 In order to answer the question regarding the clarity of the test of material 
alignment, bankers in Jordan were asked about the meaning of a material conflict in 
sub-article 14 (d) of UCP 600.460 Some bankers stated that a material conflict is the 
conflict that affects the essence of the commercial transaction. They gave an 
example for their understanding461 which appeared to be in accordance with the 
intended meaning by the Drafting Group in that conformity would fall in dimension 
six as illustrated above.462 However, other bankers interpret a material conflict as a 
conflict that affects the rights, liabilities and commercial interests of the bank.463 One 
banker emphasised that the reality of what is meant by a material conflict is 
                                                          
459 Drafting Group, Commentary on UCP 600: Article by Article Analysis, (No. 680, ICC 2009), 64.  
460 Annex I, para 24-26. 
461 Annex I, para 24.  
462 Para 3.2.4. 
463 Annex I, para 24. 
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contingent on the relationships between parties.464 Thus the empirical findings clarify 
that there is a lack of commonality in understanding the general test for conformity 
in UCP 600. It is submitted that this is due to the lack of comprehensible clarity in 
sub-article 14 (d) of UCP 600. The new phrase “when read in context” is not 
explained precisely in UCP 600. Indeed the Drafting Group emphasised, in their 
commentary on UCP 600, the criticality of considering conformity against the 
structure and purpose of documents.465 This should have been expressed in UCP 600. 
The problem is that the Drafting Group’s Commentary on UCP 600, unlike the UCP 
and ISBP, was not issued by the Banking Commission of ICC. Bankers therefore 
might not be familiar with the Commentary. English and Jordanian laws might not 
give effect to the Commentary, particularly in cases where it is proved by expert 
evidence that many bankers did not rely on Commentary for interpretation. Here 
courts might hold that the parties did not intend to interpret their contract in the 
light of the Commentary. Unfortunately, neither ISBP 2007 nor ISBP 2013 adopts 
the clarification of the Commentary regarding the general test for conformity.  
 
CLARITY 
 
3.4.30 In conclusion, the lack of clarity, as explained above under the empirical findings, 
affects the “formal realisability” of the test of material alignment. Thus a fair number 
of bankers might not understand, and hence apply, the test as intended by the 
Drafting Group. This might generate bleak problems as the test of material alignment 
is the first step that a documentary checker would take for most documentary credit 
cases. If such a test is defective then banks subsequent actions might also be flawed. 
However, the introduction of the new changes in sub-article 14 (d) of UCP 600 is a 
welcome step in comparison to UCP 500, as the intention is to clarify that conformity 
falls in dimension six which would achieve a good balance as between the competing 
                                                          
464 Annex I, para 26. 
465 Drafting Group, Commentary on UCP 600: Article by Article Analysis, (No. 680, ICC 2009), 64.  
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interests for security. The meaning of “when read in context” needs to be far clearer 
and it is to be hoped that this might in time be clarified by the ISBP.     
 
ENGLISH AND JORDANIAN LAWS 
 
3.4.31 There is no direct authority under English law as to the general test for conformity, 
and thus the dimension of conformity is not determined. It is, however, clear that 
conformity does not fall in the first dimension.466 In Jordan the Court of Distinction 
states “if there is a difference the bank will refuse the documents”.467 This is the 
general rule for the test of conformity under Jordanian law. Indeed the meaning of 
difference in Arabic is loaded with confusing semantic baggage. Difference might 
refer to a mere difference, discrepancy or a material conflict. The ambiguity of the 
general test for conformity under Jordanian law leads to a serious shortcoming in the 
“formal realisability” of such a test. Consequently, the Jordanian test for conformity 
is not competent to determine within which dimension conformity falls.    
 
   
Linkage (General Rule Of Identification Of Goods)468 
3.4.32 It is well established under Common law that the presented documents in 
documentary credits must refer or link to the identification of the goods.469 This rule 
intends to be general in terms of capturing most, if not all, cases in a documentary 
credit. It is known by some authors as linkage.470 However, the term linkage is 
capable of denoting various different diverse meanings. In ICC Position Paper 
Number 3, the term linkage means that a condition in a documentary credit must 
                                                          
466 Kredietbank Antwerp v Midland Bank plc [1999] Lloyd’s Rep 219, 223 per Evans LJ; above para 4.4.7.  
467 Court of Distinction 316/1988 (Civil) Kurtas Programme. 
468 Hwaidi, The Story of The English Strict Compliance Principle in Letters of Credit and its Consistency with the 
UCP, [2014] J.I.B.L.R (28 (2), 73-75. 
469 Banque de l’Indochine et de Suez SA v J.H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd [1983] Q.B. 711, 731-732, per Sir 
Donaldson MR.   
470 Malek and Quest, Jack: Documentary Credits, (4th edn, Tottel 2009) para 8.48: “linkage” denotes to the 
reference of the identification of the goods. 
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clearly be linked to a stipulated document. However, linkage may refer to the idea 
that documents must relate and be consistent with one another.471 In this research 
linkage refers to the idea that documents must link to the identification of the 
required goods in the credit. Although it might appear that the linkage rule is the 
creation of Common law, it is submitted that the linkage rule is an essential element 
of the embedded trade usage of conformity regardless of the fact that such rule is 
not recognised by the UCP. There is no direct authority under Jordanian law in 
respect of this linkage rule. 
 
ENGLISH LAW 
 
3.4.33 Pursuant to the linkage rule under Common law a presented document must relate 
to the identification of the goods in order to be in conformity.472 The goods that must 
be identified are the goods that are stipulated either in the credit or in the invoice, 
or the goods that are the subject matter of the transaction or that have been 
shipped.473 The scope of the standard by reference to which documents must identify 
the goods is adaptable. Primarily, the documents must with reasonable certainty 
refer to the identification of the goods.474 Where, however, the contents of the 
document are not related to the contents of other documents and the document’s 
status calls for a further inquiry then such a document must unequivocally identify 
the goods.475  
 
3.4.34 Type of documents. It is submitted, the type of documents that need to relate to 
the identification of the goods are those documents that serve the purpose of 
                                                          
471 This meaning was suggested by the claimant in Banque de l’Indochine et de Suez SA v J.H. Rayner (Mincing 
Lane) Ltd [1983] Q.B. 711, 731 
472 Banque de l’Indochine et de Suez SA v J.H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd [1983] Q.B. 711, 731-732, per Sir 
Donaldson MR. 
473 Glencore International AG v Bank of China [1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 135, 150.  
474 Glencore International AG v Bank of China [1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 135, 148, dictum per Rix J in respect of 
Banque de l’Indochine et de Suez SA v J.H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd [1983] Q.B. 711. 
475 Glencore International AG v Bank of China [1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 135, 148, dictum per Rix J in respect of 
Banque de l’Indochine et de Suez SA v J.H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd [1983] Q.B. 711. 
177 
 
confirming a particular or a general status of the goods. This would include for 
example a packing list, weight list, origin certificate, inspection certificate, health 
certificate and the like. Documents such as a beneficiary’s certificate or a copy of the 
beneficiary’s passport do not relate to the investigation as to the status of goods, 
and therefore they are not intended to be subject to the linkage rule. 
 
3.4.35 Identification not description. In Bank Meli Iran v Barclays Bank,476 which was 
not a UCP case, the description “new – good, Cheverolet trucks” in the presented 
documents was not held to be the same as “new Cheverolet trucks”. Thus such a 
presentation was not held to be in conformity. It can be inferred from the facts of 
this case that the difference clearly affected the identification of the goods. The 
matter was not substantively in relation to the description of the goods, but was 
rather regarding their identification. In Banque de l’Indochine et de Suez SA v J.H. 
Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd,477 which was subject to UCP 1976, Sir John Donaldson 
stated: 
 
“There is, in my judgement, a real distinction between an identification of the goods, 
the subject matter of the transaction, and a description of those goods”.478  
 
In Banque de l’Indochine et de Suez SA v J.H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd479 
certificates of weight, quality, packing and origin, as well as EUR 1 certificates, were 
not in compliance on the ground that they did not identify the goods in question. The 
credit required the following goods: 
 
                                                          
476 [1951] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 369 per McNair J.  
477 [1983] Q.B. 711.   
478 Banque de l’Indochine et de Suez SA v J.H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd [1983] Q.B. 711, 731-732, per Sir 
Donaldson MR.  
479 [1983] Q.B. 711.   
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“Covering shipment: "2000 (two thousand) metric tons up to 5 per cent. more or 
less E.E.C. white crystal sugar category no. 2 minimum polarisation 99.8 degrees ... 
and freight liner out Djibouti packed in new polythene lined jute bags of 50 kgs net 
as per your telex dated 1/7/81".480  
 
It was held the description of the goods as “sugar” in documents other than the 
commercial invoice was sufficient for a good tender pursuant to sub-article 32 (c) 
UCP 1974 which stated:  
 
“In all other documents the goods may be described in general terms not inconsistent 
with the description of the goods in the credit”. 481  
 
However, it was further held that the description of goods is a separate issue from 
the identification of the goods, as the latter was not subject to the latitude rule for 
descriptions of goods under sub-article 32 (c) of UCP 1974. The fact that the 
description of the carrying vessel, voyage and cargo was not identical in all the 
presented certificates was sufficient, in the context of the lack of relating to other 
documents and the fact that the documents call for inquiry,482 to indicate that the 
sugar might have come from different sources. Accordingly, the presentation of these 
certificates was not in conformity as the goods had not been identified 
“unequivocally”, although this defect might have been easily cured by making a 
reference to marks on the bags, or to a hold in the vessel which they occupied 
provided that no other goods were in the hold.483    
 
 
                                                          
480 [1983] Q.B. 711, 730.  
481 Equivalent to article 23 UCP 400, sub-article 37 (c) UCP 500 and sub-article 14 (e) UCP 600.  
482 Glencore International AG v Bank of China [1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 135, 148, dictum per Rix J in respect of 
Banque de l’Indochine et de Suez SA v J.H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd [1983] Q.B. 711.  
483 Banque de l’Indochine et de Suez SA v J.H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd [1983] Q.B. 711, 732, per Sir Donaldson 
MR. 
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UCP 
 
3.4.36 The question is whether English rule of linkage applies to documentary credits 
subject to UCP 600 or not.484 The position of UCP 600 is quite clear. There is no 
mandatory requirement for any description of the goods, or for any identification of 
the goods, in the presented documents. The new structure of the test for conformity 
in UCP 600485 indicates that there is no requirement for consistency between the 
contents of documents, but merely that the contents of the presented document 
must not be in material conflict with other presented documents.486 Further, sub-
article 14 (e) UCP 600 states:  
 
“In documents other than the commercial invoice, the description of the goods, 
services or performance, if stated, may be in general terms not conflicting with their 
description in the credit”.487 
 
The equivalent provision under UCP 500 is sub-article 37 (c) which stated: 
 
“The description of the goods in the commercial invoice must correspond with the 
description in the Credit. In all other documents, the goods may be described in 
general terms not inconsistent with the description of the goods in the Credit”. 
 
The concept of “inconsistency” is replaced by “not conflict with” under UCP 600 to 
clarify that there is no requirement of consistency and linkage between the 
documents, and the words “if stated” were introduced to emphasise that. The ICC 
Banking Commission clearly confirmed this position in their Opinion regarding an 
                                                          
484 For an affirmative answer see below para 3.4.38.   
485 Sub-article 14 (d) UCP 600. 
486 Drafting Group, Commentary on UCP 600: Article by Article Analysis, (No. 680, ICC 2009), 65.  
487 Equivalent to sub-article 37 (c) UCP 500.  
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enquiry in respect of a health certificate that did not bear any description, or 
reference as to the identification, of the goods. The Commission stated:  
 
“There is no requirement in UCP for the certificate of health to bear a description of 
the goods that corresponds with that given in the credit, or for any goods 
description...”.488  
 
However, the intended position was the same under UCP 500. Thus an ICC Opinion489 
in relation to sub-article 37 (c) of UCP 500 provided that sub-article 37 (c) 
supersedes the test of consistency under both article 21 and sub-article 13 (a) of 
UCP 500, and therefore linkage to the description or identification (i.e. as was 
required by the refusing bank in the enquiry) to the goods was not, according to this 
Opinion, actually required under UCP 500. Yet, English law enforced the rule of 
linkage to the identification of goods on documentary credits subject to UCP 500.490 
 
3.4.37 ISBP. The only documents that are required to relate to the goods under UCP 600 
are the commercial invoice491 and the certificate of origin.492 The new revision of 
ISBP493 regulates a new list of documents which are: packing list, weight list, 
beneficiary’s certificate, analysis certificate, health certificate, inspection certificate, 
and quantity and quality certificates. It is not expressly required in the ISBP that 
these documents need to relate to the invoiced goods, even though they are – except 
beneficiary’s certificate - related to the investigation of a particular status of the 
invoiced goods. As an exception, the ISBP states that the certificate of origin – which 
has the function of confirming an investigation as to the status of goods - must relate 
to the invoiced goods.494  
                                                          
488 Opinions 2009-2011, R.728. 
489 Collected Opinions 1995-2001, R.261.  
490 Glencore International AG v Bank of China [1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 135.  
491 Article 18 UCP 600; ISBP 2013, C3.  
492 ISBP 2013, L4; Opinions 2009-2011, R.727: referred to ISBP 2007, para 183.  
493 ISBP 2013 (No. 745, ICC 2013).  
494 ISBP 2013, L1, L4.  
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UCP 600, LEGAL ORDERS AND EMBEDED TRADE USAGE 
 
3.4.38 It is submitted, the answer to the question of whether the rule of linkage to the 
identification of goods applies to documentary credits subject to UCP 600 must be in 
the affirmative. On the one hand, treating documents that do not identify the goods 
as in compliance with the credit – which does not expressly require the identification 
of goods in the required documents - might reduce the rate of rejections.495 It is an 
approach that would benefit sellers as it minimises the risk that credits might be 
dishonoured and promote certainty as banks are assured that the UCP position is 
enforced under the relevant legal order. On the other hand, buyers would be left 
vulnerable as there is no assurance that the required documents relate to the 
invoiced goods. It is submitted that if the English rule of linkage would not be 
applicable to documentary credits subject to UCP 600, it would be an invitation to 
fraud.496 Indeed security for both sellers and buyers is one of the main underlying 
substantive objectives of documentary credits. Getting the right balance of security 
as between the trading parties involved in a documentary credit transaction is a 
matter of essential justice that should not be sacrificed on the altar of certainty. 
Given the fact that the linkage rule only applies to a document that has the function 
of confirming to investigate the status of goods, it is to be expected that prudent 
sellers would ensure that such a document would clearly identify the goods. 
 
3.4.39 Thus a rule of UCP 600 that would reject the requirement for such linkage cannot 
reflect the buyers’ substantial need as to the proof of goods in documentary credits. 
Hence the linkage rule is a necessary element of the embedded trade usage of 
                                                          
495 As it is one of the main factors to revise UCP 600: UCP 600, introduction; Collyer, A look back at the UCP 
revision, [2006] 10 DCInsight, 22. 
496 Malek and Quest, Jack: Documentary Credits, (4th edn, Tottel 2009), para 8.50.  
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conformity. Legal orders, therefore, are to be expected to continue to require linkage 
notwithstanding any contrary interpretation of the UCP since the linkage rule is a 
necessary element of the embedded trade usage. It is unfortunate that the UCP are 
not responsive to this element of the embedded trade usage. The potential clash 
between UCP 600 and Municipal  legal orders in connection with linkage deleteriously 
affects certainty (i.e. as parties do not know in advance their legal positions),497 since 
the ultimate position to be adopted by legal orders, particularly the developing 
systems, as to linkage in the context of UCP 600 is uncertain. Here, the extent of 
uncertainty is outstretched as the linkage rule is a general rule that affects most, if 
not all, documentary credit transactions.   
 
3.4.40 English law. The rule of linkage was applied under English law on documentary 
credits subject to UCP 500 and its predecessors.498 The Common law effectively relied 
on the lack of precision in the language of the UCP to avoid acknowledging any 
disavowal of linkage under the UCP. Thus it was held in Banque de l’Indochine et de 
Suez SA v J.H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd499 that the description of goods is distinct 
from the identification of goods, and the latter is not therefore caught by the UCP. 
Such a ground is available to be raised on credits subject to UCP 600 as UCP 600 
does not make it precisely clear that a reference to the identification of goods is not 
required, even though the changes in UCP 600 as above mentioned make it clearer 
that the linkage rule is not required and that ICC Opinions confirm such an 
interpretation. In conclusion, the concept of identification connotes the assurance 
that the documents are linked to the same goods. Being a necessary element of the 
embedded trade usage of conformity it reflects the underlying objective of 
documentary credits as being a secure method of payment. Thus in the light of Fortis 
Bank S.A./N.V., Stemcor UK Limited v Indian Overseas Bank500 the interpretation 
                                                          
497 Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication [1976] 89 Harvard Law Review 1685, 1688-1689. 
498 Glencore International AG v Bank of China [1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 135.  
499 [1983] Q.B. 711, 731-732, per Sir Donaldson MR. 
500 [2011] EWCA (Civ) 58, [29]; [2011] 1 C.L.C. 276, 287.  
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that is based on usage and security (i.e. the underlying policy of documentary 
credits) is expected to give effect to the rule of linkage and for parties to contract 
out of linkage they must clearly express their intention to do so. 
 
3.4.41 Jordanian law. There is no direct authority under Jordanian law regarding the 
English linkage rule. Sub-article 239 (2) of the Civil Code provides that where there 
is a lack of clarity or precision in the contractual term, the judge should look at the 
nature of the transaction and must give weight to the trustworthy between the 
contractual parties as presumed by the current custom. There is no clear indication 
by the empirical findings that the linkage rule is applied by bankers in Jordan.501 As 
the linkage rule is a necessary element of the embedded trade usage of conformity 
Jordanian courts need to give effect to it unless it is clearly that the parties intend to 
contract out of that usage. Alternatively, since the nature of the transaction of 
documentary credit is based on the policy of security, Jordanian courts need to give 
effect to the linkage rule  and not to the intended proposition by the ICC in respect 
of sub-article 14 (e) of UCP 600. 
 
 
Time To Determine And Inform Conformity 
3.4.42 It is clear that the principle of conformity, general rule of appearance and general 
test for conformity (i.e. the general rules of material alignment and linkage) capture 
most, if not all, cases of conformity in documentary credits not determined by the 
particular rules governing particular documents. There is, however, another and final 
general rule in conformity which is regarding the permitted time to determine 
conformity. 
 
                                                          
501 Annex I, para 24.  
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3.4.43 Distinct times. The permitted period to determine conformity is distinct from the 
permitted period to honour the credit, or to refuse to honour on the basis of non-
conformity. 
 
UNDERLYING FACTORS 
 
3.4.44 Documentary credits are not only meant to be a secure method of payment but also 
a means of settlement in international trade. Thus, the issuing and confirming bank 
obligation to honour a credit lasts until the expiry date of the credit. Given the fact 
that the presented documents are the beneficiary’s property, the beneficiary has the 
right to withdraw the documents, correct and re-present them many times within 
the permitted period for presentation until the documents are honoured, negotiated 
or otherwise disposed of in accordance with the beneficiary’s instructions.502 The 
speed in the determination of conformity, and thus in accepting or refusing 
documents, is an essential issue for both buyers and sellers. Buyers might need to 
take immediate action if the presented documents are in conformity (e.g. to make 
arrangements to collect the goods) or not in conformity (e.g. to seek alternative 
suppliers for importation of the goods). Sellers want to be paid expeditiously after 
the presentation of documents in order to finance their trades. Also sellers need to 
know within a reasonably expeditious time whether the documents are accepted or 
rejected, otherwise they might lose the right to re-present conforming documents 
within the permitted period of the credit. Banks therefore need to determine 
conformity within a reasonably expeditious time. The empirical findings confirm that 
banks in Jordan appreciate the need for speed in the determination of conformity.503 
But what is meant by a reasonably expeditious time, or reasonable time, differs from 
case to case and is open to dispute. A one banking day difference might lead to the 
bank being held responsible for delay. Hence it is necessary for banks to be certain 
                                                          
502 Opinions 2009-2011, R.715.  
503 Annex I, para 33.  
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in respect of the permitted period to determine conformity in order to avoid disputes 
and to be secure in the legality of their actions. But would a fixed period (e.g. five 
banking days) as a safe harbour period permit a bank to wait intentionally, and 
without good faith, until the last day of the fixed period to determine the conformity 
of a presentation or to inform the beneficiary regarding the status of the 
presentation?  
 
SUB-ARTICLE 14 (B) TIME FOR EXAMINATION 
 
3.4.45 The period for examination of documents under UCP 500 was regulated by sub-article 
13 (b) which is now replaced by sub-article 14 (b) of UCP 600 which states:  
 
“A nominated bank acting on its nomination, a confirming bank, if any, and the 
issuing bank shall each have a maximum of five banking days following the day of 
presentation to determine if a presentation is complying. This period is not curtailed 
or otherwise affected by the occurrence on or after the date of presentation of any 
expiry date or last day for presentation”. 
 
3.4.46 Fixed period. Sub-article 14 (b) of UCP 600 introduces significant changes from its 
predecessor. The permitted period to determine conformity is now “a maximum of 
five banking days” instead of “a reasonable time, not to exceed seven banking days”. 
The new period of “maximum of five banking days” is simply a fixed period.504   
 
3.4.47 Reasonable time. The purpose of removing the reference to “reasonable time” in 
the UCP was “the lack of a standard application of this concept globally”.505 Namely, 
there was no uniform certainty as to the exact period, so what was regarded as 
                                                          
504 Bridge and others (eds), Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, (8th edn, Thompson 2010) para 23.94; Malek and Quest, 
Jack: Documentary Credits, (4th edn, Tottel 2009) para 5.52.  
505 Drafting Group, Commentary on UCP 600: Article by Article Analysis, (No. 680, ICC 2009), 62-63; for the 
difficulty in determining the meaning of reasonable time under English law: Banker’s Trust Co v State Bank of 
India [1991] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 443.   
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reasonable time in the country of the issuing bank might not be regarded as 
reasonable in the country or the region of the confirming bank. The ICC national 
committees voted to reduce the period for examination from seven banking days to 
five banking days just after they had voted to remove the words “reasonable 
time”.506 Such a process indicates that the omission of “reasonable time” had led the 
ICC national committees to view the period of seven banking days as being too 
lengthy a fixed period, and it was therefore reduced to five banking days. Thus it is 
clear that the intention of the ICC national committees is to introduce a new period 
which is fixed in terms that it is not generally subject to the circumstances of the 
parties. Here the bank that determines conformity within the fixed period of five 
banking days is protected from a claim that the bank should reasonably have 
determined the conformity of documents earlier than the last day (i.e. fifth banking 
day) of the new permitted period. 
 
3.4.48 Maximum. The introduction of the concept “maximum” in the new fixed period 
reflects the new position presented by article 15 of UCP 600 that when the bank has 
decided that the documents are in conformity it must honour the credit without 
delay.507 The fixed period for examination is thus automatically reduced when the 
bank determines conformity prior the close of the fifth banking day. So, when the 
bank determines the documents are in conformity in the second day after the 
presentation, it will then be obliged to honour the credit without delay which is equal 
to the same banking day or the next banking day in the UK and in Jordan.508 The 
concept “maximum” also means that when the bank has made the decision to 
“refuse” the presentation earlier than five banking days it will have thereby curtailed 
the examination period. In order to validate the refusal, the bank in this case must 
                                                          
506 Drafting Group, Commentary on UCP 600: Article by Article Analysis, (No. 680, ICC 2009), 63.  
507 Drafting Group, Commentary on UCP 600: Article by Article Analysis, (No. 680, ICC 2009), 70; Debattista, 
The new UCP 600-changes to the tender of the seller’s shipping documents under letters of credit, [2007] J.B.L, 
June, 329, 339 suggests that the word “maximum” reflects the entitlement of the bank to complete the 
examination before the end of the permitted period for examination.  
508 Below para 3.4.50.  
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give a refusal notice by telecommunication or, if that is not possible, by other 
expeditious means immediately after the decision to refuse is made.509 In any event 
a refusal notice must be given not later than the close of the fifth banking day after 
the day of presentation510 (i.e. the permitted period of refusal expires at precisely 
the same moment as the expiration of the new fixed period for examination). 
Practically, in this case, the bank needs to complete the examination prior the end 
of the permitted period for examination in order to be able to communicate the 
refusal notice within the same period.511   
 
3.4.49 Empirical findings. All the interviewed bankers in Jordan confirm that banks in 
Jordan take two to three banking days to determine the conformity of the presented 
documents and it is perceived as the good practice.512 As an exception Arab bank 
takes five banking days to examine the documents. This is regarded as a bad 
practice, particularly given the fact that Arab bank always sends a copy of the 
presented documents to its customer (i.e. applicant) in order to obtain confirmation 
that the applicant accepts the conformity of the documents prior to the bank 
accepting the conformity of the documents. What would clearly be contrary to good 
faith under Jordanian law is if the bank actually determined that the documents were 
in conformity in the beginning of the permitted period for examination but postponed 
the honour of the credit until the last day of the period for examination.  
 
ARTICLE 15 (TIME FOR HONOUR) 
 
3.4.50 In order to avoid the risk of banks acting in such a way that is contrary to good faith, 
UCP 600 wisely reflects the legal norm of good faith, by providing in article 15 that 
                                                          
509 Chapter 4, para 4.5.6: where it is suggested that the bank is obliged to send a refusal notice in reasonable 
promptness after taking the decision of refusal.  
510 Sub-article 16 (d) UCP 600. 
511 Bridge and others (eds), Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, (8th edn, Thompson 2010) para 23.94. 
512 Annex I, para 33.  
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the bank is obliged to honour within reasonable promptness once it decides that the 
documents are in conformity. Article 15 states:  
 
“A. When an issuing bank determines that a presentation is complying, it must 
honour; B. When a confirming bank determines that a presentation is complying, it 
must honour or negotiate and forward the documents to the issuing bank; 
C. When a nominated bank determines that a presentation is complying and honours 
or negotiates, it must forward the documents to the confirming bank or issuing 
bank”. 
 
The word “when” in article 15 is an operative term indicating that whenever the 
issuing or confirming bank – within the permitted period for examination - 
determines that the documents are in conformity, the bank must immediately begin 
the process of honouring or negotiating the presentation.513 The same rule applies 
to the conforming and the nominated bank regarding the obligation to forward the 
documents. Article 15, therefore, confirms that a discrete time period commences 
for the performance of the obligation to honour, negotiate and forward documents 
once a decision is made as to the conformity or non-conformity of the documents.514 
It is regrettable that such a proposition is implied by the word “when” instead of 
being comprehensibly stipulated. However, the addition of article 15 of UCP 600 is a 
necessary development due to the replacement of “reasonable time, up to seven 
banking days”515 by a new fixed period of five banking days.516 Namely, since the 
reference to “reasonable time” is omitted, it became necessary to formulate a rule 
to address the obligations of the bank (i.e. a bank which determines that the 
documents are in conformity prior the end of the fixed period) to honour or negotiate 
prior the end of the fixed period. In conclusion, article 15 does not only assist UCP 
                                                          
513 Drafting Group, Commentary on UCP 600: Article by Article Analysis, (No. 680, ICC 2009), 70. 
514 Banker’s Trust Company v State Bank of India [1991] Lloyd’s Rep 443, [12]. 
515 Sub-article 13 (b) UCP 500.  
516 Sub-article 14 (b) UCP 600.  
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600 to avoid repugnancy as to the legal communication of good faith under civil laws, 
but it also assists UCP 600 to avoid repugnancy as to the legal communication of 
reasonableness under Common law as encapsulated by the judgement of the Court 
of Appeal in Seaconsar Far East Ltd v Bank Markazi Jomhouri Islami Iran517 where it 
was stated: 
 
“We can see no reason why the bank, if it has checked the documents with greater 
dispatch than normal, should be allowed to carry forward a period of time as a credit 
against its next obligation”. 
 
3.4.51 Reasonable promptness. UCP 600 does not, however, stipulate a precise period 
of time to honour or negotiate the credit after the determination that the documents 
are in conformity. In this respect, the Drafting Group in their commentary on UCP 
600 expressed the view  that the bank must immediately honour or negotiate once 
it decides that documents are in conformity and expressed their understanding that 
the process to honour or negotiate takes from an hour to a day.518 As a matter of 
English and Jordanian law, where no time is stipulated for the performance of an 
obligation, it is implied that the time should be a reasonable time.519 In the context 
of documentary credits, the time is one of reasonable promptness which is 
determined by reference to expert evidence in the relevant country. In the UK, it 
equates to the same banking day or the next banking day.520 The empirical findings 
clearly indicate that the practice in Jordan is to honour or negotiate the credit on the 
same day, or on the next banking day where the decision that the documents are in 
conformity is made in the last hour of the banking day.521  
                                                          
517 [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 36, [14].  
518 Drafting Group, Commentary on UCP 600: Article by Article Analysis, (No. 680, ICC 2009), 70. 
519 English law: Hick v Raymond & Reid [1893] AC 22, 32; Bridge and others (eds), Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, 
(8th edn, Thompson 2010) para 23.170. Jordanian law: article 202 Civil Code 1976.   
520 This period being consistent with the meaning assumed  to  reasonable promptness in the context of returning 
the documents as provided by the expert evidence in Fortis Bank SA/NV v Indian Overseas Bank (No.2) [2010] 
EWHC 84 (Comm), [23]-[25]; 2012] 1 All E.R. (Comm) 41;  affirmed by the Court of Appeal, Fortis Bank 
S.A./N.V, Stemcor UK Limited v Indian Overseas Bank [2011] EWCA (Civ) 58; [2011] 1 C.L.C. 276 [35],[37] 
and [45]; Seaconsar Far East Ltd v Bank Markazi Jomhouri Islami Iran[1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 36, [14]. 
521 Annex I, para 34.  
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DAY OF PRESENTATION  
 
3.4.52 The calculation of the time for examination starts on the day following the day of 
presentation522 which is the day on which the bank is regularly open within its 
banking hours523 for the receipt of documentary presentations.524 Sub-article 14 (b) 
of UCP 600 provides that the occurrence of the last permitted day for presentation, 
or the expiry date of the credit, on or after the date of the actual presentation, does 
not curtail or affect the fixed period for examination. It is submitted that this new 
provision is necessary for clarity as it reflects the fact that a fixed period, unlike a 
reasonable period, is not expected to be curtailed by an expiry date, and it responds 
to the fact that the applicant will focus on the expiry date rather than the permitted 
fixed period.  
 
FORMALITY OVER SUBSTANCE 
 
3.4.53 The new scheme of sub-article 14 (b) favours formality over substantive fairness. 
Traders and bankers might well agree that a reasonable period would be fair and the 
fact that a reasonable banker in Jordan, as indicated by the empirical findings, takes 
two to three banking days to examine the documents suggests that traders might 
regard the new fixed period for examination as being unfair. However, as any such 
reasonable period would be contingent on the factual matrix of each case in a 
particular region, what is a reasonable time might differ from transaction to 
transaction and even in the same documentary credit transaction where banks are 
domiciled in different regions, and such factual divergence would cause confusion as 
                                                          
522 Sub-article 14(b) UCP 600. 
523 Article 33 UCP 600: “The bank has no obligation to accept a presentation outside of its banking’s hours”.  
524 Article 2 UCP 600; Drafting Group, Commentary on UCP 600: Article by Article Analysis, (No. 680, ICC 2009), 
15.  
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to the accepted reasonable time for examination which would affect the right of 
banks to reimbursement. Therefore the dominant need for banks of being assured 
to reimbursement can only be achieved through the means of certainty which needs 
in this context formality, as expressed by sub-article 14 (b), promoting commonality 
without being repugnant, as implied by article 15, to legal order doctrines of good 
faith or reasonableness.    
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CONCLUSION 
 
3.5.1 It is a thorny task to regulate the conformity of documents under documentary 
credits, because of the elastic nature of conformity caused by the opposing needs of 
the parties. It was analysed in this chapter that conformity in social science terms is 
a “wide scale” concept, which in the commercial and legal context of documentary 
credits has seven meanings or dimensions. It was evaluated that dimension six 
reflects the right balance of security. As the cornerstone of conformity, the UCP 
community must recognise the existence of the differing dimensions of conformity 
and select the appropriate dimension to operate as the definitive dominant meaning 
for the terms regulating conformity. Fortunately, it was the intention of both UCP 
600 and its predecessor to adopt dimension six, and indeed UCP 600 expresses this 
position far clearer than UCP 500. Sub-article 14 (d) of UCP 600 is designed to adopt 
dimension six as being the general test for conformity which is called in this research 
the material alignment test. The purport of this provision can be contrasted with that 
of UCP 500 in which the general test for conformity was shattered by different 
provisions and misleading words that led to the application of dimension one (i.e. 
mirror image) in determining conformity. Unfortunately, the element of contextual 
conflict of the material alignment test under UCP 600 still lacks comprehensible 
clarity not only in UCP 600 but also in the last revision of ISBP. The empirical findings 
clarify that banks in Jordan do not adopt the explanation offered by the Drafting 
Group’s Commentary on UCP 600, as such an interpretative aid, is not referred to by 
UCP 600. It is hoped that such an issue would be addressed by updating ISBP 2013, 
since the general test for conformity captures most cases of documentary credits, in 
the absence in many instances of particular rules for the determination of conformity.  
 
3.5.2 The legal nature of conformity must also be appreciated, such that the examination 
of documents is seen to be a means of protecting banks from liability when the status 
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of conformity is uncertain. The omission of the reference to “reasonable care” in UCP 
600 for the determination of conformity is a welcome step. Banks can no longer 
assert, simply from the language of the UCP, that the bank might have a broad 
reasonable care defence in its determination of conformity, rather than a defence 
based upon the reasonable exercise of their discretion in the performance of their 
ministerial function relative to the circumstances. It is hoped, however, that the 
forthcoming iteration of the UCP would lay down an objective standard (i.e. any 
prudent bank might reach the same decision regardless the circumstances of the 
bank) against which the decision of the bank should be assessed whenever the status 
of the conformity of presented documents is uncertain.  
 
3.5.3 The attempt to define conformity in article 2 of UCP 600 is sound as it is formed as 
a principle reflecting the underlying policy of documentary credits and capturing all 
documentary credit transactions, and it has to a certain extent “formal realisability” 
in the sense of providing the sources for the criteria of conformity. However, not only 
the principle of conformity but even the general rules for conformity lack a high 
degree of “formal realisability” due to the elastic nature of conformity. On the other 
hand, the general rule of appearance has a high degree of both generality and 
“formal realisability” because the concept of appearance is not encountered by 
parties’ contested needs. The clarity of the rule of appearance is fostered in UCP 600 
by adopting the technique of avoiding undue verbosity, particularly as to avoid the 
repetition of the phrase “on the face of the documents”. However, the empirical 
findings clarify that there is a lack of commonality as to the application of the 
particular rule of authenticity – generated from the general rule of appearance - in 
UCP 600 by Jordanian banks. This is due to social factors and not to the text of UCP 
600, and the available solution that the ICC might be able to offer is to run training 
sessions highlighting the pragmatic need for and the impact of the presumption of 
authenticity. Ironically the omission of the reference to “reasonable time” in article 
14 regarding the time for examination is a brave step that favours formality over 
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substance which aims to achieve commonality, and such a step is safeguarded by 
the introduction of article 15 so as to avoid repugnancy to legal order doctrines of 
good faith and reasonableness.   
 
3.5.4 The happy story of the enhancement of clarity and certainty of conformity under UCP 
600 reflecting the balance of security underlying documentary credits has its 
downside. Instead of being responsive to the linkage rule which is a necessary 
element in the embedded trade usage of conformity, reflecting the buyers’ need for 
security by requiring the documents - which aim to investigate the status of the 
goods - to be linked to the identification of the goods, as is the position under English 
law, sub-article 14 (e) of UCP 600 emphasises that there is no requirement for 
linkage. Such a UCP proposition, which is unfortunately a general rule purport 
applicable to many documentary credit transactions, would lead to uncertainty as it 
might not be enforced under many legal orders. Nevertheless, the general rule of 
the time for examining the documents under sub-article 14 (b) of UCP 600 enhances 
“formal realisability” and reflects the security underlying documentary credits for 
banks and, by article 15, avoids the repugnancy to legal orders.   
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GENERAL VIEW 
 
4.1.1 The test of “material alignment” in article 14 (d) of UCP 600 clarifies that dimension 
six is the applicable dimension, or meaning, of conformity under UCP 600.525 Being 
a general rule the “material alignment” test has a residual effect in framing what is 
conformity, since it applies as an initial step in the determination of conformity for 
the majority of documentary credit transactions. Yet, such a general rule lacks a high 
degree of “formal realisability”526 so it is unable to determine with certainty whether 
or not documents are in conformity across a wide range of various factual matrices. 
This is due to the elastic nature of conformity. In order to enhance the “formal 
realisability” of the general rule of “material alignment”, UCP 600 and its 
interpretative aids provide particular rules, directly generated from the general rule, 
directing a banker as to whether data in connection with a particular matrix of facts 
is in material alignment or not.  
 
4.1.2 Based on the conceptual model explained in chapter 1, such particular rules mainly 
seek to reflect the needs of banks and sellers for manageable examination and 
manageable presentation respectively, since the fulfilment of these needs directly 
serves the need for assurance of payment. Of course the means of certainty through 
clear and sufficient rules is the most suitable tool to fulfil such needs. However the 
means of flexibility must be taken into account particularly for situations that are not 
directly regulated by the UCP. Furthermore, UCP 600 provides sets of particular rules 
which must reflect the needs of the documentary credit parties, which have been 
rationally deducted from the functions of the embedded trade usages of 
irrevocability, conformity and autonomy as proposed in the conceptual model. These 
needs are: assurance of payment for sellers and banks; documentary assurance as 
                                                          
525 Chapter 3, para 3.2.4; 3.2.20. 
526 For the concept of formal realisability: chapter 1, para 1.2.26.   
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to the shipment of the required goods (proof of goods, insurance and shipment) for 
buyers; manageable presentation for sellers; manageable examination for banks; 
and speed for all parties. The key task in this chapter is to ascertain whether these 
particular rules do in fact reflect those functions in such a way that the rules are 
capable of being enforced in a uniform way under English and Jordanian laws.  
Diagrams 7 and 8 below illustratively emphasise how the needs for assurance of 
payment; manageable examination; documentary proof; manageable presentation 
and speed can generally be materialised through a suitable means. 
 
Diagram 7: The Need for Manageable Examination/Assurance of Payment and the 
Needs for Proof of Goods, Shipment and Insurance 
 
 
Diagram 8: The Need for Manageable Presentation and the Need for Speed 
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4.1.3 Plan of the chapter. Firstly, the particular rules that seek to apply the material 
alignment test are addressed. Then the particular rules that purport to facilitate 
speedy manageable presentation and examination are evaluated, followed by the 
particular rules that intend to satisfy the needs of buyers as to proof of goods, 
insurance, shipment and speed. Finally, the rules that seek to regulate refusal of 
non-conforming documents are evaluated.  
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APPLICATIONS OF THE GENERAL RULE FOR CONFORMITY  
 
4.2.1 The new worded test of “material alignment” in sub-article 14 (d) of UCP 600 
contains the following criteria. An apparent difference between expressed data in the 
presented document and data that are required in the credit or data in other 
presented documents is insufficient to justify rejection unless it reaches the level of 
textual conflict, and unless the conflict reaches the level of contextual conflict (i.e. a 
conflict affecting the purpose and structure of the documents in the context of the 
credit, UCP 600 and ISBP). A lack of required data (“contextual data”) affecting the 
structure and the purpose of the document in the context of the credit, UCP 600 and 
ISBP would justify a refusal, whilst the lack of other data (“non-contextual data”) 
would not, even though such non-contextual data was required by the credit. 
Additional data in the presented documents is tolerated unless it causes a contextual 
conflict. In the same spirit, additional documents are irrelevant in conformity.  
 
 
Level Of Conflict And Level Of Contextual Conflict 
4.2.2 An apparent difference in meaning that does not reach the level of conflict is 
disregarded (e.g. the use of coma “,” instead of ampersand “&”).527 Similarly, a 
conflict that does not reach the level of contextual conflict does not justify a refusal 
(e.g. the name of consignee in the certificate of origin is in conflict with the name of 
consignee in the bill of lading).528 The use of a punctuation mark in the presented 
document that is different from the punctuation mark which is stated in the credit, 
may not reach the level of conflict529 unless there is an obvious conflict in the context 
in which the punctuation is used.530 A replacement of a full word by a general 
                                                          
527 Collected Opinions 1996-2005, R.409.  
528 Drafting Group, Commentary on UCP 600: Article by Article Analysis, (No. 680, ICC 2009), 64.  
529 Collected Opinions 1996-2005, R.409.  
530 For the rule and its illustrations: ISBP 213, A2.  
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accepted abbreviation does not constitute a contextual conflict.531 Similarly, the use 
of an ISO country code does not constitute conflict.532 To achieve certainty, it is 
hoped that the future revision of ISBP will include a broad list of accepted 
abbreviations (including in languages other than English) that are commonly in use 
in documentary credits. A misspelling or a typing error that does not affect the 
meaning of a word or a sentence in which it occurs is treated as a linguistic disparity 
that does not reach the level of conflict.533 Accordingly, a presentation of the postal 
district code as “0256” instead of “2056” is treated as a typographical error and 
stating “industrial parl” instead of “industrial park” is also treated as a clear 
typographical error that does not constitute a conflict.534 However, a description of 
“model 123” instead of “model 321” is to be treated as a contextual conflict,535 since 
the order of each number is essential to identify the model and any change in the 
order would cause confusion as to the identity of the model. But, if the number “0” 
was added in the front of these numbers “123”, then that would not to be treated as 
a conflict for it would not affect the order of the numbers. On the contrary, if “0” was 
added and followed by “.”, then the order of “0.123” would be different from, and 
conflict with, “123” and would thus be treated as a contextual conflict. Similarly, a 
presentation of the name “Chai” instead of “Chan” reaches the level of contextual 
conflict536 and the name of “Mohammed Soran” instead of “Mohammed Sofan” 
constitutes contextual conflict in the Middle East for this causes confusion between 
different names.537  
 
4.2.3 Empirical findings. The empirical findings suggest that some bankers in Jordan are 
of the opinion that a misspelling, or a typographical error, is indeterminate.538 An 
apostrophe in the form of (‘) might be treated as in contextual conflict with a ditto 
                                                          
531 ISBP 2013, A1; ISBP 2007, R.6.  
532 Opinions 2009-2011, R.757.  
533 ISBP 2013, A23; ISBP 2007, Para 22.  
534 Collected Opinions 1996-2005, R.209; see also Collected Opinions 1996-2005, R.408.  
535 ISBP 2013, A23; ISBP 2007, Para 25.  
536 Collected Opinions 1996-2005, R.209.  
537 United States: Beyene v Irving Trust Co 762 F 2d 4 (2nd Cir) (1985).  
538 This is the opinion, and not the practice, of Qaleb Joudeh: Annex I, para 26.  
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mark of the form of (”) as the latter might refer to a different size of goods in 
China.539 According to this opinion, a discrepancy is a discrepancy and a banker 
cannot actually know whether a difference can affect the commercial purpose.540 It 
is submitted that this opinion leads to place conformity in dimension one. It is true 
that in reality a banker cannot actually know whether a discrepancy is truly material 
or not, but there must be a presumption that such errors are not material (in the 
absence of contrary evidence) to secure the stability of transactions.  
 
4.2.4 Mathematical calculation. A conflict between detailed mathematical calculations 
should not be considered as being in contextual conflict where the stated total in 
respect of the criterion such as amount, quantity, weight or packing list corresponds 
to that required in the credit or with other documents.541 However, where a credit 
specifies the manner in which the subject matter of the calculations (e.g. packing 
details) is to be expressed, then if the total value of detailed mathematical 
calculations is not apparent in the presented document the bank needs to calculate 
the unexpressed total value to check whether there is a conflict with the credit or 
other documents.542 This application of the “material alignment” test does not merely 
reflect the need of sellers for manageable presentation, but also highlights the 
positive role of the bank in its ministerial role in checking the conformity of the 
presented documents.  
 
 
ALLOWANCE FOR THE AMOUNT OF THE CREDIT, THE QUANTITY OF GOODS 
OR THE UNIT PRICE 
 
                                                          
539 Annex I, para 26. 
540 Annex I, para 26. 
541 ISBP 2013, A22; ISBP 2007, Para 24; Collected Opinions 1996-2005, R.447.  
542 Collected Opinions 1995-2005, R.447: the quantity of each package was shown in one of the presented 
documents whereas the other documents showed the quantity of total packages.  
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4.2.5 Where the words “about” or “approximately” are used in connection with the amount 
(i.e. the sum of money available under the credit) stated in the credit, then a 10% 
plus or minus of the amount is not considered as a contextual conflict by virtue of 
sub-article 30 (a) of UCP 600. This tolerance is not automatically applied to the 
quantity of the goods or the unit price unless the words “about” or “approximate” 
are stipulated with each of them.543 Sub-article 30 (a) of UCP 600 omits the word 
“circa” and the reference to the statement “or other similar statement” from sub-
article 39 (a) of UCP 500. Such a change was introduced as a reflection to the limited 
use of the words “circa” or “similar expressions” as stated by the Drafting Group.544 
It is submitted, however, this new stricter language of limiting the tolerance of 10% 
to the words “about” or “approximately” should not be interpreted literally in 
languages other than the formal languages of the UCP.545 Namely, similar 
expressions to the words “about” or “approximately” must have the same effects, 
since there is a high possibility that translating these words into other languages 
would throw many different synonyms. 
 
4.2.6 Still, where sub-article 30 (a) is not applicable, as for instance the words “about” or 
“approximately” are not used, then pursuant to sub-article 30 (b) of UCP 600 a 
difference of plus or minus 5% of the quantity of the goods is not considered as a 
contextual conflict. This de minimis rule does not apply where the quantity is 
stipulated in terms of a number of packing units or individual items (e.g. bales,546 
bags or 500 tyres).547 The de minimis permission does not apply to the description 
of goods. So the phrase “about 100 planks of sawn timber about 30 foot long and 
about 18 inches wide” was considered under English law as being part of the 
                                                          
543 Collected Opinions 1996-2005, R.365. 
544 Drafting Group, Commentary on UCP 600: Article by Article Analysis, (No. 680, ICC 2009), 138. 
545 Malek and Quest, Jack: Documentary Credits, (4th edn, Tottel 2009) para 8.70.  
546 Collected Opinions 1996-2005, R.366. 
547 Collected Opinions 1996-2005, R.367.  
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description of the goods and not the quantity of the goods.548 To enhance the 
comprehensible clarity in order to avoid confusions in practice, it is to be hoped that 
a reference to the distinction between the description of goods and their quantity 
would be expressly stipulated in a future ISBP revision. Where the credit stipulates 
detailed quantities for each part of the goods then the tolerance rule applies for each 
part and also for the total amount of the goods.549 The tolerance of 5% as stated in 
sub-article 30 (b) should not be used as a means of increasing the amount of the 
credit, otherwise doors would be opened to a beneficiary who acts with bad faith to 
ship extra quantity of goods in order to increase his payment. Accordingly, where 
the total amount of the drawings exceeds the amount of the credit then a refusal 
would be justified on the ground of contextual conflict,550 but in case of a 95% 
shipment a tolerance of up to 5% downwards for the amount to be drawn under the 
credit is not considered as a contextual conflict.551  
 
4.2.7 Where neither sub-article 30 (a) nor sub-article 30 (b) are applicable, then a 
difference of minus 5% of the amount of the credit is not considered as a contextual 
conflict - by virtue of sub-article 30 (c) – if both the quantity of the goods is shipped 
in full and the unit price is not reduced.552  
 
4.2.8 English law. Originally, there was no application of any de minimis concept to 
documentary credits under English law.553 This is prominently due to the 
interpretation of the principle of strict compliance in both Moralice (London) Ltd v E 
D and F Man554 and Soproma SpA v Marine and Animal By Products Corpn.555 It is 
                                                          
548 Kydon Compania Naviera SA v National Westminster Bank [1981] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 68, 76; Malek and Quest, 
Jack: Documentary Credits, (4th edn, Tottel 2009) para 8.71: the scope of the application of sub-article 30 (b) 
seems to be where the quantity of the goods is referred to weight or volume. 
549 Collected Opinions 1996-2005, R.238.  
550 Sub-article 30 (b) UCP 600.  
551 Collected Opinions 1996-2005, R.239.  
552 Collected Opinions 1996-2005, R.367.  
553 Even though De minimis non curat lex is a doctrine recognised by English common law but it is one that has 
a strictly limited application in connection with the sale of goods (Wilensko v Fenwick [1938] 3All E.R. 429): 
albeit in this context it is now displaced by s30(2A) SGA 1979. 
554 [1954] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 526. 
555 [1966] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 367.  
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submitted that the refusal to apply any de minimis concept was not generated by 
the acclamation of trade practice.556 Even if the peripheral trade usage at that time 
supported the judgments that is not evident from the judgments. The fact that the 
judgments are in contrast with both the current peripheral trade usage or market 
practice and the UCP makes it difficult to see the viability, or even the applicability, 
of such law nowadays. Thus most documentary credits apply a de minimis concept 
as they are subject to the UCP, and it is clear that there is no place for the 
applicability of the above cases in the context of UCP 600.557 For documentary credits 
that are not subject to the UCP, courts might find that parties have the intention to 
apply the current peripheral trade usage, or in the light of the modern approach of 
interpreting the contracts by looking at the matrix of facts,558 courts would interpret 
the documentary credit contract according to market practices as being part of the 
matrix of fact, rather than the exclusive rules in the above English cases.  
 
4.2.9 Jordanian law. It is one of the doctrines of Jordanian law that trade usage and 
practices559 are taken into consideration in the interpretation of contracts. Jordanian 
law would adopt the UCP position if proved by expert evidence that such a UCP 
position reflects the practices in international trade.   
 
Lack Of Data 
4.2.10 Where data that constitutes part of a documentary term are not contained in the 
presented documents, then the lack of such data is accepted as long as it does not 
affect the purpose and the structure of the presented documents in the context of 
                                                          
556 For the concept of acclamation:  Hwaidi and Ferris ‘The Existence of International Unchangeable and 
Changeable Trade Usage’ (SLS Conference, Edinburgh, September 2013) 
<http://archive.legalscholars.ac.uk/edinburgh/restricted/paper.cfm?id=107>.  
557 Article 30 UCP 600.  
558 Prenn v Simmonds [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1381 1383 per Lord Wilberforce; Reardon Smith Line Ltd. v Yngvar 
Hansen-Tangen [1976] 1 W.L.R. 989 per Lord Wilberforce; American Airlines Inc v Hope [1974] 2 Lloyd's Rep 
301, 305 per Lord Diplock; Reasonable reader: Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank  [2011] 1 W.L.R. 2900; Attorney 
General of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd [2009] 1 W.L.R. 1988 per Lord Hoffman; Investors Compensation Scheme 
LTD v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 W.L.R. 896, 912 per Lord Hoffman. 
559 Articles 224-225 Civil Code (1976).   
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the credit, UCP 600 and international standard banking practice. The examples 
provided by ISBP and ICC Opinions of non-contextual data illustrate how discretion 
of the banks is essential for scenarios that are not expressly stipulated by the ICC in 
order to determine whether the missing data affects the collective purpose of the 
required documents.560 However, when the lack of the required data affects the 
purpose of the presented document, then the difference between what is and what 
should have been provided is a contextual conflict which justifies a refusal. 
Accordingly, a certificate of origin must expressly state the origin of the goods and 
a statement such as “Sudan raw cotton” is not sufficient to mean that the origin of 
the goods is from Sudan.561 Indeed, the main purpose of a certificate of origin is to 
certify the original source of the goods and such purpose must strictly be adhered. 
On the same basis, where a credit requires an inspection certificate to be signed by 
an inspector appointed of trading company B (the applicant), the presentation of an 
inspection certificate signed by an inspector without stating that the inspector is 
appointed by trading company B (the applicant) is not in conformity,562 and by reason 
of the appearance rule the bank has no right to check whether the inspector is 
appointed by B or not.  
 
4.2.11 Irrelevant data and documents. The purpose of the general test for conformity is 
to ensure that what is required by the credit is fulfilled by the contents of the 
presented documents that are linked to the terms of the credit. It is sensible 
therefore to ignore data and documents that are irrelevant to the terms of the credit. 
Accordingly, where the presented documents contain data that are not required by 
the credit, such data is accepted unless it clearly causes a contextual conflict. 
Helpfully, there are many examples of particular rules promulgated in ISBP and ICC 
Opinions illustrating factual matrices to be treated as additional data.563 This, of 
                                                          
560 ISBP 2013, A20; ISBP 2007, Para 22; Opinions 2009-2011, R.757 ; Opinions 2005-2008, R.635; Collected 
Opinions 1996-2005, R.289. 
561 Collected Opinions 1996-2005, R.320.  
562 Collected Opinions 1996-2005, R.403.  
563 Opinions 2009-2011, 715. 
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course, promotes certainty which serves as a means for assuring banks and sellers 
as to the status of conformity. Banks might face the situation where there are some 
documents amongst the presented documents that are not required by the credit. 
For such a situation, both UCP 600 and its predecessor declare the position that such 
documents are irrelevant to the determination of the conformity of the presentation. 
Sub-article 14 (g) of UCP 600 states:  
 
“A document presented but not required by the credit will be disregarded and may 
be returned to the presenter”. 
 
Thus banks are directed to disregard the additional documents and they have the 
right to return them to the presenter. The reference to “must not be examined” in 
the equivalent sub-article 13 (a) of the predecessor revision is now replaced by “will 
be disregarded” under sub-article 14 (g). This reflects the actual fact that banks are 
not able to determine whether documents are additional or not unless they generally 
examine them. The other change in sub-article 14 (g) is the omission of the 
possibility of “or pass them [documents] without responsibility”. Such an omission 
does not affect the previous position in the light of Rule 715 of ICC Opinions,564 in 
that the presented documents are regarded as the presenter’s property and thus the 
bank must dispose of the documents in accordance with the presenter’s instruction.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
564 Opinions 2009-2011, R.715.  
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PARTICULAR RULES FACILITATING SPEEDY 
MANAGEABLE PRESENTATION AND EXAMINATION  
4.3.1 The dominant theme on the changes introduced by UCP 600 is the attempt to reflect 
the need for manageable presentation in order to serve the principal need for sellers 
of having an assurance of payment. Reducing rejections based on a mere formality 
that does not actually affect the underlying substantive rights and obligations of the 
parties is one of the main tasks of UCP 600, and the issues of addresses, languages 
and drafts are regulated under UCP 600 and ISBP 2013 in that spirit facilitating a 
sensible presentation under documentary credits. 
 
Addresses 
4.3.2 The rule for conformity as to the addresses of the beneficiary and the applicant is 
specifically articulated in sub-article 14 (j) of UCP 600 which states: 
 
“When the addresses of the beneficiary and the applicant appear in any stipulated 
document, they need not be the same as those stated in the credit or in any other 
stipulated document, but must be within the same country as the respective 
addresses mentioned in the credit. Contact details (telefax, telephone, email and the 
like) stated as part of the beneficiary’s and the applicant’s address will be 
disregarded. However, when the address and contact details of the applicant appear 
as part of the consignee or notify party details on a transport document subject to 
articles 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 or 25, they must be as stated in the credit”. 
 
This is a new article under UCP 600 that does not have an equivalent under UCP 500. 
The new article presents a significant change. It pronounces irrelevant required data 
as to the addresses of the applicant and the beneficiary, except as to country 
identification. In other words, the data in the credit regarding addresses of 
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beneficiaries and applicants, except the name of the country, are regarded as non-
contextual data. This position reflects the fact that export and import companies 
have many branches and offices in the same country,565 and it is thus responsive to 
the need for manageable presentation without affecting the security for buyers. 
However this rule does not apply where the address of the applicant appears as part 
of the description of the consignee as stated by the same provision. Here the details 
of the applicant’s address must be the “same” as stated in the credit,566 so it is 
submitted that in this situation conformity falls in dimension one.567 The mirror image 
dimension applies because transport documents usually function as documents of 
title, and as such it is vital to exactly reflect the consignee’s name and addresses in 
order to enable the applicant to receive the goods and thus reflect the security of 
documentary credits. Since the Drafting Group’s Commentary lacks commonality as 
clarified by the empirical findings,568 it is regrettable that the words of sub-article 14 
(j) do not make it exclusively clear that the mirror image test applies for addresses 
in transport documents.   
 
4.3.3 English and Jordanian laws. Given the fact that freedom to contract is one of the 
most dominant legal doctrines, or paradigms, under English569 and Jordanian570 laws, 
it is questionable whether sub-article 14 (j) would have enforceable effects under 
these legal orders. The analyses below regarding non-documentary conditions 
apply.571 However, the empirical findings confirm that, as some bankers in Jordan 
stated, sub-article 14 (j) reflects the practice that had already been implemented.572 
In describing the test for conformity Nart Lambaz said: 
 
                                                          
565 Drafting Group, Commentary on UCP 600: Article by Article Analysis, (No. 680, ICC 2009), 66. 
566 Drafting Group, Commentary on UCP 600: Article by Article Analysis, (No. 680, ICC 2009), 67. 
567 For the mirror image dimension: chapter 3, para 3.2.4. 
568 Annex I, para 14. 
569 Suisse Atlantique Société d'Armement Maritime SA v NV Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale [1967] 1 AC 361, 399 
per Lord Reid.  
570 Article 213 Civil Code (1976). 
571 Para 4.3.11. 
572 Annex I, para 24. 
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The discrepancy needs to be a material one that affects the essence of the 
commercial transaction.  For example, the address is required only in relation to the 
name of the country in UCP 600, we used to apply this rule under UCP 500 because 
we regarded the discrepancy in the details of the address - except as to the name of 
the country - as not being a material one”.573 
 
This is due to the fact that banks realise that applicants do not actually intend to 
give effects to the details of the addresses of the applicant or the beneficiary as 
stated in the credit. It is submitted therefore sub-article 14 (j) would be held effective 
under both English law in the light of the approach of interpreting contracts in 
business common sense574 and Jordanian law. Consequently, the introduction of sub-
article 14 (j) is a welcome change as it is responsive to the practices in documentary 
credits and that should reduce unnecessary rejections.    
 
Languages 
 
4.3.4 Although it is expected in international standard banking practice that the issued 
documents by the beneficiary will be in the language of the credit,575 it is confirmed 
now that the documents may be issued in any language where the credit is silent in 
respect of the language of the presented documents.576 This proposition facilitates 
manageable presentation by sellers. By the same spirit, if the credit allows two or 
more languages, then the fact that data in the documents are expressed in any of 
the stipulated languages is not treated as in contextual conflict. Of course, if the 
credit stipulates the language of the documents to be presented, the data in the 
presented documents needs to be expressed in the required language.577 But a draft 
                                                          
573 Annex I, para 24. 
574 Antaios Compania Naviera S.A. v Salen Rederierna A.B  [1985] AC 191 , 201 per Lord Diplock. 
575 ISBP 2007, para 23. 
576 ISBP 2013, A21 (b). 
577 ISBP 2013, A21 (a); Opinions 2009-2011, R.774. 
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(i.e. bill of exchange) is not to be considered as one of the documents that the credit 
requires to be presented in the stipulated language.578 This approach of the ICC 
Opinion and English law needs to be adopted under Jordanian law, for it is essential 
to keep a draft operative under the law of the country in which the draft is intended 
to be paid. However, the number of the accepted languages that are allowed by the 
credit may be limited by the nominated bank on its advice of the credit.579 In order 
to reduce unnecessary rejections, data in the presented documents that are 
expressed in a language other than the required or allowed languages are treated as 
additional data that are irrelevant for the determination of conformity,580 and it is 
unreasonable to expect banks to examine such data. Moreover, and as an indirect 
application to the principle of appearance, “the name of a person or entity, any 
stamps, legalization, endorsements or similar, and the pre-printed text on a 
document, such as, but not limited to, field heading”581 are presumed to be in 
“material alignment” where they are expressed in a language other than the 
stipulated language in the credit.582  
 
Drafts 
 
4.3.5 The issue of conformity of drafts directly affects the need of sellers for an assurance 
of payment. The new revision of ISBP has introduced many paragraphs regulating 
the conformity of drafts. Thus ISBP 2013 clarifies many requirements for drafts in 
documentary credits since such requirements had been misunderstood by some 
banks because, as submitted, of the lack of written rules. For instance, it is clear 
now that the drawee of drafts in acceptance credits is the nominated bank who 
decides to accept the draft,583 and such understanding reflects the purpose of having 
                                                          
578 Opinions 2009-2011, R.730; Credit Industriel et Commercial v China Merchants Bank [2002] 2 All E.R. 427 
(Comm). 
579 ISBP 2013, A21 (c) (i); ISBP 2007, para 23; Opinions 2009-2011, R.771.   
580 ISBP 2013, A21 (d). 
581 ISBP 2013, A21 (e).  
582 ISBP 2013, A21 (e). 
583 ISBP 2013, B11, B12.  
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acceptance credits that are available with nominated banks in addition to the 
confirming bank. But that was not clearly understood by many bankers in Jordan as 
indicated by the interviews with bankers that were conducted just couple of days 
before the distribution of ISBP 2013 to Jordanian banks.584 Another illustration of the 
core improvements is the clarification that conformity of drafts is only determined 
by the terms of the credit according to the rules and the requirements stipulated in 
ISBP 2013,585 and thus banks should not check whether drafts fulfil the requirements 
of the applicable local law. Such a clarification having the effect of simplifying the 
requirements for drafts which in turn serves the need for manageable examination 
and presentation. The participating bankers, in all bar one case, stated that they do 
not check the Jordanian Commercial Code in order to determine the conformity of 
the presented bills of exchange. According to Qhaleb Joudeh there is a common 
standard for the structure of a bill of exchange. Muhammad Burjaq stated that “bills 
of exchange are meant to be negotiable instruments”.586 Thus, there are no specific 
requirements outside the regime of UCP 600 for the conformity of bills of exchanges 
except the practice of Arabic Bank as Koloud Alkalaldeh said “a bill of exchange must 
be in accordance with both the Commercial Code and ICC Opinions”.587 A further 
improvement not only fosters clarity but it also responds to the legal doctrine of 
“freedom to contract” is the rule B18 of ISBP (2013). Such rule interprets sub-article 
6 (c) of UCP 600, which provides that a credit must not be available by a draft drawn 
on the applicant, to the effect that sub-article 6 (c) has no effect where the parties 
expressly require in the credit a presentation of a draft drawn on the applicant.588    
 
 
 
                                                          
584 Annex I, para 31. 
585 ISBP 2013, B1 (b). 
586 Annex I, para 31. 
587 Annex I, para 31.  
588 ISBP 2013, B18.  
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Ambiguity 
4.3.6 Having a term in the credit that has a high degree of ambiguity is a serious dilemma, 
as it is an express term that is commonly regarded as being stipulated to reflect the 
intention of the parties. It leads to a dispute, for instance between the issuing bank 
and the confirming bank, as to what is the right interpretation for an ambiguous term 
in order to determine the conformity of the presented document that is related to 
such a term.  
 
4.3.7 There are many types of ambiguous documentary credits terms, and UCP 600 
identifies two types of them. One is known as a “non-documentary condition” and 
the other is the term that is silent as to the contents of, or the issuer of, the required 
document. However, there is no particular rule in UCP 600 generally regulating the 
dilemma of ambiguous terms or instructions but the ISBP do provide a provision 
regarding ambiguous terms. Paragraph V of the preliminary considerations of ISBP 
2013 states: 
 
“The applicant bears the risk of any ambiguity in its instructions to issue or amend a 
credit. An issuing bank may, unless the applicant expressly instructs to the contrary, 
supplement or develop those instructions in a manner necessary or desirable to 
permit the use of the credit or any amendment thereto. An issuing bank should 
ensure that any credit or amendment it issued is not ambiguous or conflicting in its 
terms and conditions”.589  
 
The ISBP reflects the need for discretion by offering the proposition that the issuing 
bank is entitled to convert the ambiguous instructions of the applicant into workable 
documentary terms. This as we will see in the next paragraph is consistent with the 
                                                          
589 ISBP 2013, Preliminary Considerations (v); ISBP 2007, para 2.   
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position of legal orders. The last sentence of the above provision in ISBP 2013 is a 
new provision that was not contained in paragraph 2 of ISBP 2007. Such new 
provision is significant. It seems that there is a realisation that legal orders would 
not accept the idea that applicants who usually have no expertise in dealing with 
documentary credits should bear the risk of framing documentary credits, given the 
fact that banks use their standard form of documentary credit as they are the 
experienced and skilled party in documentary credits. In other words, there is no 
escape from the reality that Municipal legal orders would impose a duty of care upon 
banks in order to advise applicants in framing workable documentary credits. UCP 
600 introduced a new provision responding to such a position where sub-article 4 
(b) states:  
 
“An issuing bank should discourage any attempt by the applicant to include, as an 
integral part of the credit, copies of the underlying contract, proforma invoice and 
the like”. 
 
Thus the applicant bears the risk of the ambiguity of its instructions to the issuing 
bank to open the credit. The instructions are converted into terms when the credit is 
issued by the issuing bank, and here the bank is responsible to issue a workable 
documentary credit, namely: the terms of the credit need to be effective within the 
context of the administrative task of banks to determine the conformity of 
documentary presentations. The new change in the ISBP is a welcome step as it 
responses positively to the legal communications generated by Municipal legal orders 
(i.e. that they will oblige banks to honour their contractual commitments and 
exercise the variable standards of care required by those legal orders). 
 
4.3.8 English law. An agent who receives ambiguous instructions or instructions bearing 
different meanings (where the appearance of the ambiguity is reasonably apparent) 
is obliged to seek a clarification – where reasonably possible - from the principal, 
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and thus if it fails to do so it will proceed at its own risk.590 This is applicable to the 
documentary credit contract between the applicant and the issuing bank, as the 
latter is an agent of the applicant591 in terms of the internal mandate.592 Where it is 
not reasonably possible to seek a clarification from the applicant,593 or where the 
ambiguity was not reasonably apparent before the date of the presentation of the 
documents, then the consequences are different. In these situations, the instructed 
party (i.e. the issuing or confirming bank) is obliged to place on the ambiguous terms 
a reasonable interpretation.594 The bank is not liable for a failure to adopt another 
reasonable interpretation as long as it has adopted one of the reasonable alternative 
interpretations. This position is valid whether the legal nature of the relationship 
between the bank and the instructing party is an agency595 or not.596  
 
4.3.9 Jordanian law. The relationship between the issuing bank and the applicant is a 
documentary credit relationship.597 The issuing bank must adhere to the instructions 
of the applicant, and thus the bank is not entitled to reimbursement if it pays against 
documents that are not in conformity.598 However, if the mistake in the decision of 
conformity is caused by the applicant then the bank is entitled to reimbursement,599 
and the applicant therefore should bear the risk. It is not clear what is meant by the 
                                                          
590 Bridge and others (eds), Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, (8th edn, Thompson 2010) para 23.38; Woodhouse AC 
Israel Coca Ltd SA v Nigerian Produce Marketing Co Ltd [1972] AC 741, 772.   
591 Midland Bank v Seymour1955) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 147,153 per Devlin J; Commercial Banking Co. of Sydney v 
Jalsard Pty Ltd (1973) AC 279, 285 per Lord Diplock. 
592 Credit Agricole Indosuez v Muslim Commercial Banking [2000] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 275, 280 where Sir Christopher 
Staughton stated that there is no agency relationship in law between the issuing bank and the applicant and that 
lead to the suggestion of Elinger and Neo (The Law and Practice of Documentary Credit, (1st edn, 2010) 83-84) 
that the agency relationship is confined to the internal mandate. The issuing bank under a duty to strictly adhere 
to the instructions or the mandate of the applicant: Equitable Trust Co of New York v Dawson Partners Ltd (1927) 
27 Lloyd’s Rep. 49, 52; South African Reserve Bank v Samuel & Co (1931) 40 Lloyd’s Rep. 291; Rayner & Co Ltd 
v Hambro's Bank Ltd [1943] K.B. 37, 43 per Goddared LJ. 
593 Credit Agricole Indosuez v Muslim Commercial Banking [2000] 1Lloyd’sRep 275, 278: seeking a clarification 
would unreasonably affect the time for the examination of documents.  
594 Midland Bank Ltd. v Seymour [1955] 2 Lloyd's Rep 147, 153 per Devlin J; Commercial Banking Co of Sydney 
Ltd v Jalsard Pty Ltd [1973] AC 279, 286 per Lord Diplock; Credit Agricole Indosuez v Muslim Commercial Bank 
Ltd [2000] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 275. 
595 Midland Bank v Seymour (1955) 2 Lloyd’s 147, 153; Commercial Banking Co. of Sydney v Jalsard Pty Ltd 
(1973) AC 279, 285. 
596 Credit Agricole Indosuez v Muslim Commercial Banking [2000] 1Lloyd’s Rep 275: the confirming bank (which 
is clearly under English law not an agent of the issuing bank) was entitled to reasonably interpret the ambiguous 
instructions.  
597 Court of Distinction, 1068/1989, (Civil) Adalah Programme.  
598 Court of Distinction, 781/1990, (Civil) Adalah Programme. 
599 Court of Distinction, 1068/1989, (Civil) Adalah Programme. 
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applicant’s mistake. It might be inferred that an ambiguous instruction is seen as an 
applicant’s mistake but the decisions of the Court of Distinction are not clear on this 
point. For ambiguous instructions in documentary credits, we can review the 
principles of interpreting ambiguous contractual terms under Civil Code.600 The 
relative provision is article 239 (2) which states: 
 
“If there is a place for the [non literal] interpretation of the contract, the common 
intention of the contracting parties must be searched without sticking to the literal 
meaning of the words but by looking at the nature of the transaction and what should 
be available from the trustworthiness between the contracting parties according to 
the current custom in transactions”.  
 
Indeed, the nature of the transaction between the applicant and the issuing bank is 
similar to the internal mandate in the agency contract. By looking at the agency 
contract under Jordanian Civil Code, particularly the mandate between the principal 
and the agent, there is - unlike Common law – no clear duty upon an agent to seek 
a clarification from its principal whose instructions are ambiguous. There is, however, 
a duty upon the agent to inform the principal regarding any necessary information 
the agent needs as to the performance of the mandate.601 It can be deduced from 
this, by analogy, that the issuing bank is under a duty of care to advise the applicant 
as to the effectiveness of the credit terms. This is heightened by the provisions of 
both sub-article 4 (b) of UCP 600 and the preliminary considerations under ISBP 
2013. Also an agent is obliged to perform the contract on the basis of both the 
mandate and what is necessary by custom in order to perform the tasks in the 
mandate.602 Alternatively, the trust and security between the parties acting in good 
faith would impose a duty upon the issuing bank, as it is the experienced party 
                                                          
600 Articles 213-240 Civil Code (1976). 
601 Article 856 Civil Code (1976).  
602 Article 836 (1) Civil Code (1976). 
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providing the documentary credit service, to advise the applicant as to the status of 
the ambiguous terms.  
 
4.3.10 Duty to advise the applicant. In conclusion, it is submitted, the issuing bank is 
obliged to advise the applicant with regard to all information, such as to the 
effectiveness of ambiguous terms, which are necessary to render the credit terms 
workable. The issuing bank is entitled to convert the instructions of the applicant - 
by a supplementary addition that reflects the intention of the applicant – into 
workable documentary terms. However, the applicant ultimately bears the risk of 
ambiguous instructions if he insists on imposing ambiguous instructions or acts 
unreasonably in seeking to impose ambiguous instructions on the bank. In such a 
situation the bank is entitled to place a reasonable interpretation on the ambiguous 
term and act accordingly.      
 
NON-DOCUMENTARY CONDITIONS 
4.3.11 A non - documentary condition is a term of a documentary credit which requires a 
fact to exist without specifying what documentary confirmation is to be presented to 
prove that fact (e.g. a term requiring shipment by a conference line vessel).603 Thus 
a non-documentary condition is perceived as a type of ambiguous term, but one that 
has a special direct treatment under the UCP. In this regard, sub-article 14 (h) of 
UCP 600, which is reproduction of sub-article 13 (c) of UCP 500, states:  
 
“If a credit contains a condition without stipulating the document to indicate 
compliance with the condition, banks will deem such condition as not stated and will 
disregard it”. 
                                                          
603 Drafting Group, Commentary on UCP 600: Article by Article Analysis, (No. 680, ICC 2009), 66; Bridge and 
others (eds), Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, (8th edn, Thompson 2010) para 23.114.  
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Nevertheless, a non- documentary term is not treated as if it did not exist, because 
data in presented documents must not be in contextual conflict with the non-
documentary term.604 Data in other stipulated documents would justify a refusal if it 
was in contextual conflict with the credit, including the non-documentary term, as 
stipulated by the general test in sub-article 14 (d).  
 
4.3.12 New UCP relevant provisions. Pursuant to the new provisions of both sub-article 
4 (b) of UCP 600 and the last sentence of paragraph V of the preliminary 
considerations of ISBP 2013, and as  analysed above, the issuing bank is under a 
duty of care to advise the applicant as to the status of ambiguous terms. Thus if the 
issuing bank did not advise the applicant as to the consequences of a non-
documentary condition, the bank would be liable for a breach of a duty of care where 
the applicant suffers damages from the disregarding of the non-documentary 
condition.605   
 
4.3.13 Empirical findings. 606 Muhammad Burjaq stated that, as a UCP rule, the non-
documentary condition is ignored. He elucidated: 
 
“We face these problems with Iraqi banks where we deal as a confirming bank. We 
ask the issuing bank to amend the instructions, since, indeed prevention is better 
than cure. We explain to them in advance that instructions such as non-documentary 
conditions will be ignored. It is not fair for the applicant, and the issuing bank must 
advise the applicant regarding the consequences of such ambiguous instructions”.607 
 
                                                          
604 ISBP 2013, A26; Opinions 2005-2008, R.631; Drafting Group, Commentary on UCP 600: Article by Article 
Analysis, (No. 680, ICC 2009), 66.  
605 For contractual and tortious liability: Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1995] 2 AC145. 
606 Annex I, para 27-8.  
607 Annex I, para 27.  
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Mr B stated “it happens a lot with Iraqi banks, we receive ambiguous instructions.  
We disregard non-documentary conditions”.608 It can be inferred from these 
statements that the lack of experience and training are the main reasons for 
ambiguous instructions. However, the Jordanian banks in this situation tend to treat 
ambiguous instructions as non-documentary conditions, as stated by the 
participating banks. Traders would perceive the credit as being a non-secure method 
of payment if they were not to be advised as to that issue and given the opportunity 
of rectifying any ambiguity or invalidity in such a term. Ali Melham said “I have never 
had such a situation, but it is not fair for traders”.609 The empirical findings indicate 
that even bankers are of the opinion that banks are responsible to advise the 
applicant as to the inherent ambiguity of a non-documentary condition, and that the 
issuing bank is the party which should be responsible for spotting any such 
ambiguity. However, the empirical findings also clearly indicate that bankers consider 
sub-article 14 (h) to be fully effective and would thus disregard a non-documentary 
condition. Sub-article 14 (h) appears to be intended to have the effect of favouring 
the interests of banks over traders. This might be due to the fact that there were no 
representatives for exporters or importers in the Drafting Groups responsible for the 
design of UCP 600 and traders represented only about one percent of the members 
of the ICC Banking Commission.610 
 
4.3.14 Repugnancy. Given the fact that sub-article 14 (h) might be seen as being 
repugnant to the fundamental doctrine of freedom to contract under English611 and 
Jordanian612 laws, the question is whether such a repugnant article would be 
enforced under these legal orders. If it were repugnant the attempted erasure of bad 
practice in the inclusion of non-documentary conditions might result in uncertainty.   
                                                          
608 Annex I, para 27.  
609 Annex I, para 28.  
610 Bacon, “Who speaks for the exporter” [2006] 9 DCInsight.  
611 Suisse Atlantique Société d'Armement Maritime SA v NV Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale  [1967] 1 AC 361, 
399 per Lord Reid.  
612 Article 213 Civil Code (1976). 
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4.3.15 English law.613 Express contractual terms are treated under Common law as being 
the most likely manifestation of the intention of the contractual parties,614 and thus 
in the case of conflict with incorporated terms (i.e. most of the UCP terms) the 
express terms prevail. It is obvious and certain that parties can exclude or amend 
any incorporated UCP term by an expressed contractual term.615 But, it is not certain 
that spelling out a non-documentary condition in the credit reflects the intention of 
the parties to exclude sub-article 14 (h) of UCP 600. The question is whether courts, 
as a matter of interpretation, are willing to strike down such a UCP rule. It is 
submitted that there are four interconnected issues that need to be scrutinised to 
answer such a question.  
 
4.3.16 Firstly the nature of sub-article 14 (h) in UCP 600. It is essential to determine 
whether such a term operates independently as law, by means, for instance, of being 
fundamental to a documentary credit such as embedded trade usage.616 For in this 
case the term might have a paramount status in the sense that parties need to 
clearly express their intention to contract out of it. However, sub-article 14 (h) is not 
regarded as a fundamental concept in documentary credits or in UCP 600.617 This 
eases the task of striking down such a UCP term.  
 
4.3.17 Secondly is the level of the importance of the non-documentary condition for the 
operation of the credit. In Korea Exchange Bank v Standard Chartered Bank618 and 
Kumagai-Zenecon Construction Ltd (in Liq) v Arab Bank plc619 the non-documentary 
                                                          
613 Hwaidi, The Story of The English Strict Compliance Principle in Letters of Credit and its Consistency with the 
UCP, [2014] J.I.B.L.R 28 (2), 73-78. 
614 Homburg Houtimport BV v Agorsin Private Ltd (The Starsin) [2004] 1 AC 715, [11].      
615 Article 1 UCP 600; article 1 UCP 500; Homburg Houtimport BV v Agorsin Private Ltd (The Starsin) [2004] 1 
AC 715, [11]. 
616 Chapter 2, para 2.2.1. 
617 Bridge and others (eds), Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, (8th edn, Thompson 2010) para 23.114.  
618 [2006] 1 S.L.R. 565, 577. 
619 [1997] 3 SLR 770.  
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conditions, subject to sub-article 13 (c) of UCP 500,620 were given effect as they were 
essential for the commercial operation of the relevant credits.  
 
4.3.18 Thirdly, the underlying aim of the promulgation of sub-article 14 (h) is to eradicate 
the “wrong practice of incorporating non-documentary condition(s) into documentary 
credits”.621 Given the fact that the issue of non-documentary conditions causes 
problems to all parties dealing with documentary credits, the ICC Banking 
Commission has endeavoured to promote formality over substance. Formality 
narrows the scope of discretion. It seeks to serve certainty. It might thus lead to 
uniformity in practice - not only on the rejection of non-documentary terms but also 
on their treatment - which is a substantive objective of the UCP.622 On the other 
hand, substance in this issue stands for the effectiveness of the intention of the 
parties and freedom to contact. Such substance requires banks to call for a document 
that can reasonably be required to fulfil the relevant non-documentary condition. It 
achieves fairness for the parties who express, and intend to give effect to, the non-
documentary conditions. Most importantly, it serves security for buyers. Thus the 
formality of sub-article 14 (h) causes repugnancy as to the substantive principle of 
freedom to contract, and does not reflect the underlying policy of documentary 
credits as being a means of security for buyers. It must be realised that up to this 
date the UCP has not attained the status of mandatory rules623 so sub-article 14 (h) 
may be overridden by express agreement even when that agreement takes the form 
of a non-documentary condition. 
 
                                                          
620 Equivalent to sub-article 14 (h) UCP 600. 
621 ICC Position Paper N.3 (1994).    
622 Taylor, The Complete UCP, (1ST edn, ICC 2008), 27.   
623 There is a stronger view in that the UCP have never been “a legal regime automatically applicable”: Debattista, 
The new UCP 600 – changes to the tender of the seller’s shipping documents under letters of credit [2007] J.B.L 
329, 332-333. 
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4.3.19 Fourthly, the expressed trend under English law is to interpret the UCP through the 
international lens of business practices rather than a literalistic national approach.624 
As uniformity of practice is one of the main underlying objectives of the UCP,625 the 
interpretation of non-documentary conditions must substantively serve the purpose 
of uniformity and gives rise to the proposition that sub-article 14 (h) ought to be 
allowed to prevail irrespective of the parties’ express agreements. This proposition 
needs to be balanced with the needs of security, which is the underlying aim of a 
documentary credit transaction. Buyers, and some issuing banks which have real 
interests in documents, would be left vulnerable if the non-documentary condition 
that they required was to be ignored, particularly when the fulfilment of such 
condition could be seen as being essential for the commercial purpose of the 
transaction. Furthermore, the approach to the interpretation laid out in Fortis is 
subject to the general contractual interpretation principles of English law requiring 
interpretation from the standpoint of the informed reasonable reader construing the 
agreement in the context of its factual matrix.626 Any reasonable reader within the 
international trading community who is not a banker would not expect sub-article 14 
(h) to have full effectiveness.627 Such a reasonable interpretation reflects the 
expectation of international traders that is referred to by Thomas LJ in Fortis.628 But 
it does not reflect the expectation of the international banking community as any 
reasonable banker would expect, as he relies on UCP 600, the effectiveness of sub-
article 14 (h).629   
 
4.3.20 Conclusion. The original position under Common law is that a non-documentary 
condition needs to be satisfied by presenting a document that reasonably proves the 
                                                          
624 Fortis Bank S.A./N.V, Stemcor UK Limited v Indian Overseas Bank [2011] EWCA (Civ) 58, [29]; [2011] 1 
C.L.C. 276, 287 per Thomas LJ.  
625 Taylor, The Complete UCP, (1ST edn, ICC 2008), 27.   
626 Antaios Compania Naviera S.A. v Salen Rederierna A.B [1985] AC 191, 201 per Lord Diplock; Investors 
Compensation Scheme LTD v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 All E.R. 98, 114 per Lord Hoffman.  
627 As indicated by the empirical findings: chapter Chapter 1, para 1.2.28.  
628 Fortis Bank S.A./N.V, Stemcor UK Limited v Indian Overseas Bank [2011] EWCA (Civ) 58, [29]; [2011] 1 
C.L.C. 276, 287.  
629 Annex I, para 27. 
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existence of the called fact.630 The credit, subject to UCP 400, in Banque de 
l’Indochine et de Suez SA v J.H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd631 required: 
 
“Shipment to be effected on vessel belonging to shipping company that member of 
an International Shipping Conference”.632  
 
It was held that the bank must have satisfied itself of the existence of such a fact by 
calling for any evidence reasonably establishing that fact. However, the position of 
the Common law after the introduction of the rule requiring the disregarding of a 
non-documentary condition under UCP 500 is not certain. What is clear is that 
Common law will not give effect to sub-article 14 (h) where the non-documentary 
condition is essential for the commercial purpose of the transaction.633 This is 
because in such a case it would be clear that the parties did intend to give effects to 
such a non-documentary condition.   
 
4.3.21 Jordanian law. It is clear under Jordanian law that express terms override implied 
terms634 and accordingly, a non-documentary condition would be given effects over 
sub-article 14 (h) of UCP 600.    
 
4.3.22 Evaluation. In conclusion, Courts would be willing to strike down the repugnant UCP 
rule, namely, sub-article 14 (h). This is clearly a surprise for banks in Jordan as the 
empirical findings show that bankers expect the effectiveness of sub-article 14 (h). 
Banks therefore need to be aware that a non-documentary condition is most 
probably operative under English and Jordanian laws, irrespective of sub-article 14 
(h). By accepting a non-documentary condition in a documentary credit, the bank is 
                                                          
630 Union Bank of Canada v Cole (1877) 47 L.J.C.P. 100; Banque de l’Indochine et de Suez SA v J.H. Rayner 
(Mincing Lane) Ltd [1983] Q.B. 711. 
631 [1983] Q.B. 711, 719 per Parker J. 
632 [1983] Q.B. 711, 717. 
633 Korea Exchange Bank v Standard Chartered Bank [2006] 1 S.L.R. 565, 577; Kumagai-Zenecon Construction 
Ltd (in Liq) v Arab Bank plc [1997] 3 SLR 770.  
634 Article 15 Civil Code (1976); article 13 Mecelle (1877). 
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signifying its intention to respect that condition. Accordingly, beneficiaries would be 
well advised to require the issuing bank to stipulate what document is required to 
prove satisfaction of any non-documentary condition.635 Where the issuing or 
confirming bank does not provide a clarification, then beneficiaries would be advised 
to present documents evidencing compliance with the non-documentary condition, 
and such documentary compliance needs to be contained in a document that is 
required by a documentary condition in order to avoid the application of sub-article 
14 (e) of UCP 600 (i.e. which directs banks to ignore additional documents).636 The 
real problem is that the parties are uncertain about the status of non-documentary 
conditions, as there is no direct authority under English and Jordanian laws dealing 
with such an issue subject to the UCP 600 regime. This uncertainty is illustrative of 
the problems arising where a self-regulatory rule contravenes a fundamental legal 
doctrine (e.g. freedom to contract) shared transnationally across legal orders.637 The 
resulting uncertainty is far more extensive than the mischief of uncommon practice 
that was intended to be tackled. Fortunately, the rule of non-documentary conditions 
is a particular rule and it does not therefore capture many cases. It is undeniable 
that the extreme solution offered by sub-article 14 (h) has resulted in deterring 
banks from including non-documentary terms. Indeed the researcher noticed from 
the reaction of the interviewed bankers, when a question was posed regarding 
ambiguous terms or non-documentary terms, that the bankers gave a quick and a 
decisive answer that they would disregard such a condition.638    
 
NON-STIPULATED CONTENTS OR ISSUER  
4.3.23 Where a documentary condition in the credit does not stipulate the required issuer 
or contents for the called document, other than transport, insurance or commercial 
                                                          
635 To avoid the application of sub-article 14 (e) UCP 600.  
636 Above, para 4.2.11.  
637 For the transnational doctrine of freedom to contract: Berger, The Creeping Codification of the New Lex 
Mercatoria, (2edn, Kluwer Law International 2010).  
638 Annex I, para 27. 
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invoice documents, then pursuant to sub-article 14 (f) of UCP 600 the document as 
a whole must appear to fulfil its function as appearing in the credit in order to be in 
conformity. The general test “material alignment” in sub-article 14 (d) applies to the 
data in that document with emphasis on the “function” of such document as stated 
in sub-article 14 (f) of UCP 600: 
 
“If a credit requires presentation of a document other than a transport document, 
insurance document or commercial invoice, without stipulating by whom the 
document is to be issued or its data content, banks will accept the document as 
presented if its content appears to fulfil the function of the required document and 
otherwise complies with sub-article 14 (d)”. 
 
The new guidance of checking the fulfilment of the “function” of the document does 
not mean that the bank needs to have knowledge regarding all the specific 
requirements of the presented document, it merely means that the document must 
appear to fulfil its purpose as it appears on its face which can be known by any 
reasonable banker.639 It is submitted that the emphasis on the “function” of the 
documents is a mere reflection as how the test of “material alignment” in sub-article 
14 (d) must apply in general and in particular to the situation of ambiguous terms in 
documentary credits, and it is regrettable that the Drafting Group did not clearly 
stipulate such a proposition. However, it is the responsibility of the bank to ensure 
that the terms of the credit contain sufficient requirements.640 This reflects the 
security policy in that a non-expert applicant, as indicated by the empirical findings, 
expects the terms of the credits to be operative and to fulfil their function. The 
emphasis on function is illustrative of how the problem of ambiguous terms in 
documentary credits can be resolved without repugnancy to legal orders.  
 
                                                          
639 Drafting Group, Commentary on UCP 600: Article by Article Analysis, (No. 680, ICC 2009), 65.  
640 Drafting Group, Commentary on UCP 600: Article by Article Analysis, (No. 680, ICC 2009), 65.  
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PARTICULAR RULES FOR PROOF OF GOODS, INSURANCE, 
SHIPMENT AND SPEED 
4.4.1 Given the fact that documentary credits are regarded as the ideal method of payment 
for C.I.F, C.I.P, C & F and F.O.B contracts, commercial invoice, transport documents 
and insurance documents are commonly tendered under many documentary credits. 
It is for the convenience of all parties in documentary credits to have standard terms 
regulating the material requirements for the above common documents, since such 
rules have the potential to avoid, or at least resolve, many possible disputes 
regarding the conformity of these common documents. Articles 18 to 28 of UCP 600 
stipulate the ruling requirements for the above common documents, and such rules 
are particular as they are only applicable to specific documents. However, the fact 
that these documents are common results in these rules being applicable to many 
documentary credit transactions.  
 
Commercial Invoice 
4.4.2 Article 18 of UCP 600 provides particular rules for commercial invoices. Article 18 
replaces article 37 of UCP 500 and there are no significant changes under the new 
article since that the new sub-article 18 (b) is not now expressed as being subject 
to the terms of the credit as discussed below. Of course the general test for 
conformity in sub-article 14 (d) of UCP 600 applies to commercial invoices subject 
to the particular rules stipulated in article 18.  
 
4.4.3 Empirical findings and invoice value. Pursuant to sub-article 18 (b) of UCP 600, 
the equivalent to sub-article 37 (b) of UCP 500, the bank’s decision to accept an 
invoice exceeding the value of the goods stipulated by the credit will be valid and 
binding on all the parties, as long as the bank in question has not honoured or 
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negotiated the credit for an amount in excess to that permitted by the credit. The 
language of sub-article 18 (b) is unlike sub-article 37 (b), which started with the 
phrase “unless otherwise stipulated in the Credit, banks may refuse commercial 
invoices”. Rather sub-article 18 (b) starts by saying that the bank “may accept 
commercial invoice”. The new language in sub-article 18 (b) encourages banks to 
accept invoices rather than refusing them.641 Here, the empirical findings indicate 
that many banks in Jordan now exclude sub-article 18 (b), and replace it by a 
provision prohibiting the acceptance of an invoice in excess of the value stated in the 
credit.642 This is mainly due to the fact that, if the value of the invoice exceeded that 
required, many importers would face difficulties with Jordanian customs as they 
would be required to pay a higher custom duty than that contemplated.643 The 
commonalty of sub-article 18 (b) is questionable, when many traders in developing 
countries will want to reject invoices for amounts in excess of the credit to avoid 
unexpected custom duties. However, the need underlying sub-article 18 (b) is to 
simplify the presentation of invoices in order to assure the sellers of their right of 
payment, and, as submitted, such need has the priority over the need of buyers for 
invoices that are not in excess to the stipulated value in the credit.  
 
Insurance Documents 
 
4.4.4 Article 28 of UCP 600 addresses the applicable criteria on the presented insurance 
documents. Sub-article 28 (a) provides that insurance policy, insurance certificate 
and declaration under an open cover are the types of the documents that are 
included in the concept of an insurance document. This indicates that insurance 
documents are not confined to an insurance policy. As in other documents, 
conformity for insurance documents is determined by the terms of the credit and 
                                                          
641 Drafting Group, Commentary on UCP 600: Article by Article Analysis, (No. 680, ICC 2009), 78. 
642 Annex I, paras 20-22.  
643 Annex I, para 20. 
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UCP 600 but not the requirements of insurance in the applicable Municipal  law.644 
Even though they have had a significant effect on documentary presentations of 
insurance documents for documentary credit transactions, only a couple of the 
particular rules articulated by article 28 of UCP 600 require particular comment as 
follows. 
 
(i). When a credit requires insurance against all risks, then an insurance document 
contains any “all risks” notation or clause is accepted even if it indicates that certain 
risks are excluded.645 It is submitted that such a provision in UCP 600 which is 
equivalent to article 36 of UCP 500 is responsive to the insurance practice as the 
words “all risks” are understood in the insurance industry, and presumably by the 
parties to the credit, to be not absolute in terms that an insurance coverage contains 
exclusions as provided in clauses 4 to 7 of Institute Cargo Clauses (A). Indeed, the 
ISBP stipulates that an insurance document indicating that it covers Institute Cargo 
Clauses (A) satisfies the requirement of “all risks” insurance coverage.646 Still “an 
insurance document may contain reference to any exclusion clause” 647 even if the 
credit is explicit regarding the risks that need to be covered.648 This is a new provision 
under UCP 600 that seeks to further reflect the insurance industry practices in 
implementing numerous exclusion clauses which often relate to terrorism.649 Such a 
broad position might reduce the amount of rejections. However, it is submitted that 
under the English and Jordanian legal orders a reference to any exclusion clause 
needs to reflect the intention of the parties.650 Thus an exclusion clause in this 
context is only permitted if it is the type that is common in the insurance industry so 
as to be within the contracting parties reasonable expectation. It is a matter of fact 
                                                          
644 Bridge and others (eds), Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, (8th edn, Thompson 2010) para 23.155, ftn 534.  
645 Sub-article 28 (h) UCP 600; ISBP 2013, K18; article 36 UCP 500.  
646 ISBP 2013, K18; ISBP 2007, para 173. 
647 Sub-article 28 (h) (i) UCP 600 
648 ISBP 2013, K17 (b); ISBP 2007, para 173.  
649 Drafting Group, Commentary on UCP 600: Article by Article Analysis, (No. 680, ICC 2009), 133.  
650 As this is the main cause of the doctrine of freedom to contract.  
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that needs to be proved by expert evidence. Of course an express term in the credit 
that clearly prohibits exclusion clauses in insurance must prevail.651   
 
(ii). The introduction of the word proxy to the effect that an insurance document may be 
signed by proxies is a welcome clarification as although the term proxy is a synonym 
to the term agent it has a slight technical distinction in some countries.652 Sub-article 
28 (a) also clarifies in precise language how an agent or proxy needs to declare the 
capacity in which it signs. The new revision of ISBP clarifies that the name of the 
insurance company or underwriter must be indicated in the insurance document that 
is signed by an agent or proxy.653 These changes foster clarity to serve certainty 
leading to commonality.  
 
(iii). The general terms and conditions in an insurance document are irrelevant in 
conformity.654 Given the need for speed and manageable presentation, this change 
reflects the need for manageable examination. Albeit as such terms and conditions 
may significantly undermine buyers’ security, the credit may expressly provide to 
the contrary.   
 
Transport Documents 
4.4.5 Articles 19 to 27 of UCP 600 articulate the requirements that must be fulfilled for the 
conformity of a document that is categorised as a transport document under the 
aforementioned articles. Such articles regulate as a matter of conformity the most 
common types of transport documents in a documentary credit which are as follows: 
transport documents covering at least two different modes of transport (article 19), 
                                                          
651 Express terms must prevail where there is a clear conflict between express terms and incorporated terms as 
the former is the most closely connected to the parties’ intention. English law: Homburg Houtimport BV v Agorsin 
Private Ltd (The Starsin) [2004] 1 AC 715, [11]; Jordanian law: Article 15 Civil Code (1976); article 13 Mecelle 
(1877).  
652 Byrne, The Comparison of UCP 600 & UCP 500, (2007), 215. 
653 ISBP 2013, K4.  
654 ISBP 2013, K22.  
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bills of lading (article 20), non-negotiable sea waybills (article 21), charterparty bills 
of lading (article 22), air transport documents (article 23), road, rail or inland 
waterway transport documents (article 24), and courier receipts, post receipts or 
certificate of posting (article 25). Each type of transport document is distinguished 
by its means of transportation. The main function that transport documents must 
serve in the context of conformity is to evidence the fact of shipment having occurred 
between two places, ports or airports and the fact of consignment to the required 
consignee.655 If, thus, a transport document merely evidences the receipt of goods 
(e.g. forwarding agent’s goods receipt) it will not be treated as a transport 
document,656 and this of course reflects the need of buyers for documentary evidence 
of shipment. These particular rules have had a significant effect and a high degree 
of “formal realisability” on documentary presentations of transport documents for 
documentary credit transactions, and that is illustrated in this thesis by focussing on 
the particular rules concerning bills of lading at article 20 of UCP 600. 
 
BILL OF LADING 
4.4.6 A bill of lading is considered as evidence of shipment of the goods from the port of 
loading to the port of discharge,657 and it must only cover a port to-port shipment.658 
It serves the functions of being evidence of the contract of carriage659 and a 
document of title660 under the UCP. A bill of lading functions as a semi-negotiable 
instrument under English law.661 Conversely and oddly, the Jordanian Marine 
Commercial Code (1972) only recognises a charter party bill of lading as the 
                                                          
655 Opinions 2005-2008, R.638 and R.640: a forwarding agent’s goods receipt is not a transport document 
covered by the content of UCP 600’s articles 19-25 as it is not intended to evidence shipment having occurred 
between two places, ports or airports.  
656 Opinions 2005-2008, R.640.  
657 Sub-article 20 (a) (iii) UCP 600; ISBP 2007, para 92.  
658 ISBP 2013, E1. 
659 Sub-article 20 (a) (v) UCP 600; English law: Harris, Ridley’s Law of the Carriage of Goods by Land Sea and 
Air, (8th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2010) para 3.2.3.4.2.   
660 ISBP 2013, E12 and E13; ISBP 2007, paras 101-103; English law: Harris, Ridley’s Law of the Carriage of 
Goods by Land Sea and Air, (8th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2010) para 3.2.3.3.   
661 Harris, Ridley’s Law of the Carriage of Goods by Land Sea and Air, (8th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2010) para 
3.2.3.4.3.  
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transport document for carriage of goods by sea, since – based on holistic 
interpretation of the Code - the name of the charterer is a binding requirement to be 
indicated in the bill.662 A charter party bill of lading serves the functions of being 
evidence of the carriage and of the charter party contract,663 and being a document 
of title that can be treated as a negotiable instrument.664 However, the requirements 
for a charter party bill of lading that are set out in article 22 of UCP 600 would be 
insufficient to validate a charter party bill of lading under Jordanian law,665 so we are 
left in the position that Jordanian law would not recognise as being bills of lading 
many of the documents presented as bills of lading under UCP 600. 
 
4.4.7 Empirical findings. Accordingly, it is questionable whether Jordanian banks are 
obliged to accept a negotiable bill of lading or a negotiable charter party bill of lading 
that has fulfilled the expressed requirements as spelled out in the credit and UCP 
600, or whether they are also obliged to ensure such negotiable transport documents 
fulfil the requirements of such documents under the applicable Municipal law. The 
empirical findings clarify that the practice in Jordan is that banks do not check 
whether negotiable bills of lading or charter bills of lading are in conformity with the 
Marine Commercial Code666 and this practice reflects the material alignment test for 
conformity.   
 
 
REQUIREMENTS FOR A BILL OF LADING 
 
4.4.8 Article 20 of UCP 600 articulates particular rules for conformity in bills of lading and 
requirements that bills of lading need to fulfil in order to be in conformity. Such rules 
                                                          
662 Article 200 Marine Commercial Code (1972). 
663 Article 198 Marine Commercial Code (1972).  
664 Article 200-2009 Marine Commercial Code (1972).  
665 Marine Commercial Code (1972) contains requirements for the charter party bill of lading that are not provided 
by the UCP.   
666 Annex I, para 32. 
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have a high degree of “formal realisability” as they direct the documents checker as 
to whether or not the presented transport documents are in conformity. However, 
only a couple of the particular rules articulated by Article 20 of UCP 600 require 
particular comment as follows. 
 
(i). Since the bill of lading is a type of a transport document that envisages to cover 
shipment from a port of loading to a port of discharge,667 subs-article 20 (a) (ii) and 
(iii) of UCP 600 have been rephrased in a way that omits the reference to “loaded 
on board” and “place of receipt” that was contained in sub-article 23 (a) (ii) of UCP 
500. This change is to ensure that pre-carriage of the goods is not to be covered in 
a bill of lading.668 Thus, any reference or indication to a pre-carriage of the goods, 
regardless that the bill is pre-printed as “shipped on board” or “received for 
shipment”, leads to a requirement that the bill must include a dated on-board 
notation which indicates the name of the vessel and the port of loading stated in the 
credit.669 This of course has the effects of protecting the buyer’s need for proof of 
shipment. However, the mere fact that there is a place of receipt in addition to the 
port of loading does not indicate that there is a pre-carriage, as long as the bill of 
lading is pre-printed “shipped on board” and not “received for shipment”.670 In any 
case, if there is no clear indication in the bill that the goods have been shipped on 
board the required vessel or shipped at the required port of loading (e.g. intended 
vessel or intended port of loading), then a dated on-board notation indicating the 
name of the actual vessel and the port of loading as stated in the credit is required.671  
 
                                                          
667 Sub-article 20 (a) (iii) UCP 600: “indicate shipment from the port of loading to the port of discharge stated in 
the credit” where the predecessor sub-article  23 (a) (iii) UCP 500 provided the same provision without including 
the word “shipment”.  
668 Drafting Group, Commentary on UCP 600: Article by Article Analysis, (No. 680, ICC 2009), 91. 
669 ISBP 2013, E6 (c) (i).  
670 ISBP 2013, E6 (b); for shipped and received for shipment bills of lading: Harris, Ridley’s Law of the Carriage 
of Goods by Land Sea and Air, (8th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2010) para 3.2.3.3.   
671 Sub-article 20 (a) (ii) UCP 600; Drafting Group, Commentary on UCP 600: Article by Article Analysis, (No. 
680, ICC 2009), 91. 
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(ii). Where a bill of lading indicates that the goods will or may be transhipped, the 
transhipment must be evidenced by one and the same bill of lading, thus the 
presentation of separate documents covering each leg of the carriage constitutes a 
contextual conflict.672 Sub-article 20 (c) (ii) of UCP 600 has been restructured to 
clearly confirm the effectiveness of the requirement that in transhipment the whole 
journey must be evidenced by one and the same bill of lading.673 To foster clarity, 
transhipment is now defined in the context of a bill of lading as “unloading from one 
vessel and reloading to another vessel during the carriage from the port of loading 
to the port of discharge stated in the credit”.674  
 
(iii). A clause in a bill of lading reserving the right to tranship is not treated as evidence 
of transhipment, and it is accordingly to be disregarded even if the credit prohibits 
transhipment.675 This is in alignment with the English law’s doctrine that “reserving 
the right to do something cannot be equated with doing it”.676 
 
(iv). As an assurance for buyers the new revision of ISBP expresses a previous ICC 
Opinion providing that a bill of lading must indicate the name of the actual port of 
discharge, even where the credit indicates a geographical area or range of ports of 
discharge.677 On the other hand, the charter party bill might either state the name 
of the actual port of discharge – which is to be within the geographical area – or 
simply show the geographical area or range of ports as the port of discharge.678 
Indeed transportation by charter party, unlike liner vessels, often provides for 
shipment to a range of ports or to a certain geographical area.679 Such a rule is highly 
responsive to the practices of the transportation industry and it is therefore, in 
                                                          
672 Sub-article 20 (c) (i) UCP 600.  
673 Sub-article 20 (c) (i) UCP 600.  
674 Sub-article 20 (b) UCP 600.  
675 Sub-article 20 (d) UCP 600.   
676 Bridge and others (eds), Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, (8th edn, Thompson 2010) para 23.141: Svenska Traktor 
Aktiebolget v Maritime Agencies (Southampton) Ltd [1953] 2 Q.B. 295.  
677 ISBP 2013, E10; Collected Opinions 1995-2001, R.281. 
678 ISBP 2013, G9. 
679 Collected Opinions 1995-2001, R.281; Drafting Group, Commentary on UCP 600: Article by Article Analysis, 
(No. 680, ICC 2009), 106.  
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addition of being accepted and adopted by all the parties of documentary credits, 
serves the needs for manageable presentation and examination.  
 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND TRANSHIPMENT 
   
4.4.9 The scheme in sub-articles 20 (c) (ii), 21 (c) (ii), 23 (c) (ii) and 24 (e) (ii) of UCP 
600 provides that transhipment of goods is permitted even if transhipment is 
prohibited in the credit. However, the empirical findings indicate that it is the practice 
of most banks in Jordan to include a standard term, as part of the standard form of 
the application for documentary credits, excluding the application of the 
transhipment UCP 600 scheme.680 The empirical findings clarify that the main 
concern for Arab Bank, which influences other banks in Jordan, is that transhipment 
might otherwise be permitted in road carriage.681 Thus the intended purpose of the 
scheme to enforce the common practices in the transport industry faces a lack of 
commonality as documentary credits parties tend to reject such a scheme as they 
do not consider that practice is appropriate. Koloud Alkalaldeh stated: 
 
“A bill of lading must be consigned to our order and when we release the bill of lading 
we ask the applicant to sign a bill of exchange to our order as a guarantee of our 
rights”.682 
 
Nart Lambarz stated: 
 
                                                          
680 Annex I, para 20. 
681 Annex I, para 6.  
682 Annex I, para 32.  
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“We impose a condition that bills of lading must be issued from the actual carrier 
and not from forwarders. We expressly exclude the relevant UCP article and we 
stipulate our condition in the DC contract”.683 
 
4.4.10 English and Jordanian laws. Freedom to contract is a fundamental doctrine under 
English684 and Jordanian laws.685 Accordingly, where there is a conflict between 
express terms (e.g. the term in the credit prohibits transhipment) and incorporated 
terms (e.g. sub-article 20 (c) (ii) of UCP 600), express terms must prevail as they 
are presumed to be the most closely connected to the intention of the parties.686 
Thus, on the one hand, it seems that an express term in the credit prohibiting 
transhipment would overcome the UCP 600 scheme. On the other hand, as it is 
common and expected that goods shipped by sea in containers or trailers are to be 
transhipped from one vessel to another vessel, parties who intend to prohibit 
transhipment of goods shipped in containers or trailers need to express their 
intention clearly in the credit. However, it is submitted that under Jordanian law an 
express term in the credit prohibiting transhipment, would still prevail over the UCP 
600 scheme even without an express exclusion of the UCP 600 articles in respect of 
transhipment. This is due to the fact that the empirical findings clearly indicate that 
parties to documentary credits in Jordan do not intend to give effect to the UCP 600 
provisions relating to transhipment. Given the free market in transnational context, 
freedom to contract is more predominant norm than common practices. For the 
efficacy of the UCP it is advocated that one cannot sacrifice freedom to contract for 
common practices as such an attempt would be futile under Municipal legal orders 
and some local practices, as explained above for transhipment in Jordan.   
 
                                                          
683 Annex I, para 32.  
684 Suisse Atlantique Société d'Armement Maritime SA v NV Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale  [1967] 1 AC 361, 
399 per Lord Reid.  
685 Article 213 Civil Code (1976).  
686 Homburg Houtimport BV v Agorsin Private Ltd (The Starsin) [2004] 1 AC 715, [11]; Article 215 Civil Code 
(1976); article 13 Mecelle (1877).     
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Particular Rules For Speed 
 
4.4.11 Time is a dominant need for all the parties as it is generally of the essence in 
international supply contracts.687 As a reflection to the need for speed in shipment, 
a presentation for transport documents, subject to articles 19-25 of UCP 600, must 
not be made later than 21 calendar days after the date of shipment, and in any event 
not later than the expiry date of the credit.688     
 
4.4.12 Drafts, transport and insurance documents. The absence of issue dates from 
drafts, transports documents and insurance documents is considered as a contextual 
conflict even if the credit does not expressly require such dates to be stated.689 The 
new ISBP revision provides extensive particular rules in A11, which is the equivalent 
to paragraph 13 of ISBP 2007, regarding the requirement of dating drafts and the 
other above documents. It particularly clarifies what is meant by dating documents 
in order to protect the buyers’ rights, who usually lack technical experience in 
documentary credits, by stipulating the requirements for conformity. It generally 
enhances the “formal realisability” as to the determination of conformity and it 
affects many documentary credits as the use of the aforementioned documents is 
common in documentary credits.690   
 
4.4.13 Date of insurance documents. Sub-article 28 (e) of UCP 600 states:  
 
“The date of the insurance document must be no later than the date of shipment, 
unless it appears from the insurance document that the cover is effective from a date 
not later than the date of shipment”. 
                                                          
687 Bunge Corporation v Tradax Export SA [1980] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 294.  
688 Sub-article 14 (c) UCP 600; sub-article 43 (a) UCP 500.  
689 ISBP 2013, A11; ISBP 2007, para 13.  
690 For the date of insurance documents: ISBP 2013, K11. 
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Sub-article 28 (e) of UCP 600 is elucidated by K10 of ISBP 2013 in a clear decisive 
language. Thus a statement in the insurance document indicating that the cover is 
effective from a date later than the date of shipment is a contextual conflict that 
justifies a refusal.691 This protects buyers need to have insurance covering the goods 
from the date of shipment. An indication in the insurance documents that the date 
of their issuance is later than the date of shipment is a contextual conflict, unless “it 
is clearly indicated by addition or note that coverage is effective from a date not later 
than the date of shipment”.692 In this context K10 (c) of ISBP 2013 reserved the 
prior ICC position (contained in Rule 766 of ICC Opinions) 693 by stating that:  
 
“An insurance document that indicates coverage has been effected from “warehouse-
to-warehouse” or words of similar effect, and is dated after the date of shipment, 
does not indicate that coverage was effective from a date not later than the date of 
shipment”.  
 
This is because the Drafting Group consulted the insurance industry, and it was 
revealed that the clause “coverage has been effected from warehouse- to – 
warehouse” does not necessarily backdate the commencement of cover.694 
Accordingly, the ISBP is responsive to the actual practices in the insurance industry 
which in turn protects buyers, and such responsiveness is consistent with the concept 
of business common sense under English law.695  
 
4.4.14 Other documents. A requirement for the date of documents, other than the invoice, 
insurance and transport documents can be satisfied by a reference to the document’s 
                                                          
691 ISBP 2013, K10 (a).  
692 ISBP 2013, K10 (b).  
693 ISBP 2013, Introduction. 
694 http://www.lcviews.com/index.php?page_id=75 access 04/04/2014.  
695 Antaios Compania Naviera S.A. v Salen Rederierna A.B [1985] AC 191 , 201 per Lord Diplock. 
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date in another document in the same presentation.696 There is no contextual conflict 
where documents, such as a certificate of analysis, inspection certificate or 
fumigation certificate, indicate a date of issue later than the date of shipment.697 But 
a document that has the purpose to evidence a pre-shipment (e.g. pre-shipment 
inspection) must verify the pre-shipment event,698 in order to secure buyer’s 
expressed need. If the date of issuance is not stipulated in a document then the date 
of signing is deemed to be the date of issuance.699 Such a position reflects the need 
for manageable presentation through the means of flexibility. Furthermore, article 3 
of UCP 600 enhances clarity by providing guidance as to the contextual significance 
of dates.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
696 ISBP 2013, A11 (b); ISBP 2007, para 13.  
697 ISBP 2013, A12 (a). 
698 ISBP 2013, A12 (b); ISBP 2007, para 14.  
699 In alignment with ISBP 2013, A13; ISBP 2007, para 15.  
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REFUSAL FOR NON CONFORMITY700 
4.5.1 As the determination of conformity is essential for documentary credits parties, the 
validity of the decision of refusing the presented documents after the determination 
that the documents are not confirming to the terms of the credit is also essential, so 
the intention of refusal ought to be clearly communicated to the other parties in a 
way that is unequivocally understandable as a refusal with reasons that are also 
clearly communicated. After the determination that the presented documents are 
not in conformity the bank (i.e. issuing bank, conforming bank or nominated bank 
which acts upon its nomination) has the choice either to accept the presentation (by 
virtue of the principle of autonomy)701 or to refuse it.702 Since the bank has a choice 
of inconsistent options and may elect for either acceptance or refusal, the doctrine 
of election at English law is applicable703 and thus the bank must make an election 
for one of them rather than the other.704 The acceptance of the bank for non-
confirming documents would be at the bank’s peril for it would not be entitled to 
reimbursement. Banks in most cases, therefore, would elect to refuse the non-
conforming presentation.  
 
4.5.2 However, in order to validate the bank’s choice for refusal, the bank must follow the 
requirements for refusal that are set out in article 16 of UCP 600, otherwise the bank 
is precluded by sub-article 16 (f) of UCP 600 from claiming that it has provided a 
valid refusal notice. The aim of article 16 is to achieve uniformity in the practice of 
refusing presentations in order to reduce disputes. So the intention is to promulgate 
                                                          
700 Hwaidi and Harris, The Mechanics of Refusal in Documentary Letter of Credits: An Analysis of the Procedures 
Introduced in Article 16 UCP 600, [2013] J.I.B.L.R, 28(4), 146-155. 
701 Articles 4 and 5 UCP 600; chapter 5.  
702 Article 16 UCP 600.  
703 In Fortis Bank S.A./N.V, Stemcor UK Limited v Indian Overseas Bank [2011] EWCA (Civ) 58, [29]; [2011] 1 
C.L.C. 276, 287,[37] Thomas LJ stated “when the issuing bank determines that the documents do not conform, 
it may reject them. If it does, then it cannot be entitled to retain the documents, as it is implicit in rejection that 
it has refused to accept them”.  
704 Fortis Bank S.A./N.V, Stemcor UK Limited v Indian Overseas Bank [2011] EWCA (Civ) 58, [29]; [2011] 1 
C.L.C. 276, 287,[37]; Craine v Colonial Mutual Fire Insurance Co. Ltd. (1920) 28 C.L.R. 305, 326, this Australian 
case was cited by Lord Scarman in China National Foreign Trade Transportation Corp v Evlogia Shipping SA of 
Panama [1979] 1 W.L.R. 1018,1034; Motor Oil Hellas (Corinth) Refineries SA v Shipping Corpn of India (The 
Kanchenjunga) [1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep 391, 398– 399. 
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rules to standardise the ways presentations are commonly refused as between the 
parties to documentary credits. There are two main general rules in refusal. The first 
requires the giving of a single refusal notice containing the required formalities as 
stipulated in sub-article 16 (c). The second requires that the refusal notice be served 
not later than the fifth banking day from the date of the presentation as stipulated 
in sub-article 16 (b). Although general these rules intend to have a high degree of 
“formal realisability” through the means of both certainty (i.e. by introducing 
particular rules and formalities) and communication by spelling out the consequences 
of not adhering to these rules. The consequences are spelled out in sub-article 16 (f) 
(generally referred to as the preclusion rule) as being that the refusal is deemed 
invalid. These rules are generally applicable to all cases of refusal of a documentary 
presentation.       
 
4.5.3 The precedent provision of article 16 was article 14 of UCP 500 which was one of the 
most frequently queried articles in queries directed to the ICC Banking Commission 
and which resulted in the ICC issuing a paper in 2002 entitled “Examination of 
Documents, Waiver of Discrepancies and notice under UCP 500” to enhance the 
understanding of article 14 of UCP 500.705 Accordingly, article 16 of UCP 600 was 
drafted to improve the expression of the ICC understanding of this provision and this 
required the use of the means of clarity.  
 
Formality And Substance Of Unequivocal Refusal  
 
4.5.4 The introduction of the requirement of a statement of refusal706 in a single notice707 
in UCP 600 makes it necessary to the status under the English and Jordanian legal 
orders of unequivocal communications of refusal that do not comply with the UCP 
                                                          
705 Drafting Group, Commentary on UCP 600: Article by Article Analysis, (No. 680, ICC 2009) 72. 
706 Sub-article 16 (c) (i) UCP 600.  
707 Sub-article 16 (c) UCP 600. 
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specified formalities. As where, for instance, the bank provides a list of discrepancies 
and selects one of the available options in sub-article 16 (c) (iii) (c) as to the 
presented documents, so that the bank’s refusal of the presentation could be implied 
into the communication, but the communication itself – without such implication - 
does not contain the required statement of refusal.  
 
4.5.5 Formality over substance. The scheme of UCP 600 intends to promote formality 
over substance. So even where the communication, such as the one in the previous 
paragraph, clearly conveys by implication the position and the intention that the 
communication is an unequivocal refusal notice, the fact that the statement of refusal 
is not expressed renders the communication as an equivocal refusal note. The bank 
must  transmit  a statement of  refusal as part of the single refusal notice to be 
submitted with reasonable promptness after the bank has arrived at a determination 
to refuse,708 and in any event within the period of five banking days.709 Of course 
equivocal prior communications will not constrain the bank’s liberties to subsequently 
submit a valid refusal notice within the permitted timescale.  
 
4.5.6 Nevertheless, any prior unequivocal communication of refusal not in compliance with 
the required formalities might do so: since that prior unequivocal communication of 
refusal would constitute the single refusal notice and its non-compliance with the 
required formalities might trigger the preclusion rule. The purpose as to the 
articulation of the new requirement of a statement of refusal is to introduce a 
formality710 in order to promote commonality, in that banks would use standard 
forms of refusal that clearly express the intention of refusal. Such a scheme aims to 
achieve certainty in order to reduce disputes as to the status of refusal. But such a 
formality does not intend to have the effect of a mere advice. It intends to have the 
                                                          
708 Below para 4.6.23.   
709 Sub-article 16 (d) & sub-article 14 (b) UCP 600. 
710 Byrne, The Comparison of UCP 600 & UCP 500, (2007), 147.  
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function of determinative rule that has a high “formal realisability” as the 
consequences of disobeying such a formality is materialised by the “preclusion rule” 
in sub-article 16 (f) of UCP 600. Therefore the question is whether this new formality 
of stating that the bank refuses to honour or negotiate would be responsive to 
fundamental doctrines or effectively enforced under English and Jordanian legal 
orders.  
 
4.5.7 English and Jordanian laws. A communication which clearly conveys by 
implication the position and the intention that the communication is an unequivocal 
refusal note, would simply amount an unequivocal refusal note,711 the intention of 
refusal being implied where the recipient, acting reasonably, would have understood 
the communication as being a statement of unequivocal and unconditional refusal. 
Such was the conclusion of the Court of Appeal, under UCP 500, in The Royan,712 
where the communicated statement of refusal was in the following terms: “please 
consider these documents at your disposal until we receive our principal’s 
instructions concerning the discrepancies mentioned in your schedules”. English and 
Jordanian judges generally seek to avoid attributing to the parties an intention (e.g. 
one of non-refusal) which they plainly could not have had.713 Clearly, unless the 
communicated intention is entirely disregarded, a statement of refusal could not be 
considered equivocal simply because of the absence of an express refusal statement.  
 
4.5.8 Empirical findings and evaluation. However, it was revealed in the interviews 
that a reasonable banker who has expertise in documentary credits expects that a 
                                                          
711 China National Foreign Trade Transportation Corp v Evlogia Shipping SA of Panama [1979] 1 W.L.R. 1018. 
712 Co-operative Central Raffeisen-Boerenleebank BA v Sumitomo Bank Ltd (The Royan) [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 
250; Banker’s Trust Co v State Bank of India [1991] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 443 where the notice was invalid for being a 
conditional.  
713 An approach encapsulated in the statement by Lord Diplock in Antaios Compania Naviera S.A. v Salen 
Rederierna A.B  [1985] AC 191 , 201: “if detailed semantic and syntactical analysis of words in a commercial 
contract is going to lead to a conclusion that flouts business commonsense, it must be made to yield to business 
commonsense”; article 239 Civil Code (1976): “where the phrase or expression of the contract is clear, such 
phrase should not be manoeuvred by interpreting it in a way seeking to know the intention of the parties”; article 
214 Civil Code (1976): “1) The consideration of interpreting contracts is to the purposes and meanings and not 
to the words and phrases; 2) the default position is that words convey the fact for it is not allowed to suppose 
that a word convey a metaphor unless its true meaning cannot be conveyed”.  
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communication clearly conveying an implication of refusal would be perceived by 
bankers as a valid unequivocal refusal note. 714 Muhammad Burjaq stated: 
 
“Where the content clearly conveys the meaning of refusal it will be regarded as a 
refusal notice and it makes no sense that the notice must in this situation spell out 
the statements that ‘the bank refuses the documents’ or ‘refusal notice’”.715 
 
The interviewed bankers opined that it is unreasonable to expect otherwise.716 If it 
were to be assumed that such an opinion reflects the views of the international 
business community of bankers and beneficiaries more accurately than the apparent 
meaning of UCP Article 16, the formality of the statement of refusal might then be 
considered as repugnant to the very fundamental doctrine or legal communication 
under English and Jordanian laws: that the task of interpreting contractual terms is 
to reflect the intention of the parties.717 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
714 Annex I, para 37.  
715 Annex I, para 37.  
716 Annex I, para 37.  
717 Chapter 2, para 2.3.17 -22. 
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CONCLUSION 
4.6.1 It is beneficial to international trade that UCP 600 and its interpretative aids have 
greatly enhanced the “formal realisability” of the general rule of “material alignment” 
through the form of detailed particular rules that are tailored to various distinctive 
common situations as elucidated in this chapter under the section of applications for 
the general rule of “material alignment”. Such certainty reflects the needs of 
documentary credit parties, particularly the need of banks for manageable 
examination and the needs of sellers and banks for assurance of payments and 
reimbursement respectively. One of the core inferences that can be abstracted from 
these particular rules is that in the case of their absence the means of flexibility must 
operate in order to reflect the need of banks for manageable examination in the 
sense of giving effect to a reasonable banker’s prudent objective judgement as 
structured by the “material alignment” test. Therefore if an apparent conflict most 
probably appears, pursuant to the principle of appearance, to be in material 
alignment then a mere conflict must not justify a refusal even if it might in fact be a 
material conflict (e.g. misspelling errors, lack of non-contextual data). This of course 
serves the need of sellers for manageable presentation and it is clear in the UCP that 
the bank must take a positive role in its ministerial role in the determination of 
conformity by for instance working out the mathematical calculation of the total 
amount of the quantity of goods.  
 
4.6.2 No doubt the particular rules of conformity under UCP 600 generally serve the need 
of banks for manageable examination. However, the dilemma of non-documentary 
terms has been handled in UCP 600, by the use of the tool of communication that 
has a clear formality ordering banks to ignore non-documentary terms in order to 
achieve the means of certainty which aims to reflect the needs for manageable 
examination and presentation, without being responsive to “freedom to contract” 
which is a fundamental common doctrine across legal orders. That results in 
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uncertainty. Although the UCP 600 scheme might erase the bad practice of 
expressing non-documentary terms as highlighted in the empirical findings, its 
enforceability is however questionable under the English and Jordanian legal orders 
leading to the non-materialisation of the need for manageable examination. Still, as 
indicated by the empirical study such a UCP scheme does not reflect the need of 
buyers for documentary assurance as to the shipment of the required goods. It is, 
nevertheless, a welcome change that sub-article 4(b) of UCP 600 and the preliminary 
considerations of ISBP 2013 indicate that the issuing bank is under a duty to advise 
the applicant as to the consequences of the documentary credit terms, because this 
assists buyers on expressing the credit terms in a clear way that ensures the 
protection of their prominent needs.  
 
4.6.3 Given the high rate of rejected presentations in documentary credits under the UCP 
500 regime, it is to be expected that the need of sellers for manageable presentation 
- in order to achieve the dominant need for sellers of assurance of payment - is the 
prominent factor triggering many changes as to the rules of conformity under UCP 
600. Strikingly, the most successful tool fulfilling the need for manageable 
presentation is the responsiveness to the general practices and understandings 
adopted by the documentary credit parties or by actors in the industries directly 
relevant to documentary credits and accepted by the parties, because such practices 
are evidence that one or more of the needs of the documentary credit parties are 
fulfilled without the other partys’ needs being undermined. Sub-article 14 (j) of UCP 
600 is illustrative of this whereby it reflects the practice, as confirmed by the 
empirical findings, of confining the interpretation as to the required details of the 
addresses of beneficiaries and applicants to the name of the country, and such an 
interpretation does not apply to the transport documents due to the need for proof 
of shipment. The flexibility in accepting different languages as expressed in A21 of 
ISBP 2013, particularly for drafts as expressed in a new ICC Opinion, and the 
acceptance of the reference to dating a presented document in other presented 
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documents are also some of the main successful examples that are responsive to 
common practices facilitating justified manageable presentation. A strong example, 
illustrating how the responsiveness to practices reflects the dominant need of buyers 
for proof of insurance coverage, is the introduction of paragraph K10 (c) of ISBP 
2013, whereby the interpretation is driven from the general understanding of 
insurance companies as to the statement of “coverage has been effected from 
warehouse- to – warehouse” confirming that such a statement does not necessarily 
backdate the commencement of cover.   
 
4.6.4 However, the keenness to facilitate manageable presentation is excessive under UCP 
600 and that could result in uncertainty for particular situations under English and 
Jordanian laws. Thus the introduction of sub-article 28 (h) (i) of UCP 600 and K17 of 
ISBP 2013 postulating that a reference to an insurance exclusion clause is 
permissible in an insurance document even where the credit clearly stipulates each 
risk that the insurance document must cover, might conflict with the parties’ 
contemplation as to the extent of coverage and potentially conflict with the dominant 
doctrines of the English and Jordanian legal orders. Hence although such a UCP 600 
proposition is responsive to the common practice of implying institute cargo clause 
exclusions, there is a lack of clarity as to the type of exclusion clauses that are 
expected to operate. Another, and implausible, proposition is the emphasis in the 
designated articles for transport documents (articles 20-24) disregarding express 
documentary credit term that prohibits transhipment of goods. Such a position is 
responsive to the common practice of transhipment of goods in the sea, road and air 
transportations. Yet, it is clear that such a scheme lacks responsiveness to the 
transnational legal doctrine of “freedom to contract”. Here the repugnancy to such a 
fundamental legal doctrine is intolerable, since the UCP scheme does not merely 
attempt to interpret a documentary credit’s term, as in the above situation for 
insurance documents, rather the scheme attempts to dismiss the intention of the 
parties by totally invalidating an expressed term. Indeed, the empirical findings 
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clarify that many banks in Jordan exclude such a UCP 600 scheme in their standard 
form of documentary credits, and the interviewed bankers indicate that the scheme 
does not reflect the dominant need of buyers for proof of shipment, and this also 
affects the dominant need of banks for assurance of reimbursement.   
 
4.6.5 Hence, the responsiveness to trade practices is part of a mosaic scene in the sense 
that it is an effective means only when it operates cooperatively with other means, 
particularly the responsiveness to the fundamental doctrines of legal orders, in order 
to reflect the balance of the needs of the parties to documentary credits. An ironic 
example is the welcome provisions of E12 and G9 in ISBP 2013 that require the 
ascertainment of the name of the actual port of discharge in bills of lading and not 
in charter-party bills of lading. However, the responsiveness to legal orders 
comprises a non-repugnancy to the fundamental legal doctrines transnationally 
shared across legal orders. Thus the fact that the UCP rules of de minimis in 
documentary credits are contrary to those of English law (i.e. the concept of de 
minimis in documentary credits is rejected under English law on the basis of the 
principle of strict compliance) does not affect the viability of such UCP rules. Here 
English law is rigid and lacks the responsiveness to peripheral trade usage in 
documentary credits and the social norm of de minimis in documentary credits.  
 
4.6.6 The particular rules for commercial invoice, insurance documents and transport 
documents have a high degree of “formal realisability” and they are reflective of the 
dominant needs of buyers for a documentary assurance of proof of goods, shipment 
and insurance. The structure and precision of UCP 600 language aided by ISBP 2013 
have fostered the clarity of the UCP. An example is article 20 (a) (ii) and (iii) of UCP 
600 that deals with bills of lading. It has been rephrased in a clear way by, for 
instance, omitting the words “loaded on board” in order to protect the buyer’s need 
for proof of shipment from the port of loading to the port of discharge. A further 
example is the introduction of paragraph K4 in ISBP 2013 clarifying how the 
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identification of insurance companies is to be indicated in the insurance documents 
that are signed by an agent. However, a few provisions in UCP 600 particularly those 
relating to newly expressed propositions in UCP 600 need further comprehensible 
clarity. An example is the lack of clarity in sub-article 14 (j) as to the applicable test 
for conformity to the addresses of the applicant where he is the consignee of the 
goods in the transport documents.     
 
4.6.7 In order to avoid confusions in respect of the unequivocal communication of the 
intention of the bank as to the refusal of documents article 16 of UCP 600 adopts the 
means of certainty through the imposing of formalities to which the parties must 
adhere. The new options in refusal notice that are introduced by article 16 foster 
clarity, in addition to being responsive to the practices, leading to a high degree of 
“formal realisability”. However, the insistence on formalities should not be at the cost 
of substance. So the introduction of the formality of the statement that “the bank 
refuses the documents” in sub-article 16 (c) (i), would lead to uncertainty under the 
English and Jordanian legal orders in the situations where a refusal notice which does 
not comprise the above statement is nonetheless a clear communication of the 
intention of the bank to refuse documents. Here such a communicated intention 
should not be ineffective simply for the lack of an unmerited formality, as the 
substance would prevail under English and Jordanian laws.  
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5.1.1 The embedded trade usage of autonomy is one of the main functional elements in 
the substance of a documentary credit transaction, as was postulated in the 
conceptual model in chapter 1. For effective terms regulating documentary credits, 
one must prudently analyse the elements of the embedded usage of autonomy in 
order to reflect the functions of such usage that convey the accepted needs of the 
parties to documentary credits. This also assists how each element of the embedded 
usage of autonomy must be responsive to overriding mandatory norms (i.e. a 
prohibition by a national parliament of certain activities: the norm of the 
parliamentary sovereignty has a very high hierarchical status in the structure of 
many Municipal legal order)718 under legal orders. Still, a comprehensive formula of 
the embedded usage of autonomy provided by clear terms assists courts and other 
submitted actors to rationalise the extent of the operation of such usage under the 
relevant Municipal legal orders. It is well known under the English and Jordanian 
legal orders that fraud is an exception to the operation of the norm (embedded 
usage) of autonomy in documentary credits, but the type and the scope of fraud that 
is, and ought to be, recognised as an exception to the autonomy norm can only be 
determined once the elements of the embedded usage of autonomy are distilled. The 
current scholarly discourse in the law of documentary credits does not analytically 
address such elements. The enforceability of documentary credits may also be 
undermined by concepts of illegality even though illegality is not so readily 
recognised as an exception to the autonomy norm and so concepts of illegality can 
give rise to similar issues to those thrown up by fraud.  
 
5.1.2 The first part of this chapter analyses therefore the elements of the embedded usage 
of autonomy and evaluates from the standpoint of the conceptual model (on the 
                                                          
718 Carter, The Role of Public Policy in English Private International Law, [1993] ICLQ, 42, 1 Jan 1-10; Kuwait 
Airways Corp v Iraqi Airways Co (No.6) [2002] 2 A.C. 883. 
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basis that these elements of autonomy must be conveyed using the means 
developed in the conceptual model) how effectively the interests of autonomy are 
served (in the context of English and Jordanian laws) by the designated content of 
UCP 600. Given observed deficiencies in the effectiveness of the autonomy norm in 
the context of UCP 600, this chapter then moves on to address how the interests of 
autonomy might be better served in the future.  
 
5.1.3 Given that the bank must decide on the conformity of the presented documents 
within a short period of time that is five banking days under UCP 600,719 and it must 
thus either honour (pay or negotiate) or refuse to honour the credit within such a 
period, it is within that time period that the norm of autonomy might be infringed by 
a refusal to honour on basis other than that of an apparent non-conformity of 
documents. It is, accordingly, almost always that the exceptions of fraud and 
illegality operate at the pre-trial or interim stage, when the full facts are unknown. 
Therefore, when one deals with fraud and illegality exceptions it is essential to 
determine: (1) the grounds at full trial that would justify the bank’s refusal to honour 
the credit within the short period in which the bank must take its honour or refusal 
decision; (2) the  grounds that would justify at full trial a bank’s or an applicant’s  
refusal (within the due period for reimbursement)  to reimburse the negotiating, 
confirming or issuing  bank (as the case may be) who paid the credit and (3) the 
grounds at a pre-trial, or interlocutory, stage that would justify a court granting 
interlocutory injunctions either prohibiting a bank from making a payment or a 
beneficiary from drawing on the credit. The second part of the chapter postulates - 
on the basis of rational deduction - what is, and ought to be, the legal positions of 
the English and Jordanian legal orders as to fraud in documentary credits. The third 
part deals with the similar issue arising in connection with illegality, which is 
generally considered an unruly area.720 The task is how to regulate illegality as an 
                                                          
719 Article 14 UCP 600.  
720 Burroughs J stated in Richardson v Mellish (1824) 2 Bing 229, 252 that public policy is “a very unruly horse, 
and when once you get astride it you never know where it will carry you”. 
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exception to the embedded usage of autonomy in a way that both serves an 
appropriately narrow application of such exception and tackles the justifiable public 
policy concern of the misuse of documentary credits for illegal purposes. Finally, the 
chapter evaluates whether the UCP should maintain its present silence on the fraud 
and illegality issues whilst witnessing the potential rise of the disorderly evolution of 
these exceptions to the embedded usage of autonomy under Municipal legal orders? 
In this context it is argued that the UCP should, before it is too late to do so, 
endeavour to nudge legal orders towards appropriate outcomes by utilising the 
means of communication.         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ELEMENTS OF THE EMBEDDED USAGE OF AUTONOMY 
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5.2.1 As proposed in the conceptual model, the autonomy usage serves the function of 
ensuring that the payment offered by a third party is independent from the 
underlying contracts and that the documents are presumed to truly represent the 
underlying facts. Being independent from the underlying contracts, such a function 
in the usage of autonomy protects the needs of sellers for an assurance of payment 
and banks for an assurance of reimbursement. The function that the payment is not 
subject to the examination of the underlying facts, but merely to the appearance of 
the presented documents, protects the needs of banks for manageable examination 
and speed and of course the need of sellers for secure and speedy payment. 
      
5.2.2 The principle of independence. The commercial reality is that documentary 
credits are usually opened for the purpose of discharging the buyer’s payment 
obligation, even if they might occasionally be opened for other reasons.721 Thus, 
generally speaking, the underlying supply contract is the cause of a documentary 
credit. Accordingly, the applicant usually enters into a documentary credit contract 
with the issuing bank to discharge its payment obligation with the seller under the 
underlying contract. Making a profit is the main cause for an issuing bank to enter 
into the credit contract. The credit contract is the cause of the unilateral binding offer 
or undertaking that is made by the issuing bank to honour the credit when the 
beneficiary presents conforming documents. Similarly, the cause of the undertaking 
unilateral binding offer by the confirming bank to honour the credit is the contract 
between the issuing bank and the confirming bank. Yet, the reality of the 
interconnection of these relationships is replaced by the “fiction of independence”, 
which gives rise to the first element of the embedded usage of autonomy, namely, 
the principle of independence.  
 
                                                          
721 For instance to facilitate finance as in GKN  Contractors Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Plc (1985) 30 B.L.R. 48. 
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5.2.3 Independence and the needs of parties. Pursuant to the independence principle, 
each relationship is treated as independent from the other relationships. The 
principle of independence constitutes two hands. The right hand provides that the 
documentary credit is to be treated as separate and independent of the underlying 
contract that generates the documentary credit. The left hand provides that the 
operative contracts (i.e. contracts between issuing bank and applicant, issuing bank 
and beneficiary, issuing bank and advising/confirming bank, confirming bank and 
beneficiary) in the documentary credit are themselves independent from one 
another. The norms of autonomy, conformity and irrevocability collectively function 
as a median compromising the contented security’s needs of the parties 
(compromise of the security of payment for sellers and banks with the security of 
shipment of the required goods for buyers). More specifically, the norm of autonomy 
reflects the policy that documentary credits are supposed to be a means of security 
for sellers and banks, as it maintains the mechanism of documentary letters of credit 
being an independent facility of payment and finance. Thus sellers are assured that 
the banks’ undertaking to honour the credit is not influenced by the other relevant 
relationships, particularly where some of these relationships are invalid. So, banks 
are not permitted to be influenced by the applicant in the honouring of the credit. It 
is accordingly said that documentary credits are meant to be cash for sellers,722 even 
though the cash is conditional on a conforming presentation. Such a condition is 
meant to provide buyers with a sort of security, in that the payment is not made 
unless the beneficiary presents documents evidencing the shipment of the goods and 
the other requirements stipulated in the credit. Banks, therefore, are not entitled to 
reimbursement where they make payment against non-conforming documents.723 
Pursuant to the principle of independence, banks are assured that their right to 
reimbursement, whilst conditional upon them only honouring conforming documents, 
                                                          
722 Intraco Ltd v Notis Shipping Corp of Liberia (The Bhoja Trader) [1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 256; [1981] Com. L.R. 
184, [9] per Donaldson L.J. 
723 Chapter 3. 
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is not to be infringed by any other contractual relationships such as the relationship 
between the applicant and the beneficiary.  
 
5.2.4 Appearance and the needs of parties. As banks are facilitators and guarantors of 
payments, their role is a ministerial one in checking the conformity of documents.724 
Given the need for speed in documentary credits (and the need for manageable 
presentation, given that banks are not part of – or expert - the underlying 
transaction),725 it is a normative presumption that the facts are truly represented by 
the presented documents. This entails the protection of banks where it turns out that 
the accepted documents actually lack authenticity or are not genuine.726 In addition, 
the normative force of autonomy generates the presumption that banks are not 
entitled to examine the actual facts represented by the documents. This serves the 
underlying aim of documentary credits as being a secure means of payment and 
settlement. Both the presumption that documents suffice on their face to evidence 
the actual facts, and the position that banks are not entitled to examine the actual 
facts, give rise - and constitute - the “principle of appearance”.    
 
5.2.5 High degree of formal realisability. The autonomy fiction and the appearance 
normative presumption take the form of principles as they directly represent the 
substantive objective of documentary credits as described.727 However, the 
appearance principle also takes the form of a general rule when it operates with the 
principle of conformity.728 Both the autonomy fiction and the appearance principle 
have high degree of “formal realisability”.729 This is due to the fact that the autonomy 
                                                          
724 As suggested by the appellate in Kredietbank Antwerp v Midland Bank plc [1999] Lloyd’s Rep 219, 223; 
chapter 3, para 3.2.1.  
725 The needs of the parties in documentary credits are elucidated in the evaluative standpoint: chapter 1, para 
1.1.32. 
726 As expressed in article 34 UCP 600.  
727 For types of form: Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, [1976] 89 Harvard Law Review 
1685, 1686.  
728 Chapter 3, para 3.4.9. 
729 For the definition of this Kennedian’s concept: chapter 1, para 1.1.6; Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private 
Law Adjudication, [1976] 89 Harvard Law Review 1685, 1688. 
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and appearance concepts are, unlike conformity, not elastic concepts in society, 730 
since they are not directly encountered with contested needs of the parties so they 
are not by themselves meant to bridge between opposing functions. The autonomy 
fiction is a conjunction concept, in that it requires the combinations of two conditions 
being the right and left hands of autonomy as explained above. The appearance 
normative presumption is a simple concept, in that it constitutes one condition or 
element which is elucidated above. Thus these concepts have very clear boundaries 
and each case unambiguously falls within or outside these concepts.731   
 
5.2.6 Not absolute principles. As we will notice under the headings of fraud and illegality 
the principles of autonomy and appearance would not be enforced under the English 
and Jordanian legal orders where there is fraud or illegality. Fraud is a well-
established exception to the principle of appearance under English and Jordanian 
laws. It is also submitted in this chapter that illegality would permit the laying aside 
of the principle of autonomy. The autonomous nature of documentary credits 
manifests the protection of their underlying aim of being secure methods of payment 
and finance.732 In this spirit, thrombosis will occur in the financial system if courts 
intervene in the autonomous nature of these established mercantile methods of 
payment.733     
 
5.2.7 Demand bonds. Documentary credits and demand bonds share the nature of being 
autonomous methods of payment. They are treated alike in respect of the autonomy 
principle in the context of fraud and illegality. However, the role of documents in 
demand bonds is in fact far less important than in documentary credits, as in most 
                                                          
730 For the elastic nature of conformity: chapter 3, para 3.2.1. 
731 6 and Bellamy, Principles of Methodologies, (1st edn, Sage 2012), 138-139. 
732 Intraco Ltd v Notis Shipping Corp of Liberia (The Bhoja Trader) [1981] 2 Lloyd's Rep 256; [1981] Com. Lloyd’s 
Rep 184, [10]. 
733 Intraco Ltd v Notis Shipping Corp of Liberia (The Bhoja Trader) [1981] 2 Lloyd's Rep 256; [1981] Com. Lloyd’s 
Rep 184, [10] per Donaldson LJ. 
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cases demand bonds merely require a written demand from the beneficiary in order 
to trigger the payment.734  
 
5.2.8 Needs and means in the conceptual model. As in other chapters in this thesis, 
the conceptual model that was set out in chapter 1 applies to the principles of 
autonomy and appearance in this chapter. The needs of the documentary credit 
parties under the principles of independence and appearance (embedded usage of 
autonomy) can be listed in descending order of importance as: (1) the need of sellers 
for an assurance of payment; (2) the need of banks for an assurance of 
reimbursement; (3) the need of sellers for manageable presentation; (4) the need 
of banks for manageable examination; (5) the need of sellers, buyers and banks for 
speed; and (6) the need of buyers for a documentary proof of performance by sellers 
of the underlying contract in  compliance with the terms of the credit. Of course, to 
maintain a high degree of the “formal realisability” for these principles the means of 
certainty that is reflective to the above needs is required. Since, however, the 
independence and appearance principles are not absolute, by being subject to 
exceptions, under legal orders, the means of flexibility is also required. Here the 
means of responsiveness to the common fundamental doctrines among legal orders 
that are relevant to such principles is the key to promulgating successful rules that 
are capable of being adopted and applied by various legal orders. Still, to influence 
social actors and legal orders, one must use the means of communication. Clarity is 
an essential means assisting the uniformity in the interpretation of the substance of 
documentary credits and the realisation of all other means. The diagram below 
illustrates how the means in the conceptual model should together function to 
effectively regulate the principles of independence and appearance in the embedded 
usage of autonomy.  
 
 
                                                          
734 Elinger and Neo, The Law and Practice of Documentary Credit, (1st edn, Hart 2010), 143.  
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Diagram 9: The Prominent Needs and Means for Regulating Autonomy and 
Appearance 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
Independence And Appearance Principles Under the UCP 
 
5.2.9 The principles of independence and appearance are spelled out in UCP 600. Article 4 
of UCP 600 articulates the principle of independence as follows:  
 
“A.   A credit by its nature is a separate transaction from the sale or other contract 
on which it may be based. Banks are in no way concerned with or bound by such 
contract, even if any reference whatsoever to it is included in the credit. 
Consequently, the undertaking of a bank to honour, to negotiate or to fulfil any other 
obligation under the credit is not subject to claims or defences by the applicant 
resulting from its relationships with the issuing bank or the beneficiary. 
A beneficiary can in no case avail itself of the contractual relationships existing 
between banks or between the applicant and the issuing bank. 
1. Payment, 2.Manageable presentation, 
3.Speed 4. Documentary proof 
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B.     An issuing bank should discourage any attempt by the applicant to include, as 
an integral part of the credit, copies of the underlying contract, proforma invoice and 
the like.” 
 
Sub-article 4 (a) of UCP 600 is the equivalent to article 3 of UCP 500, there are no 
changes in sub-article 4(a) except a linguistic change. The equivalent to sub-article 
4 (b) of UCP 600 is sub-article 5 (a) (i) under UCP 500. There is a change in the 
language of sub article 4 (b) to make explicit the duty of the issuing bank to 
discourage the applicant from including the underlying contract in the credit. This 
might convey a substantive change under legal orders by creating a duty of care for 
bank to advice as explained below.  
 
RIGHT HAND OF INDEPENDENCE 
 
5.2.10 The right hand of the independence principle (i.e. the credit is independent from the 
underlying contracts) is clearly laid down in sub-article 4 (a) of UCP 600 and 
generates the main proposition that the bank’s undertaking to the beneficiary is not 
subject to claims or defences arising under the underlying contract, even where a 
reference is made to such a contract in the credit. It is submitted that under English 
and Jordanian laws a mere reference to the underlying contract would be ignored, 
because sub-article 4 (a) has a paramount status as reflecting the embedded trade 
usage of autonomy. This lex mercatoria of documentary credits is enforceable unless 
there is an express term to clearly exclude the applicability of such embedded 
usage.735  
 
5.2.11 High protection. Sub-article 4 (b) goes on to protect the right hand of 
independence. It thus endeavours to impose a duty on the issuing bank to discourage 
                                                          
735 See the discussion of non-documentary conditions: chapter 4, paras 4.3.11.  
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any attempt to include copies of the underlying contract, performa invoice and the 
like into the credit. This is not to say that an issuing bank is now under a legal 
obligation to refuse the inclusion of such documents into the credit. Indeed, the UCP 
are incapable of imposing such an obligation due to the fact that the UCP terms are 
not mandatory law. Accordingly, the parties can contract out of them even if a UCP 
term has the force of law.736 Indeed UCP 600 provides that the parties are free to 
exclude or modify any of its terms.737 However, unlike sub-article 5 (a) (i) of UCP 
500, it is clear now, pursuant to sub-article 4 (b) of UCP 600, that there is a duty 
upon the issuing bank to discourage the inclusion of any terms of the underlying 
contract into the credit notwithstanding a clear request by the applicant for such 
inclusion. Discouragement must mean more than the issuing bank simply informing 
the applicant that it should not incorporate the underlying contract, since otherwise 
such discouragement would not convey to the applicant – who usually has no 
expertise in documentary credits - the consequence of such an inclusion. It is thus 
submitted, that an effective discouragement must involve the issuing bank 
explaining the reasons “why” the underlying contract should not be included. 
Namely, because the terms of the underlying contract would be subject to being 
disregarded by other banks for being non-documentary terms pursuant to sub-article 
14 (h) of UCP 600.738 It follows that one consequence of the issuing bank having a 
duty under sub-article 4(b) to discourage any inclusion of the underlying contract is 
that, under English and Jordanian laws, the issuing bank would have a concomitant 
duty of care to advise the applicant of the consequences of the incorporation of the 
underlying contract. Should it fail to advise as to the effect of non-documentary 
conditions the issuing bank would be exposed to liability for breach of contract or in 
tort for negligence739 depending upon the extent of the duty of care arising in the 
particular transaction. Sub-article 4 (b) is a welcome change in the UCP because it 
                                                          
736 Chapter 2, paras 2.3.5-9.   
737 Article 1 UCP 600.   
738 Chapter 4, para 4.3.21. 
739 For contractual and tortious liability: Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1995] 2 AC145.  
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not only reflects the need of buyers for documentary proof, but it is also responsive 
to the legal doctrine of duty of care arising under the English and Jordanian legal 
orders. It is hoped, however, that a future iteration of the UCP would be clearer in 
expressing that the duty of discouragement extends to the advising of consequences.  
LEFT HAND OF INDEPNDENCE 
5.2.12 Conversely, the left hand of the independence principle has not been clearly tackled 
in the second part of sub-article 4 (a) of UCP 600 which merely states “a beneficiary 
can in no case avail itself of the contractual relationships existing between banks or 
between the applicant and the issuing bank”. Despite the contractual relationship 
between the beneficiary and the applicant being rendered independent, pursuant to 
the first part of sub-article 4 (a), article 4 does not necessarily, as a matter of textual 
interpretation, bar the issuing bank from availing itself of the contractual 
relationships between itself and the beneficiary, the confirming bank and the 
beneficiary or even between the first beneficiary and the second beneficiary in the 
transferred credits. This generates the possibility that an issuing bank might, in 
honouring or negotiating the credit, seek to avail itself of its contractual relationship 
with the applicant and argue, for instance, that it can rely on its documentary credit 
contract with the applicant to correct an error in the advised credit without the 
agreement of the beneficiary or that the illegality of the contract with the applicant 
taints the issuing bank’s contract with the beneficiary. Unlike English law,740 there is 
no clear provision in UCP 600 expressly confirming that each contract in the operative 
documentary credit contracts are each independent from one another. 
APPEARANCE 
5.2.13 The principle of appearance is articulated separately under the heading of documents 
v. goods in article 5 which provides “banks deal with documents and not with goods, 
                                                          
740 Below para 5.2.14.  
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services or performance to which the documents may relate”. This is to say that 
banks are not entitled to check the actual facts represented by the documents. This 
prohibitory principle is effective where it operates as a general rule in the 
determination of conformity. Thus sub-article 14 (a) of UCP 600 provides that the 
bank must examine the documents “on their face”. The result of this position is that 
the bank is not entitled (i.e. would be liable to the beneficiary for wrongful refusal) 
to refuse documents that on their appearance are in conformity, by reason only that 
the actual facts are not actually in conformity. The bank is not entitled to investigate 
the actual facts.741 This, however, must be subject to the honesty of the beneficiary 
and therefore under English and Jordanian laws in the case of documentary fraud 
the bank is entitled to require documents that are actually in conformity with the 
actual facts.742 Article 5 now replaces the phrase “all parties” (which was contained 
in article 4 of UCP 500) by “banks”. This is a welcome change as it reflects the fact 
that an applicant as a buyer and a beneficiary as a supplier deal not only with 
documents, but they also deal with goods or services. As a consequence of the 
appearance principle, the bank is not liable for any want of authenticity in the 
documents as expressed in detail by article 34 of UCP 600. 
 
Independence And Appearance Under English Law 
5.2.14 Lord Diplock eloquently formulated the principle of independence in United City 
Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada,743 as follows: 
 
“It is trite law that there are four autonomous though interconnected contractual 
relationships involved. (1) The underlying contract for the sale of goods, to which 
the only parties are the buyer and the seller; (2) the contract between the buyer and 
                                                          
741 Collected Opinions 1995-2001, R.405: banks should not investigate the authority under which a specific 
document was issued; Westpac Banking Corpn v South Carolina National Bank [1986] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 311, 315.  
742 Below para 5.3.30. 
743 [1983] 1 AC 168, 182, 183.  
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the issuing bank under which the latter agrees to issue the credit and either itself or 
through a confirming bank to notify the credit to the seller and to make payments to 
or to the order of the seller ... ; (3) if payment is to be made through a confirming 
bank the contract between the issuing bank and the confirming bank authorising and 
requiring the latter to make such payments and to remit the stipulated documents 
to the issuing bank when they are received, the issuing bank in turn agreeing to 
reimburse the confirming bank for payments made under the credit; (4) the contract 
between the confirming bank and the seller under which the confirming bank 
undertakes to pay to the seller (or to accept or negotiate without recourse to drawer 
bills of exchange drawn by him) up to the amount of the credit against presentation 
of the stipulated documents”. 
 
Of course, there is also a fifth contractual relationship between the issuing bank and 
the seller (beneficiary).  This formula must have intended to address both the right 
hand and the left hand of the independence. The formula must have reflected the 
embedded trade usage of autonomy in a clearer way by expressly stating that the 
operative contracts are independent from one another and independent from the 
underlying contract. Lord Diplock also addressed the appearance principle:   
 
“Again, it is trite law that in contract (4), with which alone the instant appeal is 
directly concerned, the parties to it, the seller and the confirming bank, "deal in 
documents and not in goods," as article 8 of the Uniform Customs puts it”.   
 
5.2.15 It is well established under English law that the bank is not entitled to examine the 
underlying facts,744 goods745 or the relevant contracts.746 Lord Diplock went on to 
                                                          
744 Westpac Banking Corp v South Carolina National Bank [1986] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 311, 315 per Goff L.J.; Forestal 
Mimosa Ltd v Original Credit Ltd [1986] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 329, 334; Basse and Selve v Bank of Australia (1904) 90 
LT 618, 20 TLR 431. 
745 Guaranty Trust Co of New York v Van den Berghs Ltd (1925) 22 Lloyd's Rep 446, 454 per Scrutton L.J; Biddell 
Bros v E Clemens Horst Co [1911] 1 K.B. 934, 958 per Kennedy L.J. 
746 United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1983] 1 AC 168, 183; Credit Industriel et 
Commercial v China Merchants Bank [2002] C.L.C. 1263, [30]. 
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elucidate the underlying aim of the independence and appearance principles in 
documentary credits, he stated:  
 
“The whole commercial purpose for which the system of confirmed irrevocable 
documentary credits has been developed in international trade is to give to the seller 
an assured right to be paid before he parts with control of the goods that does not 
permit of any dispute with the buyer as to the performance of the contract of sale 
being used as a ground for non-payment or reduction or deferment of payment”.  
 
Thus English law accepts that the principles of independence and appearance 
represent the substantive objective of documentary credits and that the application 
of these principles needs to be responsive to the underlying security aim of 
documentary credits.  
 
Independence And Appearance Under Jordanian Law 
 
5.2.16 The right hand of the principle of independence is well established under Jordanian 
law,747 but the position of the left hand has not arisen before the Jordanian courts. 
It is submitted that the lacunae in UCP 600 as to the left hand of the independence 
principle (whereby each contract is independent from one another) should also be 
considered embedded trade usage under Jordanian law.748 Indeed, the empirical 
findings indicate that judges in Jordan recognise the left hand of autonomy as an 
essential part of documentary credits, as Judge B stated, “it is the fundamental 
structure of documentary credits that each contract is independent from one 
another”.749  
 
                                                          
747 Court of Distinction (Civil), 1050/2006, Adalah Programme.  
748 Chapter 2, para 2.2.22. 
749 Annex I, para 44. 
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5.2.17 The principle of appearance has not been articulated by the Court of Distinction. It 
is submitted that the appearance principle would be applied by Jordanian courts even 
where the documentary credit is not subject to the UCP. This is due to the fact that 
this principle operates as a part of the embedded trade usage of autonomy and, as 
a general rule under the principle of conformity, as a matter of trade usage in Jordan 
which is consistently applied as indicated by the empirical findings.750 For example, 
Koloud Alkalaldeh stated “we examine the appearance of documents in accordance 
with the DC terms. What is recognised by custom is considered as a contractual 
condition under Jordanian law.751  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
750 Annex I: as indicated by bankers para 24; as indicated by traders para 25.  
751 Articles 224 and 225 Jordanian Civil Code 1976.  
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FRAUD 
 
General view 
5.3.1 As analysed above, the principle of independence is a normative fiction and the 
principle of appearance is a normative presumption that are both founded by, and 
constitute, the embedded trade usage of autonomy. But fraud challenges the 
effectiveness, or the application, of these principles. The performance of 
documentary credits is manifested when issuing or confirming banks fulfil their 
autonomous undertaking of honouring the credit. The issuing bank, the confirming 
bank and the applicant might wish to avoid the trap of fraud by refusing or restraining 
others from the honouring or the reimbursement of the credit where fraud is 
suspected. In most cases, fraud occurs in documentary credits where the tendered 
documents appear on their face to conform to the terms of the credit, but in fact 
misrepresent the actual facts, or alternatively they are fully or partly forged. Fraud 
is a well-established exception to the embedded trade usage of autonomy both under 
the English752 and Jordanian753 legal orders. A distinction must be drawn between 
fraud in the credit contract between the issuing or confirming bank and the 
beneficiary, and fraud in the underlying contract (or in one of the operative 
contracts) in the documentary credit between other parties. Thus it is submitted in 
this thesis that fraud is actually a well-known exception to the presumption of 
appearance, which constitutes part of the embedded trade usage of autonomy, and 
                                                          
752 United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1983] AC 168; Edward Owen Engineering 
Ltd v Barclays Bank International Ltd [1978] 1 Q.B. 159, 172-173; European Asian Bank AG v Punjab & Sind 
Bank (No.2) [1983] 1 W.L.R. 642, 658; Bolivinter Oil SA v Chase Manhattan Bank NA [1984] 1 Llyod’s Rep 251; 
United Trading Corp SA v Allied Arab Bank Ltd [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 554, 561; GKN Contractors Ltd v Lloyds 
Bank Plc (1985) 30 B.L.R. 48, 63; Themehelp Ltd v West [1996] Q.B. 84; Group Josi Re v Walbrook Insurance 
Co [1996] 1 W.L.R. 1152, 1161; Turkiye Is Bankasi AS v Bank of China [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 250, 253; Safa Ltd 
v Banque du Caire [2000] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 567; [2000] 2 Lloyd's Rep 600; Solo Industries UK Ltd v Canara 
Bank [2001] EWCA Civ 1041; [2001] 1 W.L.R. 1800; Consolidated Oil Ltd v American Express Bank Ltd [2002] 
C.L.C. 488, 495; Banque Saudi Fransi v Lear Siegler Services Inc [2007] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 47; Enka Insaat Ve Sanayi 
AS v Banca Popolare dell'Alto Adige SpA [2009] EWHC 2410 (Comm); [2009] C.I.L.L. 2777; RD Harbottle 
(Mercantile) Ltd v National Westminster Bank Ltd [1978] Q.B. 146, 155-156; Discount Records Ltd v Barclays 
Bank Ltd [1975] 1 W.L.R. 315; Tukan Timber Ltd v Barclays Bank Plc [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 171, 174; Society of 
Lloyd’s v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 251,256; Kvaerner John Brown Ltd v 
Midland Bank Plc [1998] C.L.C. 446; Credit Agricole Indosuez v Generale Bank (No.1) [1999] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 
1009, 1015; Czarnikow-Rionda Sugar Trading Inc v Standard Bank London Ltd [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 187, 191.  
753 Court of Distinction (Civil), 1215/2005, Alkurtas programme.  
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not to the fiction or principle of independence under English and Jordanian laws. It 
is also postulated that the UCP Drafting Group should exercise their power of 
seduction by promulgating advisory guidance as to the fraud exception to encourage 
uniformity.   
 
5.3.2 English law. The fraud exception to documentary credit transactions received 
authoritative iteration under English law in United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd 
v Royal Bank of Canada.754 The bill of lading contained a fraudulent misstatement by 
one of the carrier’s agents that the date 15th December was the shipment date when 
the goods were in fact shipped one day later. This was a material misstatement as 
the credit provided that the last date for shipment was to be 15th December. The 
confirming bank refused to pay on the ground that they had received information 
that shipment was not effected as it appeared in the bills of lading, but neither the 
sellers (original beneficiary) nor their transferee had any knowledge about the fraud 
at the time of the presentation of documents. The confirming bank was sued by the 
sellers and their transferee for wrongful refusal to pay. After elaborating on the 
nature of the norm of autonomy and the presumption of appearance Lord Diplock 
confirmed that fraud is a well-established exception to the norm of autonomy under 
English law stating: 
 
“To this general statement of principle as to the contractual obligations of the 
confirming bank to the seller, there is one established exception: that is, where the 
seller, for the purpose of drawing on the credit, fraudulently presents to the 
confirming bank documents that contain, expressly or by implication, material 
representations of fact that to his knowledge are untrue”.755  
 
                                                          
754 [1983] AC 168. 
755 United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1983] AC 168, 183.  
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5.3.3 This statement must convey the position that fraud in the issue or presentation of 
documents is an exception to the normative presumption of appearance and not to 
the fiction of independence in documentary credits. Thus later in the same judgment, 
in the course of rejecting the confirming bank’s submission that a deliberate 
misstatement could operate as an exception to the principle of autonomy where it 
obscured the buyer’s right to reject the goods, Lord Diplock stated: 
 
“But this [submission] is to destroy the autonomy of the documentary credit which 
is its raison d'etre; it is to make the seller's right to payment by the confirming bank 
dependent upon the buyer's rights against the seller under the terms of the contract 
for the sale of goods, of which the confirming bank will have no knowledge”.756 
 
5.3.4 Underlying policy. The House of Lords held that the underlying policy of fraud is 
based on the maxim of ex turpi causa non oritur actio, translated to English as “no 
action arises from an unworthy cause”, and therefore “courts will not allow their 
process be used by a dishonest person to carry out fraud”.757 The bank was 
accordingly held liable for refusal to pay, because the sellers and the transferee were 
not dishonest at the time of presentation.758  
 
5.3.5 In a subsequent case Rix J sought to define the effect of fraud on documentary 
credits rather more rigorously than had the House of Lords, commenting in the 
following manner on the judgment of Lord Diplock: 
 
“When, therefore, Lord Diplock stated that the fraud exception was an application of 
the doctrine that “fraud unravels all”, he was not, in my respectful opinion, speaking 
as broadly as might be thought. It would be less pithy but more accurate to fill out 
                                                          
756 United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1983] AC 168, 185.  
757 United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1983] AC 168, 183 per Lord Diplock. 
758 Below para 5.3.30. 
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the dictum by saying that fraud unravels the bank's obligation to act on the 
appearance of documents to be in accordance with a credit's requirements provided 
that the bank knows in time of the beneficiary's fraud”.759 
 
5.3.6 It does seem likely that Lord Diplock meant that the impact of a documentary fraud 
is that it unravels the bank’s obligation to pay on the appearance of documents. On 
this interpretation fraud simply rebuts the presumption that the documents reflect 
the facts of the underlying transaction as the application of the appearance principle 
is conditional upon the honesty of the beneficiary, or the paying bank, at the time of 
payment.760 Once the implied condition of honesty is breached the appearance 
principle is dissolved and the bank is entitled for documents that actually conform 
the represented facts. It is, however, clear from Lord Diplock’s statement that the 
English law public policy concept of fraud, which applies to any type of fraud including 
non-documentary fraud, is that courts will not let a fraudster use their participation 
in a documentary credit transaction to carry out a fraud. Hence, the complicity of the 
beneficiary, or the entity who asserts rights based on a documentary credit (e.g. a 
paying bank), in the fraud is essential, in order to permit fraud impeaching the 
embedded usage of autonomy. The bank in United City Merchants was, therefore, 
held liable for refusal to pay, because the sellers and the transferee were not 
dishonest at the time of presentation.761  
 
5.3.7 Jordanian law. Similarly authoritative treatment of the fraud exception under 
Jordanian law was given in Exports and Imports Bank v Jordanian Ahli Bank762 where 
the beneficiary presented documents that appeared on their face to be in conformity. 
Prior to the date of payment the issuing bank discovered by perusal of inspection 
                                                          
759 Czarnikow-Rionda Sugar Trading Inc v Standard Bank London Ltd [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 187, 203. 
760 In the context of demand bonds which is applicable to documentary fraud a statement by Lord Dinning in 
Edward Owen Engineering Ltd v Barclays Bank International Ltd [1978] 1 Q.B. 159, 171 suggests that a bank’s 
duty to pay is conditional upon the honesty of the demand: cited with approval by Mance LJ in Solo Industries 
UK Ltd v Canara Bank [2001] EWCA Civ 104; [2001] 1 W.L.R. 1800, [10]; 
761 Below para 5.3.30 
762 Court of Distinction (Civil), 1215/2005, Alkurtas programme.  
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reports (issued both by the Governmental Institution of Iraqi Coordination and the 
Jordanian Royal Science Society) that the actual goods that had been shipped by the 
seller (i.e. the beneficiary) were sham goods. The issuing bank informed the other 
parties, whose precise role is unclear from the judgment, about the fraud and 
required them to restrain payment. However notwithstanding that notice, one of 
those banks honoured the documentary credit and was automatically reimbursed by 
the issuing bank under the interbank payment mechanism. The issuing bank sued 
the paying party to recover the amount reimbursed. It was held that banks are not 
entitled to make payment to the beneficiary when they clearly know that a fraud is 
being, or has been, committed by the beneficiary, or by others, with the knowledge 
of the beneficiary. Thus the confirming bank and the beneficiary were liable to the 
issuing bank for the amount of payment. The Court stated: 
 
“The jurists and jurisdictions provide that there is a condition in order to regard 
documentary credits as a strong assurance for the beneficiary (seller) and that is the 
documentary credits are means of payment to an honest commercial transaction, 
namely, the behaviour of the seller should not be tainted by fraud... if the documents 
appeared to be in conformity but in fact they did not match the reality by the will or 
the knowledge of the beneficiary, then the bank is obliged to reject the documents. 
It is permitted for the bank to restrain from its obligatory promise if the contents of 
the documents do not confirm the actual fact and this was by the fraud of the seller 
or with his knowledge”.  
 
5.3.8 Underlying policy. The Court of Appeal and the First Instance Court provided that 
“fraud unravels all”, namely that it invalidates the contract of sale and extending to 
the relationship between the bank and the seller. Yet, it was held that one of the 
requirements to give fraud the power to infringe the autonomy principle is that the 
beneficiary must act fraudulently or must have knowledge of the fraud prior the 
presentation of documents. The case for treating fraud as an exception to the norm 
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of autonomy must be confined to the effect that fraud invalidates the relationship 
between the bank and the guilty beneficiary. Thus, the Court of Distinction, unlike 
the Court of Appeal and the First Instance Court, stated that fraud “invalidates the 
relationship between the bank and the seller”. It is submitted, the underlying policy 
for the fraud exception should not be based on the maxim “fraud unravels all”. 
Otherwise the innocent seller is caught by such a maxim. According to the principles 
of Sharia law,763 it can be said that the Hadeeth (saying) of Prophet Muhammad to 
a seller that “whoever commits a fraud is not one of us”764 applies as the policy on 
how to regulate the effects of fraud in civil litigation. This Hadeeth is parallel to the 
maxim of ex turbi causa non-orito action, namely that a person will not be able to 
pursue a cause of action arising from his own illegal act (e.g. the beneficiary who 
knowingly presents forged documents that appear on their face to be in conformity). 
The consequence of this analogy is that fraud would only operate to deter the guilty 
party. Fraud would not thus lead to the collapse of the whole transaction. 
Consequently, fraud would not vitiate all transactions as it is not based on the maxim 
of “fraud unravels all”.765 Thus, the beneficiary who innocently presents forged 
documents is not prevented from enforcing its right for payment. The maxim of 
“fraud unravels all” does not originate in Sharia law, and it is irreconcilable with 
Sharia’s approach that aims to achieve consistency and stability in transactions.766  
 
Meaning Of Fraud 
 
5.3.9 English law. The civil767 and criminal frauds are the two main categories of fraud 
under English law. The Common law civil fraud is defined in Derry v Peek768 as “a 
                                                          
763 Article 2 Civil Code 1976.  
764 Narrated by Abul-Hussain Muslim son of Habaj son of al Nishapuri, Sahih Muslim Book 10 Business 
Transactions.  
765 Most Arabic scholars adopt the maxim “fraus omnia corrumpit” in dealing with fraud exception in documentary 
credits.  
766 Jordan Laws and Rules, Memorandum of Clarification of Civil Code, (1977), 23-24.  
767 GKN Contractors Ltd v Lloyds Bank Plc (1985) 30 B.L.R. 48, 63.  
768 (1889) 14 App. Cas. 337. 
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false representation has been made: (1) knowingly; or (2) without belief in its truth; 
or (3) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false”.769 Thus dishonesty770 is the 
fundamental element. It can be established by proving actual knowledge, including 
the reckless behaviour of a wilful shutting of eyes to a credible suspicion that a 
statement might be false. Under criminal fraud, in addition to the dishonesty 
element, there must be a dishonest motive.771 Namely: the person who made the 
representation must have the intention to make a dishonest gain for himself, or to 
cause loss to another or to expose another to the risk of loss.772 Fraud in civil 
litigation often occurs in the form of fraudulent misrepresentation, in that the false 
statement aims to induce the other contractual party to enter into the contract.773 
 
5.3.10 Jordanian law. There are two types of civil fraud under Jordanian law. The first is 
fraud in the formation of the contract. It is known as delusion )ريرغت(. It is similar to 
the Common law concept of fraudulent misrepresentation. Delusion is categorised 
under the general heading of “defects of consent” in the Civil Code.774 Article 143 of 
the Civil Code defines delusion by stating, inter alia:  
 
“Delusion is where one of the contracting parties deceives the other party by verbal 
or behavioural deceitful ways in order to induce that party to consent to enter into a 
contract that he would not have consented to enter had the delusion not been made”.  
 
Article 144 of the Civil Code adds that: 
 
                                                          
769 (1889) 14 App. Cas. 337, 374, Per Lord Herschell.  
770 The term indicates telling of a lie.   
771 S2 Fraud Act (2006); Polhill v Walter (1832) 3 B. & Ad. 114; Denton v G.N. Ry (1856) 5 E. & B. 860; Beale 
and others (eds), Chitty on Contracts (31st edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2012) para 6.50, ftn 246. 
772 S2 Fraud Act (2006).  
773 Peel, Treitel The Law of Contract, (12th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2007), para 9.17.  
774 Articles 143-150 Civil Code (1976).  
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“A deliberate silence in respect of a state of affair is considered as delusion if it is 
proved that the victim would not have entered into the contract had he known such 
a state of affairs”.  
 
5.3.11 A deliberate silence denotes the idea that there are situations where the contracting 
party is under a duty of disclosure as to information that cannot reasonably be 
available to the other party, and the knowledge of such information is vital to the 
decision to enter into the contract.775 Behavioural delusion occurs where the 
contracting party displays the subject matter of the contract so as to hide its actual 
condition.776 Verbal delusion is the provision of dishonest statements as to some 
fundamental aspects of the contract. Distinctively, delusion under Jordanian law is 
only effective where it leads to onerous disadvantage.777 A disadvantage is 
considered as onerous in property and other transactions if the range of expert 
valuation would have differed had the true facts been known.778  
 
5.3.12 The second type is fraud committed in the performance of a contract. Article 358 (2) 
of the Civil Code states:  
 
“In any event the guilty party is responsible for any fraud that he commits, or any 
fundamental mistake that he makes”.   
 
It is submitted that the meaning of civil fraud in the course of performance of a 
contract is the same as the criminal fraud under Jordanian law, except that the civil 
fraud does not require motive.779 The distinction between criminal fraud780 and 
delusion781 under Jordanian law is not easy to draw. Both types share the same 
                                                          
775 Court of Distinction (Civil), 3837/2009, Adalah Programme.  
776 Sarhan and Khater, Explanation of Civil Code Sources of Rights and Obligations, (2000) 147.  
777 Article 145 Civil Code (1976): subject to exceptions (e.g. state property) laid down in articles 147-149 Civil 
Code (1976).   
778 Article 146 Civil Code (1976).  
779 Court of Distinction (Crim: Five members), 256/2004 7/3/2004, http://www.lob.govjo. 
780 Articles 417 and 428 Criminal Code (1960).   
781 Articles 143 and 144 Civil Code (1976).  
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fundamental elements, except that deliberate silence is not recognised in criminal 
fraud782 and inducement to enter into the contract is not a requirement for criminal 
fraud. The latter might therefore occur prior the formation of the contract or during 
the contractual performance.  
 
Qualifications For Fraud Exception 
 
5.3.13 To breach the embedded usage of autonomy (i.e. whether it is in relation to the 
principle of appearance or independence) any type of fraud must fulfil three 
qualifications under English law, namely: (1) knowledge of the relevant parties (i.e. 
those against whom the fraud exception is asserted) prior to the payment; (2) strong 
corroborative evidence in order to restrain the bank from payment at the pre-trial 
stage and (3) the balance of convenience for a protective relief at the pre-trial stage 
pending a full trial of the issues. Under Jordanian law it is clear that knowledge of 
the parties is an essential qualification for the operation of fraud exception. However, 
the strength of evidence of fraud required by a Jordanian court is a matter that is 
simply for the discretion of the court in each individual case. Also the test of English 
law of the balance of convenience does not operate under the procedural rules of 
Jordanian legal system, as the Jordanian courts appear to grant relief whenever they 
suspect both the existence of fraud and knowledge of it by the party seeking to 
enforce the documentary credit. 
KNOWLEDGE OF THE PARTIES  
5.3.14 As a consequence of the policy that courts will not lend their process to a fraudulent 
person underlying the principle that fraud is an exception to the autonomy usage, 
the knowledge of the relevant parties is essential. The applicant, who wishes to 
restrain the bank from payment, or refuses to reimburse the bank, on the basis of 
                                                          
782 This can be clearly inferred in Court of Distinction (Crim), 120/1977, http://www.lob.govjo. 
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fraud, must prove the knowledge of the bank and the involvement, or the knowledge, 
of the beneficiary as to the fraud. The same applies where the issuing bank, or 
confirming bank, wishes to refuse to reimburse the nominated bank which made a 
payment. Furthermore, where the bank refuses to pay, it needs to be able to defend 
itself against a claim by the beneficiary, or the applicant, that it has acted wrongfully. 
So the bank must be able to prove the involvement, or the knowledge, of the 
beneficiary as to the fraud.  
 
5.3.15 English law. The applicant who relies on the fraud exception needs to prove that 
the bank has knowledge as to the fraud783 prior to the payment. The bank is under 
no obligation to investigate whether there is fraud or not and the onus is on the 
applicant to present clear strong evidence of fraud to the bank.784 The bank is not 
obliged to investigate the applicant’s presented evidence, even where the 
investigation would reveal the weakness of the applicant’s evidence.785 The fraud 
exception is inoperative against the bank which does not have the required 
knowledge of fraud prior to the date of payment against apparently conforming 
documents.786 Of course the involvement, or the knowledge, of the beneficiary as to 
the fraud is required.787 The applicant, or the bank as the case may be, must prove 
either the beneficiary’s involvement, or his knowledge, as to the fraud. Here, actual 
knowledge is required under the rule in Derry v Peek788 including the situation where 
there is a wilful shutting of eyes to credible evidence of falsehood.789 It does not 
include a constructive knowledge based on what the beneficiary as a reasonable 
                                                          
783 Deutsche Ruckversicherung AG v Walbrook Insurance Co Ltd [1995] 1 W.L.R. 1017, 1030. 
784 Turkiye Is Bankasi AS v Bank of China [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 611, 617; United Trading Corp SA v Allied Arab 
Bank Ltd [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 554, 560. 
785 Gian Singh & Co. Ltd. v Banque de l'Indochine [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1234. 
786 European Asian Bank AG v Punjab & Sind Bank (No.2) [1983] 1 W.L.R. 642, 658; United Trading Corp SA v 
Allied Arab Bank Ltd [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 554, 560; Credit Agricole Indosuez v Generale Bank [1999] 2 All E.R. 
(Comm) 1009, 1015; DCD Factors Plc v Ramada Trading Ltd [2007] EWHC 2820 (Q.B.), [2008] Bus L.R 654; 
Group Josi Re v Walbrook Insurance Co [1996] 1 W.L.R. 1152, 1161. 
787 United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1983] AC 168, 187. 
788 (1889) 14 App. Cas. 337. 
789 Malek and Quest, Jack: Documentary Credits, (4th edn, Tottel 2009) para 9.18.  
275 
 
person should have known,790 as the dishonesty of the beneficiary is required. Parker 
LJ expressed this requirement in the following terms: “The reasonable application of 
the doctrine [fraud exception] must involve active dishonesty as an exception to the 
protection otherwise afforded”.791 It is the knowledge of the beneficiary prior to, or 
at the time of, the documentary presentation that is relevant.792 Accordingly, the 
knowledge of the beneficiary is hard to prove as he must be shown to have actual 
knowledge at the time of the presentation.  
 
5.3.16 Jordanian law. The knowledge of the bank as to the fraud is a requirement for the 
enforcement of the fraud exception.793 In Exports and Imports Bank v Jordanian Ahli 
Bank794 the claimant informed the bank that a fraud was being committed by the 
beneficiary and later presented to the bank strong documentary evidence as to the 
fraud. There is no statement by the Court of Distinction suggesting that the 
knowledge of the bank can only be acquired from the applicant or other parties. The 
empirical findings indicate that there are situations that the banks would be confident 
from the appearance of the documents that there is a fraud, as for example where 
different types of documents (such as bills of lading and inspection certificates) are 
effected by the same signature.795 Here, it can be argued that the knowledge of the 
bank must be presumed as it is driven from the appearance of the documents. This 
is not to say that the bank is under an obligation to investigate whether there is 
fraud or not,796 but where it is clear to any reasonable banker from the appearance 
of the documents that there is a fraud then the bank is presumed to have knowledge 
of fraud. But fraud of whom? It must be fraud by or with the knowledge of the 
beneficiary.797 Since the bank is not under a duty to investigate fraud, it must be 
                                                          
790 Malek and Quest, Jack: Documentary Credits, (4th edn, Tottel 2009) para 9.18; Elinger and Neo, The Law and 
Practice of Documentary Credit, (1st edn, Hart 2010) p.142.  
791 GKN  Contractors Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Plc (1985) 30 B.L.R. 48, 63; Consolidated Oil Ltd v American Express 
Bank Ltd [2002] C.L.C. 488, 495. 
792 Group Josi Re v Walbrook Insurance Co [1996] 1 W.L.R. 1152, 1161.  
793 Court of Distinction (Civil), 1215/2005, Alkurtas programme. 
794 Court of Distinction (Civil), 1215/2005, Alkurtas programme.  
795 Chapter 1, para 1.2.39. 
796 Article 34 UCP 600.  
797 Court of Distinction (Civil), 1215/2005, Alkurtas programme. 
276 
 
protected regardless of the fact that the appearance of the documents indicates the 
occurrence of fraud.  
 
5.3.17 Degree of knowledge. The question is what is the degree of the knowledge required 
of the beneficiary? Is it an actual knowledge as under English law or a constructive 
knowledge (i.e. what the beneficiary as a reasonable person should have known)? 
The Court of Distinction stated in Exports and Imports Bank v Jordanian Ahli Bank:798 
 
“If the documents appeared to be in conformity but in fact they did not match the 
reality by the will or the knowledge of the beneficiary, then the bank is obliged to 
reject the documents. It is permitted for the bank to restrain from its obligatory 
promise if the contents of the documents do not confirm the actual fact and this was 
by the fraud of the seller or with his knowledge”. 
 
The judgment emphasises that it is not only the actual involvement or participation 
of the beneficiary in the fraud that gives rise to the fraud exception, but also 
knowledge of the fraud on the part of the beneficiary. In this context knowledge 
means a deliberate silence which is equivalent to wilfully shutting eyes to credible 
evidence of fraud.799 However, the issue of knowledge of fraud is a matter of fact 
that is left to the total discretion of the court as to whether or not it is convinced by 
the presented evidence as to the fact of the parties’ knowledge of the fraud.800 The 
Court of Distinction has no authority on other courts as to the weighting of 
evidence.801 It is submitted that the relevant time for knowledge of the beneficiary 
and the bank must, as under English law, be prior to or at the time of documentary 
                                                          
798 Court of Distinction (Civil), 1215/2005, Alkurtas programme. 
799 For deliberate silence: Court of Distinction (Civil), 3837/2009, Adalah Programme.  
800 Articles 33 and 34 Evidence Code (1956).  
801 Court of Distinction (Civil), 1215/2005, Alkurtas programme. 
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presentation. This is a consequence of the underlying policy for the fraud exception 
as elucidated above. 
 
EVIDENCE 
 
5.3.18 English law. The second qualification for the fraud exception under English law is 
that the evidence of fraud at pre-trial must be strong and corroborative, so that from 
the material available the only realistic inference to be drawn is that the beneficiary, 
or other party asserting rights on the credit has committed fraud, or is complicit in 
fraud committed by others.802 Such a requirement is based on the reality that the 
evidence is fully examined only at the full trial, but not at the interim stage.803 
Therefore, both banks in the refusal of payment, and courts in granting injunctions 
prohibiting payment (or prohibiting the beneficiary from drawing on the credit) 
should be extra cautious as to the proof of fraud. It has been clear under English law 
that the standard for proving fraud at the interlocutory stage is stronger than the 
balance of probabilities at full trial,804 and the formulation of such a standard of proof 
is now confirmed by the Privy Council in Alternative Power Solution Ltd v Central 
Electricity Board and another805 in which the Board reiterated the test that had 
previously been laid out per Akner LJ in United Trading Corp SA v Allied Arab Bank 
Ltd806 by stating that: 
 
“On the material available, the only realistic inference is that [the beneficiary] could 
not honestly have believed in the validity of its demands on the performance bonds”. 
 
                                                          
802 Alternative Power Solution Ltd v Central Electricity Board and another [2015] 1 W.L.R. 697, [59]. 
803 Czarnikow-Rionda Sugar Trading Inc v Standard Bank London Ltd [1999] 2 Lloyd's Rep 187, 202 per Rix J; 
cited with approval; Alternative Power Solution Ltd v Central Electricity Board and another [2015] 1 W.L.R. 697, 
[57].  
804 United Trading Corp SA v Allied Arab Bank Ltd [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 554, 561 per Ackner LJ; Group Josi Re v 
Walbrook Insurance Co Ltd [1996] 1 WLR 1152 , 1160 per Staughton LJ; Czarnikow-Rionda Sugar Trading Inc v 
Standard Bank London Ltd [1999] 2 Lloyd's Rep 187, 202 per Rix J.  
805 [2015] 1 W.L.R. 697, [59]. 
806 [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 554, 561.  
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5.3.19 Fraud as the only realistic inference is, however, presumed where there is strong 
evidence of fraud combined with a failure on the part of the allegedly guilty party to 
provide a reasonable response to the allegation of fraud.807  
 
5.3.20 The applicant who relies on the fraud exception needs to prove that the bank has 
knowledge of both the fraud808 and the complicity of the beneficiary809 prior to the 
payment. The bank is not liable for making payment unless it is proved that strong 
corroborative evidence of the fraud with the actual knowledge of the beneficiary was 
presented to the bank at or before the time of payment.810 Given the principle of 
appearance, the bank is under no obligation to investigate whether there is fraud or 
not and the onus is on the applicant to present clear strong evidence of fraud to the 
bank.811 Given the need for speed in examining the documents,812 the bank is not 
obliged to investigate the applicant’s presented evidence, even where the 
investigation would reveal the weakness of the applicant’s evidence.813 The fraud 
exception is inoperative against the bank which does not have the required 
knowledge of fraud prior to the date of payment against apparently conforming 
documents.814 However, the bank which refuses payment on a mere suspicion of 
fraud, would not be liable if it transpires at the full trial that there was a fraud and 
that the beneficiary was complicit in the fraud; but if it transpires at the full trial that 
either the beneficiary was not complicit in a fraud or that there was, in fact, no fraud 
                                                          
807 United Trading Corp SA v Allied Arab Bank Ltd [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 554, 560-564.  
808 Deutsche Ruckversicherung AG v Walbrook Insurance Co Ltd [1995] 1 W.L.R. 1017, 1030. 
809 United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1983] AC 168, 183 per Lord Diplock; 
Alternative Power Solution Ltd v Central Electricity Board and another [2015] 1 W.L.R. 697, [59].   
810 Turkiye Is Bankasi AS v Bank of China [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 611, 617; United Trading Corp SA v Allied Arab 
Bank Ltd [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 554, 560. 
811 Turkiye Is Bankasi AS v Bank of China [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 611, 617; United Trading Corp SA v Allied Arab 
Bank Ltd [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 554, 560. 
812 The period for examining documents in a documentary credit is a maximum of five banking days pursuant to 
sub- article 14 (d) UCP 600 and was a reasonable time up to seven banking days under sub-article 13 (b) UCP 
500; under English law, for instance, terms relating to time in international trade are regarded as conditions to 
the effect that the breach of them gives rise to a repudiatory breach: Bunge Corporation v Tradax Esport SA 
[1980] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 1 HL.   
813 Gian Singh & Co. Ltd. v Banque de l'Indochine [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1234. 
814 European Asian Bank AG v Punjab & Sind Bank (No.2) [1983] 1 W.L.R. 642, 658; United Trading Corp SA v 
Allied Arab Bank Ltd [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 554, 560; Credit Agricole Indosuez v Generale Bank [1999] 2 All E.R. 
(Comm) 1009, 1015; DCD Factors Plc v Ramada Trading Ltd [2007] EWHC 2820 (Q.B.), [2008] Bus L.R 654; 
Group Josi Re v Walbrook Insurance Co [1996] 1 W.L.R. 1152, 1161. 
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at all,815 the bank would be liable for wrongful refusal as well as damaging its own 
reputation as a payment facilitator.  
 
5.3.21 Empirical findings. It is indicated by the empirical findings of the present research 
that many banks in Jordan refuse to infringe the autonomy principle where there is 
an allegation of fraud, unless there is an injunction obliging them to dishonour the 
credit.816  Thus, Muhammad Burjaq stated “we advise the customer that the credit is 
separate from the underlying contract and that we refuse to integrate such a contract 
with the credit contract”.817 He also commented in respect of faulty goods that: 
 
“Many times the applicants tried to influence our decision to pay, but the applicants 
never produced solid evidence. The only evidence we accept is a decision from 
courts”.818  
 
5.3.22 The analysis of the collected data generated by the empirical study indicates that 
Jordanian judges presume that the issue of restraining payment to a fraudster in 
documentary credits as an urgent matter, particularly where the fraudster is 
domiciled outside the Jordanian jurisdiction.819 All the participating judges stated that 
in order to grant an injunction, there must be very strong documentary and apparent 
evidence of fraud on the part of the beneficiary, and the bank would need to have 
knowledge about the fraud. The participating judges confirmed that the matter 
depends on whether the court is convinced as to the evidence of fraud. In respect of 
the balance of convenience which is an essential stage under English law, the 
Jordanian judges stated that the balance of convenience in terms of weighing 
damages and benefits is borne in mind. But the judges commented that the most 
influential factor would be that if the beneficiary was a fraudster he would receive 
                                                          
815 United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1983] AC 168, 183.  
816 Annex I, para 39.  
817 Annex I, para 49.  
818 Annex I, par 49.  
819 Annex I, para 49. 
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payment under the documentary credit and would be able to escape from any future 
enforced judgment (given the fact that all cases before the judges involved a 
beneficiary who was not domiciled within the Jordanian jurisdiction). Thus the priority 
for judges in Jordan is to restrain payment to the beneficiary if there was strong 
evidence that he is a fraudster.   
 
5.3.23 The court has a broad discretion either to accept or to refuse the presented evidence, 
but it has no power to require additional evidence. It is submitted that the required 
level of the strength of the presented evidence is higher under English law than under 
Jordanian law, because the defendant in English law must have the opportunity to 
reply820 whereas the defendant under Jordanian law has merely the right to appeal 
against an enforced injunction.821 Judge A gave an example of strong evidence: 
“documents issued by the Jordanian custom confirming that the goods are water 
mixed with chemical instead of being petrol as required by the credit”.822 Although 
Judge A asserted that such evidence is strong the other party does not have the 
opportunity to challenge the evidence in the first instance, nor did the Judge explain 
how that evidence is capable of clarifying the level of the beneficiary’s knowledge 
(as proving actual knowledge is far harder than proving constructive knowledge). 
Banks therefore need to be cautious. There is a possibility under Jordanian law that 
where a bank is presented with documentary evidence that indicates a possibility of 
constructive knowledge on the part of a beneficiary as to a fraud, the bank will not 
be protected if it makes payment.   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
820 CPR 23.7(1). 
821 Article 170 Jordanian Civil Procedures Rules (1988).  
822 Annex I, para 49. 
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BALANCE OF CONVENIENCE 
 
5.3.24 English law. Another qualification under English law for the fraud exception is the 
balance of convenience823 in granting a protective relief (an interlocutory injunction 
and a freezing injunction) pending a full trial of the issues, because in most cases 
the credit’s payment will be due prior to any full trial and final judgement. An 
interlocutory injunction would not be granted where the petitioner is considered likely 
to have an adequate remedy in damages at trial (were it to be successful at trial)824 
or the respondent is likely to suffer greater damages by the interlocutory injunction 
than it is likely to suffer by losing at trial.825  
 
5.3.25 Applying the balance of convenience, it is difficult to see how an interlocutory 
injunction could ever be obtained against a bank (prohibiting the bank from payment 
pending full trial),826 since any infringement of its autonomous undertaking to make 
a payment under a documentary credit would lead to considerable damage in respect 
of the bank’s reputation as a trusted provider of payments in international trade.827 
In other words, the prejudice suffered by the bank could not be compensated by a 
subsequent award of damages.828  
 
5.3.26 However, where the subject of the interlocutory injunction is to restrain the bank 
from honouring the credit from the account of, or debiting the account of, the 
applicant, the bank is free to honour the credit from its own assets. The bank might 
therefore preserve its reputation by taking the risk of honouring the credit. In this 
                                                          
823 Section 37 (1) Senior Courts Act 1981; American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396.   
824 American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] F.S.R. 101, 107.  
825 RD Harbottle (Mercantile) Ltd v National Westminster Bank Ltd [1978] QB 146, 155 per Kerr J. 
826 Elinger and Neo, The Law and Practice of Documentary Credit, (1st edn, 2010) 159.  
827 RD Harbottle (Mercantile) Ltd v National Westminster Bank Ltd [1978] QB 146, 155 per Kerr J; Czarnikow-
Rionda Sugar Trading Inc v Standard Bank London Ltd [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 187, 191. 
828 RD Harbottle (Mercantile) Ltd v National Westminster Bank Ltd [1978] QB 146, 155 per Kerr J; Bolivinter Oil 
SA v Chase Manhattan Bank NA [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 251, 257; United Trading Corp SA v Allied Arab Bank Ltd 
[1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 554, 566; Tukan Timber Ltd v Barclays Bank Plc [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 171, 174; 
Consolidated Oil Ltd v. American Express Bank Ltd [2002] C.L.C. 488, 497- 498.  
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case, the bank would be protected by the assurance of reimbursement from the 
petitioner’s cross-undertaking in damages and proffered security, and applying the 
balance of convenience test such an injunction should be granted where, as above 
mentioned, there is strong corroborative evidence of both the fraud and the 
beneficiary’s knowledge of the fraud..  
 
5.3.27 Moreover, where the purpose of the interlocutory injunction is to restrain the 
beneficiary from presenting documents in furtherance of a fraud the bank’s 
reputation will not be adversely affected, since in that event the bank is not the party 
being restrained and may not even be a party to the action.829 Any suspension of the 
principle of appearance would not be taking place as between the bank and 
beneficiary or applicant but between the applicant and the beneficiary and the 
undermined. Alternatively, a Mareva830 injunction to restrain the beneficiary from 
dissipating his assets might be an adequate protection for the applicant where 
sufficient assets of the beneficiary are susceptible to the jurisdiction of the court.  
 
5.3.28 Jordanian law. Granting interim and ex parte injunctions must relate to categories 
which are spelled out in the Jordanian Civil Procedures Rules (1988) as follows:  
 
“1) Urgent matters that it is feared that they might disappear by the elapsing of 
time;  
2) to consider requests for appointment of a guardian on money, or prohibitory 
seizure, or guardianship, or travel bans;  
3) an urgent detection to prove a state of affairs;   
4) to hear a witness that it is feared that his testimony might disappear by the 
elapsing of time...”.831   
                                                          
829 Themehelp Ltd v West [1996] Q.B. 84.  
830 Mareva Compania Naviera SA v International Bulkcarriers SA (1975) 2 Lloyd's Rep. 509.  
831 Article 32 Jordanian Civil Procedural Rules (1988).  
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5.3.29 Unlike English law, there is an exclusive list of categories for an interim injunction. 
However, there is no direct underlying policy of “just and convenient” under 
Jordanian law for granting interim injunctions as will be explained below. There are 
no guidelines under Jordanian law that the court must follow in order to grant an 
injunction, and there are no doctrinal rules for injunctions in documentary credits. 
Under Jordanian law the initial task for the court is to scrutinise whether the subject 
matter of the application for the injunction fits into one of the exclusive categories, 
and in that the court has a wide discretion that is not doctrinally structured by 
particular guidelines. So, the initial question for granting an interlocutory injunction 
to restrain the payment in documentary credits is whether the restraint of payment 
in the case of fraud in a documentary credit is an urgent matter that might be 
defeated by the lapse of time. Of course, the court follows any precedent of the Court 
of Distinction in respect of a state of affairs that is categorised as a valid subject for 
interim injunctions.832 There is a decision by the Court of Distinction treating an 
application to temporarily prevent the operation of a written debt as a valid subject 
fitting into the categories of interim injunctions.833 By analogy, it is submitted that 
the prevention of payment under a documentary credit to a fraudulent beneficiary 
fits into the first category of article 32 of the Jordanian Civil Procedures Rules (1988), 
given the fact that fraud is a well-established exception to the autonomy principle in 
Jordanian law. 834 
 
5.3.30 There is no public access in Jordan to the Courts judgments regarding injunctions to 
restrain payments under documentary credits. However, the empirical findings did 
reveal that many interlocutory injunctions were granted by Jordanian courts to 
restrain payment under documentary credits.835  They also reveal that the success 
                                                          
832 The Formation and Structure of Courts Law (No. 17, 2011). 
833 Court of Distinction (Civil), 568/1994, http://www.lob.gov.jo. 
834 Court of Distinction (Civil), 1215/2005, Alkurtas programme. 
835 Annex I, para 42. 
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or otherwise of those applications might not even differ according to whether or not 
the beneficiary is domiciled within the Jordanian jurisdiction.836 Thus, the Judges in 
the interviews emphasised the strength of the application of the policy that courts 
will not let their process be used by fraudsters with Judge A stating “I am not going 
to enforce a payment to a fraudster”.837 In this spirit, the empirical findings indicate 
that courts are willing to grant injunctions to restrain the issuing bank from payment, 
even where the payment had already been made to the beneficiary by the confirming 
bank.838 So, the confirming bank which innocently pays out to the fraudulent 
beneficiary might not be able to enforce its right to reimbursement from the 
Jordanian issuing bank. This might damage the reputation of Jordanian banks as 
trusty providers for documentary credits, but the Judges are of the opinion that it is 
up to the issuing bank which wishes to preserve its reputation to voluntarily 
reimburse the confirming bank from the issuing bank’s own account.839  Accordingly, 
the tangible effect is that the priority for the Jordanian legal order is to protect 
innocent applicants. The fact that many injunctions were granted under Jordanian 
law is clearly due to the lack of the requirement for any balance of convenience. 
Such a fact may also indicate that the standard of evidence for the fraud exception 
at the pre-trial stage is not as strong as it is under English law, and an inference can 
be drawn from the empirical evidence that the degree of the beneficiary’s knowledge 
as to fraud need not be actual knowledge but can extend to constructive 
knowledge.840   
 
Types And Effects Of Fraud In Documentary Credits  
5.3.31 Fraud might occur in the issue or presentation of the documents specified by a 
documentary credit or in the formation or performance of the contracts touching and 
                                                          
836 Annex I, para 42.  
837 Annex I, para 42.  
838 Annex I, para 43.  
839 Annex I, para 43.  
840 Annex I, para 42: it can be inferred from the provided example by Judge A.   
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concerning documentary credits. The former can be characterised as documentary 
fraud and the latter as non-documentary fraud. 
 
DOCUMENTARY FRAUD 
5.3.32 Infringement of the appearance principle. A fraud in the issue or presentation 
of documents is the most common fraud in documentary credits. If Municipal  legal 
orders were to allow documentary fraud to unravel the payment and reimbursement 
obligations under documentary credits, then that would lead to the departure from 
the appearance principle. Based on the common policy behind the fraud exception 
under English and Jordanian laws that the guilty party should not be assisted by the 
court,841 the beneficiary of the credit must be guilty of fraud in order to permit the 
infringement of the appearance principle.842 It is submitted that only a fraudulent 
misstatement, or forgery, in documents misrepresenting the actual facts that are 
required to be documentary proved by the credit with the knowledge of the 
beneficiary justifies the departure from the principle of appearance. This principle is 
based on the presumption of the honesty of the beneficiary and once the beneficiary 
can be seen to be dishonest that presumption is rebutted and the principle of 
appearance ought to collapse.843 In that event, the actual conformity of documents 
would then be required; namely; the examination of documents to determine 
conformity would involve the question of whether documents actually represent the 
true facts or not. Although documentary fraud usually relates to a misstatement of 
fact in connection with the underlying contract, the deliberate presentation of false 
documents by the beneficiary infringes the principle of appearance and not the 
                                                          
841 Above para 5.3.4-7. 
842 Above para 5.3.13.  
843 In the context of demand bonds a statement by Lord Dinning in Edward Owen Engineering Ltd v Barclays 
Bank International Ltd [1978] 1 Q.B. 159, 171 suggests that a bank’s duty to pay is  conditional upon the honesty 
of the demand: cited with approval by Mance LJ in Solo Industries UK Ltd v Canara Bank [2001] EWCA Civ 104; 
[2001] 1 W.L.R. 1800, [10]; it was expressed by the Court of Distinction that a documentary credit is a 
transaction that is assumed to be based on honesty: Court of Distinction (Civil), 1215/2005, Alkurtas programme.  
286 
 
autonomy principle. Accordingly the right of the beneficiary to payment is not 
dependent upon the rights of the applicant against the beneficiary.  
 
5.3.33 Scenario and claims. A documentary fraud commonly occurs when the beneficiary 
knowingly presents documents that appear to be in conformity but which in fact 
misrepresent the actual facts required to be proved by the credit844 (e.g. a false 
statement as to the date of the bill of lading). The issuing or confirming bank is 
entitled to refuse to honour the credit if it discovers the documentary fraud, by or 
with the actual knowledge of the beneficiary, before payment. Similarly the bank is 
entitled to recover the money as paid under a mistake of fact if it finds out after 
payment.845 If the bank fails to satisfy its evidential burden at trial, the bank would 
be liable to the beneficiary for non-payment,846 and might also be liable to the 
applicant for breach of contract. The bank will in most cases also suffer damage to 
its reputation.847 Where the issuing bank requests the confirming bank, or other 
nominated bank, to refrain from payment the other bank might nevertheless choose 
to make payment. In this situation, the issuing bank might apply for an injunction to 
restrain the other banks from payment, refuse to reimburse them, or sue them for 
wrongful reimbursement as the case may be.848 Where the applicant, as in most 
cases, requires the bank to restrain the payment, the applicant would have the 
burden of proving the fraud and the beneficiary’s complicity in the fraud.849 In this 
situation, it is the applicant who might apply for an interlocutory injunction to restrain 
payment, refuse to reimburse the issuing bank, or sue it for wrongful reimbursement. 
However, documentary fraud could also arise both where a confirming or nominated 
bank passes the documents with the knowledge of the documentary fraud by the 
                                                          
844 United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1983] 1 AC 168; Standard Chartered Bank 
v Pakistan National Shipping Corp [2001] Q.B. 167; Court of Distinction (Civil), 1215/2005, Alkurtas programme. 
845 Bank Russo-Iran v Gordon, Woodroffe & Co. Ltd (Unreported), October 3, 1972 per Browne J. 
846 United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1983] 1 AC 168.  
847 RD Harbottle (Mercantile) Ltd v National Westminster Bank Ltd [1978] Q.B. 146, 155 per Kerr J; Czarnikow-
Rionda Sugar Trading Inc v Standard Bank London Ltd [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 187, 191.  
848 Court of Distinction (Civil), 1215/2005, Alkurtas programme.  
849 Above para 5.3.1.  
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beneficiary and, more extraordinary, where an issuing bank conspires with the 
beneficiary to defraud the applicant.    
 
5.3.34 Material fraud. A documentary fraud must be material in order to be an operative 
exception to the appearance principle. The idea of material misstatement or false 
statement was highlighted by the House of Lords in United City Merchants 
(Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada850 in which little guidance was given 
regarding the meaning of material. It is suggested in Jack in Documentary Credits 
that a misstatement is material where it affects the conformity of documents.851 For 
example, if the actual date of 16th in the bill of lading in United City case was not 
falsified to be 15th but 17th, the fraud would have been immaterial to the credit 
obligation. It is submitted that the material misstatement requirement also applies 
under Jordanian law. Since false statements in documents cannot be an actionable 
delusion without onerous disadvantage.852 This being manifested in a documentary 
presentation by some representation of fact that is essential to the conformity of the 
documents as in Exports and Imports Bank v Jordanian Ahli Bank.853 Similarly, for a 
fraudulently false statement to be actionable under Jordanian law as fraud, the false 
statement must affect conformity.   
 
Non-documentary fraud  
 
5.3.35 A non-documentary fraud is fraud that is committed in the underlying contract or 
any one of the operative documentary credit contracts but is not related to the 
presented documents in that the presented documents truly represent the actual 
facts required to be proved by the credit. In this context, it is submitted that a 
distinction must be drawn between a non-documentary fraud in the credit contract 
                                                          
850 [1983] AC 168, 184-185.  
851 Malek and Quest, Jack: Documentary Credits, (4th edn, Tottel 2009) para 9.17. 
852 Article 145 Civil Code (1976).  
853 Court of Distinction (Civil), 1215/2005, Alkurtas programme.  
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itself between the issuing or confirming bank with the beneficiary, and a non-
documentary fraud in the other operative contracts or the underlying contract.  
 
5.3.36 Fraud in the credit contract between the bank and the beneficiary. On the 
one hand, giving effect to the legal consequences to a fraud that is committed in the 
credit contract between the issuing, or confirming, bank and the beneficiary does not 
impeach the principle of autonomy. Here, such fraud is to be considered as a 
challenge to the validity of the credit contract itself between the beneficiary and the 
bank.854 Fraudulent misrepresentation makes the contract voidable under English 
law in that the injured party is entitled to rescind the contract ab initio855 (i.e. the 
contract is set aside for all purposes)856 but must provide restitution subject to its 
right to damages in tort for deceit. The consequence of rescission for delusion 
combines with onerous disadvantage under Jordanian law is substantially the same 
as under English law857 albeit, unlike English law, the injured party has the right to 
claim damages based on contract.858 However, fraudulent misrepresentation or 
delusion might render the contract void (i.e. the contract is treated as if it had never 
existed so that under English law innocent third parties disadvantaged by the 
invalidity have no protection in equity) where the fraud destroys the parties’ 
substantive agreement so as to amount to a common mistake at law.859 The refusal 
of payment on the basis of fraud in the credit contract itself does not require the 
bank to know, or to involve itself in, disputes between the beneficiary and the 
applicant. 
 
                                                          
854 Bolivinter Oil SA v Chase Manhattan Bank NA [1984] 1 W.L.R. 392, 393.  
855 Johnson v Agnew [1980] AC 367; Beale and others (eds), Chitty on Contracts (31st edn, Sweet and Maxwell 
2012) para 6.111.  
856 Peel, Treitel The Law of Contract, (12th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2007) para 9.81. 
857 Article 204 Civil Code (1979), Article 300 Civil Code (1976); Court of Distinction (Civil), 3837/2009, Adalah 
Programme; Court of Distinction (Civil), 1082/1987, http://www.lob.govjo; Court of Distinction (Civil), 
845/1988, http://www.lob.govjo; Court of Distinction (Civil), 3308/1999, http://www.lob.govjo.   
858 Aljbouri, The Concise in the Explanation of Jordanian Civil Code, (1st, 2011) 456.  
859 Bell v Lever Brothers Ltd [1932] AC 161.  
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5.3.37 Fraud in the underlying or operative contract. On the other hand, giving effect 
to the legal consequences of a fraud that is committed in the underlying contract, or 
any of the other operative documentary credit contracts would impeach the principle 
of autonomy, since the right of the beneficiary to payment under a documentary 
credit would be dependent upon the rights of the applicant or other parties against 
the beneficiary. The question is whether or not such fraud justifies the infringement 
of the principle of autonomy. To answer this question it is essential to draw a 
distinction between fraud in the formation of the underlying or operative contract 
and fraud in the performance of that contract. 
 
5.3.38 Fraud in the performance. It is postulated that fraud in the performance of the 
underlying contract (i.e. a deliberate breach by for instance agreeing to sell petrol 
but subsequently shipping crude oil) only taints the documentary credit contract 
between the beneficiary and the bank if it is a documentary fraud. It is neither 
understandable, nor justifiable, to allow to infringe the principle of autonomy on the 
basis of fraud in the performance of the underlying contract where the fraud does 
not relate to facts which are required to be proved by the presented documents. 
Unlike demand bonds, the role of documents in documentary credits is essential for 
they function as a documentary proof of performance of certain contractual terms 
that are perceived by the buyer as being essential for the security of his bargain.860 
It is not surprisingly therefore that Browne J underlined the right of the bank to 
refuse payment under documentary credits on the basis of a documentary fraud.861 
Moreover, the policy, under English and Jordanian laws, that courts will not allow 
their process be used by a dishonest person should not be so rigorously applied as 
to disentitle the beneficiary from benefiting from the credit contract simply because 
he is dishonest in the performance of the underlying contract. This would, as 
                                                          
860 Elinger and Neo, The Law and Practice of Documentary Credit, (1st edn, Hart 2010), 143.  
861 Bank Russo-Iran v Gordon, Woodroffe & Co. Ltd (Unreported), October 3, 1972; Edward Owen Engineering 
Ltd v Barclays Bank International Ltd [1978] 1 Q.B. 159, 171, 172.    
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submitted, undermine the security of the credit by admitting the possibility of 
numerous claims for restraining the payment in documentary credits on the basis of 
a deliberate breach in the performance of underlying contracts. 
 
5.3.39 Fraud in the formation. By contrast, it is postulated that the policy, under English 
and Jordanian laws,862 courts will not allow their process be used by a dishonest 
person should necessarily apply to the situation where a fraud is committed by the 
beneficiary in the formation of the contract underlying the documentary credit 
contract between the beneficiary and the bank, otherwise a fraudster would be 
allowed to set up a sham transaction of which the documentary credit would be an 
integral part. In this scenario, the applicant, who is usually the buyer, is the victim 
of fraudulent misrepresentation that induces him to enter into the underlying sale 
contract.863 Unlike fraud in the performance of the contract, he will not be able to 
require a documentary proof of performance in the credit since the fraud preceds the 
credit.864 Thus, impeachment of the principle of autonomy should be justified for 
fraud in the formation of the underlying contract. Fraudulent misrepresentation 
vitiating the underlying contract, or any one of the operative documentary credit 
contracts, gives rise to rescission under English and Jordanian laws.865 As a 
consequence of the policy courts will not allow their process be used by a dishonest 
person for fraud exception under English and Jordanian laws, only fraud on the part 
of the party ascertaining rights under the credit should justify the departure from 
the autonomy principle. Thus, the invalidity of the contract between the issuing bank 
and the confirming bank by reason of fraudulent misrepresentation should only 
                                                          
862 English law: United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1983] AC 168, 183 per Lord 
Diplock; Jordanian law: Hadith of the Prophet Mohammad, Narrated by Abul-Hussain Muslim son of Habaj son of 
al Nishapuri, Sahih Muslim Book 10 Business Transactions.  
863 As it was alleged by the applicant in Czarnikow-Rionda Sugar Trading Inc v Standard Bank London Ltd [1999] 
2 Lloyd’s Rep 187.  
864 This would include the situation where the credit contract is opened as a financial facility to a third party 
contracting with the applicant who lends its name for opening a documentary credit: Czarnikow-Rionda Sugar 
Trading Inc v Standard Bank London Ltd [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 187.  
865 For general principles of rescession n the basis of fraud: English law: Johnson v Agnew [1980] AC 367; 
Jordanian law: Article 204 Civil Code (1979), Article 300 Civil Code (1976); Court of Distinction 3837/2009 (Civil) 
Adalah Programme; Court of Distinction 1082/1987 (Civil) http://www.lob.govjo; Court of Distinction (Civil), 
845/1988, http://www.lob.govjo; Court of Distinction 3308/1999 (Civil) http://www.lob.govjo.   
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discharge the confirming bank’s binding unilateral offer or the credit contract to the 
beneficiary where the beneficiary is complicit as to the fraud. Similarly, as explained 
above under the heading of knowledge, fraud on the part of the beneficiary should 
not affect a bank’s right to reimbursement where it pays against conforming 
documents unless the bank has knowledge or is complicit as to the fraud at or prior 
to the time of payment.   
 
5.3.40 Demand bonds to be distinguished. Lord Denning eloquently described the nature of 
demand bonds in Edward Owen Engineering Ltd v Barclays Bank International Ltd866 
by saying:   
 
“These performance guarantees are virtually promissory notes payable on demand. 
So long as the Libyan customers make an honest demand, the banks are bound 
to pay”.867  
 
Thus, unlike documentary credits, the role of documents in demand bonds functions 
as being a mere notice, usually as to the breach of the performance of the underlying 
contract,868 triggering the demand of payment upon which the bank is 
unconditionally obliged to honour as long as the beneficiary is honest in making the 
demand. It follows a fraud that is committed by the beneficiary in the performance 
or formation869 of the underlying contract in order to demand payment under the 
bond is to be considered as a dishonest demand which permits the infringement of 
the autonomy principle. Such an application of the fraud exception being broader in 
demand bonds than in documentary credits might be the reason that most cases of 
                                                          
866 [1978] 1 Q.B. 159, 172.  
867 Edward Owen Engineering Ltd v Barclays Bank International Ltd [1978] 1 Q.B. 159, 171, 172.  
868 See for instance: Kvaerner John Brown Ltd v Midland Bank Plc [1998] C.L.C. 446.  
869 Themehelp Ltd v West [1996] Q.B. 84. 
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fraud exception to the principle of autonomy under English law are in respect of 
demand bonds.870  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
870 Edward Owen Engineering Ltd v Barclays Bank International Ltd [1978] 1 Q.B. 159, 172-173; Bolivinter Oil 
SA v Chase Manhattan Bank NA [1984] 1 Llyod’s Rep 251; United Trading Corp SA v Allied Arab Bank Ltd [1985] 
2 Lloyd’s Rep 554, 561; GKN Contractors Ltd v Lloyds Bank Plc (1985) 30 B.L.R. 48, 63; Themehelp Ltd v West 
[1996] Q.B. 84; Turkiye Is Bankasi AS v Bank of China [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 250, 253; Balfour Beatty Civil 
Engineering v Technical & General Guarantee Co Ltd [2000] CLC 252; Solo Industries UK Ltd v Canara Bank 
[2001] EWCA Civ 1041; [2001] 1 W.L.R. 1800; Consolidated Oil Ltd v American Express Bank Ltd [2002] C.L.C. 
488, 495; Banque Saudi Fransi v Lear Siegler Services Inc [2007] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 47; Enka Insaat Ve Sanayi AS v 
Banca Popolare dell'Alto Adige SpA [2009] EWHC 2410 (Comm); [2009] C.I.L.L. 2777; RD Harbottle (Mercantile) 
Ltd v National Westminster Bank Ltd [1978] Q.B. 146, 155-156; Tukan Timber Ltd v Barclays Bank Plc [1987] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep 171, 174; Kvaerner John Brown Ltd v Midland Bank Plc [1998] C.L.C. 446.  
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ILLEGALITY 
General View 
5.4.1 Illegality as an abstract term is recognised under English law without being 
authoritatively classified or categorised. Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston871 distinguish 
between illegal and void contracts, whereas Treitel distinguishes between legal 
wrong and public policy.872 The different approaches in classification amongst 
scholars do not represent disagreements regarding the substance of law. This 
chapter adopts the pragmatic approach as to the classification of illegality under 
English law undertaken in Chitty on Contracts. The classification is based on the 
effects of illegality which are contingent on whether illegality occurs in the formation 
or the performance of the contract.873 Jordanian law does not linguistically recognise 
the use of the abstract term of “illegality”, but its meaning in terms of committing a 
legal wrong (i.e. a forbidden act by a statute)874 or an act that is contrary to public 
policy and good morals has an effective operation under Jordanian law. The notion 
of public policy denotes to the common good and interest of the society and social 
justice as perceived by society. Public policy is a dominant social norm that is 
contingent on time, place, manners, morals and politic and economic conditions.875 
Such meanings collectively constitute the term illegality, likewise is used in this 
research in relation to Jordanian law. 
 
5.4.2 How illegality occurs in documentary credits. Illegality might occur in the 
following legal relationships within and in connection to a documentary credit chain 
of contracts or legal relationships. (1) Illegality in the documentary credit itself 
between the issuing or confirming bank and the beneficiary and in such a situation 
the general illegality principles of the law apply without the engagement of the 
                                                          
871 Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston, Law of Contract, (15th edn, Butterworths Asia 2007). 
872 Peel, Treitel The Law of Contract, (12th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2007). 
873 Beale and others (eds), Chitty on Contracts, (31st edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2012), para 16.007. 
874 Articles 163 and 165 Civil Code (1976). 
875 English law: Buckley, Illegality and Public Policy, (2nd edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2009); Jordanian law: Jordan 
Laws and Rules, Memorandum of Clarification of Civil Code, (1977), 159. 
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principle of autonomy. (2) Illegality in one of the operative contracts in the 
documentary credit and such illegality would not justify the infringement of the 
autonomy principle where the payment of the credit to the beneficiary does not assist 
the realisation of the illegal operative contract. (3) Illegality in the underlying 
contract of the documentary credit which has the potential to infringe the principle 
of autonomy to the effect that the payment in the issuing or confirming bank credit 
contract with the beneficiary must not be performed due to the illegality in the 
underlying contract.      
 
Meaning Of Illegality 
ENGLISH LAW 
5.4.3 Illegality as to formation. For the purpose of exposition, there are two limbs of 
illegality as to the formation of the contract. Firstly, the apparent terms of the 
contract necessarily involve breaching a civil statute, criminal law or public policy. 
Secondly, the contractual parties intend to enter into the contract for an unlawful 
purpose or to perform the contract in an illegal way.   
  
5.4.4 In respect of the first limb the civil illegality arises where the making of the contract 
is prohibited by a civil statute generally (e.g. trading in whisky when forbidden),876 
or where the parties agree to do the act that violates a civil statute (e.g. the financial 
value for the work exceeds the maximum permitted level without license)877 or where 
the parties agree to avoid a statutory requirement the consequence of is to render 
the contract illegal or unenforceable as a whole as indicated by the statute (e.g. a 
licence being required by both parties for a sale of linseed oil).878 Criminal illegality 
occurs where the term of the contract necessarily involves committing an offence 
                                                          
876 Foster v Driscoll [1935] AC 148: the case was regarding smuggling whisky; Mohamed v Alaga & Co [2000] 1 
W.L.R. 1815; Archbolds (Freightage) Ltd v Spanglett Ltd [1961] 1 Q.B. 374, 388. 
877 Frank W. Clifford Ltd v Garth [1956] 1 W.L.R. 570.  
878 Re Mahmoud and Ispahani [1921] 2 K.B; Levy v Yates (1838) 8 A. & E 129.  
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under Common law (e.g. a contract to publish criminal libel879 or blasphemy),880 or 
under statute (e.g. infringing food and drug legislation881 or exchange control 
legislation882 or the making of  a bribe pursuant to the Bribery Act 2000). Contracts 
contrary to public policy in international trade are mainly those contracts that involve 
trading with an enemy883 or deceiving a public authority (e.g. where an integral part 
of the contract is to illegality evade tax revenue).884 In this limb (i.e. as to the 
formation of the contract) illegality generally renders the contract unenforceable 
against both parties regardless of the knowledge of the parties.885  
 
5.4.5 Secondly, the contractual parties intend to enter into the contract for an unlawful 
purpose (e.g. the contract appears to be a sale of goods but in reality it aims to 
defeat the enforcement of exchange control regulation,886 or an insolvent debtor 
undertakes payment obligations so as to defraud creditors,887 the offering of inflated 
share prices to rig a financial market),888 or to perform the contract illegally889 or use 
the lawful subject matter of the contract for an upcoming unlawful purpose (e.g. the 
sale of juices to illegally flavour beer).890Illegality under this second limb is clearly 
relevant to ostensibly lawful documentary credit contracts entered into for an illegal 
purpose891 that is not remote to the contract.892 However, knowledge of such illegal 
purpose by both contracting parties is essential for that contract to be considered 
illegal under this limb.893 Thus there must be an unlawful conspiracy by both parties 
                                                          
879 Fores v Johnes (1802) 4 Esp 97.  
880 Cowan v Milbourn (1867) L.R. 2 Ex. 230; cited; Beale and others (eds), Chitty on Contracts (31st edn, Sweet 
and Maxwell 2012), para 16.014.  
881 Langton v Hughes (1813) 1 M. & S. 593; Askey v Golden Wine Co [1948] 2 All E.R. 35. 
882 Bigos v Bousted [1951] 1 All E.R. 92. 
883 Ertel Bieber & Co v Rio Tinto Co [1918] AC 260, 273, 289. 
884 Miller v Karlinski (1945) 62 T.L.R. 85; Napier v National Business Agency [1951] 2 All E.R. 264; Beauvale 
Furnishings Ltd v Chapman [2000] All E.R. (D) 2038.  
885 Beale and others (eds), Chitty on Contracts, (31stedn, Sweet and Maxwell 2010), para 16.007. 
886 As claimed by the confirming in United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1983] AC 
168.  
887 Begbie v Phosphate Sewage Co Ltd (1875) L.R. 10 Q.B. 491; Cockshott v Bennett (1788) 2 T.R. 763.  
888 Scott v Brown [1892] 2 Q.B. 724; cited;.Harry Parker Ltd v Mason [1940] 2 K.B. 590.  
889 Apthorp v Neville (1907) 23 T.L.R. 575; cf; Stoneleigh Finance Ltd v Phillips [1965] 2 Q.B. 537, 572, 580.  
890 Langton v Hughes (1813) 1 M. & S. 593; cf; Gas Light & Cake Co v Turner (1839) 6 Bing. N.C. 324; Peel, 
Treitel The Law of Contract, (12th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2007) para 11.19. 
891 Alexander v Rayson [1936] 1. K.B. 169.  
892 21 st Century Logistic Solutions Ltd v Madysen Ltd [2004] Lloyd’s Rep 92. 
893 Ashmore, Benson, Pease & Co Ltd v A.V Dawson Ltd [1973] 1 W.L.R. 828; Beale and others (eds), Chitty on 
Contracts, (31st edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2012), para 16.010.  
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and not merely an intent on one party to use a contract for an illegal purpose.894 If 
there is only an illegal intention by one party that would not make the contract illegal 
per se - as it could still be performed by the other party - but merely disentitle the 
person with the illegal motive from enforcing the contract. The innocent party can 
only enforce the contract if the enforcement does not necessarily involve the 
commission of a legally objectionable act.895 Yet, the innocent party can sue for the 
quantum merit (i.e. measure of damages) of what it has lawfully done in the 
contract.896 Once the innocent party learns about the illegality mode of the 
performance it must not participate in the illegality and should make all reasonable 
efforts to prevent the illegal performance. But where the innocent party learns that 
the other party may have an unlawful purpose then such knowledge does not count 
unless the innocent party participates in carrying out the illegal purpose.897 It is 
suggested by some scholars that knowledge without participation is sufficient to 
establish illegality if the unlawful purpose engages grave illegality.898  
 
5.4.6 Illegality as to performance. The other type is illegality as to the performance of 
the contract. Here the parties do not have the intention when they enter into the 
contract to perform the contract in an illegal way, rather illegality occurs when one 
or both parties commit an objectionable legal act in the course of the performance 
of the contract. As, for instance, where a carriage contract was illegal because both 
parties were complicit in the overloading of a lorry.899 The unlawful act never 
prevents the innocent party from enforcing the contract but may prevent the guilty 
party from doing so if the law is such as to prohibit such contractual performance 
and not merely penalise the unlawful act.900 Where the statute does not clearly 
                                                          
894 Waugh v Morris (1872-73) L.R. 8 Q.B. 202, 207-208; Mason v Clarke [1955] AC 778, 793, 805.  
895 Mason v Clarke [1955] AC 778, 793, 805.  
896 Beale and others (eds), Chitty on Contracts (31st edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2012), para 16.011.  
897 Beale and others (eds), Chitty on Contracts (31st edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2012), para 16.011. 
898 Buckley, Illegality and Public Policy, (2nd edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2009) para 4.21-27.  
899 Ashmore, Benson, Pease & Co Ltd v A.V Dawson Ltd [1973] 1 W.L.R. 828.  
900 St John Shipping Corporation v Joseph Rank Ltd [1957] 1 Q.B. 267, 283; Peel, Treitel The Law of Contract, 
(12th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2007) para 11.20. 
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provide for a contractual consequence in the event of a statutory offence, then courts 
will assume no contractual consequence attends the statutory offence. This is due to 
the fact that some parties might otherwise be treated unjustly by being unfairly 
enriched or impoverished, since illegality in English law, unlike in Jordanian law, 
operates bluntly by eliminating contractually rights entirely or not at all.901 The 
contract might be held illegal if the other party participates in the unlawful act, as 
the participation might be regarded as proof that the parties had the intention, when 
they entered into the contract, to perform it illegally.  
 
5.4.7 Severance. Interestingly, there might be an application to the doctrine of severance 
in illegality in the sense that the legal parts of the contract might be enforced 
provided that the illegal elements of the contract can lawfully be severed from the 
remainder of the contract. This is only possible where the contractual consideration 
is not deemed entire in which case the illegality would render the contract 
unenforceable as a whole. Where the contractual bargain between the parties is not 
entire, but can be seen to be divisible into clearly distinguishable lawful and unlawful 
parts then the court might enforce the lawful part by applying the blue pencil test to 
strike out the unlawful parts.902 For instance, in Frank W. Clifford Ltd v Garth903 the 
contracted work violated a statute because its value exceeded the maximum 
permitted level and the court enforced the contract up to the permitted value. 
Another example is that of a stipulation in restraint of trade which may merely render 
that condition unenforceable without affecting the enforceability of other contractual 
terms.904 The doctrine of severance does not apply where there is a criminal 
illegality,905 because the gravity of criminal illegality engages the need to protect the 
public.  
                                                          
901 St John Shipping Corporation v Joseph Rank Ltd [1957] 1 Q.B. 267, 288; Beale and others (eds), Chitty on 
Contracts (31st edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2012), para 16.149-154.  
902 Peel, Treitel The Law of Contract, (12th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2007) para 11.51. 
903 [1956] 1 W.L.R. 570.  
904 Rock Refrigeration Ltd v Jones [1997] 1.C.R. 938, 948, 953.  
905 Beale and others (eds), Chitty on Contracts, (31st edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2010), para 16.007.  
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JORDANIAN LAW 
 
5.4.8 Illegality under Jordanian law is associated with a want of legality in the subject 
matter (i.e. goods in sale of goods) and the cause of the contract (i.e. both the 
presumed cause of the contractual obligation and the underlying purpose of the 
contract).906 The aim of the latter element of cause is to ensure the lawfulness of the 
contract.907 Accordingly, illegality affects the validity of the contract only where it 
occurs in the formation of the contract. The Jordanian Civil Code simply provides that 
a contract is unenforceable where the subject matter908 or the cause909 of the 
contract is prohibited by law or is contrary to the public policy and public morals of 
Jordanian law. So, as under English law, the contract is unenforceable where the 
subject matter (e.g. wine in the sale of wine) or the substantive purpose (e.g. sale 
of grapes for the manufacture of wine) of the contract as evidenced by the stipulated 
terms of the contract is illegal. Also, a contract that appears legal is unenforceable 
where the guilty party, with the knowledge of the other party,910 actually enters into 
the contract with an unlawful purpose.  
 
5.4.9 Under Jordanian law, the scope of illegality is narrower than its scope under English 
law. Thus, under Jordanian law illegality is not merely confined to the formation of 
the contract, but also further to the fundamental elements of that formation which 
are identified as the subject matter and cause. But it is not clear what the position 
would be where an innocent party had lawfully entered into a contract and discovered 
later that the purpose of the other party was unlawful, or that in reality the 
                                                          
906 Articles 165, 166 Civil Code (1976); Aljbouri, The Breif of Explanation the Jordanian Civil Code, (1st, 2011) 
269. 
907 Ibn Qayem Aljawzeiah, I'laam ul Muwaqqi'een 'an Rabb il 'Aalameen (Information for Those who Write on 
Behalf of the Lord of the Worlds) (1320 AD), republished, (2000) 96, 98 Dar Albayan publication; cited; Jordan 
Laws and Rules, Memorandum of Clarification of Civil Code, (1977), 166. 
908 Articles 88 and 163 Civil Code (1976). 
909 Article 165 Civil Code (1976).  
910 Jordan Laws and Rules, Memorandum of Clarification of Civil Code, (1977), 167.  
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performance of the contract would necessarily involve unlawfulness. It is submitted 
that in this situation the guilty party cannot rely on illegality to invalidate what has 
been performed in the contract.911 Still it is not clear whether the parties are obliged 
either to render, or to stop, further performance of such a contract. Interestingly, 
under Jordanian law where some parts of the illegal contract are legal and their 
consideration or price is determinable and can be severed from the illegal cause or 
subject matter, then such parts are enforceable (e.g. a contract to sell both sardine 
and tuna might be enforced for tuna even if illegal for sardines).912 Contracts that 
are contrary to public policy in international trade are mainly those contracts of which 
their subject matter or cause involves breaching revenue laws (e.g. custom and tax 
revenues and exchange control regulation) or breaching criminal laws (e.g. trading 
with an enemy913 or criminal libel914) or committing civil wrongs (e.g. attempting by 
a contractual condition to exclude liability for breach of tortious or contractual 
duties).915 There is an overriding respect under the Jordanian legal order for the 
doctrine of “unjust enrichment” even in the case of illegality, so the innocent or guilty 
person who is unjustly enriched in an illegal contract is liable to relinquish any unjust 
enrichment.916   
 
Illegality In The Documentary Credit Itself Between The Bank 
And The Beneficiary 
 
5.4.10 For illegality in the documentary credit contract between the issuing, or conforming, 
bank and the beneficiary, the general illegality principles of law apply. In this case, 
the principle of autonomy is not engaged and thus no real difficulty would arise. A 
                                                          
911 As can be inferred from article 238 Civil Code (1976).  
912 Article 169 Civil Code (1976); Jordan Laws and Rules, Memorandum of Clarification of Civil Code, (1977), 
174. 
913 Article 118 Criminal Code (1960). 
914 Articles 132, 189, 195 and 197 Criminal Code (1960). 
915 Aljbouri, The Breif of Explanation of the Jordanian Civil Code, (1st, 2011) 244-246.  
916 Article 293 Civil Code (1976). 
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clear example is where the issuing of the credit is prohibited as the beneficiary for 
instance is from an enemy country. Another example is where the issuing of the 
credit is lawful but at the time of honouring the credit it has become illegal to honour 
the credit because the beneficiary is from a country that has become an enemy to 
the bank’s country or due to a governmental order prohibiting the banks to honour 
the credit.917 The second type is where the documentary credit is set up by the 
beneficiary as a facility to further an illegal act. This might occur in practice where a 
documentary credit is a facility to achieve money laundering, disguised money 
exchanging, defrauding creditors, abusing tax or revenue regulations or commercial 
bribery. 
 
5.4.11 United City Merchants. In addition to the issue of documentary fraud, as explained 
above, the English case United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of 
Canada918 provides an example of the second type of illegality in the credit itself 
where part of the payment under the documentary credit was a facility to contravene 
exchange control restrictions. Here, an English company sold a glass-fibre making 
plant to a Peruvian company and participated in a scheme whereby a US Dollar price 
was doubled to enable the Peruvian company to exchange Peruvian currency for the 
artificially increased contract price and thereby avoid Peruvian exchange control 
regulations. In connection with the transaction, a documentary credit – subject to 
the UCP (1974) - for both the genuine and fictional increased contract price was 
issued by Banco Continental S.A in Peru and confirmed by Royal Bank of Canada, 
the defendant, in London. The seller assigned its rights to the United City Merchants 
(Investments) Ltd. The confirming bank, Royal Bank of Canada, refused to honour 
the credit contending that the contract of sale was contrary to Peru's exchange 
control regulations and the UK was bound to give effect to such a foreign regulation 
                                                          
917 After the ending of Iraqi regime in 2003 the Jordanian government ordered banks in Jordan to restrain 
payments of letters of credit to Iraqi beneficiaries as many credits involved transactions for the previous Iraqi 
government.  
918 [1983] AC 168. 
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since both the UK and Peru were contracting states (“members”) to the International 
Monetary Fund Treaty (“Bretton Woods Agreement” having the force of law in the 
UK by the delegated legislation).  
 
5.4.12 It was held by the House of Lords that the documentary credit payment was 
enforceable to the extent that it represented the true price of the sale contract. In a 
judgment agreed by all their Lordships Lord Diplock elucidated that the task of the 
court was to look at the substance of the transaction to which the enforcement of 
the contract will give effect in order to: 
 
“Penetrate any disguise presented by the actual words the parties have used, to 
identify any monetary transaction ... which those words were intended to conceal 
and to refuse to enforce the contract to the extent that to do so would give effect to 
the monetary transaction”.919 
 
5.4.13 It was held that since it was not difficult to identify the monetary transaction that 
sought to be concealed by the actual words of both the documentary credit and the 
sale contract, only that part of the payment in the documentary credit that related 
to the monetary transaction was unenforceable. Although the policy that a court 
must not lend its aid to enforce the contract that is unenforceable by law was 
applicable, and thus the court must take the point itself, there was no illegality since 
the statue that had been breached was a non-UK statute and the effect of such a 
breach, pursuant to article VIIII (2) (b) of Bretton Wood Agreement, was to treat 
the transgressed act as unenforceable and nothing more.920 Since the documentary 
credit was a facility to conceal the breach of the exchange control regulation the 
principle of autonomy was not engaged because the documentary credit contract 
was itself violating the legislation,921 although it was not the payment of the money 
                                                          
919 United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1983] AC 168, 190-91 per Lord Diplock.  
920 United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1983] AC 168, 189 per Lord Diplock.  
921 Enonchong, The autonomy principle of letters of credit: an illegality exception? [2006] L.M.C.L.Q, 406-407.  
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per se that was unenforceable but only the inflation of the contract price in the 
underlying contract. 
  
Illegality In One Of The Other Operative Contracts Of The 
Documentary Credit  
 
5.4.14 Illegality in one of the other operative contracts might occur in practice where the 
documentary credit contract of the issuing bank with the applicant, or the indemnity 
contract with the confirming bank, becomes illegal if the countries of the parties issue 
orders or enact laws prohibiting trading with each other. There is no direct authority 
under English and Jordanian laws regarding this issue. According to the general 
illegality principles under Jordanian law, the confirming bank might argue that 
because the cause of the contract with the beneficiary is the indemnity contract of 
the confirming bank with the issuing bank once the latter contract becomes illegal 
with the knowledge of the beneficiary the credit contract with the beneficiary would 
become illegal.922 However, pursuant to the left hand of the principle of autonomy 
the documentary credit contract between the issuing or confirming bank and the 
beneficiary should not be affected by the illegality of the operative contracts. Indeed, 
since the payment of the credit does not assist the realisation of the illegal contract 
between the confirming bank and the issuing bank it is not justifiable to infringe the 
principle of autonomy for such illegality. Although the confirming bank would not be 
able to enforce the indemnity contract with the issuing bank due to the supervening 
illegality, it is a risk that banks must bear when they issue or confirm documentary 
credits as they promise to facilitate a secure method of payment and thus to honour 
the credit regardless to the banks circumstances. Under the general illegality 
principles of English law the credit contract with the confirming bank would be 
                                                          
922 Above para 5.4.8. 
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enforced as the beneficiary would not base its claim on the illegal contract between 
the issuing bank and the confirming bank.923  
 
Illegality In The Underlying Contract 
 
5.4.15 The principle of autonomy would imply that illegality in the underlying contract ought 
not to affect the documentary credit contract between the issuing, or confirming, 
bank and the beneficiary. In that event, the beneficiary’s payment right would be 
secure notwithstanding such illegality. Can this implication from the principle of 
autonomy be sustained even where the cause of illegality is a serious crime such as 
a sale of heroin924 or a supply of arms to an enemy?925 The answer must surely be 
in the negative because both the payment through the documentary credit is actually 
the payment or the consideration for such illegal contracts to the effect that it assists 
the realisation of these contracts, and such actions have been made illegal as they 
have the potential to cause grave harm to society. Thus it is essential that legal 
orders ensure high protection for society against such harm. The need for such 
protection needs to overrule other norms such as the norm of autonomy which 
materialises that documentary credits are a secure means of payment for sellers. 
Conversely, should the autonomy principle always be relegated below the illegality 
norms whatever – and however minor – the illegality in the underlying contract? For 
instance should the principle of autonomy be laid aside simply because the 
beneficiary in the performance of the underlying C.I.P. sale contract breaches the 
law by sending goods on an unlicensed means of transport, or the quantity of goods 
to be imported exceeds the maximum amount permitted in the applicant’s country, 
or where the applicant, unbeknown to the beneficiary, had not procured the requisite 
importation licence? In order to address the inquiry we need to appreciate the 
                                                          
923 Holman v Johnson (1775) 1 Cowp. 341, 343. 
924 Mahonia Ltd v JP Morgan Chase Bank (No.1) [2004] EWHC 1938, 2026 (Comm). 
925 As suggested by Staughton LJ in Group Josi Re v Walbrook Insurance Co Ltd [1996] 1 W.L.R. 1152, 1163.  
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competing policies and norms of illegality in the context of documentary credits first, 
then to analyse the current position of English and Jordanian laws and finally it will 
be proposed when illegality in the underlying contract ought to be recognised as an 
exception to the autonomy principle under legal orders.    
 
COMPETING POLICIES AND NORMS 
 
5.4.16 Moral justification. Four dominant policies give rise to the law of illegality under 
the English enrichment norms. The autonomy norm (i.e. including the principles of 
independence and appearance) can also be seen as an opposing policy, even though 
it merely sounds in normative a fiction that connected contracts, and the documents 
they generate, are autonomous. Firstly, respect for the normative effect of 
mandatory law expressed in the English and Jordanian legal orders by the principle 
of parliamentary sovereignty (i.e. if something is forbidden it must not be done).926 
Secondly, the policy underlying the law of illegality is the protection of public 
interests and morals,927 particularly where an action is criminalised.928 The third, 
being generated from the second policy and has a higher formal realisability, is the 
policy under English law expressed by the maxim ex dolo malo non oritur actio (i.e. 
no court will lend its aid to a person who founds his cause of action upon an immoral 
or illegal act)929 and the doctrine under Jordanian law that the contract is 
unenforceable where its cause is illegal with the knowledge of the parties.930 The 
fourth is expressed by the maxim ex turpi causa non oritur action that “courts will 
not recognise a benefit accruing to a criminal from his crime”931 and therefore courts 
                                                          
926 Pickin v British Railways Board [1974] 2 W.L.R. 208; Jordanian Constitution (1952) chapter 5.    
927 The Law Commission (The Law Commission, The Illegality Defence, Consultation Paper 189, para 2.5: 
http://lawcommission.justice.govuk/docs/cp189_Illegality_Defence_Consultation.pdf) identified six rationales 
policy triggering illegality: (1) furthering the purpose of the rule which the claimant’s illegal behaviour has 
infringed; (2) consistency; (3) the need to prevent the claimant profiting from his or her own wrong; (4) 
deterrence; (5) maintaining the integrity of the legal system; and (6) punishment. Except the first rationale the 
Commission did not provide decisive evidence as to the application of other rationales in the context of civil 
illegality.    
928 Smith and Hogan, Criminal Law, (13edn, OUP 2013) para 1.3.1.  
929 Holman v Johnson (1775) 1 Cowp. 341, 343 per Lord Mansfeild.   
930 Articles 165, 166 Civil Code (1976).  
931 Beresford v Royal Insurance Company Limited [1938] AC 586, 599 per Lord Atkin.  
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will not lend their aid to a guilty person to be benefited from his illegal act.932 The ex 
turpi causa policy intersects with partially opposing equitable and unjust of each 
other and underlying facts. In consequence the policies of parliamentary sovereignty, 
the protection of society as a whole and ex turpi causa provide a moral justification 
for illegality to infringe the autonomy norm. But the application of those policies 
might, however, be unruly and be the cause of uncertainties, which could threaten 
the stability of transactions and undermine the security of documentary credit 
transactions.  
 
5.4.17 Rational justification. However, the whole basis of the rational justification for the 
illegality exception is questionable, particularly in the context of international trade, 
because of the absence of transparency (i.e. both the problem of access to laws933 
and the problem of access to information concerning the underlying transaction). 
Thus, unlike fraud, there are many different types of illegality and these vary greatly 
internationally even across the legal orders that might operate in the same 
documentary credit transaction. Also in illegality, the confirming bank will face the 
dilemma of dealing with foreign laws in many cases, particularly since illegality often 
relates to the violation of the regulations of the buyer’s country when the confirming 
bank is operating in the seller’s country. Given the needs for assurance of 
reimbursement, manageable examination and speed banks do not enter 
documentary credit contracts with the expectation that they will have an extra duty 
to scrutinise both the laws appertaining to the underlying transaction and the 
underlying transaction itself. Given the growth of statutory law under legal orders, 
trading parties might unintentionally violate laws and even with careful scrutiny 
banks may well not be able to uncover such violations. Indeed the problem of the 
absence of transparency as to underlying performance and access to laws generates 
                                                          
932 Holman v Johnson (1775) 1 Cowp. 341, 343 per Lord Mansfeild.  
933 Access to law is regarded as one of the eight principles of the rule of law identified by Lord Bingham extra 
judicially: Bingham, The Rule of Law, [2007] The Cambridge Law Journal (66), 76. 
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uncertainties that open the door for unnecessary litigation, and serves to encourage 
traders (acting without good faith, who simply aim to escape from their contractual 
obligations) to raise illegality as a defence to their payment obligation. Still the scope 
of illegality is broad under some jurisdictions (e.g. in the USA penalty clauses render 
the contract illegal) to the effect that permitting any type of illegality to interfere 
with the principle of autonomy might capture many documentary credits and thus 
undermine the reputation of documentary credits as being a secure method of 
payment. Hence, the focal issue is not whether an infringement or exception to the 
autonomy principle is right or wrong in itself, rather the issue is the containment of 
the effects of the exception on the security of documentary credits. Accordingly, an 
illegality exception to the principle of autonomy needs to be designed in a way that 
is responsive to the need of legal orders to safe guard society and the competing 
needs of the banks and traders as to the maintenance of the security of documentary 
credits in the absence of transparency as to illegality norm.      
 
THE PRESENT POSITION OF ENGLISH AND JORDANIAN LAWS 
5.4.18 English law. Although there is no decisive authority under English law regarding 
the illegality exception there are judicial opinions clearly supporting the recognition 
of illegality that has the effect of prohibiting the whole contract, whether it is civil or 
criminal illegality, as an exception to the autonomy principle where there is clear 
evidence of illegality with the knowledge of the bank prior the payment of the credit.   
 
5.4.19 In Group Josi Re v Walbrook Insurance Co Ltd934 the underlying reinsurance 
contracts of the letters of credit, or demand bonds,935 were alleged by the reinsurer 
to be illegal as the reinsurer was not authorised to carry out their business in the UK 
                                                          
934 [1996] 1 W.L.R. 1152. 
935 They are called as letters of credit in the judgment but they have the function of demand bonds as they are 
set up to secure the right of insurance companies to draw on the credit in the case the liability for outstanding 
loss reserves under the reinsurance company’s umbrella quota share facilities.  
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pursuant to the Insurance Companies Act 1982. The reinsurer succeeded in issuing 
an injunction restraining the beneficiaries, insurance companies, from drawing on 
the letters of credit on the ground that the credit was tainted by the illegality of the 
underlying reinsurance contract. In the Court of Appeal Staughton LJ stated obiter 
that:  
 
“In my judgment illegality is a separate ground for non-payment under a letter of 
credit ... Take for example a contract for the sale of arms to Iraq, at a time when 
such a sale is illegal. The contract provides for the opening of a letter of credit, to 
operate on presentation of a bill of lading for 1,000 Kalashnikov rifles to be carried 
to the port of Basra. I do not suppose that a court would give judgment for the 
beneficiary against the bank in such a case”.936    
 
Staughton LJ considered that if the underlying reinsurance contracts were illegal the 
court would restrain the payment under the letters of credit, because the latter would 
have been used to carry out an illegal transaction. The learned judge went on to hold 
that the performance of letter of credit would be illegal if the beneficiary in the letter 
of credit would rely, or found its action, on the illegal contract to draw on the credit. 
He held that since beneficiaries in the Group Josi case must present a debit covering 
the liability for outstanding loss reserves under the reinsurance company’s umbrella 
quota share facilities, their drawing on the letters of credit would be illegal. The 
leaned Judge was inclined that illegality, as fraud, would “have to be clearly 
established and known to the bank before it could operate as a defence, or a ground 
for restraining payment by the bank”.937  
 
5.4.20 In Mahonia Ltd v JP Morgan Chase Bank (No.2)938 the issuing bank West Bank 
accepted the application of Enron Corporation, one of the most successful companies 
                                                          
936 Group Josi Re v Walbrook Insurance Co Ltd [1996] 1 W.L.R. 1152, 1163. 
937 Group Josi Re v Walbrook Insurance Co Ltd [1996] 1 W.L.R. 1152, 1163.  
938 [2004] EWHC 1938 (Comm).  
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worldwide at that time, to issue on 5th of October 2001 a standby letter of credit (i.e. 
demand bond) in support of the swap transaction between ENAC the subsidiary of 
Enron and Mahonia. The beneficiary Mahonia was entitled to draw $165 million on 
presentation of a statement of an event of default by ENAC. On 2nd of December 
2001 Enron went into Chapter 11 Bankruptcy and subsequently Mahonia presented 
a statement of ENAC’s default demanding the payment under the bond. But, West 
Bank refused to honour the demand bond on the ground of illegality, alleging that 
the underlying purpose of the transaction as a whole, including the swap contracts 
and the demand bond, was unlawful. West Bank alleged that the swap transaction 
was a disguised loan to enable Enron to manipulate its corporate accounts in contrary 
to the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and the USA Securities 
Exchange Act 1934. At first instance, Cook J held that there was no proof of breach 
of the 1934 Act (and thus no illegality) but in the course of his judgment he went on 
to elucidate, as obiter, how illegality would be considered as an exception to the 
autonomy principle had the facts of illegality been established. The Judge explained 
that if the parties to the underling contract including the beneficiary, Mahonia, were 
complicit in an attempt to breach the laws of a foreign friendly country the court 
would not enforce the swap contracts and the demand bond. Cook J considered how 
the demand bond could have been regarded as being sufficiently close to the illegality 
of the underlying contract to justify the interference with the principle of autonomy.  
 
5.4.21 Thus Cook J considered that the test of reliance set out, as obiter, by Staughton LJ 
in Group Josi Re v Walbrook Insurance Co Ltd939 was not effective to determine the 
degree by which it can be said that a letter of credit is tainted by the illegality in the 
underlying contract, because in the Mahonia the fact that the beneficiary presented 
a document stating that the applicant went into bankruptcy - which was sufficient to 
draw on the credit – was not based on the alleged illegal swap contracts. As an 
                                                          
939 [1996] 1 W.L.R. 1152. 
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alternative test, Cook J opined that the demand bond would have been tainted by 
illegality (had there been proof of illegality) as it was an important part of the scheme 
to facilitate the unlawful accounting, even though the demand bond – unlike the 
swap transaction - was not directly connected to the accounting malpractice. He 
considered that this conclusion was confirmed by the following assumptions:  
 
“Furthermore, had the L/C's not been provided by October 9 th, the Swap 
transactions would have been terminated. Thus the L/C was brought into existence 
for the very purpose of being part of what was, on this hypothesis, an unlawful 
scheme... Equally, the doctrine of taint could be seen to apply inasmuch as the L/C 
is analogous to a form of security for the performance of ENAC's obligations ... so 
that the L/C was part of the overall arrangements and shared the same common 
purpose, since without it the transaction would not have gone ahead ”.940   
 
5.4.22 In addition, the learned judge considered that a breach of the USA Security Exchange 
Act 1934 would have given rise to illegality, and not a mere unenforceability, as 
there would have been an element of deceit or intentional wrongdoing triggering two 
of the dominant policies underpinning illegality under English law. Namely, in the 
absence of any issue of parliamentary sovereignty, that courts will not lend their aid 
to enforce an unlawful purpose and the protection of public interests and morals 
where the unlawfulness is such as to engage public policy.  
 
5.4.23 Jordanian law. Given the fact that illegality as an exception to the autonomy 
principle is not the subject of discourse amongst Arabic commentators, it is perhaps 
not surprising that the defence of illegality in documentary credits has not arisen 
before Jordanian courts.941 However, the empirical findings indicate that judges are 
                                                          
940 Mahonia Ltd v JP Morgan Chase Bank (No.2) [2004] EWHC 1938, 2026 (Comm). 
941 The interviewed judges expressed the view that they have never heard about illegality exception to the 
autonomy principle in documentary credits: Annex I, para 44.   
310 
 
not willing to enforce payment under a documentary credit where the subject matter 
of the underlying contract could under Jordanian law be considered a grave crime 
such as the sale of heroin.942  
 
A PROPOSAL FOR ILLEGALITY EXCEPTION 
 
5.4.24 English judicial opinions, as explained above, support the view that illegality whether 
criminal or civil, that has the effect of rendering the underlying contract as being 
prohibited,943 is an exception to the autonomy norm where it taints documentary 
credits.944 Staughton LJ provided the reliance test as explained above to determine 
the degree of connection that permits illegality in the underlying contract to interfere 
with the autonomy principle.945 Such a test was later challenged by Cook J who 
provided an alternative test for a sufficient connection in that the credit must be set 
up in the beginning as an integral part of the illegal scheme.946 Professor Enonchong 
has suggested, quite rightly in the researcher’s opinion from the perspective of the 
autonomy principle, that the enquiry should not be to establish the degree of 
connection between the illegality of the underlying contract and the documentary 
credit but rather to establish the degree of knowledge on the part of the 
beneficiary.947 Being the payment or the reward for an underlying contract, the 
documentary credit is by default an integral part to the underlying contract. Thus 
the payment of the credit to the guilty beneficiary might simply be considered as a 
reward for his illegal act. The present research builds on that approach and proposes 
analyses as to the degree and the time of the beneficiary’s knowledge that is required 
to infringe the autonomy principle. Furthermore, Staughton LJ opined that illegality 
                                                          
942 Annex I, para 44.  
943 Harris, The EC REACH Regulation and contractual supply obligations, [2010] J.B.L. (5), 394, 407-411. 
944 Group Josi Re v Walbrook Insurance Co Ltd [1996] 1 W.L.R. 1152, 1163; Mahonia Ltd v JP Morgan Chase 
Bank (No.2) [2004] EWHC 1938, 2026 (Comm).  
945 Group Josi Re v Walbrook Insurance Co Ltd [1996] 1 W.L.R. 1152, 1163. 
946 Mahonia Ltd v JP Morgan Chase Bank (No.2) [2004] EWHC 1938, 2026 (Comm).  
947 Enonchong, The autonomy principle of letters of credit: an illegality exception? [2006] L.M.C.L.Q, 408.  
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with the knowledge of the bank must be clearly established by strong evidence,948 
such requirements are adopted in proposing illegality exception in this research in 
addition to offer further analysis as to the degree and the time of such knowledge. 
It is argued that beneficiary’s knowledge, strong evidence and seriousness of 
illegality (i.e. deliberate wrongdoing by the beneficiary)949 narrow the potential broad 
application of illegality exception under English law.950  
 
5.4.25 Nevertheless, the dogmatic view simply rejects illegality as an exception to the 
embedded usage of autonomy due to the potential broad application of illegality. 
This is the convenient view in the USA as illegality has a broad application under 
both US federal and state laws with illegality extending, for example, to penalty 
clauses.951 This approach interacts with the policies underpinning illegality in the 
sense that it is repugnant to the public conscience to enforce payment under a 
documentary credit for the type of illegality - in the underlying contract or operative 
credit contracts - that is considered as a grave crime such as a sale of heroin and 
the bank might be held criminally liable for the payment of a crime. McLaughlin thus 
argues in the USA for criminal illegality as being capable to infringe the autonomy 
principle.952 To ensure the narrowness of the illegality exception it is submitted that 
the seriousness of illegality ought to denote both criminal illegality that has the effect 
of prohibiting the contract and civil illegality that also has the effect of prohibiting 
the underlying contract in addition of having the element of deceitful wrongdoing. 
Also, the actual knowledge of the bank as to such illegality must be required to the 
effect that the lack of such knowledge protects the right of banks for reimbursement.   
 
                                                          
948 Group Josi Re v Walbrook Insurance Co Ltd [1996] 1 W.L.R. 1152, 1163. 
949 The element of deliberate wrongdoing being an important factor to apprehend serious illegality as was implied 
in Mahonia Ltd v JP Morgan Chase Bank (No.2) [2004] EWHC 1938, 2026 (Comm).  
950 Enonchong, The autonomy principle of letters of credit: an illegality exception? [2006] L.M.C.L.Q, 408, 417. 
951 Enonchong, The autonomy principle of letters of credit: an illegality exception? [2006] L.M.C.L.Q, 408.  
952 McLaughlin, Exploring Boundaries: A Legal and Structural Analysis of the Indepndence Principle of Letter of 
Credit Law, [2002] Banking LJ 521; McLaughlin, Letters of credit and illegal contracts: the limits of the 
independence principle, [1988] 49 Ohio St. L.J. 1197.  
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Types of illegality to infringe the autonomy principle 
 
5.4.26 It is submitted that criminal illegality, with the knowledge of the beneficiary and with 
the actual knowledge of the bank as explained below, in the underlying contract 
which renders the consideration, or the promise, of that contract unenforceable or 
void is the first type of illegality that should be permitted to infringe the principle of 
autonomy. Of course, an action is criminalised under a legal order for the protection 
of the whole society and for the safeguarding of a state, and the level of the 
engagement of such policy varies according to the severity of the crime as perceived 
by the state. Clearly punishment and deterrence are viable policies for criminal 
illegality, but ostensibly they have no application to civil illegality.953 Also the maxim 
ex turpi causa emanate from the criminal context under English law,954 and it is not 
generally applicable to civil illegality.955 Being the policy triggering the fraud 
exception under English and Jordanian laws the ex turpi causa has an application in 
the context of criminal illegality where the beneficiary is guilty of such illegality.956 
Criminal illegality that renders the contract void or unenforceable involves any 
criminal illegality known by the parties at the formation of the contract under English 
and Jordanian laws,957 or a criminal illegality in the performance that renders - under 
the applicable law - the underlying contract void or unenforceable (e.g. lawful sale 
of coffee but the seller in the performance of the contract uses slave workers to 
produce the coffee). Where the committed crime in the performance of the 
underlying contract does not affect the validity or the enforceability of the promise, 
                                                          
953 Tribe v Tribe [1996] Ch 107, 133-134 per Millett LJ; Tinsley v Milligan [1992] Ch 310, 334 per Ralph Gibson 
LJ; although it was argued by the Law Commission (The Law Commission, The Illegality Defence, Consultation 
Paper 189, par 2.5: http://lawcommission.justice.govuk/docs/cp189_Illegality_Defence_Consultation.pdf) that 
deterrence and punishment were policies underpinning the civil illegality doctrine under English law, the empirical 
findings in their Consultation indicated that just over half of the respondents believed that deterrence is a rational 
policy behind civil illegality and the majority thought that punishment is not a rational policy underlying civil 
illegality.   
954 Beresford v Royal Insurance Company Limited [1938] AC 586, 599 per Lord Atkin.  
955 Except in tort where there is dishonesty: Beale and others (eds), Chitty on Contracts, (31st edn, Sweet and 
Maxwell 2012), para 16.165; under Jordanian law the maxim may operate in dishonesty in the formation of a 
contract: Hadith Narrated by Abul-Hussain Muslim son of Habaj son of al Nishapuri, Sahih Muslim Book 10 
Business Transactions.   
956 Above para 5.3.7.  
957 Above para 5.4.3-8. 
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or the consideration, of the contract under the applicable law entails that the 
enforceability of the contract does not affect the public conscience under that legal 
regime, and therefore such criminal illegality should not affect the payment 
obligations in documentary credits. This has the effect of narrowing the scope of 
criminal illegality in a justified pragmatic way that associates public protection to the 
manifested measures by a state.  
 
5.4.27 However, civil illegality in the underlying contract which renders the consideration, 
or the promise, of that contract unenforceable or void so as to prohibit the contract 
pursuant to a statute triggers the principle of parliamentary sovereignty which is a 
dominant norm under English law, and that might explain why English judges in 
Group Josi and Mahonia are of the opinion to accept such illegality to infringe the 
autonomy norm. But if such civil illegality was truly severe in the sense of affecting 
the whole society, and thus being a supervening norm ousting other norms such as 
the autonomy norm, it would be criminalised by the parliament. Hence, deceitful 
wrongdoing is (i.e. the underlying transaction is set up to deceit third parties and 
the letter of credit is used to secure such transaction) a further qualification that 
should be required, as it was opined per Cook J in Mahonia,958 to civil illegality to 
give effect to the illegality exception, since the ex turpi causa maxim operates under 
such illegality though, unlike fraud exception, is used to prevent deceiving a party 
privy from the letter of credit. Accordingly, it is submitted that such civil illegality is 
the second type of illegality that is qualified to infringe the autonomy norm because: 
(1) having the effect of prohibiting the underlying contract clearly indicates the 
seriousness of illegality, though it is not severe as criminal illegality, and the intention 
of the legislation to safeguard the state;959 (2) having the element of deceitful 
wrongdoing triggers the maxim ex turi causa; (3) the problem of the lack of 
                                                          
958 Mahonia Ltd v JP Morgan Chase Bank (No.2) [2004] EWHC 1938, 2026 (Comm).  
959 For instance REACH Regulation prohibits substances requiring registration to be placed in the market of EEA 
for the objectives of protecting human health, environmnet and the free movement of goods in a single market: 
Harris, The EC REACH Regulation and contractual supply obligations, [2010] J.B.L. (5), 394-419.  
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transparency can be overcome by requiring the actual knowledge of the bank in 
order to protect the bank from unexpected liability as explained below.   
 
Knowledge of the beneficiary 
 
5.4.28 Knowledge is required. To infringe the principle of autonomy for illegality 
committed in the underlying contract without the knowledge of the beneficiary, 
where the payment of the credit does not itself perform an illegal act, is neither 
morally nor rationally justified.960 The maxim ex turpi causa is not applicable in the 
absence of criminality or dishonesty on the part of the beneficiary. A recognition of 
such illegality whether or not the documents are nullity, which is unbeknown to the 
beneficiary, as an exception to the autonomy principle would give the opportunity to 
guilty parties to use documentary credits as means to avoid the consequences of 
their wrongdoing. For instance, the buyer who purchases goods knowing that are to 
be shipped illegally without the knowledge of the seller, might then be granted an 
injunctive relief restraining the bank from payment on the basis of illegality. 
Furthermore such recognition would substantially devastate the security 
underpinning documentary credits given the potential breadth of illegality. Thus the 
knowledge of the beneficiary as to the relevant illegality is essential under English 
and Jordanian laws as it should also be the case under any rational legal order.  
 
5.4.29 Degree of knowledge. Yet, both the degree of the beneficiary’s knowledge and the 
level of proof are contingent on different types of illegality. So, under English and 
Jordanian laws, where the underlying contract is ostensibly illegal in the place of the 
beneficiary’s performance, then the knowledge of the beneficiary is presumed.961 If, 
                                                          
960 Above para 5.4.16.   
961 English law: Waugh v Morris (1873) L.R. 8 Q.B. 202, 208 per Blackburn J; Jordanian law: Aljbouri, The Concise 
In The Explanation Of Jordanian Civil Law, (1st, Wael 2011) 275. 
The sale of goods that are not legally saleable in the buyer’s country with the knowledge of the seller is a valid 
contract for the seller as long as the seller is not obliged to deliver the goods  to the buyer’s  warehouse: Sumner 
Permain and Company v Webb and Company [1922] 1 K.B. 55.   
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however, such underlying contract does not necessarily involve the commission of 
an offence to the effect that the contract may be performed lawfully, then if it is 
performed illegally by a party other than the beneficiary the actual knowledge (i.e. 
including a wilful of shutting eyes) of the beneficiary of the fact of such illegal 
performance must be proved.962 Where illegality in the formation of the underlying 
contract is not apparent (i.e. the parties entered into an ostensibly lawful contract 
to achieve an unlawful purpose or to perform the contract illegally, for example a 
lawful sale of medical thermometers for the unlawful purpose of the use of heroin), 
then the beneficiary’s complicity under English law must include participation (e.g. 
producing unusual thermometers that fit for heroin)963 and it is submitted that should 
also be the case under Jordanian law.964 Illegality in the performance on the part of 
the beneficiary requires the knowledge of the beneficiary as explained above, but if 
that illegality related to the performance of the part of the applicant then the 
participation of the beneficiary is required.965 
 
5.4.30 Time of the beneficiary’s knowledge. For illegality in the formation, it is 
submitted that it must be proved that the beneficiary has knowledge as to the non-
apparent illegality before or at the time when the contractual term for the payment 
by documentary credits in the underlying contract is concluded as it is a proof of the 
beneficiary’s illegal intent at the time of forming the contract. It should not thus be 
sufficient to prove that the beneficiary has knowledge as to the illegality at the time 
of documents presented. For illegality in the performance which renders the contract 
void or unenforceable, it is submitted, the knowledge of the beneficiary must be 
proved prior to the time of honouring the credit, given that the ultimate risk – where 
all the parties are innocent prior the honour of the credit - must rest on the applicant 
                                                          
962 As under fraud exception: above para 5.3.10. 
963 Beale and others (eds), Chitty on Contracts (31st edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2012), para 16.011.  
964 There are two schools under Sharia law regarding this issue where Hanfisim is of the opinion that the contract 
should be valid unless it is ostensibly illegal but Hanabilisim and Malikisim are of the opinion that the apparent 
lawful contract is illegal if the purpose of it is unlawful with the knowledge of the parties: Aljbouri, The Concise 
In The Explanation Of Jordanian Civil Law, (1st, Wael 2011) 275. 
965 For analogy: Ashmore, Benson, Pease & Co Ltd v A.V Dawson Ltd [1973] 1 W.L.R. 828.  
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and as such the beneficiary might enter into new contracts creating obligations upon 
himself on the confidence that the payment of the honoured credit would be realised.   
 
Actual knowledge of the bank and no duty to investigate 
 
5.4.31 Given the absence of transparency of illegality as to the underlying contract and the 
represented facts by documents in documentary credits, as analysed above,966 the 
main problem in the recognition of an illegality exception is the potential exposure 
of banks to the risk of being innocently caught by illegality. The factual matrix that 
the bank is not a contracting party to the underlying contract, is not usually an expert 
in the underlying trade and needs to determine the conformity of documents on their 
face967 within a short period of five banking days968 justify that the bank should not 
be under a duty to investigate the illegality of the presented documents, or of the 
underlying contract.969 As the bank is not obliged to investigate the fraud in 
documentary credits under English law,970 it is fortiori that it is not obliged to do so 
for illegality and that in turn reflects the needs for speed and manageable 
examination. Therefore, for illegality to be recognised as an exception to the 
autonomy principle, the “actual knowledge” of the bank is required. Here it must be 
proved, by the person seeking to restrain the paying bank from payment on the 
ground of illegality,971 that there is a wilful shutting of eyes by the bank to credible 
evidence as to illegality and its “effects” under the relevant law.  
 
5.4.32 The bank’s knowledge in this respect should not include a constructive knowledge 
based on what a reasonable bank should have known and must be established taking 
                                                          
966 Para 5.4.17. 
967 Principle of appearance: article 4 and 14 UCP 600; there is an assumption that the documents are lawful and 
genuine: article 37 UCP 600; chapter 3.  
968 Sub-article 14 (d) UCP 600.  
969 To draw an analogy regarding the absence of transparency for illegality in a context other than documentary 
credits: Bank für Gemeinwirtschaft Aktiengesellschaft v City of London Garages Ltdclose [1971] 1 W.L.R. 149.  
970 Turkiye Is Bankasi AS v Bank of China [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 611, 617; United Trading Corp SA v Allied Arab 
Bank Ltd [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 554, 560; Gian Singh & Co. Ltd. v Banque de l'Indochine [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1234. 
971 By analougy to fraud: Deutsche Ruckversicherung AG v Walbrook Insurance Co Ltd [1995] 1 W.L.R. 1017, 
1030. 
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into account that the bank is not under a duty to make inquiries as to illegality. Only 
where there is credible evidence presented to the bank as to illegality and its general 
effects under the applicable law the bank should proceed in making inquiries to 
ensure the reliability of the evidence and the actual effects of illegality and the extent 
of that obligation should be responsive to the individual circumstances of the bank.972 
The time of the bank’s actual knowledge must be prior to the payment of the 
credit.973 The requirement of actual knowledge should operate as a protective to the 
bank’s right of reimbursement. Therefore where the bank refuses to pay the credit 
on the basis of mere allegation of illegality, without having strong evidence and 
actual knowledge as to the illegality, and it turns out in the judgment that the 
underlying contract is actually prohibited due to criminal or civil illegality with the 
knowledge of the beneficiary the bank would not be liable for refusal of payment. 
One exception to the actual knowledge is to be that for crimes against humanity as 
defined by the Rome Statute of International Criminal Court, the constructive 
knowledge of the bank should be sufficient in relation to the effects of such illegality 
under the applicable law, but not as to the factual occurrence of such illegality in the 
underlying contract.      
 
 
 
 
 
        
                                                          
972 In a different context (trusts) it was said that a wilfully or recklessly failing to make inquiries which an honest 
person would have made constitutes part of actual knowledge: Bank of Credit and Commerce International 
(Overseas) Ltd v Akindele [2001] Ch 437,CA.  
973 By analogy to fraud exception: European Asian Bank AG v Punjab & Sind Bank (No.2) [1983] 1 W.L.R. 642, 
658; United Trading Corp SA v Allied Arab Bank Ltd [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 554, 560; Credit Agricole Indosuez v 
Generale Bank [1999] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 1009, 1015; DCD Factors Plc v Ramada Trading Ltd [2007] EWHC 2820 
(Q.B.), [2008] Bus L.R 654; Group Josi Re v Walbrook Insurance Co [1996] 1 W.L.R. 1152, 1161. 
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EVALUATION OF FRAUD AND ILLEGALITY EXCEPTIONS AND THE 
UCP 
 
Evaluation Under English And Jordanian Laws 
 
5.5.1 Substance and procedures. English and Jordanian laws share the same underlying 
policy for the exception of fraud. Indeed, both legal systems require the knowledge 
of the parties against whom the fraud exception is to be executed. However, the 
tangible results and effects vary. On the one hand, many interlocutory injunctions 
for fraud exceptions have been granted by Jordanian courts.974 On the other hand, 
there are only two cases for fraud where the granting of an injunction was confirmed 
at pre-trial by English courts and those were in respect of demand bonds.975 This is 
mainly due to the procedural rules which differ under these legal systems. It is an 
illustration of how substantive law is affected by procedural law.  
 
5.5.2 No right to response and evidential strength. The problem under Jordanian law 
is that the respondent does not have the right to reply to the application for an 
injunction; the respondent only has the right to appeal against the injunction after it 
has been implemented.976 This right to reply allows the respondent to challenge the 
strength of evidence submitted by the petitioner and the merits of that challenge are 
taken into account by the court when exercising the discretion upon which it decides 
whether to grant or refuse the requested injunction. The risk that arises where the 
discretion is exercised without the input of the respondent is that a door is thereby 
opened for traders – who wish to restrain payment under documentary credits – to 
                                                          
974 Annex I, para 42. 
975 Themehelp Ltd v West [1996] Q.B. 84; Kvaerner John Brown Ltd v Midland Bank Plc [1998] C.L.C. 446: in 
the latter case the issue of balance of convenience was not addressed before the court and therefore the case is 
not to be regarded as an authority as to the availability of injunctions in the light of the balance of convenience.  
976 Article 170 Jordanian Civil Procedures Rules (1988). 
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act in bad faith. Traders may advance allegations of fraud or ostensible illegality on 
the part of the respondent that have no foundation in fact, in the knowledge that a 
court will accept those allegations at face value. 
 
5.5.3 This is a particular issue in the context of allegations of illegality, because of the 
breadth of the illegality concept, and the very significant risk of illegality arising 
without the respondent being party to it, or having any knowledge of it at the 
material time. This would threaten the stability of documentary credits as a reliable 
payment mechanism as genuine payment obligations would be undermined by 
spurious injunctions. For that to be remedied under Jordanian law would require 
revision of the Jordanian Civil Procedures Rules, since the Court of Distinction does 
not itself have the authority to impose conditions on procedural rights for injunctions 
(such as giving the respondent the right to reply). The Court of Distinction could 
nevertheless improve the position significantly by the setting of an appropriate 
guideline as to the strength of the evidence required to obtain an injunction to 
restrain payment under a documentary credit. For instance, guideline can be issued 
to the effect that illegality (and indeed fraud) involving the respondent (or, to the 
knowledge of the respondent at the material time, involving the beneficiary) must 
be the only realistic inference to be drawn from the submitted evidence.      
 
5.5.4 The strictness of the balance of convenience. However, the high resistance by 
the English courts to the issue of injunctions restraining banks from honouring credits 
based on the fraud exception might lead to results that are not in accordance with 
the policy that courts will not let their process be used by a fraudster. Thus the 
English court process might actually benefit fraudsters particularly those who are 
domiciled in a jurisdiction other than the UK, by facilitating their receipt of payment 
under documentary credits so that they achieve their fraudulent aim. It is submitted 
that such results might be avoided if injunctions are sought to restrain the bank from 
honouring the credit from the account of the applicant. In this context, courts could 
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relax the strictness of the application of the balance of convenience as banks have 
the option to pay the credit (to preserve their reputation as a trusted providerof 
payment facilities under documentary credits) from their own assets on the reliance 
that they will be reimbursed by the cross-undertaking of the applicant if fraud is not 
proved at trial.   
 
5.5.5 The applicant must bear the ultimate risk of fraud.  The empirical findings of 
this research indicate that courts in Jordan might issue an injunction or a judgment 
restraining issuing banks from honouring a credit, even where the credit has already 
been paid by the innocent confirming bank.977 This leaves the innocent confirming 
bank without the ability to enforce reimbursement from the issuing bank and is not 
coherent with the policy of whoever commits a fraud is not one of us. Indeed, the 
confirming bank usually adds its confirmation on the basis of the trust and security 
that it will be reimbursed by the issuing bank. The latter relies on the reimbursement 
by the applicant who is the customer, who is usually domiciled in the same country 
as the issuing bank. It is submitted that the applicant, even though innocent, must 
bear the ultimate risk of fraud. Firstly, he is the party who chose to deal with the 
beneficiary in the first place. Secondly, he is the contracting party in the underlying 
contract which is the subject, or at least the cause, of fraud. Thirdly, there is no 
moral justification to invalidate the indemnity agreements in the documentary credit 
between the banks and with the applicant because of fraud in the underlying contract 
of the documentary credit, where the banks make payment without knowledge of 
the fraud. The situation might differ where the issuing bank takes the role as a 
business advisor to the applicant, as in this case it might be appropriate for the 
issuing bank to bear the risk of fraud.  
 
 
                                                          
977 Annex I, para 43. 
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Proposition Under The UCP 
5.5.6 Archetypal issues for legal orders. There is no revision in the UCP and their 
interpretative aids that address the issue of whether fraud and illegality operate as 
exceptions to the principles of autonomy and appearance. It is the ICC’s view that 
the issue of fraud, alike with illegality and enforcement, is the product of the 
applicable Municipal  laws.978 Indeed, it is prudent to appreciate that fraud and 
illegality have the effects of being overriding mandatory doctrines (i.e. they override 
other legal doctrines and communicated trade usages in that the parties cannot 
contract out of them) and thus any communicated agreement or trade practice by 
the international banking community opposing illegality and fraud exceptions would 
be futile. But, does this mean that the issues of fraud and illegality should not be 
addressed by the UCP? Surely this is one area that requires the UCP to exercise its 
power of seduction by nudging legal orders towards appropriate outcomes.  
 
5.5.7 Ambiguity and confusion. The generated data from the interviews that were 
conducted by the researcher with some Jordanian judges indicate that judges are 
keen to deepen their understanding as to the concerns of the actors to documentary 
credits in relation to illegality.979 This might be due to the lack of legal and commercial 
discourse regarding these issues in Arabic countries, and this could also be the case 
for other non-Arabic developing countries. Also, whether illegality in the underlying 
contract is regarded as an exception to the principle of autonomy is still uncertain 
under English law980 and has never been subject to any authority or legal discourse 
under Jordanian jurisdiction. Moreover, the time of the bank’s knowledge as to fraud 
is not certain under Jordanian law and there is a risk that courts might issue 
injunctions restraining the issuing bank from reimbursing the innocent confirming 
                                                          
978 Opinions 2009-2011, R.744.  
979 Annex I, para 44. 
980 Above para 5.4.18. 
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bank, which at the time of making payment had no knowledge as to the fraud.981 
Finally, the strength of evidence in granting an injunction for fraud under Jordanian 
law is questionable because the respondent does not have the right to respond.982    
 
5.5.8 The sociological value underlying documentary credits and the needs of the 
parties must be addressed. It is, therefore, submitted that there is a need to 
buttress the sociological value of the documentary credits (i.e. critical balancing of 
the distinct archetypal security needs of each of the four groups of contracting parties 
who typically transact documentary credits) by explicitly reflecting the respective 
transactional needs of the parties to documentary credits regarding the fraud and 
illegality exceptions. This can be achieved in the UCP through the means of 
communication. This is not to say that the purpose is to regulate by the means of 
certainty how illegality and fraud may be operated as exceptions to the independence 
and appearance principles: because such an attempt would be repugnant to most if 
not all legal orders due to the overriding nature of illegality and fraud norms. Rather, 
it must be the task of the UCP to provide guidance highlighting the sociological value 
underpinning documentary credit transactions and the prominent needs of the 
parties to documentary credits in the context of illegality and fraud. Here, the means 
of flexibility should be paramount in order to ensure the adaptability of such UCP 
guidance across the different range of legal orders and factual circumstances. In 
other words, it must be made clear in any upcoming UCP iteration that the purpose 
is not, and cannot be, to envision legal rules or standard contractual terms, but 
merely to express the expectation of the UCP community as to the narrow operation 
of illegality and fraud against the embedded trade usage of autonomy, in the light of 
the security value underpinning documentary credits and the dominant needs of the 
parties to documentary credits. 
 
                                                          
981 Annex I, para 43.  
982 Article 170 Jordanian Civil Procedures Rules (1988). 
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5.5.9 Of course this should not be taken as inviting legal orders to accept fraud or illegality 
as exceptions to the embedded usage of autonomy. The aim is that such reflective 
guidance would achieve uniformity in the approach, and not in particular rules, 
towards illegality and fraud. Accordingly it is hoped - through the means of 
communication, responsiveness, flexibility and clarity - that an upcoming iteration of 
the UCP would contain an article that is similar to the following proposed provision: 
 
“The fundamental international trade usage of autonomy, including the principle of 
appearance, must be highly guarded in order to facilitate a secure method of 
payment to beneficiaries and to protect banks reputation and their right to 
reimbursement. Fraud and illegality are idiosyncratic issues that are associated to 
Municipal  Laws and are outside the scope of the UCP. It is, however, the expectation 
of international banking community that the Municipal Laws that recognise fraud and 
illegality as exceptions to the fundamental trade usage of autonomy should merely 
permit a narrow application to these exceptions that takes into consideration the 
following.   
 
(i). There must be strong evidence of high probability as to fraud with the actual 
knowledge of the beneficiary and the bank prior to the payment of the credit, and 
the bank is under no obligation to investigate whether there is fraud or not.  
(ii). The type of illegality must be confined to grave crimes, or to an illegal action that is 
regarded as being against the fundamental principles of safeguarding the state. 
(iii). Banks do not have access to foreign laws and to the facts in the underlying contracts, 
they need to examine the documents within a short period of time, they need to 
preserve their reputation and thus they are not obliged to investigate whether there 
is illegality or not.  
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(iv). There must be strong evidence as to illegality, in the underlying contract, with the 
knowledge of the beneficiary and the actual knowledge of the bank prior to the 
payment”. 
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CONCLUSION 
5.6.1 It is postulated that both the principles of independence and appearance constitute 
the embedded trade usage of autonomy, since otherwise the right of the beneficiary 
to payment under a documentary credit would be dependent upon the rights of the 
applicant or other parties against the beneficiary. On the basis of the developed 
conceptual model in chapter 1, the terms of UCP 600 were evaluated (in the context 
of their reiteration of UCP 500) for their transnational effectiveness; particularly as 
to whether they are responsive to the functional nature of the embedded usage of 
autonomy and their clarity and quality of ruleness. A thorough understanding of the 
elements of the embedded usage of autonomy and its functions lays the rational 
ground for the communication of the transaction of documentary credit within legal 
orders.   
 
5.6.2 The principle of independence consists of two hands. The right hand of the principle 
of independence denotes that the documentary credit is independent from the 
underlying contract between the applicant and the beneficiary, whereas the left hand 
means that the operative contracts in the documentary credit are themselves 
independent from one another. Subject to the exceptions generated by Municipal 
legal orders, the right hand of the principle of independence captures all cases and 
has a high quality of “formal realisability” under UCP 600, English law and Jordanian 
law. There is consistency between the positions of UCP 600 and the aforementioned 
legal orders, and this serves both certainty and uniformity. This reflects the notion 
that autonomy is an embedded trade usage for the use of documentary credits that 
operate across borders.983 The new changes in sub-article 4 (b) of UCP 600 heighten 
the protection of the right hand of independence by imposing a duty on the issuing 
bank which is responsive to the legal principle of duty of care under English and 
                                                          
983 Hwaidi and Ferris ‘The Existence of International Unchangeable and Changeable Trade Usage’ (SLS 
Conference, Edinburgh, September 2013) 
<http://archive.legalscholars.ac.uk/edinburgh/restricted/paper.cfm?id=107>. 
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Jordanian laws and such a duty under these legal orders would operate as a general 
rule in the principle of independence which in turn enhances the “formal realisability” 
of the independence principle.  
 
5.6.3 Although, the left hand of the principle of independence is not addressed in UCP 600 
as was the case in the previous iterations, it is well established under English law984 
and there is empirical evidence of its judicial recognition in Jordan since it is part of 
the embedded trade usage of the autonomy of documentary credits.985 It needs 
however to be expressed clearer under these legal orders. In developing countries, 
that have similar conditions to Jordan, such as Egypt, Syria, Kuwait and UAE, where 
there is a need to enrich the legal discourse in documentary credits, a court might 
not take into account the left hand of the principle of independence.986 So the 
contract between the confirming bank and the issuing bank would be rendered void, 
where its cause (i.e. the contract between the applicant and the issuing bank) is void 
for a mistake in the subject matter or for lack of formality. It is hoped that the next 
revision of the UCP would adopt the means of certainty regarding this issue and thus 
would eliminate the lacunae and confirm through clear stipulations the status of the 
left hand of independence as part of embedded usage of autonomy in order to 
promote the commonality of documentary credits. It is hoped that a new revision of 
the UCP would adopt a comprehensive formula in the form of both principle and 
general rule capturing all cases with a high level of “formal realisability”. Such 
formula must therefore define the independence and appearance principles as 
elements of the embedded trade usage of autonomy in order to signify that such 
concepts are international lex mercatoria having a high hierarchical status.  
 
                                                          
984 United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1983] 1 AC 168, 182, 183 per Lord 
Diplock.  
985 Annex I, para 44.  
986 Even where such an approach might threaten the viability of documentary credits in that country.  
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5.6.4 It is necessary to realise that the principle of appearance is a normative presumption 
that the presented documents in documentary credits are lawful and genuine, and 
such a presumption constitutes part of the embedded trade usage of autonomy. Such 
a recognition assists the analysis of the legal effects of fraud under Municipal legal 
orders. UCP 600, as in the previous iteration, has successfully addressed the 
appearance principle by adopting the means of certainty and clarity.   
 
5.6.5 It is a dominant legal communication, or doctrine, under English and Jordanian legal 
orders that courts do not let their process be used by a fraudster, or by a guilty party 
to enforce an illegal act.987 Hence, fraud is a well-established exception to the 
embedded trade usage of autonomy under English and Jordanian laws. To enhance 
the simplicity and precision in dealing with fraud in documentary credits, the 
distinction between the principle of appearance and the principle of independence 
must be emphasised in order to draw a clear distinction between fraud in the contract 
of the beneficiary and the issuing or confirming bank, and fraud in the formation of 
the underlying contract, or in the operative contracts in a documentary credit. 
Accordingly, documentary fraud is the type of fraud that is clearly established as an 
exception to the principle of appearance in the embedded usage of autonomy under 
English and Jordanian laws, to the effect that there is an implied promise as to the 
honesty of the beneficiary in the issuance or presentation of documents and once 
dishonesty of the beneficiary becomes apparent the appearance principle ought to 
collapse.  
 
5.6.6 There is no current English and Jordanian legal authorities dealing with non-
documentary fraud in documentary credits. It is postulated that, where non-
documentary fraud occurs in the credit contract between the bank and the 
beneficiary, the embedded usage of autonomy is not engaged and the general 
                                                          
987 Above para 5.3.4-7. 
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principles of the law of fraud apply. But where non-documentary fraud occurs in the 
performance or formation of the underlying contract or operative contracts, the 
principle of independence in the embedded usage of autonomy would militate against 
it in order to protect its main function, namely, assurance of payment. It is submitted 
that the departure from the independence principle should not be permitted on the 
ground of non-documentary fraud in the performance of the underlying contract or 
operative contracts, as such fraud does not relate to facts which have been required 
to be proved by the presentation of documents. Thus, the role of documents in 
documentary credits is essential, because they function as a documentary proof of 
performance of certain contractual terms that are perceived by the buyer as being 
essential for the security of his bargain. On the other hand, where non-documentary 
fraud occurs in the formation of either the underlying contract or any of the operative 
contracts in the documentary credit transaction, it is suggested that English and 
Jordanian legal orders would recognise such a fraud (when carried out with the 
complicity of the beneficiary) as an exception to the independence principle as the 
fraud would precede, and could therefore undermine, the credit.  
 
5.6.7 The challenge is that courts need to ensure that claims for reliance on the fraud 
exception are genuine (in that fraud has clearly taken place and the person otherwise 
entitled to enforce the payment obligation under the credit had knowledge of the 
fraud prior to them becoming entitled to claim under the credit) and therefore not 
subject to abuse. The requirements are simple in that a bank should not honour the 
credit where there is available strong evidence – given the need for speed the bank 
is not under a duty to investigate in order to find fraud - that the beneficiary is guilty 
of fraud. The bank, however, faces the challenge as to whether or not the evidence 
for fraud is adequately strong to be upheld at trial. 
 
5.6.8 Interestingly, the policies of English and Jordanian law are the same in approaching 
the fraud exception, but the function differs due to the procedural rules. It is almost 
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impossible for the fraud exception to be the subject of abuse under English law due 
mainly to the requirements that: (1) the parties asserting the right to payment under 
the documentary credit have actual knowledge as to the fraud and (2) it be “just and 
convenient” to grant injunctive relief at pre-trial in the context of the disputants’ 
respective security interests. Whilst any injustice vis–à–vis the applicant or another 
paying party is probably alleviated by their right to seek a Mareva injunction or an 
injunction restraining the bank from being reimbursed from the account of the 
applicant.  
 
5.6.9 On the other hand, the empirical findings clarify that in many cases injunctions 
infringing the embedded usage of autonomy were granted under Jordanian law on 
the basis of the applicant’s case for fraud without any careful analysis of either the 
case for fraud or the beneficiary’s involvement in the fraud.988 This of course opens 
the door for a possible acceptance of spurious fraud allegations. It is submitted that 
guidelines should be implemented under Jordanian law as to the strength of evidence 
for injunctions in documentary credit cases. 
 
5.6.10 Yet, the bank faces far more challenges to decide whether or not it is obliged to 
honour the credit where there is an alleged illegality as it is an unruly area that is 
much more complex than fraud partly because, in the context of a transnational 
documentary credit transaction, it often involves the violation of laws which are 
foreign to the confirming bank. There is an absence of transparency in terms that 
banks lack access to both knowledge of the applicable law (unless it be that of their 
own place of business) is the law appertaining and the facts of the underlying 
contract. However, the moral justification for the illegality exception is even higher 
than that of fraud exception. Under illegality, it is not only the principle that courts 
do not let their process be used by the guilty to enforce an illegal act that is engaged, 
                                                          
988 Above paras 5.3.28, 21; Annex I, para; 42.  
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but also that transactions and activities are prohibited and thus illegal frequently to 
protect society as a whole or certain sectors or fundamental concepts in society. If 
such illegal activities are criminalised, it is usually for the protection of society as a 
whole.  
 
5.6.11 To avoid confusion, a distinction must be drawn between: (1) illegality in the 
formation or performance of the credit contract itself between the bank and the 
beneficiary, (2) illegality in one of the operating contracts in the documentary credit 
transactions themselves and (3) illegality in the underlying contract. No difficulty 
arises in the first category as the embedded usage of autonomy is not engaged, so 
the general principles of the law of illegality apply. Under the second category, it is 
submitted that the materialisation of the illegality that would occur in reality would 
not be assisted by the payment of the credit to the beneficiary and therefore, 
particularly where the beneficiary has no knowledge of the illegality, there is no 
justification to infringe the embedded usage of autonomy, although of course it might 
have the effect of denying a bank reimbursement where claimed under an illegal 
credit. English judicial obiter dictum recognises the third category as being an 
exception to the embedded usage of autonomy, but the conditions that need to be 
fulfilled for the exception of the illegality of the third category have never been fully 
addressed. The empirical findings of the present research indicate that Jordanian 
courts are willing to recognise illegality as an exception to the embedded usage of 
autonomy.989  
 
5.6.12 The challenge is how to regulate the illegality exception in a way that both serves an 
appropriately narrow application and accommodates the public policy interests of 
regulating illegal payments. The illegality exception must be sensitive to the 
sociological value of the documentary credit transaction (i.e. critical balancing of the 
                                                          
989 Annex I, para 44.  
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distinct archetypal security needs of each of the four groups of contracting parties 
who typically transact documentary credits) by taking into consideration the 
underlying needs of the parties to documentary credits for an assurance of payment, 
documentary assurance of the shipment of the required goods, speed, manageable 
presentation and manageable examination of documents. Four conditions have been 
suggested and analysed to achieve such an equation, these are that: (1) illegality 
must be confined to criminal and civil illegality in the formation of the underlying 
contract or in the performance of such a contract if that illegality renders the whole 
underlying contract unenforceable by the beneficiary; (2) of requiring the knowledge 
of the beneficiary as to the illegality and allowing the extent of such knowledge to 
vary from that of actual participation to a constructive  knowledge as the extent of 
knowledge required must take into account the nature of the illegality; (3) of 
requiring the actual knowledge of the bank and obviating the bank from any 
obligation to investigate as to whether there is illegality or not; and (4) of requiring 
strong detailed evidence as to illegality rendering it highly probable that the 
transaction is undermined by illegality to the knowledge of the party seeking 
payment.  
  
5.6.13 The understandable need for caution in addressing fraud and illegality in the UCP 
must not be exaggerated. Given the potential risk of exceptions to the embedded 
usage of autonomy being evolved by legal orders worldwide in a haphazard manner, 
which might undermine the sociological value of documentary credit transactions, 
the UCP community must utilise the means of communication to influence legal 
orders towards outcomes that are not repugnant to that value. A UCP provision 
addressing fraud and illegality is the key to materialising how such norms can be 
permitted to infringe the embedded usage of autonomy without being repugnant to 
the sociological value of documentary credit transactions. Such a provision must 
highlight the prominent needs of the parties in the context of the pragmatic 
difficulties of fraud and illegality that face the parties who usually transact 
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documentary credits (i.e.  problems such as the lack of transparency as to national 
laws and as to the underlying transaction and the bank’s need for speed and that  
for the bank’s actions to be tainted with illegality it must be proved that the bank 
has actual knowledge of the illegality). This means of communication can be achieved 
by utilising the means of clarity and flexibility. The means of flexibility is strategically 
crucial to ensure the adaptability of a UCP provision in relation to illegality and fraud, 
so as to avoid the provisions of the UCP being repugnant to legal orders. The content 
of such a provision was proposed in this chapter and it is hoped that a similar 
provision, through the means of reflective flexibility and clarity, might be adopted 
under a prospective UCP iteration. Surely, it is now time for the UCP Drafting Group 
to use the power of seduction to nudge legal orders towards appropriate outcomes. 
The present lacunae in provision only serves to invite further disunity amongst legal 
orders in the formulation and utilisation of fraud and illegality exceptions, which 
disunity could both undermine the sociological value of documentary credit 
transactions and make it too late for the UCP Drafting Group to act.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1.1 The thesis has developed a conceptual model for the evaluation of the transnational 
effectiveness of terms regulating documentary credits, and it was applied in the 
evaluation of UCP 600. Normative effectiveness was central to evaluation because 
the perceived effectiveness, by enabling the parties to realise their ends, will 
determine the reputation of law which will determine its use by being chosen by 
traders and accepted by Municipal legal orders in a transnational context. The 
developed conceptual model was close to the reality of the transaction of 
documentary credits as the perspective of effectiveness was based on the standpoint 
of the bargain at the heart of the transaction of the documentary credit itself. This 
according to John Commons is the harmony of conflicts between parties’ interests. 
At the heart of the conceptual model was the hypothesis that the usages of 
irrevocability, conformity and autonomy are “embedded” to a documentary credit 
transaction to the effect that the absence of any of these embedded usages threatens 
the social validity of documentary credit transactions.   
 
6.1.2  It was from the functions of each of the above embedded usages that the underlying 
contested needs of those parties who typically transact documentary credits were 
rationally deducted, namely: issuing and confirming banks’ needs for assurance of 
payment and speedy manageable examination of documents; applicants’ need for a 
speedy documentary assurance (for the shipment of the required goods) and 
beneficiaries’ needs for a speedy assurance of payment and manageable 
presentation. The sociological value of documentary credits was determined from the 
collective function of the embedded usages of the documentary credit transaction: 
representing the critical balancing of the distinct archetypal security needs of each 
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of the four groups of contracting parties who typically transact documentary credits. 
It is the commonly accepted and applied median compromise that is made concrete 
by the embedded usages. Such a sociological value in addition to the above 
contested needs as well as the functional element of the embedded usages constitute 
the substance of documentary credits.  
 
6.1.3 The second part of the conceptual model was the means that are capable to 
reflectively convey the substance of documentary credits in a determinable way in 
face of both envisaged and foreseen future circumstances. For the UCP (as a body 
of self-regulatory terms) to be selected by the parties the governing rules for their 
transaction they (alike with autopoietic Municipal legal systems) must, by the means 
of responsiveness, be aligned to the substance of documentary credits as 
represented by the embedded usages. They also need to be responsive to 
documentary credits' usages (e.g. peripheral usages as discussed below) and 
practices. Unlike embedded usages however, such peripheral usages and practices 
can be challenged by the UCP, always provided that once the postulated challenges 
by the UCP are rejected by actors (including legal orders), the UCP must give way to 
practices. Still, responsiveness denotes the avoidance of repugnancy to the common 
overriding doctrines of Municipal legal orders.  
 
6.1.4 A further means was certainty in that the parties must have knowledge in advance 
as to their legal position. Terms governing documentary credits must accordingly be 
coherent in achieving uniformity in interpretation. The means of certainty is essential 
for the materialisation of the need of banks and sellers to assurance of payment, and 
in order for certainty to be operative and realised the means of responsiveness 
(discussed above) and clarity (discussed below) must be utilised. On the other hand 
the means of flexibility is important as any transnational norm is not 
comprehensively absolute as it can be subject to overriding mandatory rules of 
Municipal legal orders. Also the means of flexibility is important to reflect the need 
of banks for manageable examination. A fourth means was communication. Given 
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the soft power of acclamation (i.e. acceptance, adoption and encouragement of 
adoption by social actors), the UCP can influence parties and actors involved in 
documentary credits, and third party actors such as legal orders, towards uniform 
outcomes or effects that are consistent with the sociological value of documentary 
credits. Clarity was a fifth means which is essential for the realisation of the purpose 
of all other means. To achieve clarity both the semantic expression and the ordinary, 
or the technical, meaning of the words of a UCP term should convey an obvious 
exclusive interpretation when they are read together with its interpretative aids (the 
guidance of ISBP and ICC Opinions or Papers). Such clarity demands 
comprehensibility, in that UCP terms need to be understandable to the worldwide 
transnational banking, trading and legal audience to which it is addressed. Finally, 
terms governing documentary credits such as the UCP must be cognisant of, and be 
deliberative as to, distinctions in the nature and form of legal rules, distinguishing 
as appropriate between principles, general rules and particular rules (mainly to 
determine the level of formal realisability) as discussed in chapter1.990 
 
6.1.5 The premise in this thesis as to the nature of law was based on the adaptation of 
systems theory. It was contended in chapter 2 that free actors (such as traders, 
bankers or insurers)991 who resolve controversial behaviours by firstly testing them 
against their own usages (so conflicts are defined as divergence of expectation) and, 
secondly, by their actions, classifying them as being acceptable or unacceptable 
(through the use of the code acceptance/rejection) are essentially creating socially 
diffuse law. The element of the ‘sense of being binding’ in usages, as confirmed by 
the empirical findings in this research,992 is essential for the operation of the code 
acceptance/rejection. Such a normative proposition of usages in relation to locality 
or a particular transaction (as it must have some means of functional coherence at 
                                                          
990 Para 1.2.26. 
991 On the basis of exchange on intangibles in social groups under a system of exchange in the free market: 
Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory, (1st ed Harvard University Press 1990) ch 2.    
992 Annex I, para 12.  
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a particular time) generates the further structural components of process, decision 
and identity that form lex mercatoria.  
 
6.1.6 It was postulated in chapter 2 that the peripheral aspect of usage (i.e. the absence 
of which does not threaten the existence or viability of the relevant transaction) must 
be expressly distinguished from the embedded aspect of usage. Although the 
empirical findings of this research indicated that being perceived as binding is an 
essential element to elevate the level of practice to usage (and this is a shared 
element between peripheral and embedded aspects of usage),993 it is only embedded 
usages of transnational commercial transactions that can be regarded as an 
international lex mercatoria capable of binding Municipal legal orders and overriding 
not only inconsistent default legal norms, but also inconsistent mandatory laws that 
are not fundamental and overriding.  
 
6.1.7 Unlike peripheral usages, the decision by a Municipal legal order to refuse recognition 
of, or to dramatically change, an embedded usage of a particular transaction would 
functionally lead to a rejection of the whole transaction. Parties in a transnational 
context could not be expected to choose a governing law that consistently failed to 
meet their needs. Hence, given the force of globalisation, the soft power of 
international acclamation (acceptance and application by actors across borders) has 
equipped transnational embedded usages with a normative force having the potential 
to become part of the structure of many Municipal legal orders without the need to 
fulfil their external criteria (known as de jure usage). Thus the embedded usage of 
irrevocability was accepted in Hamzeh Malas Sons v British Imex Industries Ltd994 
regardless of the fact that it violates the Common law requirement that consideration 
be reciprocal. The embedded usage of irrevocability was established under both the 
                                                          
993 Annex I, para 12.  
994 [1958] 2 Q.B. 127, 129.  
337 
 
English995 and Jordanian 996 legal orders without the need to be proved by expert 
evidence; the inference must be that the embedded usage of irrevocability is well-
known law.   
 
6.1.8 The deletion of the reference to revocable documentary credits in article 2 of UCP 
600 reflects the normative force of the embedded usage of irrevocability, and was a 
necessary change to be responsive to the sociological value of documentary credits. 
Article 1 of UCP 600 provides now that documentary credit parties need to 
“expressly” incorporate the UCP into their documentary credit contracts. This is due 
to the fact that the application of the UCP is not embedded usage: it is peripheral 
usage in Jordan as indicated by the empirical findings of this research997 and it does 
have the force of law by legislation in many legal orders or in case law as under 
English law and many legal orders. Yet an expressed incorporation as to the 
application of the self-regulatory rules of the UCP warrants a high hierarchical status 
for the effectiveness of the application of UCP 600. Such a change is responsive to 
the freedom to contract as perceived by many legal orders. It was finally evaluated 
in chapter 2 that there is a lack of clarity in UCP 600 as to the status of the UCP 
interpretative aids and such evaluation is confirmed by the empirical findings in this 
research.998 It is to be hoped that the status of the UCP’s interpretative aids will be 
expressly addressed in future texts of the UCP.   
  
6.1.9 Chapter 3 went on to investigate the sociological meaning of the embedded usage 
of conformity. It was postulated that since the embedded usage of conformity 
encounters the opposing security needs of the parties to documentary credits, it has 
become an elastic concept. In sociological terms, it can be regarded as a wide scale 
concept capable of having divergent meanings some of which are very close to the 
                                                          
995 Hamzeh Malas Sons v British Imex Industries Ltd [1958] 2 Q.B. 127.  
996 Court of Distinction (Civil), 152/1975, Adalah Programme. 
997 Annex I, para 12.  
998 Annex I, para 14. 
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main function of the usage of conformity (i.e. documentary assurance for buyers), 
whereas some other meanings travel between, or serve, various other functions (e.g. 
seller’s security to have manageable presentation) in addition to the main function 
of conformity. Accordingly, chapter 3 identified the opposing security needs and 
postulated, on the basis of the literature review of commercial and legal sources, 
that there are seven meanings or dimensions of the elastic concept of conformity. A 
first step for effective terms governing the embedded usage of conformity is to adopt 
a dimension of conformity that reflects the sociological value of documentary credits, 
as such a dimension would operate as the definitive dominant meaning and provide 
the general test for determining whether or not documents are in conformity with 
the terms of the documentary credit. Article 14 of UCP 600 does attempt to formulate 
a specific dimension of conformity, which is evaluated in the thesis. This selected 
dimension can be seen to reflect the sociological value of documentary credits, but 
it is undermined by a lack of clarity. The main element of this dimension is only made 
clear in the Commentary of the Drafting Group of UCP 600 which, according to the 
empirical findings of this research,999 is not reviewed by many bankers in Jordan and, 
furthermore, is not regarded as a binding interpretative aid for the UCP 600 by either 
the English or the Jordanian legal orders. 
 
6.1.10 Unfortunately, alike with its predecessors, UCP 600 lacks responsiveness to the rule 
of linkage (i.e. that documents must be linked to the identification of goods) which 
is an element in the embedded usage of conformity that is necessary for the buyers’ 
security. The result is a low degree of “formal realisability” 1000 within legal orders, 
since English law, by the legal communication of construing contractual terms, would 
not give effect to sub-article 14 (e) of UCP 600, and banks and traders are left 
perplexed as to whether or not Jordanian law, being a developing legal system, would 
give effect to such a UCP provision. Being a general rule, the requirement of linkage 
                                                          
999 Annex I, paras 14; 24.  
1000 For the concept of formal realisability: chapter 1, para 1.1.6.   
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might capture many cases. The core aim underlying the majority of the introduced 
changes in UCP 600 was to enhance the “formal realisability” by providing particular 
rules (as general rules have a lower level of formal realisability but a wider 
application) directing bankers to respond to each listed distinguishable fact by 
intervening in a determinative way. The emphasis was to respond to the sellers’ 
needs for a manageable presentation, and thus the assurance of payment, by 
reassuring sellers that the decision of banks as to the conformity of documents was 
objectively standardised in terms that would not be contingent on subjective 
circumstances (such as the relationship between banks with their customers). 
Whereas chapter 3 evaluated the general rules governing conformity in UCP 600, 
chapter 4 evaluated the particular rules. 
 
6.1.11 The themes underpinning the changes to the particular rules governing conformity 
in UCP 600 are the needs of sellers and banks for manageable presentation and 
manageable examination respectively, in order to meet the need for an assurance of 
payment. The formulation of some particular rules (e.g. sub-articles 14 (h) and the 
prohibition of transhipment in articles 20 to 24) promotes the means of certainty and 
clarity but departs from the means of responsive as they serve to erode the 
fundamental doctrine of freedom to contract under legal orders. The result of this 
hard-power approach may be to promote the rejection of such rules under English 
and Jordanian laws. Interestingly, and alternatively, such rejection could have been 
avoided if the rules had been responsive to the right equation of the contested needs 
of the parties (i.e. the sociological value of documentary credits), as the empirical 
findings of this research indicate that many banks in Jordan exclude the above UCP 
provision, since it opposes buyers’ needs for security.1001 This was successfully 
achieved by the reforms regarding the requirements of the addresses of the parties 
in sub-article 14 (j) of UCP 600. Thus not every expressed term by the parties is 
                                                          
1001 Annex I, para 17.  
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truly intended to be effective, and that can be revealed both by the rational 
understanding of the dominant needs of the parties and the observed practices of 
the parties. But a clear intention of the parties should not and cannot be replaced by 
the UCP. Given the nature of the UCP and its international influence through its so 
called “soft-power”, it is evidently mistaken to attempt to impose a mandatory UCP 
rule that seeks to exclude the intention of the parties. Of course the provisions of 
ISBP 2013 enhance the “formal realisability” of the conformity rules particularly by 
amplifying clarity to the provisions that are responsive to the dominant needs of 
buyers. This is a welcome step since the particular conformity rules of the UCP 600 
were mainly reformed to satisfy the need of manageable presentation for sellers.  
 
6.1.12 It was further evaluated in chapter 4 that the standardisation of banking procedures 
in the refusal of documents for the purpose of avoiding unnecessary disputes was 
the theme underpinning the amendments of the requirements for refusal under 
article 16. Thus the Drafting Group has strictly adopted the means of certainty and 
clarity at the expense of flexibility to govern the refusal of documents. The result is 
the introduction of formalities that might have a long term benefit by achieving 
uniformity in the practices of refusal in order to avoid disputes. However, formality 
would not outweigh substance (e.g. reasonableness and good faith) under English 
and Jordanian legal orders, so an unequivocal communication of refusal would be 
effective, regardless of a lack of formality as required by UCP 600. Contrary to the 
long term purpose underpinning formalities, opportunist litigation might now arise 
on the basis of a mere lack of formality and it is not surprising therefore that 
substance would prevail under legal orders. 
 
6.1.13 The legal nature of the bank’s inspection activity was analysed in chapter 3 to 
determine the legal obligations of the parties under English and Jordanian laws and 
it was determined that the deletion by UCP 600 of the reference to banks having a 
duty of “reasonable care” was a welcome step to avoid claims that are based on its 
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inherited meaning in service contracts under legal orders. Given the limited “formal 
realisability” of any law regulating the ministerial discretion of banks, since it would 
be incapable of governing the entire range of various circumstances in a 
determinative way, the means of flexibility and communication must be utilised by 
having an objective standard in the UCP (as articulated in chapter 3) against which 
the decision of the bank should be assessed whenever the status of the conformity 
of presented documents is uncertain. In this way uncertainty might not lead to a 
deviation from the underlying sociological value of documentary credits.  
 
6.1.14 Finally, it was evaluated in chapter 5 that there is a lack of clarity in the 
responsiveness to the elements of the embedded usage of autonomy under UCP 600 
and the English and Jordanian legal orders. It was analysed that both the 
independence and appearance principles are the elements that constitute the 
embedded trade usage of autonomy. Hence the independence principle is in reality 
a normative fiction that is efficient to materialise the underlying sociological value of 
documentary credits to the effect that the seller’s right of payment by a bank is not 
contingent on the underlying disputes with the buyer or on related disputes between 
other documentary credit parties. The appearance principle is a normative 
presumption that reflects the needs for speed and manageable presentation.  
 
6.1.15 It was therefore contended in chapter 5 that the so called documentary fraud must 
be a well-established exception to the principle of appearance under English and 
Jordanian laws rather than, as it is commonly misperceived, the principle of 
independence. It was postulated that for a non-documentary fraud a distinction must 
be drawn between a non-documentary fraud in the credit contract itself, as here the 
principle of independence is immaterial, and a non-documentary fraud in the 
underlying contract. It was argued that the principle of independence can be 
overstepped by a non-documentary fraud in the underlying contract only if it was a 
fraud in the formation of the underlying contract, because such a fraud cannot be 
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avoided by requiring documentary proof in the credit and this directly triggers the 
application of the dominant policy for fraud exception under the English and 
Jordanian legal orders that courts will not allow their process be used by a dishonest 
person.   
 
6.1.16 Chapter 5 went on to evaluate on the basis of the balance of moral and rational 
justifications that criminal and civil illegality having the effect of prohibiting the 
underlying transaction of documentary credit must be permitted to infringe the 
autonomy norm under the English and Jordanian legal orders, subject to the 
following qualification. In order to restrain the potential broadness of the illegality 
exception, and to tackle the dilemma of the lack of transparency to determine what 
might be illegal in transnational transaction, the fact of such illegality prohibiting the 
underlying transaction must be known (or rather proved by corroborative evidence 
to have been known) by the beneficiary and the actual knowledge of the bank and, 
as the case might be, the bank. The relevant dates for such knowledge ought to be 
determined as: for the beneficiary, at the moment they changed their position in 
reliance upon the credit; and, for the bank, at the moment the payment obligation 
under the credit was triggered. Furthermore, as far as the bank is concerned actual 
knowledge rather than constructive or deemed knowledge should be required.  
 
6.1.17 Although the cautiousness of regulating fraud and illegality exceptions to the 
embedded usage of autonomy under the UCP is understandable, the failure to 
address these issues does not generate practical benefits. In order to promote 
uniformity across legal orders in respect of their approaches in communicating the 
norm of autonomy, it was recommended that the UCP should utilise the means of 
communication to address fraud and illegality exceptions mainly through the means 
of flexibility in order to nudge legal orders towards appropriate outcomes. A drafted 
provision was proposed for that reason as an illustration of how the means of 
flexibility forms a reflective context to the sociological value of documentary credits 
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that competes with the protection of society in the light of pragmatic problems such 
as the lack of transparency. Otherwise silence in this area over a long period will 
feed the unsystematic evolution of legal propositions under Municipal laws in 
connection with fraud and illegality exceptions. Some of those propositions are likely 
to be irreconcilable with the sociological value of documentary credits and the 
development of conflicting municipal norms may reach a point at which it would 
become too late for the Drafting Group to disseminate an alternative uniform 
approach. 
 
6.1.18 Accordingly, as demonstrated in this thesis, the conceptual model described above 
for evaluating the normative effectiveness of the UCP 600 has considerable utility 
and has revealed that the UCP 600 is not as effective as it could have been. It is to 
be hoped that the next iteration of the UCP can be more deliberative in its use of the 
means (of responsiveness, certainty, flexibility, communication and clarity) to deliver 
the contested needs (of assurance of payment, assurance of shipment of required 
goods, manageable presentation, manageable examination and speed) by protecting 
the transnational recognition and application of the embedded trade usages of 
irrevocability, conformity and autonomy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
344 
 
Bibliography 
 
Alder, The Value Concept in Sociology, [1956] American Journal of Sociology, 27:272-279. 
Aljbouri, The Concise In The Explanation Of Jordanian Civil Law, (1st, Wael 2011) 275. 
Awad, Documentary Credits, (1st edn, Dar Elnahda 1985).  
Beale and others (eds), Chitty on Contracts (31st edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2010). 
Berger, The Creeping Codification of the New Lex Mercatoria, (2edn, Kluwer Law 
International 2010). 
Bingham, The Rule of Law, [2007] The Cambridge Law Journal (66), 76. 
Bridge and others (eds) Benjamin’s Sale of Goods (8th edn, Thompson 2010). 
Burnham and others, Research Methods in Politics, (1st edn, Palgrave 2004).  
Bygnes, Interviewing People-Oriented Elites, [2008], Eurosphere Online Working Paper 
Series, Bergen: University of Bergen. 
Byrne, The Comparison of UCP 600 & UCP 500, (2007). 
Carter, The Rôle of Public Policy in English Private International Law, [1993] ICLQ, 42, 1 
Jan 1-10.  
Coleman and Shapiro (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence & Philosophy of Law 
(1st edn, OUP 2002), ch 8 by Coleman.   
Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory, (1st edn, Harvard University Press 1990).    
Collyer and Katz (eds), Collected DOCDEX Decision 1997-2003 (ICC Publication No. 665, 
2004). 
Collyer and Katz (eds), Collected DOCDEX Decision 2004-2008 (ICC Publication No. 696, 
2008).  
345 
 
Collyer and Katz, ICC Opinions 2009-2011, (2012).    
Collyer, A look back at the UCP revision, [2006] 10 DCInsight, 22. 
Commons, The Problems of Correlating Law, Economics and Ethics [1932] 8 Wisconsin 
Law Review 3. 
Debattista, The new UCP 600-changes to the tender of the seller’s shipping documents 
under letters of credit, [2007] J.B.L, June, 329.  
Drafting Group, Commentary on UCP 600: Article by Article Analysis, (ICC No. 680, 2009). 
Dworkin, Law’s Empire, (1st edn, Universal Publications 1986).  
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (1st edn, Harvard University Press 1977).  
Dworkin, The Model of Rules, [1967] The University of Chicago Law Review, 35,14. 
Elinger and Neo, The Law and Practice of Documentary Credit, (1st edn, Hart 2010). 
Elinger, Documentary Letters of Credit: A Comparative Study, (1st edn, Singapore Press 
1970). 
Ellinger, The Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP): their 
development and the current revisions, [2007] L.M.C.L.Q. 2 May, 152-180.  
Enonchong, The autonomy principle of letters of credit: an illegality exception? [2006] 
L.M.C.L.Q, 406-407.  
Fisher, Critical Thinking, (1st edn 2011, Cambridge University Press). 
Goertz, Social Science Concepts: a user’s guide, (1st edn, PUP 2006). 
Goldman, La Compagnie de Suez, societee’ internationale’, [1956] Le Monde, 4 October, 
3.     
Goode, Abstract Payment Undertakings And the Rules of The International Chamber of 
Commerce, [1995] 39 Saint Louise University Journal, 725.  
346 
 
Goode, Rule, Practice, and pragmatism in transnational commercial law, [2005] 
International & Comparative Law Quarterly 539.  
Goode, Usage and its reception in transnational commercial law, [1997] International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly 1, 14. 
Hackman, Group influences on individuals in organizations, in Dunnette and Hough 
(Eds.), Handbook of industrial and organizational psychology (1992 Vol. 3, Palo Alto: 
Consulting Psychologists Press) 234-245.  
Harris, Ridley’s Law of the Carriage of Goods by Land Sea and Air, (8th edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2010).  
Harris, The EC REACH Regulation and contractual supply obligations, [2010] J.B.L. (5), 
394, 407-411. 
Hart, The Concept of Law, (1st edn, OUP 1972).  
Hart, The Model of Rules, Positivism and The Separation of Law and Morals, [1958] Harvard 
Law Review, 4. 
Hassan, Lai and Yu, Market Disciple of Canadian Banks’ Letters of Credit Activities: An 
Empirical Examination, [2002] The Service Industries Journal, (22) Oct 187-208. 
Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order (1948) vii, 271, [1] University of Chicago Press.  
Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order (University of Chicago Press, 1948) vii, 271. 
Henn, Weinstein and Foard, a Critical Introduction to Social Research, (2 edn, Sage 2009).   
Hershey, Letters of Credit, [1918] Harvard Law Review Association, 1 (Nov).  
Holland and Web, Learning Legal Rules, (6th edn, OUP 2006).    
Hwaidi and Ferris, The Existence of International Unchangeable and Changeable Trade 
Usage, submitted paper to the SLS on Sep 2013 
<http://www.conference.legalscholars.ac.uk/edinburgh/paper.cfm?id=107>. 
347 
 
Hwaidi and Harris, The Mechanics of Refusal in Documentary Letter of Credits: An Analysis 
of the Procedures Introduced in Article 16 UCP 600, [2013] J.I.B.L.R 28(4), 146-155. 
Hwaidi, The implications of Banco Santander SA v Bayfern Ltd on deferred payment under 
documentary credits in UCP 600, [2011] I.B.L.J May 569-576.   
Hwaidi, The Story of The English Strict Compliance Principle in Letters of Credit and its 
Consistency with the UCP, [2014] J.I.B.L.R 28 (2), 71-81.  
Irvine, The Law: An Engine for Trade, [2001] Modern Law Review, May 64 (3) 333, 339. 
Jacobson, Mortensen and Cialdini, Bodies obliged and unbound: differentiated response 
tendencies for injunctive and descriptive social norms, [2011] Journal of personality and 
social psychology, 100(3) 433-48.   
James, Holland and Webb, Learning Legal Rules, (7th edn, OUP 2010).  
Kant, Critique of Judgement, translated by Nicolas Walker 1956 (OUP 2007).     
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, [1976] 89 Harvard Law Review 
1685. 
Lapinski and Rimal, An explication of social norms [2005] Communication Theory, 15(2), 
127–147. 
Luhmann, Law as a Social System, (1st edn, OUP 2004), translated by Klaus Ziegert. 
Ly, International Business Law and Lex Mercatoria, (1st edn, North Holland 1992). 
Malek and Quest, Jack: Documentary Credits, (4th edn, Tottel 2009). 
McCurdy, Commercial Letters of Credit, [1922] Harvard Law Review Association 539.  
McKendrick (ed), Goode on Commercial Law, (4th edn, LexisNexis 2009), 14. 
Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative Law, in Reimann and Zimmermann (eds), 
The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, (1st edn, OUP 2006) ch 10. 
Morris, The Truth About Interviewing Elites, [2009] Politics 29 (3), 209. 
348 
 
Oelofse, The Law of Documentary Letters of Credit in Comparative Perspective, (1st edn, 
Interlegal 1997), 30.  
Peel, Treitel The Law of Contract, (12th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2007).  
Plessis, Comparative Law and the Study of Mixed Legal Systems, in Reimann and 
Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, (1st edn, OUP 2006), 489. 
Praxis, Positionality, Validity, and the Cult of the Insider, [1999] Geoforum 30(4), 321. 
Richards, Elite Interviewing: Approaches and Pitfalls, [1996] Politics, March 199-204.  
Rosenberg, ‘Scientific Values and the Values of Science’ in Carrier, Howard, Kourany (eds) 
The Challenge of the Social and the Pressure of Practice: Science and Values Revisited, 
(2008, University of Pittsburgh).  
Sarna, Letters of Credit The Law and Current Practice, (3rd edn, Carswell 1992).  
Sartori, Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics, [1970] American Political Science 
Review, 64, 4, 1033-53.  
Schmitthoff, The sources of the law of international trade: with special reference to East-
West trade, (1st edn, Stevenson and Sons 1964).   
Silverman, Doing Qualitative Research: A Practical Handbook, (2nd edn, Sage 2005).  
Story, Commentaries on the Law of Bills of Exchange, Foreign and Inland as Administered 
in England and America, (2nd edn, Little and Brown 1860) ch XIII par 459.   
Taylor, The Complete UCP, (1ST edn, ICC 2008), 27. 
Teubner, Breaking Frames: The Global Interplay of Legal and Social Systems, [1997] The 
American Journal of Comparative Law (45) 149. 
Teubner, Law As An Autopoietic System, (1993, The European University Institute).  
Teubner, Law As An Autopoietic System, (1edn 1993, Blackwell Publishers).   
349 
 
Zoaby, Legal Culture: The Law in our Life: Comprehensive Study of Jordanian Law in Light 
of The Updated Legislations and the New Practices (1st edn, Wael 2008).  
Zweigert and Ko ̈tz, Introduction to comparative law (3rd edn, Clarendon Press 1998).  
Zweigert and Puttfarken, Critical Evaluation in Comparative Law [1973-76] 5 Adelaide Law 
Review 343.  
6 and Bellamy, Principles of Methodologies, (1st edn, Sage 2012). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
350 
 
Annex I 
 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS  
 
General overview  
 
1. The total number of conducted interviews was fourteen. Each interview was conducted 
face-to-face separately with each interviewee.  
  
2. Six interviewees were expert bankers as identified in table 1: 
Table 1 
Name of the Banker Positions 
Mr Muhammad Burjaq The head of DC department at Al-Itihad 
Bank. He represented Jordan and Middle 
East in the ICC Consulting Group for the 
revision of UCP 600. He has been lecturing 
on DC and other payment and finance 
facilities for more than 10 years.   
Mr Qhaleb Joudeh  The predecessor head of DC department at 
the Central Bank. He has been lecturing on 
DC and other payment and finance facilities 
for more than 10 years.   
Mrs Koloud Alkalaldeh  The head of DC department at Arab-Bank 
Alquwaysmah Branch.  
Mr Nart Farouk Lambaz  The head of DC department at BLOM Bank. 
Mr A Banker (Identity is concealed)  The head of DC department at his bank 
which is one of the main leading banks in 
Jordan.  
Mr B Banker (Identity is concealed)  The head of DC department at his bank 
which is one of the main leading banks in 
Jordan. 
 
3. Three participants were Traders as identified in table 2: 
Table 2 
Name of Trader Positions 
Ayman Hatahet  The head of Jordan Chamber of Industry. 
He is also a well-known trader in Jordan.  
Ali Melham  An importer who mainly deals with military 
outfits.  
Jamal Abu- Shamat An importer who mainly deals with military 
outfits. He has a branch in China assisting 
him to directly receive the amount of DC.  
 
 
4. Three interviewees were Judges as identified in table 3: 
Table 3 
Name of Judge Positions 
Judge A (Identity is concealed)  A Judge in the High Court who deals with 
many cases of documentary credits. 
Judge B (Identity is concealed)  A Judge in the High Court who deals with 
many cases of documentary credits. 
Judge C (Identity is concealed)  A Judge in the High Court who has dealt 
with some cases of documentary credits. 
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5. Two interviewees were Ministers as identified in table 4: 
Table 4 
Name of the Minister Positions 
Muhammad Asfour  A predecessor Minister for trade and 
industry. He is the president of the ICC 
Chamber in Jordan.  
Hatem Halawani  The current Minister for trade and industry.  
 
 
 
THE COMMERCIALITY OF DOCUMENTARY CREDITS (DC) 
 
REASONS FOR THE USE OF DOCUMENTARY CREDITS 
6. There is always some residual risk in commercial transactions. The findings confirm that 
security, in terms of minimising the risk, is the underlying policy of DC. This shared view 
was stated by one of the bankers: “documentary credits are meant to minimise the risk of 
both the seller’s evasion from delivery and the buyer’s evasion from payment” 
(Muhammad Burjaq). Thus all the participating bankers responded to the question 
regarding the reasons that draw traders to deal with DC by stating that the lack of trust 
between exporters and importers lead traders to use DC as a method that provides security 
for both exporters and importers. Nart Lambaz stated “first time sellers prefer to use 
documentary credits. Big companies prefer documentary credits with traders in developing 
countries. A documentary credit can also be a financial tool”.   
 
7. The participating traders stated that DC is a kind of a guarantee for their rights. Jamal 
Abushamat summarised this view, stating “as sellers we will be assured that the payment 
will be made before the arrival of the goods”. However, Ali Melham said that the matter 
depends on the trust between the parties. He added that he does not prefer to use DC as 
it is “complex, costly and can be risky as the documents might be refused”.  
 
8. In respect of the reasons that draw banks to deal with DC, all the participating bankers 
confirmed that the banks prefer DC because it is profitable for them. Qhaleb Joudeh added 
“risks are low for issuing banks since almost every bank (more than 95%) requires the bill 
of lading to be consigned to the bank’s order”.  
  
ADVISING BANK 
9. As DC transactions contain chains of contracts of which some might be regarded as agency 
contracts, it is essential to identify who usually appoints the advising bank. All the 
participating bankers stated that the applicant appoints the advising bank in the credit 
contract. However, there is no common practice as to whether the issuing bank accepts 
the appointed bank. The common practice is that if the appointed advising bank is not one 
of the issuing bank’s authenticated correspondent banks in SWIFT then the issuing bank 
will choose another bank as the advising bank. Muhammad Burjaq and Mr B stated that in 
this case they do not inform the applicant regarding the advising bank. Mr A stated that 
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they inform the applicant regarding the substituted advising bank. Mr B added “in the 
general conditions in the credit contract there is a condition authorising the bank to choose 
the advising or the correspondent bank without being liable to do so”. Muhammad Burjaq 
and Mr A confirmed that the applicant might appoint a bank other than that chosen by the 
issuing bank. Distinctively, the practice for BLOM bank is that, as stated by Nart Lambaz, 
in negotiating credits the issuing bank always nominates the negotiating bank. Nart 
Lambaz added “we are not responsible for the advising or correspondent banks errors. I 
do not think that it is fair for the issuing bank to be responsible of such errors”. As a unique 
practice, Qhaleb Joudeh stated “we always choose another bank [other than the appointed 
one by the applicant] as a correspondent bank, in negotiation credits the issuing bank is 
the one which nominates the negotiating bank”. 
 
10. The participating traders stated that the issuing bank always appoints the correspondent 
bank in such a way as to ensure that the trader is not one of its customers. The traders 
added, as stated by Jamal Abushamat, “it is not fair that the issuing bank is not responsible 
for the error of the advising bank as the issuing bank always appoints the advising bank 
and the issuing bank refuses to appoint the bank that the applicant had initially appointed 
in the credit”.    
 
CONCLUSION 
11. The empirical findings confirm the common knowledge that providing security for buyers 
and sellers is the underlying policy of DC. Bankers found DC a profitable and a secure 
transaction. Some traders, however, complained about DC complexity and the risk of 
refusing documents. Such findings foster the evaluative standpoint in this research in the 
sense that security is the underlying policy and manageable presentation is the dominant 
need for sellers.1002 Interestingly, although it is not the usage or the market practice, it is 
clarified that the issuing bank is the party which in many cases nominates the 
correspondent banks, this means under legal orders the correspondent bank is in many 
cases regarded as an agent for the issuing bank. Moreover, there is an indication that an 
issuing bank in Jordan is very cautious in negotiation credits in terms of, as expressed by 
two bankers and such statements were not tested before other bankers, ensuring that the 
issuing bank is the party that nominates the negotiating banks.  
 
 
Nature of UCP 600 
THE LEGAL STATUS OF UCP 600 
 
12. The bankers participating in the study were asked whether they incorporate the UCP as 
part of their DC transactions, and if so, whether or not they think that their banks are 
obliged to do so. All bankers stated that their banks and Jordanian banks apply the UCP 
on DC and nothing else in terms that there are no Jordanian banking practices, or codes, 
other than the UCP regulating DC.1003 In respect of the status of the UCP Muhammed 
Burjaq expressed the view “the UCP is not law, it is a kind of standard contractual terms. 
We can exclude some UCP terms or apply something else”. Qhaleb Joudeh stated that the 
UCP is not considered as law in the sense of a de jure, but as a matter of fact it is law for 
banks as the bank which deals with DC not subject to the UCP might suffer negative 
                                                          
1002 Above para 1.1.34. 
1003 Below under the heading of “periods for conformity” para 2.4.10: there is a strong indication that there is a 
spontaneous Jordanian practice.   
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consequences the harshest of which is the exclusion from the DC business community. In 
this respect he said “we exclude some of the UCP terms but we cannot actually dare to 
exclude its essence or spirit”. The four other bankers stated that their “banks are obliged” 
to apply the UCP and that the banks cannot entirely exclude the application of the UCP, 
but they can merely exclude and change some of the UCP terms. So there is a common 
sense that the application of the UCP is binding upon banks. 
 
13. The participating traders view the UCP as law in terms that they must apply it to their DC 
transactions, as strikingly said by Jamal Abushamat “both the state and the banks impose 
the UCP”.   
 
LEGAL STATUS OF ISBP AND ICC OPINIONS 
14. Now, the question is whether or not the application of UCP 600 entails, in the view of 
bankers, an obligation to apply ISBP and ICC Opinions. Thus, the bankers were asked 
whether they apply ISBP in examining the presented documents, and if so, whether or not 
they think that their banks are obliged to do so. By the same token, the bankers were also 
asked about the applicability of ICC Opinions in both the examination of documents and 
the interpretation of UCP 600. Muhammad Burjaq said “the bank is not obliged to apply 
ISBP as the deletion of the capital letters in UCP 600 in the reference to ISBP signifies this 
position. But the bank is obliged to apply ICC Opinions as they reflect the international 
banking practices. The bank must apply ISBP where there is no guidance in the ICC 
Opinions”. Such a practice and view was not shared by any other bankers regarding the 
ISBP, as all other bankers stated that their banks apply the ISBP to the examination of 
the documents along with UCP 600 and they are obliged to do so. The reason behind the 
obligation to apply the ISBP was explained by Qhaleb Joudeh and Koloud Alkalaldeh in 
terms that the ISBP is part of UCP 600 and moreover, Mr A and B praised the ISBP for 
simplifying issues and easing the task for the determination of the status of conformity. 
However, almost every bank has its own practice and view as to the application of the ICC 
Opinions. Thus Qhaleb Joudeh stated “since the introduction of ISBP we stopped applying 
ICC Opinions, because such a collection of Opinions became the final version of what is 
known ISBP. I used to be guided by ICC Opinions. In the case of fraud we do not look at 
ISBP or ICC Opinions”. Nart Lambaz said “the Opinions are important to determine a 
dispute between banks, so we do not refer to ICC Opinions to interpret UCP 600. I do not 
know whether banks in Jordan refer to ICC Opinions”. Koloud Alkalaldeh stated “we refer 
to ICC Opinions if there is a dispute with other banks in relation to discrepancies in the 
presented documents”. Mr A said “we do not usually apply ICC Opinions. We only check 
them if we have a dispute or arguments in our bank regarding the conformity of 
documents”.  Mr B said that the ICC Opinions apply “where there is a matter that is not 
dealt by UCP 600 and ISBP”.  
 
15. Unsurprisingly, the traders participating in this study stated that they were not aware 
about ISBP and ICC Opinions.  
 
16. In this context His Excellency Muhammad Asfour stated “I would like to see the 
documentary credit actors – including courts – in Jordan interpret the UCP through an 
international lens as Jordan is part of the global business community, and therefore we 
[ICC] brought French experts to Jordan to explain the way of interpreting the UCP”. 
 
THE COMMERCIAL STATUS OF UCP 600 
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17. Although the application of UCP 600 is dominant in the banking community, not all UCP 
600’s articles are strictly followed or even applied by banks. Thus Muhammed Burjaq 
stated that Alitihad Bank does not usually exclude any of UCP 600 terms, but some banks 
exclude article 17 of UCP 600 as they require a hand-written signature for documents to 
be original. He added, some banks also exclude sub-article 18 (b) of UCP 600 to enable 
them to reject a commercial invoice which has a value in exceeds of the permitted amount 
in the credit. In the same spirit, Qhaleb Joudeh expressed the observation that in practice, 
Central Bank does not usually exclude any of UCP 600 terms, but other banks often exclude 
UCP 600 terms in relation to both transhipment (i.e. sub-article 20 (c) UCP 600) and the 
bank’s right to make the credit conditional upon payment of the bank’s charges by the 
beneficiary (i.e. part of sub-article 37 (c) UCP 600). Thus BLOM Bank usually excludes 
sub-article 18 (b) UCP 600 as stated by Nart Lambaz. He commented that such exclusion 
“is important for our customer [the applicant] as if the value of the goods exceeds the 
amount stated in the credit, then our customer will face customs’ difficulties and he might 
not be able to clear the goods for the extra customs’ costs which he has to pay. It is also 
important to avoid money laundering. We do not, however, mind giving effect to sub-
article 18 (c) if our customer requires that”. His bank also excludes the following 
provisions: the full effects of article 17 of UCP 600 (i.e. the rules for originality in 
documents), sub-article 20 (c) of UCP 600, part of sub-article 37 (c) of UCP 600 in relation 
to the beneficiary’s charges and sub-article 14 (k) of UCP 600 which permits the shipper 
of the goods to be an entity other than the beneficiary. He also commented on the reasons 
behind the exclusion of article 14 (k) by saying “a documentary credit is meant to be a 
method of payment rather than a facility for chain-contracts. We need to be secure as to 
whom we, and our customer, deal with”. In defiance of UCP 600, it is standard practice 
for Arabic Bank to exclude transhipment as provided for in sub-articles 20 (c), 20 (d), 23 
(c) and 24 (e) of UCP 600. Koloud Alkalaldeh gave the researcher a draft of the Arabic 
Bank’s standard form for DC which has influenced many other banks in Jordan. The form, 
in order to exclude some UCP 600 provisions, states:  
 
“- Transhipment as stated in Article Nos. 20 (C), 22 (D), 23 (C), and 24 (E) is not 
acceptable (where applicable). 
-  Commercial Invoices issued for Amounts in excess of credit value are not acceptable. 
- Any document showing Shipper or Consignor other than Beneficiary is not acceptable. 
- Documents showing any alterations / corrections without authentication by the issuer is 
not acceptable”.  
Koloud Alkalaldeh emphasised the clarity of the inapplicability of UCP 600 terms in relation 
to the transhipment as such terms have been expressly excluded. She said that the other 
UCP 600 terms in relation to the value of the commercial invoice, the name of the shipper 
and the authenticity of alterations are excluded by the fact that the expressed 
requirements in the standard form for DC provides for the contrary. She added that the 
transhipment problem usually arises in road transport documents. Mr B stated that his 
bank also excludes the same UCP 600 provisions in relation to: transhipment, the name 
of the shipper and the value of the commercial invoice. However, Mr A said that his bank 
only excludes the above issue in relation to the value of commercial invoice. In conclusion, 
although is not shared practice it is quite common amongst banks to exclude the above 
articles regarding transhipment, the name of shipper and the authenticity of corrections. 
It is common practice to exclude the provision regarding the value of commercial invoices. 
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18. The perception of the participating traders in respect of the legal status of the UCP has 
lead them to avoid attempts to exclude or change the terms of UCP 600. Moreover, traders 
stated that they are unable to even exclude any term of bank’s DC form. Thus Ali Melham 
stated “they [banks] always apply their form. I have never tried to change or to exclude 
their conditions and they will not let me to do that”. However, the participating traders 
have never faced any difficulty or litigation in respect of UCP 600.  
 
THE IMPACT OF UCP 600 
19. The participating bankers stated that UCP 600 was immediately implemented at their 
banks at the same date as UCP 600 was promulgated. The training for UCP 600 had already 
been going on prior the date of UCP 600’s promulgation. As Muhammad Burjaq said “the 
application of UCP 600 had been ready to be automatically implemented at our bank at 
the date of its promulgation by the ICC. The training had already been going on for a year 
prior to the promulgation’s date”. The training, however, for Central Bank’s staff – as 
provided by Qhaleb Joudeh – started just after the promulgation of UCP 600. It seems 
that the unity to apply UCP 600 at its promulgation’s date reflects the finding in respect of 
the obligatory nature of UCP 600.1004 
 
20. The impact of UCP 600 on banking practices and bankers views varied from bank to bank, 
even though most of the participating bankers were of the opinion that there are no 
substantive differences between UCP 600 and UCP 500. Thus Qhaleb Joudeh stated that 
UCP 600 and 500 are substantively the same and he is of the opinion that there is more 
clarity in the language of UCP 600. Both Qhaleb Joudeh and Mr A expressed the view that 
UCP 600 was revised for the benefits of sellers. Nart Lambaz expressed his view regarding 
the changes and the impact of UCP 600 on the practice of his bank by saying “there are 
some changes such as the period of examination as we now put a pressure on our staff to 
examine the documents before 5 banking days. No substantive changes”. Mr B positively 
said that UCP 600 is clearly structured and the new language assists banks to understand 
UCP 600. However, Muhammad Burjaq expressed his observation regarding the impact of 
UCP 600 on the Jordanian banking practices by saying that after the promulgation of UCP 
600 some banks started to exclude the originality provision (i.e. part of article 17 UCP 
600) as they require a hand-written signature. He added other banks started to exclude 
the provision in relation to the value of the commercial invoice. Koloud Alkalaldeh 
expressed the view that “there are some changes and differences such as the new 
requirement for addresses”. Indeed, the participating bankers, as presented under the 
heading of the commerciality of UCP 600 and as elucidated by Muhammad Burjaq under 
this section, expressed the observation that the impact of UCP 600 on the practices of 
banks is that many banks now exclude the UCP 600 provisions in relation to the value of 
invoices, transhipment and the deeming provisions for originality.   
 
21. Interestingly, there was no general or particular reaction by the Jordanian government in 
relation to the introduction of UCP 600. As His Excellency Muhammad Asfour stated “there 
was no particular reaction due to the lack of awareness, and I have heard that there was 
a willingness to amend the Commercial Code. But it is difficult to implement new 
amendments in the Code due to the bureaucratic procedures. We introduced as the ICC in 
Jordan many sessions and trainings regarding UCP 600. Unfortunately, the government 
does not give attention to the importance of the impact of the UCP so that even the Central 
                                                          
1004 For the legal nature of the UCP: chapter 2, para 2.3.8.  
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Bank refused to be a member in the ICC”.  After I explained to his Excellency the risk of 
amending the Commercial Code in order to implement the UCP he agreed and stated that 
“the Commercial Code should not be amended”. He assisted the researcher to arrange an 
interview with the current minister to address such an issue. His Excellency Hatem 
Halawani stated that as far as he was aware there is no intention to implement 
amendments in the Commercial Code.   
 
 
CONCLUSION 
22. All the represented banks in the study apply the UCP to their DC transactions. They do not 
apply another code. It is clear that the UCP is regarded as law from the perspective of 
most bankers (5 out of 6) and traders. This clearly supports the view that the application 
of UCP is trade usage in Jordan.1005 UCP 600 was immediately implemented by Jordanian 
banks. Such an action was spontaneous. Qhaleb Joudeh stated that the UCP is not formally 
regarded as law, but it operates as law as a matter of fact. So he functionally treats the 
UCP as law. However, as an exception, Muhammad Burjaq – who was the only one 
amongst the participants involved in ICC’s revision as to UCP 600 – is of the opinion that 
the UCP is not law but compromises standard contractual terms. So his bank can apply a 
totally different code, or another standard contract, other than the UCP. None of the other 
bankers are of the opinion that their banks can completely exclude the application of the 
UCP. They are, however, of the opinion that they can exclude some terms, but not all, of 
the UCP. It is revealed, in the findings as to the impact of the introduction of UCP 600 on 
the practices of banks, that it is quite common for Jordanian banks to exclude some parts 
of the provisions in UCP 600 in respect of transhipment, the amount of commercial invoices 
and the originality of documents. The bankers stated that there is no particular Jordanian 
practice dealing with DC issues. Nevertheless, under the heading of conformity we will 
notice that Jordanian banks impliedly apply a set of practices that differ from some of the 
UCP terms. The participating traders in the study felt that the UCP is a type of a mandatory 
law that they cannot exclude even any part of it. They also said that they cannot actually 
exclude or amend the banks’ DC forms. Interestingly, we will notice later when the 
researcher flags up issues that substantively affect the traders’ rights, the traders stated 
that they will exclude some of UCP 600 terms.   
 
23. It is evident that all bankers, except Muhammad Burjaq, were of the opinion that their 
banks are obliged to apply ISBP as it is part of UCP 600 for the conformity of documents. 
However, the status of ICC Opinions was disputed. Thus Muhammad Burjaq, or Alitihad 
Bank, prioritises the application of ICC Opinions on ISBP. Some banks do not apply ICC 
Opinions. Other banks apply ICC Opinions only where there is a dispute with other banks 
or a disagreement between the employees at the same bank in respect of the conformity 
of documents. The represented traders, however, were not aware about ISBP and ICC 
Opinions. The differences amongst bankers regarding the status of ICC Opinions might 
lead to incoherent interpretations.1006 Finally, it is clarified that there is no intention by 
the current Jordanian government to implement the UCP in the Commercial Code. His 
Excellency Muhammad Asfor, from his particular viewpoint as the head of the ICC in 
                                                          
1005 Chapter 2, para 2.3.8. 
1006 Chapter 2, para 2.3.13-14.  
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Jordan, stated that he wishes to see the UCP being interpreted through an international 
lens.  
 
Conformity 
NATURE OF CONFORMITY 
24. The participating banks in the study were asked about their respective banks’ 
understanding and practices as to the concept of conformity under UCP 600. Muhammad 
Burjaq stated “we examine the appearance of documents on their face in accordance with 
the DC contract, UCP and international banking practice as reflected in ICC Opinions and 
ISBP”.  He added that the DC having a high payment value is examined by three employees 
where the payment value is not high the DC is examined by two employees. Qhaleb Joudeh 
stated: 
 
“We examine the appearance of documents in accordance to the DC contract and a 
collected checklist from both UCP and ISBP. The examination is done by one employee 
and if there is a difference in the documents, it will be discussed with a supervisor. If the 
decision will conclude that the difference reaches the level of discrepancy, the documents 
will be handed to the manager. He will in turn hand the documents to a different employee. 
The manager will get involve of where the latter employee disagrees about the 
discrepancy”.  
 
Nart Lambaz said: 
 
“We examine the appearance of documents in accordance with the DC along with UCP and 
ISBP. Where there is a conflict between a DC contractual term and a UCP term the DC 
term prevails. The discrepancy needs to be a material one that affects the essence of the 
commercial transaction.  For example, the address is required only in relation to the name 
of the country in UCP 600, we used to apply this rule under UCP 500 because we regarded 
the discrepancy in the details of the address - except as to the name of the country - as 
not being a material one”.  
 
Koloud Alkalaldeh stated “we examine the appearance of documents in accordance with 
the DC terms. If there are discrepancies we will check UCP and ISBP. We compare the 
documents with each other. The material discrepancy is the one that affects the rights of 
the bank”. Mr A and Mr B stated that they examine the appearance of documents in 
accordance with the DC contract, UCP and ISBP. Mr A said regarding the bank’s procedures 
“there are always two stages. The check of one employee as to the documents then that 
check is followed by a check from another employee. If there is a disagreement between 
these two employees the documents will then to be checked by the manager. The ICC 
Opinions are studied if a disputed matter leads to different opinions in the bank”. All the 
participating bankers stated that there is no acknowledged Jordanian banking practices 
for checking the documents. Although the approach to conformity is the same, namely, 
DC contractual terms and UCP 600 with ISBP are followed in the examination by five out 
of six banks, there is no uniformity in the steps to examine the presented documents. Also 
there is no uniformity as to the interpretation of the concept of “material” in respect of 
conflict. Mr B stated that on one occasion the bank made a wrong decision on conformity 
where the documents had not actually been in conformity.   
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25. Most of the interviewed traders have the impression that the presented documents must 
be a mirror image with the conditions of the credit. Jamal Abushamat stated “the 
documents must be letter by letter in conformity”. However, Ayman Hatahet stated that 
conformity does not assist them when they deal with countries such as Iraq where the 
banks lack experience in dealing with DC. On the same lines, His Excellency Muhammad 
Asfor stated “we have, as traders, difficulties such as late shipment and the fact that 
employees in banks are not aware of international practices in many areas in trade and 
transport. The dilemma is that the banks DC forms are extremely difficult to be changed 
due to the fact that the decision can only be made by the head of a department”. Jamal 
Abu Shamat and Ali Melham stated that the bank is remarkably superior to traders in 
spotting discrepancies. They also said that they have never had the situation where the 
bank made a mistake in deciding the conformity of the appearance of the documents. 
Jamal Abushamat added that his bank has had many situations where the beneficiary in 
China presents documents that are not in conformity in respect of the originality of 
documents as they need to be authenticated by the Jordanian embassy in China. All the 
participating traders stated that the bank is only concerned with the appearance of 
documents as stated by Ayman Hatahet “the appearance is essential as it guarantees to 
us as exporters to Libya for instance that we will be paid regardless of the claims by 
importers in respect of the goods”. 
 
CONFORMITY OR NON-CONFORMITY 
26. Although the banking procedures for checking conformity are not uniform, the participating 
bankers, in all bar one case, stated that the documents must either be in conformity or 
not with the consequences that: reasonable bankers must reach the same decision as to 
conformity. Mr B agreed with this statement, but he added that the banker in this context 
must be treated as any reasonable banker (i.e. an ordinary documents checker) and not 
an expert banker in checking the documents. However, Qhaleb Joudeh stated that: 
 
“The discrepancy is a discrepancy but the decision for conformity depends on the bank 
and its customer circumstances … there is no bank that deals with conformity with utmost 
good faith because the standard for whether the discrepancy is material or not depends 
on the circumstances. So, if the applicant is well known and the bank is assured that it will 
be reimbursed from the applicant then the bank will not regard any discrepancy as a 
material one. I cannot distinguish between a material and a non-material discrepancy even 
though it theoretically exists. For example, suppose the bank, and not the customer, 
requires a condition in the credit such that documents must link with each other in respect 
of the descriptions of the goods. Here if one of the presented documents does not link with 
the other documents in respect of the descriptions of the goods, it will totally be for the 
discretion of the bank to decide whether this is a material discrepancy or not. Another 
example, suppose that the customer requires three copies of a certain document to be 
presented but the beneficiary only presents two copies of the required document. I can in 
this case either print another copy or refuse the documents. So the decision for conformity 
depends on the circumstances of the customer, the bank and the beneficiary. The changes 
in conformity under UCP 600 are for the benefits of sellers. This would increase the 
possibility of fraud. I know that the high rate of rejections badly affects the economy, but 
such a high rate is due to the lack of training and guidance booklets. Any discrepancy is a 
discrepancy: there cannot be a material or a non-material discrepancy. For example, the 
apostrophe in the form of (‘) instead of the apostrophe in the form of (‘’) might be a 
material element for the size of the goods, so you do not know if it is really a material 
discrepancy or not. For instance, it cannot be determined whether a percentage of sugar 
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99% instead of 98% is a printing error or not and I cannot know whether or not this 
difference affects the commercial purpose. As a further instance, it cannot be known if a 
discrepancy in the spelling of Mohammad instead of Mohamad is a material discrepancy 
or not”.  
 
All the participating bankers expressed the view that the bank bears the consequences of 
making a mistake as to the determination of conformity. Muhammad Burjaq stated “we 
have never had such a situation. It is the right of the applicant to refuse to reimburse the 
bank on the basis of the apparent discrepancies” and Mr B stated “we had this situation in 
one of the DC transaction, we tried to solve the problem by negotiation and reconciliation 
with our customer”. 
 
AMBIGUOUS INSTRUCTIONS 
27. The issue here regarded the actual Jordanian banking standards or practices of conformity 
where the instructions from the applicant or the issuing bank are ambiguous. Muhammad 
Burjaq stated that, as a UCP rule, the non-documentary condition is ignored. He elucidated 
“we face these problems with Iraqi banks where we deal as a confirming bank. We ask the 
issuing bank to amend the instructions, since, indeed prevention is better than cure. We 
explain to them in advance that instructions such as non-documentary conditions will be 
ignored. It is not fair for the applicant, and the issuing bank must advise the applicant 
regarding the consequences of such ambiguous instructions”. Mr B stated “it happens a 
lot with Iraqi banks, we receive ambiguous instructions.  We disregard non-documentary 
conditions”. It can be inferred from these statements that the lack of banks (i.e. Iraqi 
banks) experience and training are the main reasons for ambiguous instructions. However, 
the Jordanian banks in this situation tend to treat ambiguous instructions as non-
documentary conditions, as stated by the participating banks. There is also a sense that 
the issuing bank owes a duty of care to the applicant.  
 
28. The participating traders stated that it is not fair for the applicant for a work to impose a 
condition in the credit which will be disregarded as being a non-documentary condition. 
Ali Melham said “I have never had such a situation, but it is not fair for traders”. 
 
ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS 
29. As all the participating bankers stated that documents are not, and have never been, 
presented by electronic means, there is no need to conduct any further investigations in 
respect of electronic documents.  
 
ORIGINALITY 
30. The findings in the study under the heading of “the nature of UCP 600” indicate that some 
Jordanian banks exclude that part of article 17 of UCP 600 which deals with originality. It 
is a step further to know how banks in Jordan differentiate between original and copy 
documents. The response by Muhammad Burjaq, who expected the treatment of this issue 
to be in alignment with that of the international community, was that they follow UCP 600 
and thus they do not require the original documents to have a handwritten signature. By 
contrast, Nart Lambaz said “we impose a condition that the original documents must have 
a handwritten signature. This is to ensure whether or not the documents are original.  Our 
customers do not mind that but we have a lot of complaints from beneficiaries”. This is 
the same position of Mr A’s Bank. Arabic Bank has more relaxing approach: Koloud 
Alkalaldeh stated “we require that the documents must be signed. It can be signed in 
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handwriting or by other means”. Mr B stated “we do not require a handwritten signature 
on documents in order for them to be regarded as original. But we are thinking to 
implement such a requirement for bills of lading”. Thus there is a trend to require a 
signature and more strictly some banks require such a signature to be a handwritten one. 
Although the faxed documents are regarded as valid evidence under the Evidence 
Code,1007 the participating bankers stated that telefaxed or faxed documents are regarded 
as copy documents and banks do not check or rely on the Jordanian Evidence Code.  
 
BILLS OF EXCHANGE 
31. As the Jordanian Commercial Code regulates bills of exchange, the participating bankers 
were asked whether or not they check the conformity of bills of exchange with the articles 
of the Commercial Code. They were also asked about the drawee in bills of exchange. The 
participating bankers, in all bar one case, stated that they do not check the Commercial 
Code in order to determine the conformity of the presented bills of exchange. Qhaleb 
Joudeh added that there is a common standard for the structure of a bill of exchange. 
Muhammad Burjaq stated that “bills of exchange are meant to be negotiable instruments”. 
Thus, there are no specific requirements outside the regime of UCP 600 for the conformity 
of bills of exchanges. However, Koloud Alkalaldeh said “a bill of exchange must be in 
accordance with both the Commercial Code and ICC Opinions”. Mr B stated that bills of 
exchange must not contain a condition such as being drafted as a means of insurance. He 
also added “we might advise the beneficiary to present a bill of exchange according to the 
law of the applicant’s country”. All the participating bankers stated that a bill of exchange 
that is drawn on the applicant is treated as an additional document and is therefore 
disregarded. Nevertheless, the participating bankers clarified that they use bills of 
exchange in acceptance credits and that bills of exchange are drawn by applicants on 
issuing or confirming banks.  
 
BILLS OF LADING 
 
32. All the participating bankers stated that their banks do not check the Jordanian Maritime 
Commercial Code 1972 in order to determine the conformity of bills of lading. As to the 
question of whether banks impose special requirements for the conformity of bills of lading, 
Koloud Alkalaldeh stated “a bill of lading must be consigned to our order and when we 
release the bill of lading we ask the applicant to sign a bill of exchange to our order as a 
guarantee of our rights”. Nart Lambarz stated “we impose a condition that bills of lading 
must be issued from the actual carrier and not from forwarders. We expressly exclude the 
relevant UCP article and we stipulate our condition in the DC contract”. 
 
PERIODS FOR CONFORMITY 
 
33. After understanding the practices and the main issues as to the determination of 
conformity, it was necessary to ask the participating bankers as to how long their banks 
and other Jordanian banks take to examine documents. Muhammad Burjaq, Nart Lambaz 
and Mr A responded that it takes one to two banking days for their bank to examine 
documents. Qhaleb Joudeh and Mr B stated that it takes one to three banking days. Qhaleb 
Joudeh added that as a matter of good practice the bank needs to examine the documents 
in a maximum of three banking days, even though it has a five banking days period for 
                                                          
1007 Jordanian Evidence Code (1952).  
361 
 
examination pursuant to UCP 600. As an exception, Koloud Alkalaldeh said “it takes five 
banking days with our bank to examine the documents. We always send to our customer 
[the applicant] a form attached with a letter stating that the documents have been 
examined and no discrepancy is found. He has the right to look at the documents to check 
whether there is any discrepancy. The customer needs to sign on the form that he accepts 
the documents. In practice the customer always signs his acceptance in the form. In any 
event the time should not exceed five banking days”. Accordingly, it can comfortably be 
inferred that there is a Jordanian banking practice in respect of the period of the 
examination of documents which is two to three banking days, but it is a practice that not 
shared by Arabic Bank.  
 
34. Furthermore, the participating bankers were asked about the period that their banks and 
other Jordanian banks take to honour the credit after a decision is made that the 
documents are in conformity. All bankers stated that they honour the credit on the same 
day as the decision to accept the documents. 
 
35. The bankers were also asked regarding the period of refusing documents that are not in 
conformity. The participating bankers, in all bar one case, stated that the refusal decision 
is made and sent to the beneficiary on the same day as discrepancies are found. It is 
common amongst banks to choose the option in the refusal notice that the documents are 
held at the disposal of the beneficiary in order to consult the applicant. However, the bank 
in which Mr B is the head of DC department approaches the refusal differently. Mr B stated 
“we refuse the documents on the same day we find discrepancies where such discrepancies 
affect the bank and we hold the documents at the disposal of the beneficiary in order to 
consult the applicant. If the discrepancies do not affect the bank or are immaterial we will 
wait to refuse until the fifth banking days, in order to have sufficient time to ask the 
applicant as to whether he wishes to accept the documents or to refuse them”.   
 
36. Regarding the period of holding the presented documents after refusal, the participating 
bankers were asked whether their banks and other Jordanian banks return the documents 
after refusal, and if so, how long it takes to return the documents. All the participating 
bankers said that they hold the documents until they receive instructions from the 
applicant or the beneficiary. The reason for holding documents is that “banks are keen to 
fulfil the function of the commercial transactions as this is beneficial for the parties and 
for the reputation of the bank” as wisely stated by Muhammad Burjaq. The bankers stated 
that when they decide to return the documents they return them on the same or the next 
banking day. Most bankers said that the maximum period that their banks hold the 
documents was one month. It was emphasised by Koloud Alkalaldeh “it should not exceed 
one month”. However, Qhaleb Joudeh said that “it happened where we held the documents 
for two years as we did not want to end the ongoing negotiation between the parties”. Mr 
B stated that the maximum period to return the documents is three to four months. All 
the participating bankers stated that the expiration of the credit period does not affect the 
period to return the documents.   
 
REFUSAL’S COMMUNICATION 
37. The bankers were asked whether their banks only use SWIFT in informing the beneficiary 
about the decision of refusal. Muhammad Burjaq and Nart Lambaz stated that in the vast 
majority of cases they use SWIFT but sometimes they use fax to inform beneficiaries. 
Muhammad Burjaq added that they sometimes also use non-authenticated SWIFT 
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messages. All other bankers stated that their banks only use SWIFT. Muhammad Burjaq 
stated “where the content clearly conveys the meaning of refusal it will be regarded as a 
refusal notice and it makes no sense that the notice must in this situation spell out the 
statements that ‘the bank refuses the documents’ or ‘refusal notice’”. All participating 
bankers were of the same opinion in that respect. 
 
CONCLUSION 
38. Although the targeted sources to check conformity by banks are the same, there is no 
uniformity in the steps of the examination as to the presented documents. However, 
bankers confirmed that the banks must reach the same decision as to the conformity of 
the presented documents. Ambiguous instructions, for instance, are treated by bankers in 
the same way. As an exception Qhaleb Joudeh who is a retired banker and expert in DC 
stated that discrepancy is a discrepancy, but whether it is a material or not depends on 
the discretion of the bank in the light of the parties’ circumstances. He said it is not about 
the purpose of the commercial transaction. Such a view reflects the challenge any 
regulation of conformity may face, the main challenge being the subjectivity in the decision 
of conformity. Traders have the impression that conforming documents must be in a mirror 
image to the terms of the credit. Such a perception might reflect the fact that there is a 
high rate of refusals in DC. Ironically, the findings regarding the perception of banks and 
traders as to the meaning of conformity under UCP 600 indicate that many bankers and 
traders do not actually apply the concept of material conflict introduced by article 14 of 
UCP 600 as it was intended by the Drafting Group to operate.1008 Of course all the 
participating bankers said that the bank is liable for a wrong decision of conformity. The 
findings reveal that banks do not deal with electronic documents, and therefore studying 
EUCP is not an essential matter in this research. The findings also indicate that there is a 
trend in Jordan to implement a requirement for a handwritten, or other means of, 
signature to evidence the originality of documents. This might reflect the social fact that 
as Jordan is a developing country traditional means of authenticity are still in demand.1009 
Banks do not check the Jordanian Commercial Code for bills of exchange, as it seems that 
there is a common structure for bills of exchange that is in alignment to the Commercial 
Code. Bills of lading are issued for the order of the issuing banks in most cases and 
therefore banks find DC a secure method of payment. In addition, some banks require the 
bill of lading to be issued by the actual carrier. Such a requirement might be contrary to 
the practices in the transport industry. Strikingly, the findings indicate that there is a 
spontaneous Jordanian practice as to the period of the examination of documents which is 
two to three banking days. However, the period to hold the documents does not in most 
cases exceed one month, but there are circumstances where the parties would wish the 
bank to continue holding documents during negotiation until an agreement is reached. 
 
Principle of autonomy 
39. The participating bankers were asked whether they had been required to integrate the 
underlying sale contract into the credit contract, and if so what their action was. All bankers 
stated that many times the applicants tried to integrate the sale contract into the credit 
contract, but the banks refuse to do so as they adhere to the principle of autonomy. The 
bankers were also asked whether the applicants tried to restrain the banks from making 
payment on the basis of faulty goods, fraud or illegality. The bankers stated that many 
                                                          
1008 Chapter 4, para 4.4.27. 
1009 Chapter 4, para 4.4.18.  
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times the applicants tried to do so, but the banks refused to accept that on the basis of 
the autonomy principle. Thus, Muhammad Burjaq stated “we advise the customer that the 
credit is separate from the underlying contract and that we refuse to integrate such a 
contract with the credit contract”. He also commented in respect of faulty goods that 
“many times the applicants tried to influence our decision to pay, but the applicants never 
produced solid evidence. The only evidence we accept is a decision from courts”. In respect 
of fraud and illegality four of the bankers stated that they only consider a decision from 
the court in order to restrain payment. Muhammad Burjaq stated “we have never had a 
situation of fraud. The bank must check at the first instance the situation of the customer. 
You can tell where there is a fraud or not from the beginning”. However, Qhaleb Joudeh 
and Koloud Alkalaldeh stated that when the bank is informed about the fraud it will 
examine the documents in a very cautious way. Thus Qhaleb Joudeh stated: 
 
“If we hear about it [fraud] we will check the documents in a cautious way so that any 
discrepancy is regarded as a material one. Fraud usually happens in relation to goods such 
as seeds, oil, sugar, phosphate in charter vessels. We had a situation where every 
document bore the same signature and that was clearly fraud. The applicant applied for 
an injunction which was granted by the judge and we then orally requested the judge to 
change the language of the injunction. The initial injunction stated that we must restrain 
payment and the subsequent changed injunction stated “we must endeavour to restrain 
payment”. The reason for this was that we felt that we had to pay in order to save the 
reputation of Jordanian banks as we were the issuing bank that had to reimburse the 
confirming bank which had paid against the documents. We could not restrain the 
confirming bank to make payment as it was domiciled in a different jurisdiction and the 
fraud was discovered after the payment was made by the confirming bank”.   
 
40. On the same lines, the participating traders stated that they are unable to restrain the 
bank from payment, even where the delivered goods are contrary to the sale contract or 
they are damaged, or there is a fraud committed by the beneficiary. The traders confirmed 
that the bank is only concerned with the presented documents. Jamal Abushamat said “I 
cannot stop the payment”.  
 
41. Consequently, the main actors in DC appreciate and respect the autonomy principle. They 
accept the negative consequences of such a principle, as they understand the hierarchy of 
the DC’s advantages and disadvantages.  
 
 
INJUNCTIONS BASED ON FRAUD 
42. The judges participating in the study were asked about their discretion in granting 
injunctions (i.e. to restrain payment or to freeze assets) to restrain payment in 
documentary credits on the basis of fraud. The guidelines for an injunction in documentary 
credits under English law were briefly explained to the judges.1010 All the participating 
judges stated that in order to grant an injunction, there must be very strong documentary 
and apparent evidence of fraud on the part of the beneficiary, and the bank would need 
to have knowledge about the fraud. The participating judges confirmed that the matter 
depends on whether the court is convinced as to the evidence of fraud. In respect of the 
balance of convenience which is an essential stage under English law, the judges stated 
that the balance of convenience in terms of weighing damages and benefits is born in 
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mind. But the judges commented that the most influential factor is that if the beneficiary 
was a fraudster he would receive payment under the documentary credit and would 
endeavour to escape from any future enforced judgment, given the fact that all cases 
before the judges involved a beneficiary who was not domiciled within the Jordanian 
jurisdiction. Thus the priority is to restrain payment to the beneficiary if there was strong 
evidence that he is a fraudster. Judge A gave an example of the evidence: “Documents 
issued by the Jordanian custom confirming that the goods are water mixed with chemical 
instead of being petrol as required by the credit”. He added “I am not going to enforce a 
payment to a fraudster”. Ironically, the participating judges confirmed that they granted 
many interlocutory injunctions restraining payment in documentary credits.    
 
43. The participating judges were asked whether they would grant an injunction to restrain 
the issuing bank to pay the credit in the case where the confirming bank has already made 
payment. The judges said that they will grant an injunction if there is strong evidence of 
fraud. In this line, the judges were asked: would granting an injunction in such a situation 
damage the reputation of the issuing banks in Jordan as trusty providers of payment? The 
judges replied that it is up to the banks to preserve their reputation. It was suggested to 
Judges A and B that it might be safer to grant an injunction aiming to restrain the bank 
from paying the credit from the account of the applicant and not to restrain payment as 
such.  They replied that an injunction only aims to restrain the bank from the payment of 
the credit, so the issuing bank might voluntarily reimburse the confirming bank to preserve 
its reputation. Judge A added “but the issuing bank [in this situation] risks the fact that it 
will not be able to recover the amount from the beneficiary as he is a fraudster”.   
 
ILLEGALITY 
44. It was discussed with the judges that fraud is an exception to the autonomy principle, and 
the requirements for such an exception are both the misrepresentation of facts and the 
knowledge of the beneficiary. In this context Judge B commented that “it is the 
fundamental structure of documentary credits that each contract is independent from one 
another”. The participating judges where asked whether illegality (i.e. committing a crime, 
acting contrary to public policy or committing an act prohibited by a civil statute) is also 
regarded as an exception to the autonomy principle. The following scenarios were briefly 
explained to the Judges:   
- The purpose of the parties in the underlying sale contract is to commit a crime (e.g. 
selling drugs). Judge A commented that such a scenario is almost impossible to prove. 
- The underlying contract is a service contract that is against public policy (e.g. where a 
movie slanders the prophet Mohammad). Judge A stated that the cases they deal with 
have never involved service contracts. He added “we need to see evidence about the goods 
where the issue of an exception to the autonomy principle is involved”. 
- The subject matter of the underlying contract is to import goods the specifications of 
which are contrary to the Jordanian Health and Safety Standards law.  
- The dealing with the beneficiary, applicant or the seller in the documentary credit 
contract, or the underlying sale contract, is prohibited by a governmental decision.  
All the participating Judges stated that illegality as an exception to the autonomy principle 
has never arisen before them and it needed to be researched by studying the available 
textbooks and articles. However, Judge A stated “as fraud is an operative exception to the 
autonomy principle, it is a fortiori that a crime or an act which is contrary to the public 
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policy is regarded as an operative exception to the autonomy”. Judge C asked the 
researcher to provide him with articles regarding fraud and illegality.    
 
CONCLUSION 
45. The sanctity of the autonomy principle can be inferred from the way the participating 
banks and traders perceive the autonomy principle. Thus the participating bankers 
emphasised that even where there is an allegation of fraud they will not infringe the 
principle of autonomy unless there is a court injunction. However, as we will see later, 
under Jordanian law a bank is not entitled to honour the credit, so it cannot enforce its 
reimbursement, if the bank is aware - prior to the due date to honour the credit - of the 
allegation of fraud which is supported by strong evidence.1011 Still the empirical findings 
indicate that banks are very concerned about their reputation as documentary credit 
providers. Thus on one occasion the Central Bank dealing in the capacity as an issuing 
bank honoured a credit by reimbursing the paying bank (which had already honoured as 
a confirming bank), even though the beneficiary was a fraudster and there was an 
injunction entitling the Central Bank to restrain the payment. Furthermore, the findings 
clarify that the participating traders perceive the autonomy principle as being absolute in 
the sense that it has no exceptions. The empirical findings confirm that the autonomy 
principle is understood comprehensively by judges in that each contract in the 
documentary credit, including the underlying contract, is considered to be independent 
from one another. It is revealed, somewhat ironically, by the empirical findings that a fair 
number of injunctions restraining payment of DC by reason of fraud have been granted by 
the Jordanian courts. Although, it is also clarified that Jordanian judges do require 
documentary evidence to grant such injunctions. The empirical findings indicate that the 
illegality exception has never arisen before courts and the judges are not aware of the 
arising discourse about the illegality exception. Interestingly, the participating judges 
indicate that there is a good possibility to recognise illegality as an exception to the 
autonomy principle.    
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